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The twentieth-century disintegration of the European colonial empires has led political scientists and historians to analyse internal colonial protest primarily in terms of its impact, firstly on the process of political reform, secondly, in terms of contested sovereignty; and thirdly, in relation to the development of organised nationalist groups. Insofar as political scientists have studied colonial violence, they have tended to pursue one of two approaches. Some use micro-histories of past colonial repression to explain patterns of collective violence in conditions of acute asymmetry between the rights and powers of rulers and ruled. Others, inspired by democratic peace theory, have tried to account for the contradiction between the greater capacity of democratic states to avoid conflict between one another and the prosecution of colonial wars by Western Europe's imperial nations. Insightful work by Susan Pederson, Eric Weitz, and Mark Mazower highlights the conjuncture of a post-1919 international system that trumpeted the rights of minorities and ethnic groups alongside the codification of treaties and other instruments of international law that legitimized state violence such as enforced partition and population transfers in new ways. This paper draws upon these themes in its focus on changing concepts of British colonial protest policing after 1914. Containing demonstrations and workplace dissent became the central preoccupation in colonial policing thereafter. The central issue for us here is to establish how far Christian Davenport's propositions about the relationship between domestic threats and state repression applied in colonial situations2; in other words, in empires in which the colonial state was both an occupying, alien power and an autonomous state actor capable of taking local decisions about political repression of indigenous political, economic, or cultural opposition to colonial rule. Colonial police forces found themselves at the sharp end of this dilemma. They were servants of colonial authority, whether governmental or commercial, that imposed external values, demands, and punishments on a subject population to whom the supposed benefits of such impositions - among them, the normative standards of western government and legal codes, a capitalist wage economy, labour discipline and European-style property rights - seemed remote at best. Addressing the collapsing divide in police approaches between civilian protestor and enemy combatant, the paper considers how the policing of colonial protest and the violence associated with it were normalized and justified as colonial collapse loomed larger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the narratives of soldiers and their families and their experiences of the War in Iraq. It aims to underscore the sources of political and social tension which transpire in these narratives, especially around the issues of volunteerism and sacrifice. How do servicemembers justify their decision to enlist in the armed forces of the United States? How do they and their relatives describe the burden they carry? What sentiments do they harbor for their fellow citizens? What are their views on the War in Iraq and the sacrifices they risk in prosecuting the conflict? Ultimately, what do the narratives say about the meaning of citizenship in the US, and how has the conflict transformed it? By exploring these questions the paper argues that the field of war narratives on the War in Iraq, and the disagreements amongst soldiers and their relatives as to the merits of the conflict mirror larger divides in American society taking shape around the unequal distribution of military sacrifice between citizens. It concludes that the mobilization process for war exposes the fault lines within the field of citizenship in America, in particular between Americans who carry the burden of the conflict and those who suffer no repercussions from it. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper proposes a theoretical framework for understanding border/boundary practices of past empires and the emerging informal Empire in contemporary world politics. Hardt and Negri locate the source and mover of contemporary imperial practices in the emergence of a new sovereign rule that brings about a specific order with no spatial and temporal boundaries, seeking to take over "social life in its entirety" and dedicated to "perpetual and universal peace", we argue that both these recently observable developments and their difference from past colonial practices can be further refined by relying on a more closely Foucauldian theoretical framework based on the nature, operation and interplay of sovereignty and governmentality. In this context governmentality and sovereignty are viewed as two different modalities of power, which are presumed to combine with each other in various ways at different sites and events of world politics. In this sense "non-war", our master metaphor, can be conceived of as a particular intersection of sovereign and governmental practices that on the one hand, stands in contrast with "war proper" but also depends on (as it remains definable only through) the traditional concept of war. Additionally, it also makes accessible to analysis some features and specificities related to the current manifestations and articulations of (imperial) power. Following a conceptual circumscription of non-war embedded in a Foucauldian theory of power, the paper proceeds by elaborating and illustrating the theoretical and empirical relevance of the undertaking through a narrative presentation of selected historical examples ranging from early colonial Spanish theorizing about Amerindians through British imperial practices in Afghanistan and India to the recent US operations in Iraq. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper recasts the debate taking place in five major American newspapers and magazines over the meaning and the extent of ‘sacrifice’ called upon the United States by the War in Iraq in a historical perspective. It argues that the underlying tensions informing the debate can best be understood as a crisis of the "American imperial society". I argue that the United States may also qualify as an ‘empire’ before we even begin to look at its ‘foreign relations’ or its global politics . This is especially true of the place occupied by three founding minorities of the Republic: Blacks, Native Americans and Hispanics. The "imperial society model" also offers an explanation as to why race has seemed to play almost no part in the present journalistic contest over military sacrifice in the War in Iraq by alluding to the political technologies set in place in response to the crisis of the Vietnam era. Rather than suggesting that past imperial dynamics no longer adequately describe tensions in American society, this paper concludes by showing how affirmative action policies on minority sacrifice in the US army point to the persistance of imperial social relations. It also sketches out how the War in Iraq has exacerbated many of the contradictions inherent in the all-volunteer army. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is a followup to another paper co-authored by me on this linked panel which reaffirms the value of apprehending globalization as global restructuring to capture the ever-changing dynamics of this process, particularly in light of discursive and analytical shifts away from economic globalization to security. But the shift to security discourses operates to invisiblize ongoing economic restructuring through which there is an acceleration of the governmentality of normalizing, disciplining, and reterritorializing racialized and sexualized gendered bodies in service to securitized globalization as well as new forms of resistance this is evoking. This paper focuses more on the the theorized shift from globalization to empire, raising questions about the potentialities of transnational feminist resistance in view of dominant conceptualizations of empire and amidst charges of it beoming a form of neoliberal governmentality. It, however, also raises questions about dominant conceptualizations of empire that evacuate "politics" and calls for bringing "politics" back into transnational feminism to resist the neoliberal governmentality of empire. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the adoption of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in December 2002 a radical overhaul of US and international preventive nuclear non-proliferation policy has occurred. This paper argues that policy measures have yielded the legalization of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Under US leadership, the UN Security Council has been endowed with the role of a legislating and adjudicating third-party mechanism sanctioning non-compliance with core norms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). An operational law-enforcement and policing mechanism to interdict suspicious trade was created and international law amended to criminalize proliferation-related trading or smuggling. On this background, the paper conceptually discusses legitimation strategies ideal-typically predominant in hegemonic versus imperial social orders and evaluates what strategies have predominated with the Bush administration during the adoption and implementation of two policy innovations addressing the supply-side of proliferation: the Proliferation Security Initiative of 2003 and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a world dominated by nation-states privatised violence is often neglected: either as a relic of a more disorganised past, or as a marginal nuisance to states themselves. The prevalence and centrality of privatised violence both past and present - as part of or against the rise of nation-states or in the form of transnational terrorism, private military companies and banditry - warns against such complacency. An increasing academic interest in 'non-state' or privatised violence in international relations has been mirrored in the world of policy as terrorists, insurgents, and private military companies have all become an integral part of contemporary international relations. This paper seeks to consider both breaks and continuities in such expressions of force, with particular reference to the diverse forms and roles of sea borne violence in the eighteenth-century Atlantic world. Engaging with historical and political-economic accounts of piracy, privateering and their contemporary counterparts, the paper aims to shed light on the relationship between these expressions of violence and the reproduction of the British empire. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will consider alternative modes of balancing in the international system. Given the enormous lead that the United States currently enjoys in military affairs, internal military balancing is not a realistic option for any single country desiring to offset the hegemon’s power. Nevertheless, many other strategies are available to would-be challengers. A subtler strategy can be employed: the delegitimation of the adversary’s behavior. The use of a delegitimizing discourse avoids direct confrontation, while it undermines one of the sources of the adversary’s power. It does so by attracting potential allies who share certain affinities, and by facilitating defections from the target state?s camp. We investigate the use of delegitimation strategies in two widely different settings: Rome and the Holy Roman Empire, and Soviet-Egyptian relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on one field where imperial logics have emerged, the politics of whaling. The anti-whaling discourses produced and reproduced in a certain ‘West’ over the last thirty years have woven a discursive order which prescribes what can and cannot be done with whales worldwide. They appear as an expression of the moral order which Hardt and Negri see as a ‘frontline force’ of imperial expansion, and where NGOs figure as ‘some of the most pacific weapons of the new world order’ (Hardt & Negri, p26). Observing the anti-whaling discourses brings to light the broader constellation of interests (economic, political, symbolic) set into motion within imperial hegemony, as well as subjects and identities produced within it. Whaling politics are revealed as one issue of international co-operation where broader dynamics of hegemony have found form. It offers a particular instance in which this new imperial order came about, and thus an insight into the workings of imperial hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unipolarity is a concept which characterizes the distribution of power capabilities among states; however, it says little about the quality of those capabilities and nothing about the nature of the actors who possess them or their strategies for converting them into power. It is commonly agreed that the United States is a preeminent actor in a unipolar system. But there is much disagreement as to what kind of preeminence the United States likely to exert in the post-Cold War World. Different writers use very different terms to capture America’s role in the world. Some authors argue that the United States as an empire and see the US role as an imperial one. Others claim that the USA is a hegemon and interpret its behavior as that of a preeminent actor in a hegemonic system. Members of the conservative Bush administration see the USA as a leading state in a democratic ‘zone of peace’. Radical opponents of the administration view the USA as a core actor in a capitalist world-economy. This paper will first clarify these different concepts in the light of US foreign-policy praxis. It will then discuss more closely the relationship between the two popular concepts of empire and hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the idea of the arms trade as a transmission belt of imperial relations. There are three main trends in the contemporary arms trade: intra-Northern production and trade; transfers from the North to the South; and small arms proliferation complemented by an international small arms control agenda. Each of these contributes to spatially differentiated but nonetheless imperial relations. Intra-Northern and North-South transfers provide the coercive backbone to the capitalist states system, albeit in different ways. And arms sales and the small arms control agenda are two sides of the same coin, in that the former contributes to the development of coercive apparatuses and the latter demilitarises Southern societies and promulgates liberal social relations, both as part of ongoing processes of state formation. These practices are key means of European engagement with the non-European world, and have long histories that contribute to the mutual constitution of both the North and South. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the impact that status (or rang) occupies in the bilateral relationship between France and the United States. The title is an allusion to André Tardieu’s 1927 book Devant nous, l’obstacle, which remains one of the classic works on a r ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the post Cold War era and accelerating after 9/11, Canada adopted a more aggresive militaristic role in order to secure a more intimate and ultimately rewarding position beside the US as a subdominant player in the expanding New World Order - a states system Wood evocatively labels the Empire of Capital. In this paper, I theorize the more aggressive militaristic role of the Canadian state within this Empire of Capital. First, I examine geopolitical and economic rationales for the war in Afghanistan. Second, I examine ideologies of race, class, and gender undergirding the militarism of the empire. Third, I examine how the Bush and R2P doctrines instituionalize and legitimize empire. Finally, I examine the mythology that Canada is a peaceful state. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Spaceships, cheesy dialogues, and Alien encounters. Phaser guns, ridiculous Scottish accents, and the phallic symbol helmet of a young Jedi knight turned to “the Dark Side”. What possible relevance could the visual media of Science Fiction and Space Fantasy have for real world political questions and guiding themes of International Relations in the 21st century? This paper addresses the question of relevance by providing a historical backdrop of the posited links between imaginative worlds of science fiction and real world geo-politics. Next, a media survey of popular “Sci-Fi” television from recent years (2004-2006) explores its intersections with themes central to this “Politics of Outer Space” panel (space militarization and privatization) and to the broader ISA “North-South Divides” conference (empire, identity, and civil society). ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is it possible to establish the conditions for legitimate and sustainable local governance through a period of benevolent autocracy? This contradiction between ends and means has plagued recent efforts to govern post-conflict territories in the Balkans, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq - just as it plagued the colonies and occupied territories that are their political forebears. Such state-building operations combine an unusual mix of idealism and realism: the idealist project that a people can be saved from themselves through education, economic incentives, and the space to develop mature political institutions; the realist basis for this project in what is ultimately military occupation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The interventionary framework for Afghanistan and Iraq originally enlisted the 'empire lite' thesis, calling for quick 'in and out' missions involving military precision, regime change and quick elections. Years later, long-term counterinsurgency strategy is back in vogue. While the latter appears to be a break with the former, this paper suggests that there is an under-examined confluence between them. The paper examines the shift towards counterinsurgency in terms of a recurrent tendency within the logic of liberalism which seeks to correct the failures of the past by hinging political independence and withdrawal on a contractual narrative of social organization that requires the 'wishing away of conquest.' ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes within its scope the broad disciplines of Development Studies and International Relations both of which, I argue are predicated upon an implicit narrative of history that takes the state form as the locus of enunciation. That is within both broad realms of study, a narrative of history as the history of the state form, history as the history of the nation state, informs and motivates the methodologies, assumptions and categories of analysis of both disciplines. However, utilizing the arguments made within the field of postcolonial studies, this paper argues that both disciplines within the broader human sciences are also predicated upon an elision or writing out of European colonial history. Thus, from this perspective, it is the writing out of colonial history that makes each discipline and their implicit narrative of history organised around the state form possible. Recent developments within politics and sociology around the incidence of globalisation and the recent flurry of academic and popular writing around the existence of a ‘new’ form of imperialism have produced a discursive tug of war over the relevance and viability of the state form under neo-liberal globalisation. This paper argues that the confused nature of these debates stems in part from the absence of colonial history and an absence of theorisation about empire as a form of politics within the discipline of politics and IR (Hardt and NEgri notwithstanding). Subsequently, I argue that in order to yoke together within the same analytical field both European colonialism and the practice and politics of development in the Twentieth Century, a new theory of history is required, one that places colonial history and the form of empire squarely in the centre of our consideration of global politics, one that explores the connections between empire and the state form, one that theorises the history of capital together with the history of the European colonial project, one that teases out the axes of continuity between the 20th Century trajectory of development and the 19th Century colonial project. Yoking development together with colonialism in the same analytic field needs to be fore grounded by a methodology of inquiry that theorises historical continuity rather than narrative rupture. [364 words] ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the eighth in a series in which the political careers of civilizations/world systems receive snapshot codings of their overall power structures at feasible intervals. The narratives are produced by collating histories with large frames of reference. The codings are done using a nominal variable, polarity, with seven available values. Previous articles in the series have examined the Indic system 550 BC--AD 1800, the Far Eastern 1025 BC--AD 1850, the Southwest Asian c. 2700--1500 BC, the Northeast African c. 2625--1500 BC. The Northeast African and Southwest Asian systems and sequences merged c. 1500 BC to form the Central system. Previous papers have coded this system from 1500 BC to 300 BC. The current paper narrates and codes the century from 300 BC to 200 BC at 10-year intervals, and examines the entire period from 1500 BC to 200 BC in various ways. The current paper narrates and codes the century from 300 BC to 200 BC at 10-year intervals, during which the system ended a long run of multipolarity, and transitioned to unipolarity (polar state: Rome). In this century, imperialism, balance of power, cold war and containment are all notably present. Various patterns are also discerned for the entire period from 1500 BC to 200 BC: multipolarity and unipolarity, prevail throughout, with a slight trend toward unipolarity; configurations tend strongly to persist from one observation to the next, with some very long "runs"; breaks in a run tend to take the form of "leaps"; and Toynbee's "Helleno-Sinic model" of a civilization that oscillates between greater and lesser degrees of centralization better fits the data than a model of progress toward increasing centralization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lately there has been increasing interest among IR scholars in Chinese thought both as an alternative to Eurocentric IR and because the PRC as an emerging power will soon have the institutional power to promote its view of the world. Rather than look for suitable Chinese parallels to 'international', 'security' or other mainstream concepts, this paper will examine the concept of 'Tianxia' to understand Chinese visions of world order. Tianxia is interesting both because it was key to the governance and self-understanding of three millennia of Chinese empire, and also because discussion of Tianxia is becoming popular again in the 21st century as a Chinese model of world order that is universally valid. Firstly, the paper will examine Zhao Tingyang's popular discussion of how the all-inclusive Tianxia system would solve the world's problems through a world institution that embraces difference according to a 'magnanimous' social grammar. Then it will examine some of the philosophical and historical problems raised by this reading of Tianxia: its relation to classical Chinese philosophy and modern social theory, particularly how it deals with 'Otherness'. And finally, it will conclude that Tianxia's most important impact will not be on the world stage, but in China's domestic politics. The paper will examine how Tianxia has been redeployed by China's intellectuals of the state and public intellectuals among the Chinese diaspora in ways that blur the conceptual boundaries between empire and globalism, hierarchy and cosmopolitanism. Yet rather than guide us towards a post-hegemonic IR, Tianxia presents a new hegemony that reproduces China's hierarchical empire in an updated form. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent United States unilateralism has revived interest in the concepts of superpower, hegemony, and empire, which unfortunately have remained ill-defined. This paper examines all three concepts, with particular attention to empire. Empires have been important polities throughout most of human history, including the era that saw the emergence and consolidation of the sovereign state and nationalism in Europe. Yet there is still very little consensus about what an "empire" actually is. Drawing illustrations from recent literature,this paper argues that the root problem is that different analysts are intentionally or inadvertently employing different definitions. We identify four approaches to the task of definition that are substantially, but not entirely, competing. An empirical approach tries to establish the "essence of empire" mainly from historical examples. Another approach treats an empire as an ideal type with numerous variations. A third constructivist approach focuses on how particular polities have been classified by viewers within and without. A fourth normative approach stresses the fact that the "empire" label is used either to laud or to condemn. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with justifications of empire and imperialism in late nineteenth century British international law. Recent literature has done much to highlight the mechanisms by which these scholars justified or condoned imperial practices, including the prevalent distinction between civilization and barbarism. This paper draws on and extends this research by focusing on the practical involvement of international lawyers, particularly Sir Travers Twiss and John Westlake, in imperial questions in Africa. By scrutinising the practical implications of their interpretations of international law we can acquire a better understanding of how a world of hierarchy was conceptualised in the late nineteenth century. Moreover, we are reminded of the political nature of international law in the face of the depoliticising nature of the notion of law. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper relates the evolving relationship between republicanism and the concept of 'empire' to the changing social contexts within which republican political theory emerges in the early modern period. It is argued that the initial antagonism between republicanism and empire was a politically constituted dilemma that related to the specific configuration of economic and political power characteristic of pre-capitalist societies. With the development of capitalism in England in the early modern period, the problem of empire becomes resolved due to the way in which the separation of economic and political power under capitalism reconstitutes the nature of empire itself. This new social context - characterized by new social, economic and political relationships specific to an emerging capitalist context - laid the foundations for the resolution of the 'republican dilemma' of empire and the ideological establishment of the first 'Republican Empire' in 18th century America. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will set out to draw some preliminary thoughts based on current debates about "globalization" and "empire". It will focus in particular on the question of what kinds of critiques and contributions feminist scholarship can bring to such debates. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries states brought into being a new type of neo-colonial regime that can be described as "sham federacy." These are territorial units that have nominally been promised some credible final decision-making powers through constitutional means, but in fact such sovereignty either does not in reality exist (as with the Atlantic Coast [Nicaragua], Chittagong Hill Tracts [Bangladesh], or Tibet [China]) or is not defensible through legal or political means (as with the Palestinian Territories [Israel] or the "Bantustans" [South Africa 1973-93]). Sham federacies are similar to more traditional colonies except they are cloaked in the guise of a partially-sovereign arrangement which does not in fact exist. After introducing the newly apparent governmental form known as "sham federacy" this paper will argue that the colonies that remain in the international system are largely bereft of the exploitation that characterized historic imperialism. Sham federacies are arguably the true successors to the imperial malgovernance of the past rather than modern day colonies, which in many cases have become relatively benign and mutually beneficial arrangements. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests the heuristics of the concept of empire for the analysis the European integration process. Comparing the EU with former empires sheds light on the EU from a different standpoint among which its core and its periphery, its territorial expansion, the diffusion of its culture and values inside and outside its borders. If the EU cannot be considered an empire, the use of this concept shows how the Europolity deals with aspects that have cost the life of empires, sometimes heading in the same direction, sometimes elaborating original paths. The necessity to operationalize the concept of empire leads to a critical reflection on its definition. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The globalization of media and communications has accelerated the pace and depth of media concentration through mergers and acquisitions of media enterprises. Truly global media - not in the sense of a media technology, but in the form of globally operating commercial media enterprises - have emerged only to underscore the 'pole position’ of US- and Western-based media conglomerates in global communication. More often than not, this pole position is seen as a building bloc of global political hegemony. I.e., to proponents of this view it seems fair to rather intuitively draw a causal connection between the ascendancy of US media and the hegemonic position of the United States within the current world system.This argument rests on an ostensibly plausible hypothesis - that it is necessary for hegemonic governance (political steering based upon some basic consensus towards the existing power configuration) to be constantly (re-)produced also and, above all, in the cultural/media realm. On the other hand, we argue that to assume such a simple correlation between the global political role of the United States and the formative influence of US-based media corporations as both mandatory and automatic does not allow for a sufficient understanding of this complex relationship.Thus, although forms of hegemonic governance and the levelling of ‘soft power’ may to some degree indeed rest upon media (and other) cultural strategies, we identify at least three current trends concerning the operation of US-led global media that counter the assumption of a simple ‘media-political-complex’: first, alleged Americanization in the media realm does not at all work as a ‘Americanizing’ force in the sense of public diplomacy on behalf of US world policy; secondly, media enterprises tend to employ localization strategies in order to gain profits, which in turn may even endanger forms of hegemonic consensus based on cultural homogeneity; thirdly, we observe a deep rift within the transatlantic realm regarding the political role of media, e.g. with regard to the Iraq war, the 'war on terror', the Bush administration’s (foreign) policies and its 'grand strategy' of military pre-emption and disregard of more genuine forms of (institutionalized) multilateralism.In any case, we conclude that the relationship between hegemonic governance and cultural/media/communication issues is far more complex and, at times, ambivalent than often assumed. This fact is highlighted through the so-called 'transatlantic media divide', a divide that seems to have (further) weakened hegemony in the ‘core’, as much as it has been a consequence of transatlantic political divisions in itself. Consequently, we argue that it is plainly wrong to assert an automatism of hegemony/consensus through the near-monopolization of communication means. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amongst Americans, it has often been argued that, because it does not formally extend its territory, the US does not exhibit the same injustices and dysfunctionality as the old (notably European colonial) empires. William Appleman Williams' critique of America's imperialism as 'a way of life' is a highly influential counterclaim. According to him, imperialism is a posture with regard to others, and that posture is built into the American political order regardless of sovereign territorial expansion in the eyes of the international order of states. On this account, America's 'imperialism' pre-dates the appearance of the US on the international global stage in the 20th century. It is, however, the New World expression of conceptions of power, good order and the legitimacy of institutionalized force originating in thoroughly European values, notably those of the Enlightenment. 'J'accuse, je m'accuse.', one might then respond to Europeans inclined to tut-tut at US actions in the world. European and American ways of thinking have been equally 'imperialist' in a pejorative sense, even though it is the USA that, since the middle of the 20th century, has put such thinking into practice. Williams' prima facie appealing argument against American imperialism raises two kinds of issues for Europeans: *As regards the analysis of empires, it suggests that the difference between the 20th-century occurrence of imperialism centred on the Western side of the Atlantic and its disappearance on the European side should be explained by the circumstances that obtained in the two locations. For their power practices have been fundamentally the same. Empires have arisen where Western-type centres of rule have met weak opposition from those over whom they were in a position to extend their power.*As regards avoiding the potential evils of imperialism, Williams' argument suggests that we must pay closer attention to the make-up and the manner of power, rather than its formal territorial extent. That implication should give gung-ho Europeans pause for thought. If imperialism lies deep within the Western soul, then Europe should beware that its own does not sneak back into effect - for example, in the form of the EU's purportedly benign suzerainty over the western end of the Eurasian continent.I conclude that, if they are to put themselves forward as critics of the US Empire, Europeans must operate with a highly tuned sense of their own identity and its relation to that of America and American imperialism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commentators have recently referred to the U.S. overseas network of military installations as an empire, yet very few have examined the theoretical and practical significance of such an analogy. This article explores the analytical similarities and differences that the U.S. basing network exhibits compared to that of an archetypical imperial system. Like imperial systems, the U.S. relies on an array of heterogeneous, segmented contracts and bargains to underpin its basing arrangements. Unlike typical empires, however, the United States cannot actually control the foreign policy decisions of its peripheral elites. As historical examples suggest, this has rendered the United States vulnerable to political cross-pressures, intermediary exits and periodic bargaining failures when dealing with overseas base hosts. Moreover, globalizing processes, especially increasing information flows and the transnational networking of anti-base movements, further erode U.S. capacity to maintain multivocal legitimation strategies and keep the terms of its individual basing bargains isolated from one another. A case study of the rapid contestation of the terms of the U.S. basing presence in post-Soviet Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan illustrates some of these dynamics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My presentation explores the securitization of women, which transforms their daily needs into security issues, in terms of global biopolitics/necropolitics. Canada is currently deploying a Provincial Reconstruction Team to Kandahar (KPRT) in Afghanistan using a '3D approach,' which integrates three dimensions, diplomacy, defence and development, into a single strategic framework. KPRT is instigating 'quick-impact' development projects in order to improve the lives of the local population, women and children in particular. However, these projects are designed to meet the military needs of the war on terror rather than the needs of the local population. It can be considered that KPRT is a governmental technique which transforms the female body into a particular form of subject, incomplete bare life, who is allowed to live, but simultaneously is able to be killed by both armed groups and international forces. My conclusion is that Afghan women, who were 'liberated' from the misogynistic regime of the Taliban, are again detained and their depoliticized, subordinated and precarious bodies put under the global control of the masculine sovereign of Empire. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do hegemonic states create followers and supporters? I argue that Washington can use trade agreements to deliberately promote shifts in the societal distribution of power in a target country. I term this process the second face of security since it entails a less direct and more nuanced method of creating security. Specifically, trade agreements can strengthen the political and economic power of outward oriented internationalists in foreign states (while inward oriented nationalists will be weakened economically and politically). These domestic winners will then apply pressure on the government to support their preferred grand strategy. The long-term consequence can be the alteration in the foreign state's economic and political institutions. Thus, by strengthening the transnational links to moderate members, Washington can temper another's national and international policies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]