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The creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) could be seen as an assertion and reinforcement of the hegemony of the United States over the Internet. By United States I mean not just the US Government, but also its industry, its technology and in many respects the values associated with a liberal democratic order in communications. The paper will describe and investigate the nature of his hegemonic system, making it clear that simplistic notions of US dominance imposed on an unwilling world don’t get one very far. What we see instead are several self-reinforcing cycles of the sort that made Silicon Valley the world capital of IT innovation and Hollywood the world capital for filmmaking: network effects and agglomeration economies and first-mover advantages. The hegemonic system did not follow traditional national lines. The Internet protocols were victorious in a standards war that pitted TCP/IP against protocols (OSI) that were backed not only by European governments and European telecommunications operators, but also by the US Department of Commerce and many US telephone companies. The early Internet community was international in scope; although it was centered in and mostly populated by US computer scientists, it embraced several European and Asian institutes. These non-US technologists were outside the mainstream in their own countries and both the US and the non-US technologists often showed more allegiance to their own epistemic community than to their governments. Nevertheless, when it came time to privatize and commercialize the Internet the US government did retain the ability to control the terms of the governance transition because US military and civilian contractors were operating the centralized naming and numbering spaces. More significantly, despite its initial promise that it would fully privatize ICANN, the US reneged and retained indefinitely an unusual form of unilateral contractual control over what is ostensibly an international organization. Not much later, concerns about security and terrorism post 9-11 reinforced the decision to keep a US grip on the root of the Internet, making the relationship between ICANN and the USG a delicate matter. In addition to clarifying the historical emergence of US dominance of the Internet this paper will have three parts: * First, by way of factual background, it will analyze the institutional relationships between ICANN and the US government. * Second, it will explore and describe the ways in which assertions of the identity of a distinct Internet community interact with regional/cultural and national identities in the politics of ICANN. In developing this analysis, a critique of academically romantic notions of diversity and difference will emerge. * Third, it will explore the extent to which ICANN’s creation was a direct challenge to the hegemony of traditional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), especially the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). It will pay particular attention to the efforts of the ITU to undermine ICANN’s legitimacy and assert a role for traditional IGOs in Internet governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will explore the conditions under which leadership decapitation results in the disintegration of terrorist organizations. Leadership targeting is gaining popularity as a counterterrorist policy, based in part on the assumption that leaders are crucial to the functioning of a terrorist group. Two main trends have emerged through a statistical analysis of seventy-three incidents of leadership decapitation. First, ideological organizations are more susceptible to collapse than religious or separatist organizations. Second, targeting members of the upper echelon, as opposed to the top leader, results in organizational decline most frequently. Ultimately, this paper will question the existing assumption that charismatic leadership is crucial to the functioning of terrorist organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the use of different forms of power by a (leader/patron/hegemonic) state to get the other (non-leader/client) states cooperate with its policies: the use of different forms of power in obtaining cooperation from other states in exercising economic sanctions against a target state. Most of the literature on cooperation operate on the level of bargaining power where the policy changes are directly visible to or observable by the researcher. In this paper, I attempt to show how bargaining power model is not adequate in capturing the complete picture of the relationship between Turkey (a non-leader/client state) and the US (leader/patron state) in their cooperation and non-cooperation with regard to Iraq during the Gulf Crisis and the US War Against Iraq, respectively. In that regard, I attempt to show that the three levels of power (Krause 1991) is a much better and more comprehensive framework in understanding and explaining the power relationship between Turkey and the US. There are three main objectives of this study: (1) to shed more light on the cooperation process, (2) to challenge the conventional wisdom in the area of cooperation that states? cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors are best understood or explained on the bargaining level, and (3) to challenge the utility of paradigms, in this case the rational choice, in the discipline. This study attempts to show why a client state cooperates with a patron state even when this does not look as the best interest to that state, i.e., that state?s first preference is not to cooperate or that state does not have a dominant strategy to cooperate. Similarly, this study also aims at showing why a client state does not cooperate with a patron state even though cooperation seems to be the best interest to the client state. My working hypothesis is that Turkey?s cooperation (or non-cooperation) with the US with regard to the Iraq issue can not be fully understood or explained by using solely a bargaining model which focuses on directly observable (visible) results of a policy or an observable policy change that, for example, could be utilized by either empirical non-quantifiable, or empirical quantifiable data. Lisa Martin?s (1992) game theoretical model is a good framework to look at the relationship between the two states on the bargaining level. But it does not take into consideration the two other levels of power, i.e., it focuses on bargaining power, and omits structural power and hegemonic power. A comprehensive framework of different forms of power relationship between a patron state and a client state is needed to explain the cooperative/non-cooperative behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hegemonic Governance and International Trade: Systemic and Dyadic Effects This paper examines the impact of hegemonic governance on interstate trade. The questions of whether and how this particular type of international leadership affects the international political economy have lately received scant attention in the political science and economics literatures. This is unfortunate, given the potential explanatory power of this rich theoretical perspective. This paper has three (3) objectives. First, we review the theoretical arguments and earlier empirical investigations linking hegemonic leadership to international economic stability. Although the majority of previous studies tend to find support for the hypothesis that hegemony is not a necessary condition for financial stability (measured in terms of free trade), these examinations leave many important questions unanswered, or at best, with ambiguous answers. Thus, we develop a more complete theoretical argument explaining how hegemony affects interstate trade ? at the system, sub-systemic, and dyadic levels of analysis. The theory of hegemonic governance stipulates that strong hegemony increases trade across the system and also within nation-state pairs where the hegemon?the state with the ability, the will, and the acceptance of other states to assume leadership?has a stake. Finally, we use comprehensive, multidimensional indicators (from Sacko 2003) to conduct a much?improved assessment of the effects of both the hegemonic power and hegemonic interest of the United Kingdom (1816-1945) and the United States (1946-1992) on interstate trade. We find that hegemonic governance does not statistically significantly affect aggregate, world trade. Hegemonic governance, however, is statistically significantly and positively related to both major power sub-system trade ? and to trade within dyads strategically relevant to the hegemon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will discuss some of the theoretical and explanatory insights of my research, pertaining to US soft power and the nature of world order. The definition of soft power I adopt is a socially constitutive one, and the role of soft power in international regimes and institutions: legitimating rules, generating symbolic power, structuring the social contexts of negotiation, will be discussed. This theory of soft power is developed as a critique to dominant accounts such as Nye’s, as well as conventional neorealist and neoliberal explanations of the way the US achieved and maintained hegemony. I adopt insights from theories of social power within the hierarchical systems to give a better account of the way the US has shaped its international role. This paper will focus on the theoretical rethinking of soft power and a historical focus rather than presenting a critique of the current US administration’s foreign policy. Sarah E. Graham Australian National University. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The English School and its master concept ?international society? is currently enjoying a renaissance. The paper seeks to sustain this revitalization by suggesting how a firmer grasp of the School?s potential can be achieved by situating its contribution in the context of sociological World Society Theory. This move promises to heighten its theoretical reflexivity as well as its awareness of the non-political context of modern politics. The viability of an updated English School approach is discussed in the light of an empirical challenge: the implications of the unipolar power structure that privileges the United States in the contemporary states system. It can be argued that unipolarity introduces a degree of systemic hierarchy conflicting with central English School premises, i.e. the importance of shared intersubjective norms and anarchical state equality. The paper argues that unipolarity does indeed challenge evolving international society but also that it is unlikely to obstruct the emergence of a world order based on differentiated and interactive governance frameworks. A reflexive English School approach contributes fruitfully to our understanding of this development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Rights have had a twofold role in world politics. They contributed to forging patterns of political authority in the process of state-formation (1) and to shaping state behavior in current situations of human rights implementation (2). Nonetheless, the meaning of rights remains contested. It varies between sociocultural contexts rendering calculation and maneuvering of their potential political impact in say, foreign, defense and security policy increasingly difficult. The paper discusses rights and their changed meanings based on the related shift of impact on stateness from citizenship rights towards human rights. It argues that the transformation of intangible meanings in addition to tangible rules requires careful empirical assessment of potentially contested rights. The paper seeks to develop a comparative framework to study evolving rights norms including citizenship, human rights, gender rights and minority rights as institutions that emerge through social practices [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Embedded in a larger qualitative research framework on organizational effectiveness, this paper explores the role of small treaty secretariats?conceptualised as a distinct type of intergovernmental organizations?in international politics. Although the relevance of bureaucratic actors in international negotiations and regime implementation has been acknowledged by a number of scholars, IR research still lacks theoretical distinction and empirical scrutiny in understanding just when and how intergovernmental organizations affect the behaviour of other actors?both public and private?in the international arena. Theoretically and methodologically, the paper employs organizational theories and sociological institutionalism for qualitative case study research. Empirically, the research traces variances at the outcome level of two environmental treaty secretariats, the secretariat to the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol (?Ozone Secretariat?) and the secretariat to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (?Desertification Secretariat?). While the organizational design of both secretariats is similar, their institutional histories and outcomes differ markedly. Notably, the Ozone Secretariat is part of what is considered a swiftly implemented and largely effective environmental regime, whereas the Desertification Secretariat has only recently been set-up to complement a regime that took almost two decades from its agenda setting stage to the ratification of a substantive international convention. Looking for possible explanations for different outcomes this paper focuses on the activities of both secretariats and how they relate to the authority these secretariats enjoy vis-à-vis the parties they serve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the nature of political authority in transition in Liberia's post-conflict reconstruction process; particularly, the ways in which such authority is gendered, given Africa's first elected female head of state, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Liberia's case provides a unique opportunity to examine how post-conflict societies can use the reconstruction process to reformulate and enable the nation-state and the challenges such countries face when transitioning out of violent conflict, given the current global environment. This initial post-conflict period has been instrumental to the restructuring of gender roles; women have entered the political spectrum with a gender-balanced agenda that attempts to correct gender inequalities. Evidently, gender further complicates political authority, especially in countries such as Liberia that are in democratic transition. Of particular interest to this paper is the effectiveness of a female-led government and the perception of such among the population. The paper examines the actions taken by the reconstruction government to consider the effects of gender on policy and to design policy accordingly, in an effort to eliminate gender-based inequalities. This paper is based on a qualitative research case study conducted by the author utilizing key informant interviews and focus group discussions in rural and urban Liberia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following a Weberian notion of legitimate rule, the ability to govern effectively may not only be conceived in terms of coercion or incentives, but the willingness of people to recognize actors as legitimate "authorities" in a number of ways. As many scholars have convincingly argued, non-governmental agencies and international bureaucracies play a decisive - and maybe increasing - role in international politics by being recognized as regulative, moral or epistemic authorities. An oft-claimed trend towards a denationalized "multic-centric-world" (James Rosenau) may result, although empirical evidence is incomplete at best. Building on the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Juergen Habermas, this paper argues that looking at the way actors refer to others as "authorities" during political debates enables us to answer the question to what extent a process of political denationalization is actually taking place. To illustrate the usefulness of such research on the "communicated recognition of authorities", the paper focus on complex emergencies. Given unreliable information in terms of the scale of human suffering and its local context and causes, societies abroad are in desperate need for credible information and interpretations about what it "means to them," in terms of their own capacities and duties. This is where international and non-state actors become integral parts of various political arenas, as epistemic authorities ("experts") that compensate for the lack of sufficient factual knowledge held by journalists, politicians and audiences alike. Moreover, the reputation of humanitarian agencies as the moral conscience of the "world" gives their calls for action the impetus of an authoritative definition of responsibilities. By looking at the way actors refer to international and non-state institutions, it is argued, we can research their accumulation of "symbolic power". ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If the UN strategically selects which conflicts to intervene in, then this could pose some serious problems to empirical research on UN effectiveness, in the form of both selection bias and omitted variable bias, because UN intervention may be endogenous to conflict resolution. This paper tests for such endogenous relationships by studying the factors that make UN intervention of various types, and requests of UN intervention, more or less likely. The analysis also provides insight into how authority of international organizations is established and in what conditions actors are most likely to give up short-term autonomy to strengthen the authority of a central institution like that of the UN. The results indicate that the UN is more likely to intervene when the intensity of conflict rises, that is, when the conflicts are ex ante less prone to conflict resolution. Similarly, actors are more likely to request UN intervention in violent crises, but the relationship does not appear to be monotonic. Finally, a Heckman selection model is used to demonstrate the biases that result if the endogenous relationships are not taken into account. The meaning and implications of these findings are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the relative balance of state and private policy making in Anglo-American corporate governance. I apply a new typology of regulatory authority that combines domestic and international levels. I argue that the state is resurgent despite prominent examples of private and market regulation at the international level. Based on an overview of recent events I speculate on the reason for increased state intervention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will consider alternative modes of balancing in the international system. Given the enormous lead that the United States currently enjoys in military affairs, internal military balancing is not a realistic option for any single country desiring to offset the hegemon’s power. Nevertheless, many other strategies are available to would-be challengers. A subtler strategy can be employed: the delegitimation of the adversary’s behavior. The use of a delegitimizing discourse avoids direct confrontation, while it undermines one of the sources of the adversary’s power. It does so by attracting potential allies who share certain affinities, and by facilitating defections from the target state?s camp. We investigate the use of delegitimation strategies in two widely different settings: Rome and the Holy Roman Empire, and Soviet-Egyptian relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Working mainly from historical and sociological version of new institutionalism (NI) divergent from the mainstream IR regime theory and secondarily in line with Gramsci?s idea of hegemony, this paper explores the global dominance of the "one China" order and its discontents. It is argued that the hegemonic ?one China? order in favor of Beijing?s interest, created in a specific historical condition, has been established through the extensive and intensive institutionalization of rules concerned in both fundamental level and detailed policy realms. It is demonstrated that the ?one China? institution functions as a filter that forecloses other possibilities of historical development which were relatively open in the past, that limits Taiwan’s freedom of policy action and marginalize its diplomatic space, and that legitimates the PRC’s action in interfering in Taiwan’s international relations. Meanwhile, Beijing’s interests are embedded and entrenched in the "one China" hegemonic order. Moreover, while the institution shape agents’ organization of interests in a divergent way, its persistence hinges upon continuing practices and reproduction by the PRC or countries concerned. Finally, the state of the "one China" institutionalization was argued to be more influential than its predecessor in light of the coherence of its cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative elements and their consolidation within the hands of the PRC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper provides comparative analysis, based upon field research, into the thinking of South African and Indian leaders and strategists about regional hegemony. Both countries are well-positioned to be hegemons, with GDPs many times larger than the rest of the states in their region combined. South Africa acted as an interventionist regional hegemon during the apartheid era but has been a reluctant hegemon since majority rule was established in 1994 and has often acted within a regional organization, the Southern African Development Community. Exploiting this reluctance, Zimbabwe has challenged South African regional leadership since 1994. From 1947 to 1962, India was a reluctant regional hegemon, due to the pacifist leanings of Nehru. After losing to China in the 1962 border war, India began to assert regional hegemony, especially with its 1971 invasion of East Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh. However, Indian hegemony in South Asia has been continually challenged by Pakistan in alliance with China. Through comparative analysis, conclusions are drawn about the exercise of hegemony and the resistance that is most always encountered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My recent book, A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy, develops an alternative analytical framework of intersecting reproductive, productive, and virtual economies and deploys this framing to empirically illuminate distributions of power, authority, and resources as these shape and are shaped by today’s global restructuring. My ISA paper will draw on this framing and historical-empirical evidence to pursue two questions. First, how are policies of neoliberal marketization reconstituting identities, ideologies, and practices associated with 1) the domestic labor and informalization of the reproductive economy; 2) the flexibilized and service-oriented productive economy; and 3) the increasingly consequential--though dematerialized and deterritorialized--virtual economy of financial markets and commodified knowledge. Second, how are identities, ideologies, and practices associated with global restructuring unstable and even contradictory, and what are the implications of this for resisting hegemonic power? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advocates of unipolarity and even more so those of the new American Empire, view their projects as highly feasible, or even fait accompli. Others, along classic post-WWII realist lines warn of counter-mobilization consequences and the pitfalls of hubris. The proposed paper will and profile a set of more concrete strategies available to non-hegemons, the conditions under which they will be used, and the factors conducive to their denying the hegemon it’s preferences. The objective is to determine the limits on each general proposition, and when and how those limits are set in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how a hegemon can affect its environment through the foreign policies that it chooses to adopt. In this strategic setting, challengers will take into account likely responses before deciding on which strategy to adopt. Both historical and contemporary cases of hegemony will be examined (Britain in the 19th century, the US in the 20th and 21st centuries), in particular the domestic politics of both hegemons and challengers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After being neglected and refuted for decades, industrial and innovation policies are once again strength and becoming central parts in the political agendas of developing countries governments. In Brazil, this is no different. Since 2003 Brazil has been implementing some plans and programs of industrialization and rebuilding its national innovation system (The PITCE, PDP and PACTI are the most expressive examples). In these respects, government action is strong: loans and grants; governmental procurement; construction of regulatory and institutional frameworks. However, as we perceive the policy space for these actions are substantially lower than those available decades ago. Thus, government actions to support these development policies are strongly linked to major international issues and negotiations in multilateral forums. The aim of this paper is to present exactly this complex relationship between the Brazilian strategies to encourage industrialization and technological change (indicating the most relevant objectives and actions of the Brazilian strategy) and the Brazilian options and actions in international negotiations and foreign policy in general. It starts with the assumption that they occur in a complementary way and organically interconnected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the interconnected/global arena, states are constantly confronted with challenges to its legitimacy and authority as they are now one of the many nodes in a highly contextualized and networked world. However, states still attempt to articulate themselves as legitimate entities through specific issues that are recast as tools of the security state to conceal the struggle of the state to maintain the traditional, value laden notion of the national security state while negotiating the realities of the globalized world. In the process of constructing issues as tools of statecraft, these issues are manipulated to enhance freedom, protect collective peace, and perfect prosperity. The state attempts to reveal how these issues are utilized for the sake of the state by constructing them as threats to statist authority. The state manifests these issues as issues which need to be vocalized and challenged in order to control the discourse surrounding these issues and ensure that statist concerns and perceptions triumph over contesting concerns and perceptions. Thus, the goal of this paper is to shed light on this process and propose ways in which governance may move away from traditional concepts to new entities that reflect the current interconnected world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Starting with the assumption that the European Union has increasingly tended to present its major space achievements as a substantial contribution to a larger and more ambitious project of construction and legitimisation of a political actor (CFSP/ESDP), this paper deals with EU's international actorness regarding global space governance. Different criteria (authority, autonomy and coherence) have been settled in order to measure the level of international actorness in a given sector. This original grid of analysis has been systematically tested upon the EU in order to conclude if one can deal with the EU as an actor in the space field or if one should rather consider it is having a simple "presence" in the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debate on shifts in governance and the changing authority of the state is not only relevant for environmental governance on land, but also for environmental governance of the marine environment. Seas and oceans are transboundary spaces which require international cooperation between states and cooperation between states, market and civil society. Drawing on the work of Rosenau and using the concept sphere of authority, this paper studies the shifts in governance and changing authority of the state in one particular maritime sector, i.e. offshore oil and gas production on platforms. More specifically, oil and gas platforms in the North Sea, one of the busiest seas in the world. In the North Sea, offshore oil and gas production has expanded since the early 1970s. Moreover, platforms have been governed by states through the regional Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic since the late 1970s. However during the 1990s, other spheres of authority within the industry and between the industry and national governments started to emerge. These spheres of authority have not only caused shifts in governance, but also increased sharing of authority between state and private actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transnational risks to security require collective action in frameworks of networked security governance beyond the national state. Their management, thus, is in need of transforming state and government authority to better be able to meet the risk potentials at stake. This mode of sharing and delegating central security functions is often perceived of as being at odds with the concept of sovereign states and, hence, puts a serious challenge to Westphalian notions of order still prevalent in the mindset of East Asian leaders today. This paper argues that notwithstanding national reservations and a weak security regionalism among East Asian states, a huge swath of region-specific forms of security governance did emerge in the run of the last, say, one and a half decades. Focusing on the case of maritime security governance in terms of managing risks and threats to shipping and maritime trade, it offers a framework for the analysis of power in processes of regional governance formation in the East Asian array. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the dominant view of armed actors and groups based on the private-public distinction predominant within IR provides only a one sided understanding of these entities. In order to take into account the complexities and heterogeneous nature of armed groups, the prevailing assumptions in IR with respect to both the private-public divide and its implication on the understanding of the armed actors have to be reformulated. By viewing the difference between the private and public spheres in terms of activities (that relate to the maintenance of life and a common world, respectively), the function of authority (to unify common action) becomes evident. Such an understanding of the private-public distinction infused with authority allows us to understand armed groups as civil associations that are capable of acting both privately and publically - that is, as both voluntary organization (with authority over group members), and as compulsory associations (whose rules are imposed with relative success on the community). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The modern international system, which forms the foundation of the discipline of international relations, was the contingent outcome of a transformation that took place in early modern Europe. This transformation involved a shift from medieval heteronomous organization among widely varying actors to modern anarchy among sovereign territorial states. This paper examines the profound effect that the "cartographic revolution" had on the nature of sovereign authority in the international system, and thus on the development of modern states and the state system. The argument is that the growth of mapping in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries -- along with the widespread adoption of maps and atlases as printed media among both elites and larger audiences -- had direct effects on ideas about legitimate types of authority over space. These ideas form the basis of an international system. In particular, mapping constrained the acceptable forms of authority down to one: exclusive sovereignty over territory. This was due to the fact that maps were unable to depict any other type of political control. Mapping, therefore, provided the ideational foundations for the shift from the late medieval variety of types of authority (territorial, personal, and jurisdictional) to the modern uniformity of a single conception of authority, based on territorial exclusivity represented in the political cartography of clearly delineated states. This historical study yields implications for today's globalizing international system, including the possibility that new technologies of spatial representation may re-open the prospect of non-territorial sovereignty in the future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush Administration faced serious constraints in its attempts to build a broad military coalition in the months preceding the March 2003 invasion. This paper examines the factors that contributed to U.S. authority prior to the war, which is defined here as the particular pattern of European states' consent to and dissent from U.S. requests for contributions. The central argument is that the normative component of public opinion—referred to here as domestic policy legitimacy—interacts with states' economic capabilities to determine ally states' responses to U.S. diplomatic requests, and that authority was degraded in part because U.S. policy departed from broadly accepted international norms of legitimacy—in this case, norms regulating the use of force in the international context. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a conference paper titled "Global Democratic Governance: Learning from the Forest Stewardship Council" presented to the "46th Annual ISA Convention" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It discusses the concept of democratic global governance and takes a look at the present efforts such as the Forest Stewardship Council to introduce worldwide regulatory mechanisms in the form of certification and labelling to the forest sector.

The article presents the conference paper "Towards global migration management? - a biopolitical approach," prepared for an International Studies Association meeting in Honolulu, Hawaii from March 1 to 5, 2005. It focuses on arguments for strengthening states' dialogue, cooperation and understanding of migration with the aim of strengthening global migration management. The author says that the authority to decide over who can legitimately enter a state's territory is an intrinsic part of state sovereignty.

This paper focuses on the transformations/distortions that the concept of the ‘rentier state’ has experienced as it has been detached from its context and reworked by the hegemonic epistemological and methodological practices of Political Science. In this paper, I argue that the hegemonic epistemological stance, and methodological practices in Political Science has evacuated this concept’s theoretical and social content by reducing it to a narrow understanding of ‘taxation without representation’. In this paper, I first explore the conceptual history of the ‘rentier state’ from its original usage - where it was the core concept employed to explain the democracy problem in the Middle East by referring to the social formations it perpetuated and the social struggles it shaped - to its contemporary metamorphosed usage by mainsteam Political Science. The form it takes in this mainstream approach is embodied in the idea of ‘taxation without representation’, which itself is utilizaed in a reduced form. After describing the historical development of this concept, I aim to explain the phenomenon. The explanation focuses on two distinct aspects of hegemony in the discipline: first, on the very specific understanding of the western epistemological tradition to which it submits; and second, the particular methodology it implements. Finally, I will demonstrate how this concept - which originated in the Middle East, was mediated by the hegemonic practices of the field, and was exported back to the Middle Eastern - has lost its explanatory capacity in its original context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Issues of power, hegemony and conflict are present in all regions of the world, yet there are some contexts where these dynamics are a more salient dimension to daily life. Culture and politics within India collide with the multiple layers of hegemonic relationships that exist within Indian society. Disputes over regional, religious, territorial, economic and caste issues are all arenas in which hegemony takes center stage. This paper will consider the various ways in which power and hegemony contribute to the multiple layers of conflict within Indian society on dimensions that are evident and those that are more subtle. Peace Education is considered as one manner of addressing these issues and is evaluated as a contribution that runs the risk of possibly only impacting the more privileged members of the society. This analysis, then, will consider both the role and responsibility that education has not only in teaching about issues of hegemony, but in addressing these issues more directly in the dissemination of knowledge. This paper will consider these issues as they relate to the author’s experience as a 2003 Fulbright Scholar in India working on the development of a Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution Center at the University of Madras. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to renegotiate the relationship between gender and power in order to develop a theoretical model that will contribute to feminist analyses of international politics. At the ouset, this paper articulates four instances of politicised gender. The first is the British use of gender to legitimise their imperial aspirations in Egypt. The second is British feminist empowerment as a result of the Indian Women’s project. The third is the emasculation/hypersexualisation of colonised men. And the fourth is the use of gender as an emancipatory tool for contemporary feminists. This paper asks how can we incorporate gender into the analysis of power. It concludes by suggesting that power is discursively funnelled through the dichotomous concept of gender. Therefore, power can only be understood as gendered. elmaliks@tcd.ie [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At a time when many decry the hegemony of the United States, the world’s only superpower, we overlook regional hegemonic powers and cultures. The People’s Republic of China is about to become such a regional hegemonic power, as evidenced by the modernization of PLA. This paper is an interdisciplinary comparative reflection--embracing culture, history, religion, geography as well as politics--on the responsive strategies of three societies at the margins--Tibet, Mongolia, Vietnam--in response to the hegemonic growth and behavior of China. These strategies are cultural as much as they are military, diplomatic, political or economic. The paper asserts that the three different strategies reflect the unique circumstances of the marginal societies. Ultimately, given the critical mass of China, none of the strategies may be successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to answer the old theoretical debate as to whether hegemonic systems or systems of power parity experience less violent conflict. It first employs an index of country power developed by the author for 12 major countries to determine periods of hegemony and power parity in the international system for the period 1494 to 1945. It then uses three separate compendia of violent conflicts for that period: great power wars, large wars (> 1000 military fatalities), and all interstate violent conflicts to determine which periods and thus which systems experience more or less violent conflict. The paper compares hegemonic and parity systems both with respect to each other and with respect to systems in which there is neither hegemony nor power parity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explains the hegemony of law within the human rights discourse. Discussion on the nature of human rights discourse; Conflict between international human rights law and the norms that describe market discipline; Explanation on the belief that international human rights offers a discourse of both freedom and domination.

In its recently published National Security Strategy report, the United States asserts not only its military supremacy, but also associates that military power with a new moral vision for the international system. A vision in which the United States has the authority to wage preventive war. The United States seeks what Antonio Gramsci refers to as hegemony, i.e., the weaker parties’ acceptance of domination as morally legitimate. Although the document itself uses strictly secular language, U. S. President George W. Bush frequently uses religious language to describe and justify the United States’ war on terrorism and its recent war in Iraq. Even as President Bush sought to legitimize U.S. policy with religious language, the Vatican and almost all U. S. Christian denominations were prominent critics of the United States’ war in Iraq. The Vatican has even described some of the points of the National Security Strategy as dangerous illusions, which will lead to wars without end. An examination of the debate between these religious actors critiquing international politics and an international political actor asserting moral authority provides an opportunity to examine the role of authority in international relations, the sources of authority in global politics, and the role of religion in the construction of global hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our central argument is that the way authority is granted to non-state forms of global governance must be re-conceptualized as a market-based logic rather than a territorial logic (such as Putnam’s two-level game of domestic and international bargaining). Non-state governance schemes ? which include certification and labelling schemes, as well as promotional regimes in areas such as human rights and corporate responsibility ? operate across borders, occupying an extra-territorial political space. The authority of such schemes rests primarily on legitimacy since by definition non-state governance schemes lack the traditional enforcement capacities of the state: they must ultimately be deemed acceptable or legitimate among their relevant audiences, primarily producers and consumers of products and practices being regulated. These actors are organized through markets that frequently do not correspond to national, or even regional boundaries. Governments, however, play an indirect role as the source of authority for the web of existing rules and institutions that form the backdrop of any global governance scheme. As a result, we argue that legitimacy must be achieved on two levels: first, it must be achieved through the interaction of the market players themselves; second, legitimacy requires that the basic institutional elements of the scheme ? its norms and rules ? fit with existing accepted norms and institutions of global environmental and economic governance, the location of which corresponds to the markets in question. This second level thus may refer to a state, a regional trade bloc, or wider international rules and norms, depending on the boundaries of the market in question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that theorists name without meaning, analogize similarity, quote unconsciously, and fail in translation. In order to name meaningfully, analogize difference, quote consciously, and succeed in translation theorists would do better to name the particular in the world in which they live and act. This would mean that theorists would do better to live less in their world of theory and more in the world about which they purport to theorize. This is probably an impossible request, but one that should nevertheless be made. E-mail: mccormack@asu.edu [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hegemony is not all of a piece, but involves a range of different processes and criteria that are often problematic in themselves, as is the relationship between them. The political project of putting American hegemony into practice since the mid-1930s has raised four sorts of ongoing tensions or dilemmas that are still at the forefront of questions about the Bush Administration’s new assertion of hegemony in 2003. The first is the disparity between the requirements of hegemony in different issue-areas. Charles Kindleberger put finance and trade issues at the core of hegemony, reflected somewhat differently in Stephen Krasner’s concept of the hegemon providing liberal public goods first and foremost in the international political economy. The relationship between the economic and political-military issue-areas in particular is highly problematic and success in one can come at the expense of success in the other. Secondly, there is the issue of institutionalization. The United States has vacillated between a kind of arms’-length hegemony through supporting international regimes, on the one hand, and the direct assertion of American economic and political power, on the other. Again, the two are not always compatible. Thirdly, hegemony has three faces, like Steven Lukes’s analysis of political power: coercive or relational hegemony (*pace* Robert Dahl), in which the hegemonic state as unit actor gets other state and non-state actors to do what they would ordinarily not do; structural hegemony (*pace* Susan Strange), in which non-state actors, particularly economic actors and socio-cultural actors, use their indirect market power to impose American norms and practices (with state actors as backup); and infrastructural hegemony, in which non-American actors autonomously internalize American norms and practices from below without them having to be imposed from above. Again, the criteria for success with regard to one face of hegemony often conflicts with those relevant to other faces. Finally, cutting across the first three categories, is the all-too-likely divergence between the hegemon’s own national interests and the general welfare (in the socio-economic sense) of the international system *qua* system. Such divergences create the classic conditions in which power tends to corrupt (Lord Acton). The authors argue that because of the difficulty of operationalizing it in a homogeneous fashion, hegemony, however structurally embedded and episodically effective, constitutes a form of world order which is exogenously unstable, endogenously self-destructive, and potentially vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Islamic world, the access of women to intellectual and political institutions has clearly been restricted, limiting opportunities for Muslim women to participate in political, social, moral, and educational activities that define the character of Islamic societies and cultures. As a result, Islamic knowledge systems and political ideologies have almost invariably been composed, interpreted, and applied by men. However, in the last century, the empowerment of Muslim women to fully participate, form, and share their own accounts of social reality has significantly increased. Through local advocacy of dissent and dialogue that aims to transform women’s status as well as the Muslim public sphere, Muslim women are sharing their experiences by means of different modes of communication (i.e., the Internet). Consequently, they are forming transnational support networks which, in turn, are developing into transnational activism and transnational alliances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the change in the perceptions of the world community with regard to hegemony in the U.S. Change in focus from the military dimension to the economic and technological dimension of power, namely the softer component of power; Manner in which the U.S. can capitalize on the notion of soft power; Discussion of the dramatic shift in perceptions of U.S. power as witnessed in the war in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The purpose of this paper is to determine how democratic citizens assign responsibility for a poor outcome in an international conflict when the country undergoes a leadership change during the war. I argue that a leader who inherits a conflict from her predecessor that eventually ends in a loss is less likely to be punished in the next election than a leader who was in power for the entire war. This prediction, however, should only hold if two conditions are present. First, the new leader must be from a different political party than the leader who presided over the beginning of the war. Second, the new leader must have been opposed the country’s involvement in the war from the start of the conflict. If either of these conditions is absent, the new leader will face the same heightened probability of electoral punishment as a leader who was in change of the entire war should the war end in a loss because of the “guilt by association” that stems from his earlier support of the previous leader’s decision or the shared partisan affiliation. In current scholarship that examines the motives for electoral punishment, scholars assume the same leader is responsible for both stages of the conflict: the initial choice to enter the war and the decision to withdraw the country’s forces and accept a loss. Often wars outlast leaders, however, and scholars have not yet addressed the question of how citizens make assessments of a particular leader’s responsibility if different leaders initiate and conclude the war. The results of a national experimental survey presented in this paper allow me to compare the relative power of the two different cuesâ€"earlier support for the conflict and a shared partisan affiliation with the initiating leaderâ€"to see which aspect of the new leader’s identity affects the citizen’s assessment most strongly. Existing research makes convincing cases for both cues, but it says little about which should dominate. This paper aims to provide some resolution on this debate while introducing the novel element of an intra-war leadership change. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is conventional to describe the international system as anarchic, which is understood to mean that there are no institutions of governance with authority over states. Anarchy and authority are seen as opposites, and the non-existence of international authority is taken by assumption rather than as an empirical finding. This paper treats anarchy as an empirical question to be tested and examined, rather than as an assumption. That IR scholars have not yet done so has costs: not only do we not know the answer to whether authority exists, but we also are limited in the questions we can ask about international power, hierarchy, and sovereignty. This paper begins the process of empirically assessing international authority by examining three methods by which we might test for its presence. The three focus on compliance, justification, and unavoidability as three observable qualities we might examine for evidence of the existence of international authority above states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the mechanisms of supranationalization by specifying the conditions under which it occurs in one of the world?s most supranationalized regional environments: the European Union. In opposition to conventional wisdom that exists in the fields of EU and international studies, the EU consists of multiple regimes of governance with varying degrees supranational governance at its disposal, depending upon the policy being considered. While the EU exercises control and authority over the member states? policies of industrial assistance, it fails to govern effectively and authoritatively the monetary and economic poli-cies of its member states, despite the presence of sanctions and forums for the exchange of information in the latter and none in the former. The ability of EU institutions to exercise the power of supranational governance depends less on how institutions are designed to operate, but the internal legal dynamics that occur as a result of the possibilities of litigation. Whether private (and public) actors have access to judicial institutions to settle disputes, the language of court decisions, and other elements of the legalization approach in international relations determines the degree of international institutional governance we can observe. I compare the legal regimes surrounding the EC Treaty, the Growth and Stability Pact, and state aid in the European Union in order to demonstrate how legal incentives and language shape diverse pathways towards greater governance by international institutions. The paper makes an important contribution by identifying some of the factors that lead to the unintended consequence of supranationalization in some policy areas and not in others. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In security, as in other areas, the emergence of transnational private organizations with a central role in governance poses profound challenges to established conceptions of international politics and democracy. This paper discusses one side of this challenge by looking at accountability of private security companies (PSCs). PSCs have become authorities in their own right in the security sphere. This has raised the question of their accountability and also resulted in considerable efforts to improve the accountability of the firms. This paper looks at why these efforts bear so little fruit. It begins by pointing to the tension involved in any effort to hold an authority (private or public) accountable, namely the tension between the centrality of acceptance for authority and accountability measures that necessarily involve contestation. It then proceeds to analyse this tension in the case of PSCs. The paper argues that PSCs' status as experts on risk and entrepreneurs of security mobilizes a favourable bias, making contestation less likely. The difficulty of seeing and/or admitting that PSCs are independent actors in turn makes contestation of their activities seem ill-directed and unnecessary. The point made in this paper that this, rather than sheer complexity or hidden political agendas, is key for understanding the present rather puzzling lack of (democratic) accountability of PSCs and its likely continuation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the different understandings of competent authority in the just war tradition, and advances a view that only states with domestically legitimate political regimes can satisfy the just war requirement of "competent authority." Part one of the paper sets out a puzzle about what is a "domestically legitimate political regime." The view taken by this paper on the relationship between human rights protections and state legitimacy is less minimalist than Michael Walzer?s conception or John Rawls's in (Law of Peoples), but it is more minimalist than some Kantian liberal conceptions, and it is contextualized and distinguished between these competing views by means of three short arguments. Part Two: Do states without domestic legitimacy have a right of national defense? This section began as an engagement with David Rodin's book on the subject and also with David R. Mapel's 2006 ISA paper on the subject of national self-defense. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Resolve?the willingness to incur costs to achieve an objective?and resolve signaling are critical factors in international security and contemporary American foreign policy. The conventional wisdom, as represented by the work of James Fearon, is that democracies clearly and effectively signal resolve because leaders of democratic governments know they would suffer ?audience costs? if they overstated their nation?s resolve in a crisis and their bluff was later called. The conventional wisdom further suggests that leaders will not understate resolve as doing so will make achieving their objectives less likely. In this paper I take issue with the conventional wisdom. I argue that attempts to signal resolve are heavily impacted by bureaucratic and electoral pressures that often lead to suboptimal (from an international perspective) outcomes. Leaders try to manipulate bureaucratic actors and domestic political rivals and are, at times, subject to these actors? preferences. The paper relies on secondary sources and interviews with policymakers to explore the fit between the arguments and two cases studies: the Clinton administration?s signaling during the 1999 Kosovo War and the Bush administration?s signaling during the 2003 Iraq War and subsequent counter-insurgency operations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the way in which international administrations exercising governmental power in post-conflict territories justify their political authority in the absence of democratic legitimacy. Looking at the administrations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, the paper focuses on their establishment, their mandates, and their governmental practices and identifies five different sources of authority: consent, delegation, the maintenance of peace and security, the promotion of human rights and democracy, and the provision of government. All of these sources are contested. In particular the practices of international administrations, their lack of accountability and their limited effectiveness in providing government, undermine their authority. The paper concludes by highlighting some possible avenues for enhancing the authority of international administrations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Literature on globalization and non-state actors has focused on how new forms of authority can challenge the state. Although many studies look at how various non-state actors threaten certain sectors of state authority, few studies have tried to systematically examine private authority. This paper proposes a typology for differentiating among various forms of private authority and private organizations. The goal is to provide a systematic way for classifying these actors that will lead to more methodical studies about how private authority affects state power. Drawing on literature from international relations and public policy, the typology examines two dimensions of organizations, their legal stature and outputs and proffers a more systematic way of differentiating between private actors than extant typologies. The typology is also significant because it provides IR scholars with a conceptual tool for determining which types of private actors are the most or the least threatening to the state and why as well as where, in the North or South, these types of authority are the most prevalent and menacing. Instead of using conventional classificatory schemes that distinguish among actors based on function (i.e. MNCs vs. NGOs vs. private security firms) to draw these inferences, this paper shows why using the dimensions of legal stature and outputs is a more fruitful way of examining the entire breadth of private authority and drawing parallels between organizations that may appear to be antipodal viewed through other classificatory schemes. To demonstrate the potential utility of such a typology, the paper engages in a plausibility probe that applies the typology to empirical work done on non-state actors such as NGOs, MNCs and private security firms. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rise of contemporary globalization in the 1970s, an ensemble of institutions and political authorities sought to universalize a set of neoliberal ideas and values in tandem with the ordering of economies, societies, and power. However, this system of ideas and values has proven replete with ambiguities, silences, and instabilities. The weakening of the consensual aspects of global hegemony is accompanied by the rise of military globalization. Now, complex ideologies of globalization are being reinvented to fit a changing world order. Post-9/11 and post-Washington consensus, different standpoints for reworking hegemony have emerged. The objectives of this paper are to identify these competing positions and critically evaluate the major projects advanced by centrist neoliberals, reformist neoliberals, and critical theorists-activists in the North and South. Likely scenarios for remaking the structure of global hegemony turn on both the caliber of these rival visions and social power relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper enquires to what extent new leaders in the countries of SEE are helping cooperation and integration process and how many obstacles are still left. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]