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To this end we present four papers on the relationship between the origins of internal conflict and its mitigation. Marc Howard Ross sees cultural relations between groups as affecting both the political ambitions of competing groups and the content of effective conflict mitigating arrangements. Daniel Metz proposes a theoretical distinction between two different types of civil war, separatist rebellions and those aiming to capture the state, and argues that each requires very different institutional arrangements to mitigate conflict. Cory Welt explains why territorial autonomy often fails as a compromise solution in separatist fights and suggests that attention be paid to alternative models of state building that better reconcile opposing goals of self rule and territorial integrity. Finally, Jacques Bertrand examines the negotiation and institutionalization of relations between ethnic groups, and the constraining effect these have on future autonomy solutions to conflict. One common feature of long term ethnic conflicts are bitter disputes over cultural questions such as parades in Northern Ireland, the holy sites in Jerusalem, language and cultural autonomy in Catalonia and Quebec, and the confederate flag in the southern US. These issues serve as flash points for conflict but also opportunities for conflict mitigation. This paper will compare cultural disputes in ten ethnic conflicts in two ways. First, it explores how examining cultural flash points helps us better understand the interests and identities at stake in the conflicts. Second, it analyzes the differences in the role of cultural mechanisms of conflict mitigation in those cases where there was some measure of successful conflict mitigation and those where this did not occur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two prominent studies ? one by Kaufmann and the other by Mason and Fett ? have reached contradictory findings as to whether ethnic civil war can be settled by negotiated, power-sharing agreement or only by ethnic partition. This paper first summarizes the methodology, findings, and conclusions of the two previous studies, drawing attention to their possible shortcomings and speculating about possible reasons for their discrepant conclusions. Second, it examines the degree to which the discrepant conclusions result from divergent operational definitions of two terms ? that of "civil war," which leads to different databases, and that of "negotiated agreement," which leads to different categorization of outcomes. It explores this question, in part, by applying each study?s methodology to the other?s database. Third, a hypothesis is proposed to reconcile the two studies’ findings, and preliminary tests of this hypothesis are conducted. Fourth, this paper explores in greater depth those cases of ethnic civil war resolved by negotiated agreement to determine if they are reconcilable with Kaufmann?s theory. Fifth, it summarizes these findings and proposes an improved research design to help resolve the differences. The paper concludes by discussing the theoretical implications of this and other recently published research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many instances of separatist conflict are internationalized as religious and ethnic groups become transnational actors and take their political grievances ‘on the road’. The paper traces these movements by introducing a dyadic model that examines transnational relationships. Relying on research from the social movements’ literature, the paper presents a theory that explains the deliberate diffusion of conflict to another state. These conceptual tools are used to explore the deliberate exportation of fundamentalist Islam into the Caucuses by the Saudi Arabian-based Wahhabi group. Islam provided the foundation for Chechen separatism throughout the 1990s. While the political voices within Chechnya remain full of staunch Islamic rhetoric, factional tensions between the Wahhabi fundamentalists and mainstream Sufi Muslims are emerging. The Wahhabi agenda goes beyond that of mainstream Chechens as they seek a unified Islamic state. The conflict is not isolated; the Wahhabi presence in Chechnya has contributed to the construction of Chechen identity and the factionalization and radicalization of the separatist movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has identified ethnic violence as a central aspect of ethnic wars. Scholars, how¬ever, have omitted to explain what exactly is meant by the term 'ethnic violence' and how ethnic¬ity affects violence against civilians in ethnic wars. This study addresses this gap in research by analysing the determinants of the violent behaviour of government and rebels in ethnic wars. In detail, the paper assumes that civilian victimisation depends on the actors' capabilities to exert political and territorial control. These capabilities, in turn, are affected by the size of ethnic groups, ethnic fractionalisation and ethnic polarisation. The quantitative analysis provides evi¬dence for this assertions but also shows that the size of ethnic groups, ethnic fractionalisation and ethnic polarisation affect the actors' capabilities in different ways. In addition, it seems that the purpose of civilian victimisation differs with regard to the type of conflict. The paper applies logistic regression models in analysing data on one-sided violence and civil wars provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Programme and the Political Instability Task Force (PITF). The size of ethnic groups, ethnic fractionalisation and ethnic polarisation are captured by data of the Minori¬ties At Risk project, James D. Fearon's fractionalisation index and Marta Reynal-Querol's polarisation index. The analysis also controls for foreign intervention, regime type, mountainous terrain, total population, conflict intensity and conflict type. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the case of Hungary's relationship to its large ethnic diaspora in neighboring countries as a starting point, this paper outlines a comparative model for understanding why and under what conditions states become "ethnic activists". Ethnic activism describes a growing trend in which states undergoing political and economic deregulation seek to create, maintain, and control transnational ties with diaspora populations. This paper argues that ethnic activism serves a specific political and strategic purpose. Diasporas represent a set of unique cultural, material, and geo-political resources for homeland state elites. By supporting activist policies, elites can appropriate these resources to bolster their domestic political legitimacy, organizational capacity, and ideological positioning. The "diaspora as resource" model offers a useful framework for explaining the motives for and modes of intensified engagement with diasporas. Within this framework, homeland state elites come to understand and promote the diaspora population as a source of strength, rather than a symbol of weakness for the homeland state and for their own political agendas. Once diaspora resources have been identified and merged into political discourse and policy debates, potential threats to their access are met by an increase in activism by the homeland state. Changes in external conditions â€" such as realignments of power in interstate relations, international norms, and shifting economic and geo-political alliances â€" shape opportunities for states to establish and control their relationship with diaspora communities. The empirical examples to support this framework come primarily from research on state-diaspora relations in post-communist Europe, but comparative examples are used to illuminate cases of ethnic activism in other regions as well. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates whether the right of return has become an accepted principle of international law, and whether the world's states abide by the international legal principles associated with this right. The "right of return" as a putative principle of international law stipulates that members of national, ethnic or other groups have a right to migrate to and / or be naturalized in the country that they / the state considers to be that group's homeland or place of origin. The legal and practical significance of this rule in international law is profound, given its implications on the lives of many individuals and diaspora communities who are living in uncertainty. The paper will examine the limitations of a positivist approach in determining the status of this particular rule of international law, by looking at various key cases on the right to return, including the Palestinian case and practices by significant countries. One of the key conclusions is that a positivist assessment of the putative rule has to be tempered by the stark examples of violations and questionable state practices that have occurred vis-a-vis those seeking the right to return. The paper will also consider how other approaches and scholarly disciplines might be more relevant to the study or provide directions for future research. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European debates about regional power often are trapped in Weberian paradigms; questions revolve around which levels of hierarchical, territorially-based institutions have what powers. The rise of supranational European institutions has coincided with recognition that empowering regional institutions is inadequate for addressing certain kinds of problems. Long acknowledged regarding environmental issues, it is increasing accepted regarding national and ethnic minorities in heterogeneous areas; for example, Hungary, Norway, and Belgium recently have created forms of non-territorial minority governance. That ethnic and national groups cross state as well as regional borders at a time when the meaning of political boundaries is changing raises even more complexity. This paper will examine three sets of issues facing non-territorial governance for ethnic and national groups. First is function as some interests and demands require territorial forms and some do not. Second is governance as non-territorial forms problematize hierarchy and encourage informal governance. There will be particular focus on how these bodies operate at the local level, including their relationships with individuals and local territorial bodies and their interactions with state and supranational institutions. The final issue is representation, considering how leaders of these bodies would be selected and how non-territorial forms may require alternate ways of conceptualizing group membership and meanings of representativeness. This paper will draw on a wide variety of European cases of non-territorial governance, both those dealing with ethnic and national groups and those dealing with other issues, in order to sketch out the practical and philosophical problems and prospects for these forms. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In what way can international organizations influence the development of domestic ethnic protest movements? Since the beginning of the 1990s there has been a growing movement of Romani activists who have sought to redress the problems that face the largely impoverished and marginalized Romani populations in Central Europe. They have found support from a large number of internationally active non-governmental organizations. Gradually, the situation of the Roma also attracted the attention of international governmental organizations, in particular the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU). This paper seeks to find out how this new transnational space for discourse and action affected the development of the Romani movement in the countries of Central Europe. By locating empirical findings from research in Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary within a theoretical framework that combines insights from social movement analysis and international relations, the paper not only seeks to make a contribution to understanding of the case of the Romani movement, but also adds to ongoing debates on political action and ethnic identity formation, showing how ethnic minority movements are ultimately conditioned by the interplay of strategies of mobilization, with wider domestic and international policies towards minorities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent large-N studies of civil war conclude that inequality does not increase the risk of internal armed conflict. This paper argues that such conclusions may be premature because existing studies, which usually measure inequality as income inequality between individuals, neglect the group aspect of inequality and social organization. Case studies suggest that what matters for conflict is so-called 'horizontal inequalities' -- systematic inequalities that coincide with ethnic cleavages -- and that in addition to economics one should also consider other dimensions of inequality. The main objective of this paper is to explore whether horizontal inequalities affect the probability of civil conflict when tested quantitatively across several cases. Using data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for 33 developing countries, I construct aggregated macro-indicators on inequality between the two largest ethnic groups in each country, along three dimensions: social, economic and health-related. The main finding is that social horizontal inequalities seem to be positively related to outbreak of civil conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1999, Germany’s reformed citizenship laws permitted the naturalization of some 350,000 ethnic Turkish/Kurdish long-term immigrants in the country. As new German voters, this group now represents about 1 percent of the electorate. But by 2006, the next time German voters will elect a national government, Germany’s political parties expect this voting bloc to double, which will significantly influence the outcome of national elections. This author proposes that despite a 70 percent rate of support among the ethnic Turkish/Kurdish Germans in favor of the Social Democrats and the Green Party, it will be the Free Democrats who will garner a significant percentage of the Turkish/Kurdish vote by 2006. The author intends to evaluate the transformative political impact of the ethnic Turkish/Kurdish vote on Germany’s political landscape. A primary focus in this paper will be on changes in public discourse regarding issues such as business development, immigration, and multiculturalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hedley Bull posited that neomedievalism, a world of unclear and overlapping sovereignty, was one possible future for the international system. While scholars have since examined the growing power of international organizations and transnational actors as borders seem to weaken, less attention has been paid to the possible institutionalization of nations across international borders. In 2001 the Hungarian government passed a law (known as the Hungarian Status Law) to formalize ties to ethnic Hungarians in neighboring states, granting them rights in Hungary and direct benefits from the Hungarian government. Under severe pressure from a variety of European institutions to end this assertion of sovereignty over citizens of other states, Hungary radically altered the law in 2003. This paper will analyze the neomedieval intent of the law, the efforts by European institutions to clarify the norms of what international actors can become involved in minority questions and in what circumstances, and the remaining potential for the Hungarian Status Law to serve as a model for other nations divided by international boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to study the moderation effects of national identity building on interrelations between conflict indicators and readiness for conflict or compromise for two ethnic minorities in Crimea. Research showed that national identity moderates effect of ethnic identity, ethnocentrism, economic deprivation, and majority/minority position on individual and group conflict behavior and such effects differ between two ethnic groups, namely Russians and Crimean Tatars. For both groups the strongest moderation effect was found for ethnocentrism and ethnic identity. For example, satisfaction with fulfillment of national identity functions increases impact of ethnic identity, economic deprivation and ethnocentrism on personal and group conflict behavior of Russians, and impact of majority position on personal conflict behavior of Russians. The strongest effect was found for influence of economic deprivation. For Crimean Tatars satisfaction with fulfillment of national identity functions weakens influence of ethnocentrism, economic deprivation and minority position on personal and group conflict behavior, and impact of ethnic identity on group conflict behavior. The strongest effect was found for influence of minority position. It was expected that national identity would reduce negative impact of conflict indicators. This hypothesis was confirmed for group of Crimean Tatars except moderation effect of salient national identity on impact of perceived majority position and ethnocentrism ( for people with low level of ethnocentrism) on personal and group willingness to fights. However, hypothesis failed for most effects on personal and group conflict behavior of Russians, for whom national identity shapes their willingness to fight. It can be explain by social position and political goals of two groups. For Russians national identity can reduce willingness to fight only if they don’t have ethnocentric view and ready to adopt Ukrainian identity as a leading one; for Crimean Tatars national identity can lead to tolerant behavior only if they perceived Ukraine can provide all right for their ethnic group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do multi-ethnic states treat various ethnic groups differently? Why do these ethnic groups have diverging responses to these state policies? We argue that interstate relations and ethnic group perceptions about the relative strength of competing states account for the variation in state-ethnic group relations. In particular, whether an ethnic group has an external patron matters a great deal for the host state's treatment of the group. If the external patron of the ethnic group is an enemy of the host state, then repression is likely. Given the existence of an external patron, an ethnic group's response to a state's policies depends on the group's perceptions about the relative strength of the external patron vis-à-vis the host state. If the ethnic group perceives the external patron as a strong state, then mobilization and demand for more autonomy or even secession become likely. We illustrate our theoretical framework on eighteen largest ethnic groups in China, from 1949 to 1965. In this paper, we study the Chinese government's policies toward these groups and examine how these groups responded to these nationbuilding policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The preservation of cultural/historic resources in international border areas can have far reaching consequences beyond the mere preservation of historic sites. They have the potential to act as �olive branches� between countries which have experienced long term conflicts and negative cultural memories. In the case of the Kars Province, in the northeastern portion of Turkey, this area was occupied by various ethnic groups and Empires (Armenian, Russian, Byzantine, Ottoman etc.) who were present before the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. Tensions in this area are still persisting as the border between Turkey and Armenia, including the Kars border-crossing, has been closed by Turkey in protest to the occupation by Armenia of Nagorno-Karabakh which was previously under the sovereignty of Azerbaijan. These monuments when they exist along national borders particularly carry very strong possibilities to be vehicles of reconciliation that will lead to long term improved economic, social and political conditions between countries which have experienced negative cultural memories. This paper will investigate the efforts of historic preservation in the Kars Province in Turkey by local governments and Non Profit Organizations and its potential as an informal diplomatic or paradiplomatic vehicle between Turkey, Armenia and Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper compares between two ethnic communities (ethnies), French-Canadians and Afrikaners, addressing two puzzles: first, the emergence of their modern ethnic identities; second, the erosion of the French-Canadian ethnie and its persistence among Afrikaners. I argue that modern ethnies emerge out of ontological insecurity, deep uncertainty regarding collective identity, and sustain themselves if they effectively reduce it. Both French-Canadians and Afrikaners are immigrant-and-settler communities, originating in Europe and reaching newfound continents as part of the colonialist thrust of the 16th and 17th centuries. Both felt abandoned by their mother countries and, facing an indigenous population as well as British newcomers, opted to form and forge a distinct ethnie. The divergent upshots of the two communities' ethnic project are the result of four factors: uniqueness of language and religion, political-military success, and normative pride in distant-past. The Afrikaners have developed a unique language (Afrikaans), adhered to a relatively distinct religious group (Dutch Reformed Church) and commemorated triumphant landmark events (e.g. "Battle of Blood River"). None of these is true of the French-Canadians. Furthermore, the latter, unlike the Afrikaners, have normatively discredited the founding and defining moment of their ethnie's emergence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While some believe (like Aristotle) that people fight against economic injustice, others suggest that the collective action problems overwhelm such 'motives' for rebellion. Indeed, the empirical evidence for income inequality as a determinant of civil war is quite weak, but there is preliminary evidence to suggest that it is horizontal (inequality between ethnic and regional groups), not vertical inequality (inequality between individuals) that matters. This debate has been unfortunately mute among those who study the determinants of repression (one-sided violence). This paper examines the inequality-repression nexus, analyzing the best GINI data currently available. We also test the possibility that inequalities that coincide with ethnic cleavages may enhance both grievances and group cohesion. If ethnic groups are relatively disadvantaged, they may not have the resources to fight injustice simply because they are too weak (no civil war in Mauritania or Tibet), but there may still be large grievances due to horizontal inequalities that are actively and passively resisted (lots of repression in Mauritania and Tibet). We test the validity of this assertion by analyzing new cross-national measures of horizontal inequalities based on two different sources: aggregate data on group differentials from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project as well as household survey data on ethnicity and socioeconomic welfare from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). Our analyses indicate that both vertical and horizontal inequalities seem to have a positive impact on state repression. Contrary to arguments based on grievance, however, it seems that the opportunity for mobilization under conditions of democracy increases the chance of repression. Policymakers interested in promoting human rights should focus efforts on correcting inequalities, especially when they overlap with ethnic cleavages in society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine the impact of non-dominant ethnic minorities on foreign policy, specifically whether such minorities have the ability to advocate on behalf of their ethnic kin in neighboring states. I will argue that there are groups which, while not in control of the state, constitute “critical minorities,” because they serve a political purpose for the state, either at the domestic or international level. Although the impact of ethnic majorities in neighboring states has been thoroughly addressed in the literature, as has irredentist conflict, the relevance of critical minorities has not. To effectively isolate the issue of minority influence, I ask two separate questions: When will a non-dominant minority advocate intervention on behalf of suffering kin, and when will the state prove responsive? Challenging the contention that ethnic minorities will advocate on behalf of their suffering kin out of sympathy, I argue instead that ethnic minorities will use their influence to advocate for intervention on behalf of kin in neighboring states if it is in their interest to do so, at either the domestic or international level. Regarding the second question, I will argue that the state may heed the minority’s advocacy on behalf of its kin if the ethnic group is politically salient, particularly in the international context, for reasons either material or ideational. As evidence, I will examine the impact of the Druze (a religious minority with communities in Lebanon, Syria, and Israel) on foreign policy in the context of conflict between these three states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines postcolonial reason’s subjectification of the unassimilable, indigenous national other through analysis of two policy projects in the contemporary Philippines â€" official recognition of practitioners of “national culture,” and elaboration of rights for now officially recognized “indigenous peoples.” Postcolonial cultural governance appropriates indigeneity in the nationalization of culture, thus supplementing militarized economic development to put under erasure ongoing and violently contested indigenous land claims. An illustration of such cultural governance is the National Living Treasure Award (Gawad sa Manlilikha ng Bayan), given annually to “folk and traditional artists [who] reflect the diverse cultural traditions that transcend their beginnings to become part of [the] national character, and provide Filipinos with a vision of themselves and their nation” (National Commission on Culture and the Arts). This essay maps the anxious relation of the National Living Treasure to its complement, the National Living Artist, who receives “the highest national recognition given for significant contributions to the development of Philippine arts; namely, Music, Dance, Theater, Visual Arts, Literature, Film, Broadcast Arts, and Architecture.” The uneasy but necessary disjunction of “national artist” and “national living treasure” performs the schizoid desire for recognized entry into modern liberal statehood, and for a “living” precolonial whose practices authenticate decolonization. This shiny pluralist fantasy is also the animating impulse of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). Colonial and postcolony statecraft â€" appropriation of indigenous ancestral domain via mass migration and settlement, establishment of separate governance, forced relocation of IPs for nation-building projects â€" have historically demonstrated IPs’ subsumption through exclusion by law. The IPRA, by contrast, officially recognizes indigenous peoples and elaborates their political rights, ostensibly to reverse such historic relations of violence. I argue, however, that the IPRA continues the peripheralization of IPs by subordinating indigenous law regarding land and citizenship to that of the state. I ask, how does the legal designation “indigenous” produce â€" or fail to produce â€" a particular type of liberal rights-bearing subject? What is at stake for the postcolonial state, the Philippine citizen-subject, and self-ascribed indigenous peoples in the determination of legal criteria for nativeness? The essay concludes with reflection on Cordillera indigenous women’s assertions of the legitimacy of indigenous land tenure, in opposing land appropriation by the Philippine state in collusion with foreign development capital. Such assertions, which involve a traditional bodily comportment and the rejection of colonial attire, can be read as a resistant politics of corporeality and a critique of postcolonial reason. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to evaluate and assess the impact of contemporary developments in counter terrorism policy in the UK and the USA upon communities and citizens. The first aim will be to assess what these groups (particularly different ethnic groups) and individuals understand by security; and secondly to go on and gauge whether they feel that such security has been enhanced or reduced (and in what ways) by current anti terrorism policies. This will contribute to the current, important, debate about counter terrorism measures and their impact upon citizenship, civil liberties and security. A key, and hitherto underexplored issue, is whether there are significant differences in attitudes to these measures, from different ethnic groups. This leads to a consideration of the wider impact of any such changes on the polity, including security, citizenship, community cohesion and social trust. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The hardening of internal borders and the new delimitation of territory that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a migration of tens of millions of people. The majority of this movement involved members of titular ethnic groups returning to their eponymous republics, such as Estonians returning to Estonia. This paper examines the Russian speaking diaspora's divergent levels of repatriation from the fourteen Soviet successor states where it formed a significant minority between 1991 and 2000. We believe that a theoretical framework of relative deprivation explains the divergent levels of migration in what may be thought of as a longitudinal natural experiment. Using data from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project, and Russian immigration statistics, a variety of economic, socio-cultural and political explanations for migration in the region are tested in a longitudinal regression model. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In many respects deterrence and extended deterrence in ethnic conflicts seem very unlikely to succeed. There is a fundamental difficulty in deterring low-level violence since effectively delivering the threat to the opponent is hard; most of the time, the actors on the opposing side are not fully aware of what the consequences will be should deterrence fail. This problem stems not only from the multiple actors and interested parties that may be involved in such a conflict â€" a situation that complicates the ability to make a credible threat â€" but also from the fact that part of the violence in such conflicts is a result of spontaneous acts of local mobs and independent actions of extreme factions. There are, however, cases in which an ethnic group did not cross what could be defined as one of the red lines of an opposing group. One such case occurred in 1992 and then again in 1993, in Nakhichevan, a landlocked exclave of Azerbaijan bordering with Armenian territory. Although there was some violence between the sides, the Armenians did not act to conquer Nakhichevan. While this conflict can also be presented as a conflict between the states of Armenia and Azerbaijan, it was directly linked to the ethnic struggle in Nagorno-Karabakh, and neither the Azerbaijani nor the Armenian government had complete control over events in Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh.Our claim in the paper will be that it is exactly this blurriness between the state and the ethnic group as actors in the conflict, and the great dependence of a warring ethnic group on outside assistance from a state, that could be taken as an advantage in conducting a successful practice of (extended) deterrence, as was exercised by Turkey with regard to Nakhichevan. In addition we claim that it is important to address identity-linked issues when discussing the Turkish deterrence since the Turkish threats embodied also references to a possible partial repetition of what the Turks inflicted on the Armenians in World War I. By highlighting these two factors that strengthened the Turkish deterrence, i.e. threatening the state actor linked to the ethnic conflict, and raising identity-related fears in the threats themselves, we show the advantages of using a broader deterrence theory for understanding developments in ethnic conflicts. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethnic interest groups are politically active groups referring to a collective identity of which being part of the same diaspora group is a significant aspect. The central question in the field of ethnic interest group research is: Under which conditions do these groups succeed in translating their interests into foreign policy? Extensive research has been conducted to seek answers to this question, yet two important aspects have not been paid attention to so far: the role of ideas and the indissoluble links between different (meta) theories. With the proposed paper I seek to put these aspects into focus and explain their role in answering the central question as to the conditions of influence:1)Ethnic interest groups directly link three different political spheres: the one of their home country, the one of their host country and the international system. Liberal IR theory allows us to focus on the connection between these different levels of foreign-policy making. 2)In order to succeed in their lobbying, ethnic interest groups must reach a certain “power threshold”. According to pluralist theory of interest group influence, policy-making is viewed as a struggle for power in which elements such as the structure and strategies of the group determine its “power”.3)Yet, reaching the power threshold is but a precondition for success. Taking social constructivism into consideration, the role of ideational factors is essential. Therefore, the ability to construct own interests in accordance with the predominant national foreign policy paradigm is decisive in generating political clout. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractTrans-state ethnic and religious identity groups enable the emergence of hybrid terrorist and criminal networks that pose grave security threats. Identity-based networks provide the basis for militant organizations that use violent strategies for political objectives. To gain funds and weapons, trans-state terrorist organizations may establish criminal enterprises or align with existing criminal networks. These hybrid networks command both economic and political resources that militants can use to broaden their support and suborn local officials. New data summarized here is based on survey by the Minorities at Risk project of the activities of 112 political organizations that represented ethnic or religious minorities in Middle Eastern countries. During 113 group-years between 1980 and 2004 these entities reportedly engaged in criminal activities such as smuggling, drug and arms trafficking, and money transfers and laundering.This paper uses detailed information on the PKK to illuminate the interactions between political and economic activities by transnational terrorist organizations. The PKK for 30 years has used terror strategies aimed at establishing an independent Kurdistan in SE Turkey. By the 1990s it was able to extract about US$ 50 million annually in "taxes" and contributions from the Kurdish diaspora in Europe and to earn an estimated US$ 44 million from smuggling drugs from the Middle East and dealing them in European cities. After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq the PKK expanded its base areas in northern Iraq, intensified attacks on Turkish targets, and thus has become a source of serious conflict between the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government and Turkey. We analyze in detail the network of constraints and opportunities that have shaped the PKK's political and economic strategies, and use our theoretical framework to suggest how the PKK is likely to respond to the changing power balance in the Arab peninsula, and to the tightening of EU anti-terrorism and anti-trafficking policies. We suggest inter alia that the PKK may undergo an agenda shift away from political terrorism and toward alliances with other international criminal networks. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is intrastate ethnic conflict contagious; that is, can ethnic conflict in one country increase the likelihood of the onset of ethnic conflict in a nearby country? This diffusion aspect of ethnic conflict has not been examined systematically in previous studies. The paper considers the role of ethnic kinship as a conflict transmitter. Using a strategic interaction perspective, it is argued that ethnic conflict in one state, in combination with ethnic kin between states, may generate uncertainty in one or more neighboring states. Under certain conditions this uncertainty and fear about the future may compel actors in one or more neighboring countries to use violence. For instance, a conflict involving an ethnic group in one state may inspire kin groups in neighboring countries to reevaluate the stability of their own arrangements and challenge the existing power balance. Thus, it is hypothesized that ethnic conflict in one state, in interaction with the existence of shared ethnic kin between two states, increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict erupting in the second state. This hypothesis is assessed using a new global dataset of directed dyads of all neighboring countries in the time-span 1989-2002. The data is analyzed using logistic regression and the findings lend preliminary support for the hypothesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports the results of a survey of 1190 active-duty members of the United States Army completed in the summer of 2004. Our survey respondents include 420 white, 397 Hispanic and 288 black soldiers and officers. We find that Hispanics in the American Army, a population largely of immigrants or the children of immigrants, face a unique set of challenges. Despite these hurdles, however, Hispanic soldiers and officers are generally satisfied with Army life and optimistic about their futures. However, Hispanics in the Army are by no means homogeneous in their background or attitudes. Like white soldiers and officers, they, as a group and especially Mexicans, have enlisted in order to serve their country, and they have had guidance from mentors in the Army. However, not all Hispanics have the same views toward a military career. We find that reported discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity is still more prevalent than conventional wisdom about the Army would suggest. There are also large disparities in the way different racial and ethnic groups view the inclusiveness of the Army and the programs designed to help minorities. Given the lack of minority representation in the Army leadership ranks, these differences in perception of the Army's success in this area could lead to dissatisfaction with Army leadership among minority soldiers and to increased racial and ethnic tension as the proportion of Hispanics in the Army continues to grow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explain why it is so difficult for states and ethnic groups seeking self-determination to reach agreement over political autonomy and avoid costly conflict. I argue that states and separatist groups are made up of multiple sub-factions with different aims regarding autonomy agreements--and that these differences drive the variation we see in autonomy agreement success. I deduce that agreement is most likely when there are either a low or very high number of group factions and a moderate number of state factions. Bargaining is difficult for groups with moderate numbers of factions because they bear high costs for organizing, generate uncertainty over acceptable deals, are prone to break apart, and lack the ability to enforce settlements in the face of internal dissent. High-faction groups face these same challenges, but are likely to get small concessions from the state in an attempt to buy-off moderates. Moreover, bargaining is difficult for states with either one or many factions whose consent is necessary for an agreement. One-faction states cannot commit credibly to honor a settlement, while high-faction states are prone to deadlock because any faction can hold up a deal if unsatisfied with the terms. I test several hypotheses resulting from this theory on a 1991 cross-section of self-determination movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although recent literature has emphasized the legal rights of national minorities to exercise limited self-government, the benefits and trade-offs of existing forms of political autonomy have not been systematically examined. Analyzing the case studies of Panama and Nicaragua, this paper contrasts the limitations of formal political autonomy with the success of non-governmental grassroots mobilization to deliver the collective goods aspired by marginalized ethnic communities. This research, consequently, raises unsettling questions about the current prescriptions of academics and practitioners working on issues of ethnic rights, and suggests moving the arena of contestation from novel experiments in political autonomy towards the strengthening and mobilization of civil society organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a conference paper titled "Ethnic Diversity, Democracy and Electoral Extremism in Interwar Poland and Czechoslovakia" prepared for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Honolulu, Hawaii. It discusses the nature and limitations of the census and electoral data and analyzes election results broken down by ethnic group using graphical and statistical techniques.

Since the collapse of communism, the rise of ethnic and national minority tensions have posed significant problems for the domestic stability of many post-communist states, as well as stimulating cross-border movements and anxieties in Europe. The European Union (EU) has adopted two divergent approaches towards minority protection and policy: a ‘hands off’ approach with its own member states, while imposing political criteria on Central and Eastern European (CEE) accession candidates which have never and are not currently imposed on member states. I argue that that in light of both the founding principles of the EU and current practice, this divergence constitutes a double-standard. Internally, the EU has no uniform policy: the protection of minorities is considered an issue of national domestic policy. The EU has influence on minority policy only indirectly. Externally, the EU has taken a unified policy stance with respect to CEE accession candidate states, directly influencing domestic policy on the treatment of minorities through conditionality (the political criteria of minority protections) and Phare financing. In what ways do these trends reflect increasing Western anxieties over migration from the East? To what extent to prevailing European attitudes about and (in)tolerance of diversity influence and legitimize these differences? What are the implications of these differential policy approaches vis-à-vis the equal status of new EU member states and the minorities within these and existing member states? This paper explores these questions through an examination of policy approaches and attitudes towards Roma (gypsy) minorities in selected Eastern and Western European countries. My previous research on the Roma minority in Hungary, Romania and Spain suggests that while Roma in the West may experience somewhat higher levels of living than their Eastern counterparts, this is more a function of overall higher levels of welfare provision than progressive policies towards this minority. Moreover, EU pressure on new member states may reflect more the desire to keep Roma from migrating West, than a concern for their rights per se. Expanding on this research, this paper will assess the nature and degree of this apparent double-standard, by examining the degree to which member states are themselves meeting the criteria imposed on new candidate states, and the relative expectations that they do so. This paper will also explore the merits of alternative explanations for these policy divergences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will address why some ruling elites play the ethnic card through negative, ethnic mobilization -- or by sponsoring violence against particular ethnic groups -- during multiparty transitions. It will focus on flawed or mixed transitions where authorities have adopted a multiparty system yet continue to employ a range of authoritarian tactics. The paper will ask why ruling elites in Kenya (1990-2000) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1990-2000) engaged in both inflammatory appeals and violence against ethnic groups, but they did not employ such tactics in Kyrgyzstan (1990-2000) or during the early phases of the regime change in Côte d’Ivoire (1990-1993), despite the presence of strong ethnic cleavages in these countries. Scholars writing on ethnic violence often focus on structural factors, such as the extent of pre-existing ethnic cleavages; levels of ethnic diversity; regional decentralization; economic performance; the history of economic development and the viability of political institutions. Yet such explanations fail to address why many leaders in a range of plural societies choose not to play on ethnic divisions during the transition process, whereas others organize violence against rival groups. This paper will test an alternative theory to explain why some ruling elites engage in inflammatory appeals -- or violence -- against ethnic groups during multiparty transitions. First, a sharp rise in overall opposition protests during the early phases of multiparty transitions threatens ruling elites who employ ethnic appeals and ethnic violence as a strategy to regain political control. Second, a cohesive, ruling elite -- not marked by extensive defections -- is more likely to undertake violence against ethnic groups than is a ruling elite which is highly fragmented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a surge of interest in immigrant political participation by policymakers, political parties, and scholars, particularly with respect to these new citizens? attitudes on particular issues and their propensity to vote. Of great interest is the complex relationship between migrants, their home countries, and the United States government. Political commentators are deeply divided over the seemingly disproportionate influence that ethnic communities sometimes exercise over US foreign policy toward their home countries. Taken as a whole, Cuban exile political activism has taken a number of very complex routes for changing Castro?s Cuba. In what ways do Cuban exiles influence politics in the Western hemisphere? What range of strategies for making political change exists within the exile community? How do these organizations influence each other and agencies in the federal government? What implications do their actions have for US foreign policy? To answer these questions, I examine activist organizations within the Cuban exile community in the United States, focusing specifically on organizations? whose ultimate target for political change is the Castro regime. I explore the effect that two broad factors have on these organizations? activities: the federal government?s level of interest in Castro?s Cuba during each time period and the organization?s financial and political capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethnic consciousness depends upon the establishment of an ethnic identity, the development of socio- political organizations and the political mobilization of ethnic groups in local, national and/or international arenas. How ethnic consciousness is fully realized, however,continues to be a matter of scholarly concern. Our study asks whether heightened population density or concentration of an ethnic group in a geo-political area positively impacts ethnic consciousness. We posit that a group whose population is concentrated will have a level of ethnic consciousness that is higher than those in regions where the population of the same ethnic group is dispersed because geographical concentration enables ethnic groups to establish political and social organizations. Moreover, group members that are living close to each other develop a sense of community by practicing their traditions and experiencing a territorial dimension to their ethnic identity. Counter arguments suggest that scattered ethnic groups can better protect their identity since the dominant population has less opportunity to institutionally control dispersed ethnic groups than compact communities of settled populations Barany 2002). We test our argument by applying it to the Gypsies of Eastern Europe. The Gypsies comprise a most unusual ethnic group in that they are a transnational people who have no home state to provide a haven or protection to them. Gypsies are also a heterogeneous group with multiple languages and few fiscal resources, and have shown little success at mobilizing in a way that could provide the means to preserve group identity. Despite the absence of these factors, Gypsies have preserved their ethnic identity for centuries, which constitutes a puzzle both for political scientists and policy makers. Thus, the experiences of the Gypsies provide an interesting case study for those who seek to understand the factors that influence ethnic consciousness. Although geographical concentration and dispersion is far from providing the key to understand the whole picture, it may explain an important component. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While scholars argue that national and ethnic groups are not interest groups, state laws, funding, and programs for minorities are enmeshed in bureaucracies. As a result, governments formally and informally employ advisory councils, non-governmental organizations, and ethnic entrepreneurs to create and maintain these policies in ways that resemble the world critiqued by Theodore Lowi. At the same time, minorities have sought to gain power over their communities, although the institutional forms for autonomy vary widely. This paper will use the European Roma and Travellers Forum (ERTF) to examine this interplay between bureaucratic needs for input and minority demands for autonomy. Over the past fifteen years European governments and institutions have tried to address Roma discrimination, social and economic problems in the Roma community, and lack of support for Roma culture, but there has been a frustrating sense the programs were less effective because of a lack of legitimate Roma representatives with whom to work. Spurred by new models of non-territorial autonomy that could operate across state borders, several Roma organizations began to spearhead efforts to create a representative, autonomous body for European Roma. These two streams came together in 2004 under the auspices of the Council of Europe, resulting in the ERTF. The ERTF remains plagued with debates about whether there is a single Roma community, over what it does or should have autonomy, its relations with state and international institutions, and how to ensure representativeness. This paper will explore in detail the ERTF’s creation and these on-going issues. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will be based on my forthcoming 2007 book, DEMOCRATIZING THE HEGEMONIC STATE: POLITICALTRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AGE OF IDENTITY (Cambridge University Press). In the book I offered ananalytical framework for studying relations between majorities and minorities in ethnically divided societies. In this paper I would like to take several cases in which societies were quite successful in "bridging" the ethnic divide (e.g. post-Franco Spain) and compare them with cases in which societies failed to do that (e.g. Sri Lanka) and identify systematically factors that might explain this difference. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the roles myths play in the development of national identity and conflict. Myths explain ethnic conflict by illustrating how ethnic groups understand their interests and see themselves. Myths answer why many people so passionately support an extremist leader and sacrifice their lives. Thus, to understand ethnic conflict it is important to look at what kinds of ethnic myths groups have and whether they feel threats coming towards their identities. To demonstrate this argument this paper looks at the myths of the Turks and the Kurds of Turkey, how these myths used by extremist leaders to develop national identities as well as conflict. The Turks, especially after the establishment of the Republic, developed a myth-symbol complex, which, in their eyes, justified their ethnic dominance, and thus hostility to any who oppose it. The Kurdish myth-symbol complex mostly appeared during the 1980s as a result of the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party) propaganda, which made the Kurds stand together in opposition to the Turkish state. There developed a clash between a Kurdish myth-symbol complex focusing on annihilation of the Kurdish ethnic identity and people, if the Kurds stayed within the existing Turkish state structure, and a Turkish one emphasizing the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic. Each defined dominance over the Kurdish region as vital to its national existence and saw the other side?s aspirations as constituting a threat of group extinction. Once violence started, myths justifying hostility became all too believable. The result was war. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France and Britain have the largest ethnic Islamic populations in Europe. Scholarly literature has generally focused on questions of integration, the success or failure of integrating these populations, and political reactions to their presence. This paper will focus on another, less researched question: the impact of Islamic populations on security and foreign policy. Journalists and some scholars have noted that the presence of large ethnic populations of Islamic origin has been seen by state authorities as security problem, and has had an important influence on how security is organized and pursued. The presence of these populations creates the perception of a security threat (especially in the post 9-11 world), and therefore helps to create? directly or indirectly? repressive anti-immigrant policies. On the other hand, it has also been argued that these same populations have had an important impact on foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, in part because of their electoral clout, in part because of fear of unrest. If the first argument tends to see Islamic populations as objects of politics; the second sees them also as actors and participants. This paper will compare the process of security and foreign policy in France and Britain, and the ways that Islamic groups influence this process (a) by the ways that policy-makers understand the importance of their presence; and (b) by organized attempts to assert their presence through political institutions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1990-91, the majority of the 32 ethnically-defined Russian regions issued declarations of sovereignty. Of them, only Chechnya ended up battling the Russian federal government. In this paper, I demonstrate how and why the institutions connecting Chechnya and Moscow fell short of resolving differences between the two and, indeed, helped precipitate a full-fledged civil war between them. In particular, I argue that the ways in which center-region institutions and practices respond to regional-level societal traits such as ethnicity and wealth influence whether--and which part of--the state becomes a target of political mobilization. If the responsibility for a region or ethnic group's grievances can be attributed to the central government, mobilized action against the central government is more likely to occur. In Chechnya, both ethnic and economic grievances could be attributed to the central government and the ways in which relations between the center and the regions were governed, thus justifying action directed at the center. Furthermore, the central government's response to the Chechen demands helped justify violence as a means. From 1991 to 1994, Moscow switched back and forth between promising concessions to the Chechens and preparing for violent action, resorting to the latter in late 1994. But even before the center's military invasion of Grozny in December 1994, more routine channels for funneling the Chechen demands faced challenges due to divisions in Chechnya: The Chechen Revolution in late 1991 severed all party and institutional ties with the federal government and led to a situation of divided power within the Chechen republic, both of which made center-region negotiations problematic. The paper is part of a broader project that investigates federal states' very diverse capacity to defuse struggles between central governments and sub-national actors in pursuit of greater autonomy. Acknowledging that there is no "one-size-fits-all" federal solution to conflicts in divided states, I argue that the degree to which federal institutions can contribute to peace depends on how these institutions respond to characteristics of the societies they govern. I maintain that the "peace-preserving" effects of specific federal traits are conditional on any given region's wealth and ethnic composition. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2002 national election was the first reasonably free election in modern Kenyan history and it led to the first peaceful transfer of power in over 30 years. Mwai Kibaki, the newly elected President, was ushered into office on the pledge of promoting economic growth, cleaning-up government corruption, and restarting the stillborn constitutional reform process. Thus far, Kibaki has experienced mixed results in all three areas, but has robustly supported the efforts of the Constitutional Kenyan Reform Committee (CKRC). The CKRC is charged with the exceedingly difficult task of creating a framework that will protect the country?s competing ethnic groups? interests, increase government transparency and therefore accountability, and simultaneously promote government efficiency. At best these three requirements require distinct sets of institutional processes and at worst they run antithetical to each other. Not surprisingly, the constitutional reform process has made only limited progress with the latest efforts being rejected in a November 2005 referendum. This paper explores the relationship between elite motivations and actions and the Kenyan people?s attitudes and desires. To do so, the authors have conducted a survey of the Kenyan citizens? attitudes toward the current and proposed constitutions. The survey was conducted by the authors (in conjunction with Kenyatta University) over the spring and summer of 2006 and sampled citizens from each of the provinces. The paper will present findings from the survey and the extensive interviews with elites shaping the constitutional reform process. Will the Kenyan democratization process yield democratic results? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By any typology of colonial projects, the Republic of the Philippines (R.P.) has not -- during any of its three formal (Spanish, Japanese, American) colonial periods -- been understood as a settler colony. More often, the R.P. is gathered with other ?exploitation? or ?culturally dependent? colonies (Young 2001) that emerged chaotically during the 17th ?20th centuries as archipelagos and continents were carved into European and American spheres. This paper examines the politics of propinquity apparent in the emergent discourse of indigeneity in the Philippines in order to posit the post-independence Philippines as a settler colony. Ironically, the R.P?s status as a settler colony has been consolidated and rapidly accelerated precisely because of its formal independence, particularly given ?the new imperialism of exploitation as development? (Spivak 1999:371). Indeed, the staging of capital in the Philippines since formal independence demands analysis that simultaneously considers neocolonial relations, ongoing efforts at decolonization, and conditions of postcoloniality. It is such an analysis that must frame any discussion of the indigenous in the contemporary Philippines, where the concept of indigeneity, and the determination of which peoples can be constituted as indigenous, are complicated and generally thinly-researched subjects. This paper seeks to elaborate an inter-national genealogy of deployment of the terms ?indigenous? and ?indigeneity? in both Philippine official history and public policy, as well as by native peoples engaged in struggles against economic development and forced removal from their ancestral lands. In particular, I examine the juridical constitution of the ?indigenous? in the 1997 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA), which was officially hailed as a landmark piece of legislation recognizing the political rights of native peoples in the Philippines, but which undermines native practices of land tenure and lubricates ongoing efforts to appropriate the ancestral land of indigenous and other rural Philippine communities for hydropower, mining, and other development projects financed by foreign capital. In addition, I explore the political movement of native women in the Cordillera in negotiating and contesting the terms of implementation of the IPRA. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political participation in developing countries often happens along ethnic lines. Existing theoretical approaches have argued that political participation happens in this manner either because of pre-existing colonial political institutions or either because of the inherent ability of ethnicity to mobilize individual ethnic group members. In the case studies of Sri Lanka, Bulgaria and Malaysia, I combine primary source data (party manifestos and parliamentary debates) with an extensive longitudinal historical analysis to show that this is not the case. Analytically, I synthesize collective action approaches with resource mobilization theories. I argue that political entrepreneurs attempt to politicize ethnicity and transform it into a reliable and efficient basis for ethnic group cohesion and collective behavior. Yet, they are faced with the ?free rider? problem. Consequently, political entrepreneurs will turn to the usage of selective incentives, often in the form of discrete state economic policies, in order to match their followers? demands. Accordingly, a solution to the ?free rider? problem arises. However, the need for organization forces political entrepreneurs to tap into existing social mobilization resources in order to accelerate the organization of their groups and minimize their costs. As such, organization precedes mobilization. Successful collective mobilization requires not only ethnic group coherence and organizational efficacy, but also a readiness to act, increasing group member consensus, and institutionalization. Hence, political entrepreneurs begin to increasingly rely upon a ?critical mass? of ethnic group members. This ?critical mass? sub-group is aware of the political entrepreneurs? needs and extracts ever increasing selective incentives from them. Selective incentives that are increasingly asymmetrically become concentrated upon these ?critical mass? members. However, the provision of these selective incentives has two effects: (i) it increases the chances that political entrepreneur will support the use of the state in the allocation of economic resources so that they can credibly provide their followers with the selective incentives that they demand, and (ii) it institutionalizes this commitment to the appropriation of the selective incentives within the ethnic group, increasing the chances that it will emerge as a dominant ethnic group. The successes of the original political entrepreneurs resonate in elite settings with a powerful demonstration effect. Counter-mobilization emerges from political entrepreneurs, both from within the dominant ethnic group members as well as from the dissident ethnic group. Competition among political entrepreneurs leads to competitive intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic bidding by political entrepreneurs for more support among ethnic group members. Economic policy-making assumes an increasing level of zero-sum decisions and the boundaries among ethnic groups become rigid and exclusionary. This paper increases our substantive knowledge about the dynamics that lead to the emergence of ethnic parties in nascent democracies while testing competing hypotheses. Its policy relevance lies in its ability to generate a predictive analytical framework that shows how the interaction between the strategic interests of ethnic political entrepreneurs and the selective incentives that the ethnic group members demand affects the routinization of politics in newly-established multiethnic democracies. Accordingly, this paper allows us to better understand the interaction between democratization and the propensity for violent ethnic conflict in newly established multiethnic democracies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of ?ascriptive? civil society organizations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Ireland. Most literature agrees on the positive role of cross-ethnic civil society groups in building peace. Similarly, there a broad consensus about the damaging functions of ?uncivil groups? such as paramilitaries and mafia-like organisations. Unclear is the role in peacebuilding of those organizations where membership is determined by ascriptive criteria ? such as race or religion, or by having fulfilled patriotic duties, such as military service. On the one hand, some of these groups are key in furthering peace and democracy; on the other hand, their very existence is frequently based on exclusion of and conflict with others, particularly in regions with a history of conflict. On the basis of a joint analytical framework (panel 1), this paper identifies both the positive and negative contributions of ascriptive civil society groups in peace processes. The cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Northern Ireland provide ample opportunities for a comparative assessment. As a whole, this paper aims at filling a glaring gap in the literature on peacebuilding. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the former Yugoslavia to Rwanda, outbreaks of state-sponsored violence against ethnic groups during periods of regime change have posed one of the most pressing security problems since the end of the Cold War. This paper will examine why ruling elites sponsor large-scale, ethnic violence during multiparty transitions. Although this tactic may arise in any regime type, ruling elites face particularly strong incentives to adopt it in periods of multiparty change. Whether ruling elites undertake democratic reform or merely seek to thwart demands for multiparty change, during transitions they face a sharp increase in political threats and limited time in which to respond. By directing violence against particular ethnic communities during transition periods, ruling elites can derail the political opposition in a number of ways. First, the violence can serve as a diversionary strategy. Second, the violence can eliminate political opponents and displace ethnic communities affiliated with the opposition. Third, disturbances offer regimes a pretext for suspending the democratic transition. Ruling elites can avoid scrutiny for state violence by presenting such abuses as spontaneous, ethnic conflict. Despite the obvious advantages which such tactics can offer, the causal factors driving the decision to instigate ethnic violence remain unclear. Why do ruling elites play on ethnic divisions for political gain? This paper will examine why ruling elites from Serbia in the former Yugoslavia (1990-1999) and Kenya (1991-1998) engaged in violence against ethnic groups, whereas in Romania (1990-2003) and Chad (1992-2003) leaders refrained from using this tactic. I define ?ethnic cleansing? as the forcible deportation of at least 1,000 individuals of a specified ethnic background from a particular geographic zone. In the former Yugoslavia and Kenya, over 100,000 individuals were subjected to a purposeful depopulation strategy; thousands were killed. The paper will test three theories to explain the variation across the two sets of cases. First, it will consider whether differences in levels of state capacity lead to a higher likelihood of ethnic violence. Second, it will evaluate whether the degree of reported inter-ethnic hostility can account for the variation. The paper then will test a theory, which I developed from earlier research on the Rwandan genocide, regarding the cohesion of ruling elites. It posits that internally stable regimes -- which demonstrate strong cooperation among elites and a well-institutionalized ruling party -- at the time of the initial multiparty transition are more likely to employ large-scale, ethnic violence. By contrast, regimes which are internally divided, where alliances within the ruling party itself are not firmly cemented, are not likely to engage in ethnic cleansing during transition periods. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nonstate actors are increasingly active participants in the international arena. There are a plethora of these actors ? some of which are organized entities like international and nongovernmental organizations. Others are based on more ad-hoc arrangements that are usually activated in relation to particular issues or in reaction to world events. This paper examines the impact of transnational links between ethnic communities. It is asserted that these linkages are the strongest between ethnic groups that are dispersed across one or more neighboring states. However, the revolution in telecommunications has reduced, if not eliminated, the role of distance in lessening the intensity of ties between ethnopolitical groups. This paper seeks to map out the avenues by which the various forms of intervention based on ethnic ties can impact on the internal trajectories of violent contentions. Ethnic conflicts that emerged in the Third World in the 1980s and 1990s are considered. Along with the empirical analysis, selected cases will be highlighted to draw forth the most relevant conclusions. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do some ethnic groups in conflict receive more external support than others? In particular, what is the role of state discrimination and the overall level of violence (in the form of rebellion) in receiving external support from other states? What is the role of insecurity level caused by discrimination on attracting third party support? This paper seeks to answer these questions by incorporating the charecteristics of the host state, minority at risk and the nature of the dispute. To answer these questions, the paper proceeds in five parts. The first part is a brief overview that sets the agenda. Second is a theoretically oriented discussion of discrimination, security dilemma, rebellion and external support as related to ethnic conflict. In particular, discrimination caused by economic and political discrimination against minorities in a state and high levels of rebellion are expected to attract third-party intervention. The third part consists of the research design,which includes hypotheses and measurement of variables. Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project and Saideman's external support data (2002) will be used. The data analysis which covers the period from 1990 to 1998, appears in the fourth section. Results show that political, not economic, discrimination by the host state, in addition to the other indicators of host state and the nature of the ethnic conflict, play a significant role in explaining external support. Most interesting result of our seemingly unrelated regression is that while the level of discrimination and violence determine the level of external support, the existence of external support has a significant impact on the level of violence of the ethnic conflict. This result is particularly important for our understanding of external support and it has been overlooked in the literature. Fifth, and last, are conclusions, along with directions for future research. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractThis paper specifies a novel framework to explore how rival ethnic groups in one country learn from threats to ethnic kin in a neighboring country and from threats made by nominal rivals at home. In particular, the paper explores how a combination of external and internal threats results in animosity and violence, and argues that the lessons from these events are internalized differently across groups, leading to distinct trajectories of ethnic domination. The framework developed in the paper is formalized using an agent-based computational model which generates a range of outcomes. I discuss one outcome of the model in detail to explore the puzzle of minority domination in both Rwanda andBurundi: namely, why a Hutu majority that was able to take control of the state from a dominant minority in Rwanda failed to retain power in the long run; and why a dominant Tutsi minority in neighboring Burundi was never dislodged from power by the dominated majority? ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper maps the production of hip-hop culture from its origins in the everyday lives of marginalized Afro-Americans and Afro-Caribbeans in the United States, to its commercialization for global cultural consumption and its (re)insertion into distinct geo-cultural settings throughout the world. The makes use of specific national case studies in Colombia, Cuba and Mexico in order to analyze the interaction and negotiation that takes place between global hip-hop and its exoticization of marginal spaces and social actors, and the appropriation and hybridization of its cultural symbols and language at the everyday level. In doing so, the paper probes the extent to which global hip-hop simply reproduces everyday space according to the needs of global capitalism and the degree to which it also enables spaces of contestation in which marginalized identities, knowledge and experience can acquire relative degrees of agency. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will present an empirical test of the theoretical literature on federalism?s relationship with secession. The debate over federalism and autonomy for territorially concentrated minorities has been present for decades but became acute after the demise of East European Socialism, where secession succeeded in all three federal structures. Advocates of ethnic autonomy suggest it can provide greater security to both minority and state through a shared government without threatening the territorial integrity of the state. Critics have suggested that certain features of autonomy ? clearly delineated borders, ready-made state institutions and leadership, greater international legitimacy ? facilitate secession efforts.Moving beyond individual case studies, this paper will examine the relationship between secession and federalism through a large-N quantitative analysis under the most likely condition: civil war. As most successful secessions ? those that achieve independence ? occur under conditions of war, this paper explores all ethnic civil wars from 1945 to 2000 looking at which minorities had territorial autonomy and which achieved de jure and de facto independence. Importantly, this study does not examine attempts at secession, but rather success at achieving an independently controlled state. The data is drawn from a variety of sources, including the World Bank, Minorities at Risk, and additional variables coded by the author.This paper will provide insights at time when autonomy for ethnic groups is promoted more than ever, while the ongoing academic and policy debate is far from over. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses a game theoretic framework based on primary field work data gathered in Afghanistan (2005) and Bosnia (2004) to present a theory on ethnic alliance formation during civil wars. There is presently no existing theory on alliance formation during civil wars and none of the different hypotheses that could be derived from various fields within the political science literature (international relations literature on state alliances; comparative politics literature on parties; political economy literature on civil wars; etc) fully capture civil war alliances among ethnic groups as reflected in the empirical reality. For instance, neither balance of power considerations nor perception of ethnic distance constitute reliable predictors of ethnic coalition patterns during civil wars. Empirical findings rather suggest that: 1) Ethnic distance is endogenous to the process of alliance formation in civil wars; 2) Local level disputes can break national level ethnic alliances; and 3) Second order ethnic cleavages will fracture primary blocks in ideological and economic civil wars. The theory suggests that after the primary identity cleavage of the civil war (be it ideological, ethnic or economic) is determined by an exogenous shock, initial alliances will be formed based on balance of power considerations. If the war stalemates, we should expect to see alliance breakdowns or switches. In ethnic civil wars, local disputes will instigate alliance breakdowns. In non-ethnic civil wars primary cleavage blocks (i.e. ideologically or economically defined groups) will break along ethnic lines. This paper depicts the dynamic within a game theoretic context inspired by Bosnia and Afghanistan and argues that the model is broadly generalizable in multiethnic states facing civil wars. It concludes with important policy implications for civil war prevention and termination, as well as recommendations regarding outside intervention of the developed world (the North) in the developing world (the South). ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the conditions under which ethnic conflict may be contagious. Since ethnic conflict and ethnic groups overlap international boundaries, this paper argues that they should be analyzed using a widened notion of a strategic setting. It is suggested that regions encapsulating each conflict and its neighboring states provide such an environment. From a general notion of uncertainty as a key characteristic of the strategic environment, two explanations are outlined. Firstly, it is suggested that the existence of ethnic kin between conflict actors and groups across the borders of the state in conflict is associated with an increased risk of onset of ethnic conflict in the state at risk of contagion. Secondly, if the conflict state and a neighboring state are similar in terms of the factors commonly associated with the onset of violent conflict, here indicated by the level of democracy and economic wealth, the likelihood of ethnic conflict is heightened in the state at risk. The hypotheses are evaluated statistically with new data on the ethnic constituency of actors as well as measures of structural similarities. While the ethnic kin hypothesis is supported in all models tested, the impact of structural similarities cannot be confirmed. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From February 1988 to 1994, ethnic Azeris and Armenians fought for control over the predominantly Armenian region of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. The ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding region led to refugee flows of nearly 800,000 Azeris from the Nagorno-Karabakh region to other areas of Azerbaijan, and Armenians from other areas of Azerbaijan to either Nagorno-Karabakh or Armenia. Theoretically, ethnic warfare in the former Soviet states is hardly a surprising development - the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, in essence, the fact that "state collapse" occurred in all 13 successor states to the Soviet Union at the same time, might indicate that an opportunity had opened to ethnic groups or elite interests in these states. The loosening of Moscow's grip on these states, the political power shift from Moscow to local capitals, and the removal of Soviet troops, all provided conditions that favored insurgency or made insurgency more feasible. More remarkable, perhaps, are the other successor states that did not experience any organized ethnic violence. Repression of ethnic minorities has certainly occurred in many of these states; however, they have not experienced an actual civil war. What macro-level factors made the difference between war and peace in the former Soviet states? State collapse may be a necessary condition for ethnic violence, but it certainly does not appear to be a sufficient one. This paper is an investigation into the macro-level necessary and sufficient conditions that led some Soviet successor states to war. In order to investigate these conditions, I use Ragin's (2000) qualitative comparative analysis tools to compare a cross-national data set of former Soviet states to several rival hypotheses found in the violence literature, with a particular aim of establishing conjunctural causation. The former Soviet cases are particularly useful for this type of analysis; studying this region allows one to control for certain variables, including state collapse, new statehood, and previous occupation by another state, while benefiting from variation on the dependent variable (ethnic conflict). Many of the former Soviet states, particularly those in the Caucasus and Central Asia, straddle the North-South divide. Considered for many years to be "Northern" states due to their incorporation into the Soviet Union, these successor states now suffer from many of the ills found in those states traditionally considered "Southern": ethnic strife, increased poverty, and government instability are but a few traits these states have in common with their southern neighbors. Exploration of this region may not only answer more narrow questions about the fate of collapsed Communist states, but may also shed light on the causes, and potential cures, for some of the ills found in the South. This paper attempts to address one particular ill, namely, ethnic conflict. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]