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This paper focuses on the use of different forms of power by a (leader/patron/hegemonic) state to get the other (non-leader/client) states cooperate with its policies: the use of different forms of power in obtaining cooperation from other states in exercising economic sanctions against a target state. Most of the literature on cooperation operate on the level of bargaining power where the policy changes are directly visible to or observable by the researcher. In this paper, I attempt to show how bargaining power model is not adequate in capturing the complete picture of the relationship between Turkey (a non-leader/client state) and the US (leader/patron state) in their cooperation and non-cooperation with regard to Iraq during the Gulf Crisis and the US War Against Iraq, respectively. In that regard, I attempt to show that the three levels of power (Krause 1991) is a much better and more comprehensive framework in understanding and explaining the power relationship between Turkey and the US. There are three main objectives of this study: (1) to shed more light on the cooperation process, (2) to challenge the conventional wisdom in the area of cooperation that states? cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors are best understood or explained on the bargaining level, and (3) to challenge the utility of paradigms, in this case the rational choice, in the discipline. This study attempts to show why a client state cooperates with a patron state even when this does not look as the best interest to that state, i.e., that state?s first preference is not to cooperate or that state does not have a dominant strategy to cooperate. Similarly, this study also aims at showing why a client state does not cooperate with a patron state even though cooperation seems to be the best interest to the client state. My working hypothesis is that Turkey?s cooperation (or non-cooperation) with the US with regard to the Iraq issue can not be fully understood or explained by using solely a bargaining model which focuses on directly observable (visible) results of a policy or an observable policy change that, for example, could be utilized by either empirical non-quantifiable, or empirical quantifiable data. Lisa Martin?s (1992) game theoretical model is a good framework to look at the relationship between the two states on the bargaining level. But it does not take into consideration the two other levels of power, i.e., it focuses on bargaining power, and omits structural power and hegemonic power. A comprehensive framework of different forms of power relationship between a patron state and a client state is needed to explain the cooperative/non-cooperative behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the adoption of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in December 2002 a radical overhaul of US and international preventive nuclear non-proliferation policy has occurred. This paper argues that policy measures have yielded the legalization of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Under US leadership, the UN Security Council has been endowed with the role of a legislating and adjudicating third-party mechanism sanctioning non-compliance with core norms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). An operational law-enforcement and policing mechanism to interdict suspicious trade was created and international law amended to criminalize proliferation-related trading or smuggling. On this background, the paper conceptually discusses legitimation strategies ideal-typically predominant in hegemonic versus imperial social orders and evaluates what strategies have predominated with the Bush administration during the adoption and implementation of two policy innovations addressing the supply-side of proliferation: the Proliferation Security Initiative of 2003 and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The three hegemonies of the modern world-system have been the Dutch in the seventeenth century, the British in the nineteenth century and the hegemony of the United States in the twentieth century. Sociologists and political scientists have carefully studied the process of hegemonic rise and decline. Recent research by Rennstich (2001) retools Arrighi’s (1994) formulation of the organizational evolutions that have accompanied the emergence of larger and larger hegemons over the last six centuries. Modelski and Thompson (1996) argued that the British successfully managed to enjoy two power cycles, one in the eighteenth and another in the nineteenth centuries. With this precedent in mind Rennstich considers the possibility that the US might succeed itself in the twenty-first century. Rennstich’s analysis of the organizational, cultural and political requisites of the contemporary new lead industries ? information technology and biotechnology ? imply that the United States has a large comparative advantage that will most probably lead to another round of U.S. pre-eminence in the world-system. But important resistance to genetically engineered products has arisen as consumers and environmentalists worry about the unintended consequences of introducing radically new organisms into the biosphere. This paper will examine the agricultural biotechnology industry as a new lead industry and will consider its possible future impact on the distribution of power in the world-system. This will entail an examination of the loci and timing of private and publicly funded research and development, biotechnology firms that are developing and selling products, and the emergence of national and global policies that are intended to regulate and test genetically engineered products. The recent history of environmental impacts of genetically engineered products will be reviewed, as well as the contentious literature about the supposed risks of agricultural biotechnology. Several scenarios regarding the timing of the onset of biotech profitability and their potential impact on US economic centrality will be developed, and data on both the business history and the emergence of resistance will be employed to examine the likelihood of these possible scenarios. Draft (v. 5-51-03) 4026 words Proposed for presentation at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 17-20, Montreal. An earlier version was presented at the Division of Social Science Seminar, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the transformations/distortions that the concept of the ‘rentier state’ has experienced as it has been detached from its context and reworked by the hegemonic epistemological and methodological practices of Political Science. In this paper, I argue that the hegemonic epistemological stance, and methodological practices in Political Science has evacuated this concept’s theoretical and social content by reducing it to a narrow understanding of ‘taxation without representation’. In this paper, I first explore the conceptual history of the ‘rentier state’ from its original usage - where it was the core concept employed to explain the democracy problem in the Middle East by referring to the social formations it perpetuated and the social struggles it shaped - to its contemporary metamorphosed usage by mainsteam Political Science. The form it takes in this mainstream approach is embodied in the idea of ‘taxation without representation’, which itself is utilizaed in a reduced form. After describing the historical development of this concept, I aim to explain the phenomenon. The explanation focuses on two distinct aspects of hegemony in the discipline: first, on the very specific understanding of the western epistemological tradition to which it submits; and second, the particular methodology it implements. Finally, I will demonstrate how this concept - which originated in the Middle East, was mediated by the hegemonic practices of the field, and was exported back to the Middle Eastern - has lost its explanatory capacity in its original context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thinking from the margins or the peripheries (be they geographical, epistemological, cultural, or political) of International Relations has traditionally been discouraged by disciplinary discourses that have sought to take command of what it means to be true, objective, normal, valid, just, or simply topical. This control of meaning at the center of the discipline has been done on allegedly scientifically verifiable, or empirically manifest, or theoretically relevant methodological and ontological grounds. As Michel Foucault has argued, beyond so-called scientific, normative, or intellectual reasons advanced to impose a dominant voice at the center of a discipline (any discipline), what is at stake in the control of the center?and the corollary silencing of the margins?is a disciplinary decision over what can be said or pronounced and how it can be said or pronounced. More than producing truths, disciplines and those who position themselves at their centers are interested in the production, management and perpetuation of the ?true,? that is to say, of that discursive domain where certain linguistic, rhetorical, and narrative criteria established as normatively essential by some voices in the discipline must be used and reproduced in all sorts of explanations. Moving beyond Foucault, and bringing in the supplementary figures of thinkers like Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci, one could say that ideology and hegemony are never far behind such discursive controls often found at the center of disciplines. One also would have to recognize that such hegemonic controls also require ideological exclusions. In other words, the formation of a periphery or margin on ideological bases is a necessary part of enterprises interested in imposing dominant or hegemonic languages and accompanying regimes of truth. This paper argues that the current practice and theory of IR at the center (in the geographic West?and the United States above all?but also through the supposedly pressing contemporary empirical and conceptual issues that the discipline is said to have to deal with) provides yet another obvious instance of hegemonic discursivity put to the service of ideological distancing and silencing. What I call tabloid geopolitics is a dominant discursive formation, increasingly adopted by so-called mainstream IR scholars in the West mostly, that claims to be able to make sense of?and perhaps provide solutions to?the problems faced by the world of IR in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the US war in Iraq. Adopted by scholars of all theoretical stripes (from classical realists to die-hard idealists), tabloid geopolitics is particularly aggressive in its discursive exclusion of the margins of the discipline as it urges, sometimes openly, at other times more softly, but in all cases ideologically, scholars, students, and even lay people concerned with the fate of the ?free world? in an age of global terror to only focus on a few, essential, supposedly vital issues, such as the preservation of democracy, the destruction of terrorism, and the propagation of Western style neoliberal freedoms. The hegemony over discourse (what can be said or not said after 9/11, for example) emphasized by tabloid geopolitics not only occludes marginal voices but, moreover, sometimes integrates some of those voices or alternate possibilities into that which must be abjected, attacked, or even annihilated in the context of the global war on terror. Thus, this paper argues, critical thinking/voicing in IR coming from so-called margins?whatever they may be?must be involved in practices that seek to redefine what the margins or peripheries can mean or look like (and what they can say too) so that distancing, silencing, or even destruction by the tabloid geopolitical center can be challenged... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aspires to bring everyday life and social repetition under the spotlight of political theorising, and examine their emancipatory potential. To do so it engages with two competing understandings of hegemony in radical political theory; one based on transcendence and social antagonisms and the other based on immanence and everyday life. The main thesis of the paper is that in order to understand the ontological foundations of hegemony we need to shift our focus from social antagonisms and hegemonic representations onto social repetition. The paper starts with an exposition of Laclau's radical theory of hegemony and its limitations. It then develops a counter ontological reading, an 'ontology of social repetition', based on the work of Maurice Blanchot and Gilles Deleuze. The paper concludes by examining what kinds of agency are present in social repetition, and how these can be translated in social action and strategies for social change. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nature and conditions of the internationally relating self are of paramount importance when seeking to understand how it is that we 'know' the world. My intention in this short paper is to offer some thoughts about what it might mean to move towards something like a travelling epistemology for IR scholarship. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite Marx minuting that, ‘the veiled slavery of the wage workers in Europe needed, for its pedestal, slavery pure and simple in the new world,’ there is a heavily Eurocentric perspective in much historical sociology debate on state formation and the rise of the modern capitalist states-system. This impinges on attempts to understand the origins of capitalism in terms of feudal crisis, agrarian class structures, and economic development in Europe resting on changes in social property relations. In contrast, a contribution is made in this paper to the focus on transformations in social property relations by understanding the social origins of the transition to capitalism in Mexico. There are two principal steps to the argument. First, there is a focus on processes of primitive accumulation that created the conditions of development for capitalist production and national consolidation of the internal market in Mexico. This is understood as a ‘passive revolution’ based on state intervention to guide political modernisation. Second, this account of ‘passive revolution’ in Mexico is related to the subsequent unfolding of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) and specifically its so-called ‘institutional phase’ between 1920-1940. Overall, the argument promotes an understanding of state formation and processes of primitive accumulation by tracing the class strategy, or ‘passive revolution’, of the state in Mexico, which gave capitalism there a particular form consistent with authoritarian and hegemonic influence. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last few years a spate of books has rekindled the debate as to the status of American hegemony (eg., P.Khanna, The Second World; F. Zakaria, Post-American World, etc.), and returned systemic inquiry to the earlier 1980s analyses of Robert Gilpin Wa ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]