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The English School and its master concept ?international society? is currently enjoying a renaissance. The paper seeks to sustain this revitalization by suggesting how a firmer grasp of the School?s potential can be achieved by situating its contribution in the context of sociological World Society Theory. This move promises to heighten its theoretical reflexivity as well as its awareness of the non-political context of modern politics. The viability of an updated English School approach is discussed in the light of an empirical challenge: the implications of the unipolar power structure that privileges the United States in the contemporary states system. It can be argued that unipolarity introduces a degree of systemic hierarchy conflicting with central English School premises, i.e. the importance of shared intersubjective norms and anarchical state equality. The paper argues that unipolarity does indeed challenge evolving international society but also that it is unlikely to obstruct the emergence of a world order based on differentiated and interactive governance frameworks. A reflexive English School approach contributes fruitfully to our understanding of this development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that IR has tended to mischaracterise the 'social' basis of international society. States and other actors orient their behaviour towards shared understandings of cooperation not because of a prior common identity but because the provision of public goods provides a high value pay-off in terms of status. In the early part of the paper, we draw on Wittgenstein's ideas on rule indeterminacy to critique the idea of the causal power of norms, a view which animates a great deal of mainstream constructivism. Working with an alternative sociology of norms, it becomes possible to view the international social system as being produced through 'recognition games' played on many different boards. The goal of international social action is recognition of rightful membership of institutions and alliances, an argument familiar to English school writings in IR. China's struggle for status in contemporary international society provides an illustrative case study, one which avoids the stark choice between managing China's imminent threat (realism) or liberal socialization (constructivism). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Meaningful global governance is hardly possible without at least some consensus on the pattern of values that necessarily underpin existing international society. Although much discussion on global governance has often been reduced to "technical" problems, such as the analysis of possible solutions to identified collective problems, this paper argues that future theories of global governance need to be placed it in a broader framework of international society. Assuming there is an inherent conflict between values in any international society, who are the main dramatis personae? This discussion inevitably leads to the issue of the structure of international society considered in its empirical, legal and political dimensions. The important question is however, how this structure is related to the theoretical and paradigmatic framework of international law. Is contemporary international law prepared to accommodate the new agents of order. This paper, by providing insight into the structure of contemporary international society, explores the role of non-state actors and their relationship with international law and draws some conclusions as well as preliminary answers to these fundamental questions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the interests of Tokugawa Japan and the Russian Empire clashed for the first time in the second half of the 18th century, Ainu, the native people of Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurile islands, were in the center of the dispute. Furthermore, at least from the Japanese side, the notion of culture has defined the dispute. Namely, the potential Russian expansion of influence was seen as expansion of superior culture, conducted through enlightenment and amicable policies which could result in the voluntary embracement of the rule of the Russian empire by the Ainu (Akatsuki 1987.)In the last five decades the same border zone, namely the South Kurile islands (known as Northern Territories in Japan) have continued to occupy the central place in Japan's agenda vis-a -vis the Soviet Union and, after 1992, Russia. However, the existent scholarship has paid little attention to the role of culture and the Ainu in the contemporary dispute over control of the islands. This paper hopes to bridge this gap by bringing together the debate on the place of Ainu in Japanese society that emerged in early 1970s and the concurrent cultural construction of the Japan's "sef" vis-a -vis Russia.The first part of this paper provides a brief review of modern Japan's engagement with the Russian and the Ainu "other" in terms of national identity construction. The second part examines the contemporary dialogue between the two "others" within the broader context of identity politics of the 1970s and 1980s. It starts by analyzing the critical reevaluation of Japan's history of colonization of Ainu lands and the relocation of Ainu culture from the realm of the inferior assigned to it by the prewar discourse. This paper argues that this reconstruction presented a challenge not only to the conception of Japan as a homogenous nation but also undermined the validity of Japan's claim to the South Kurile islands as a quest for the return of inherent territory as it granted subjectivity to the Ainu "other" and allowed for the Ainu participate in the public discourse. The paper follows by introducing the cultural discourse on Russia and Japan that emerged almost simultaneously with the debates on Ainu. It argues that one of the functions of this construction of the national "self" was to suppress the challenges posed by the contemporary debates on Ainu by presenting a hierarchical construction between Japan's "self" and the Russian "other" and through this reaffirming Japan's belonging to the realm of the civilized and the normal. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the central role that C.A.W. Manning played in the conceptual development of international society. Deriving the term international society from his background in international law, Manning focused on society rather than law as his object of analysis and placed the concept at the centre of his analysis of international relations. For Manning, the ontology of international society required that IR have a special methodology to examine it and a distinct disciplinary institutionalization in order to understand its special complexities. However, curiously, if typically, Manning nowhere actually defines what he means by society. Instead, he deploys a number of different meanings in his analysis of international society. The first is the way it is now commonly understood in IR scholarship, using an analogy to political society, a society which the adjective social applies. Second, society means club or association, as in an international society of academics, or a sports club or any other special interest association. It is interesting that today a search for the words, international society, uncovers many more examples of this meaning than the first, though not in the context of the international relations. Finally, and more implicitly, Manning deploys society in an elite sense, as in high society, high culture, the civilized, and so on. I argue that each of the meanings is important and that while this has the advantage of lending a certain flexibility to his analysis, it also creates conceptual ambiguity.The third part of the paper compares Manning’s notion of international society with the subsequent development of the concept in the English School, as exemplified by the schema provided by Hedley Bull. The paper demonstrates how Bull’s tripartite framework, borrowed from Martin Wight, takes up Manning’s idea of international society, placing it between the realist concept international system and the idealist notion of world society or community. But the relativism inherent in this framework also changes the meaning of international society introducing normative elements that were not the purpose and object of Manning’s analysis.The paper concludes that debates about the membership of an English School of international relations are less important than critical examination of the development of core concepts such as international society. In this, it is suggested, a consideration of the teaching and writing of C.A.W. Manning is unavoidable. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper for presentation is a second draft (first draft was presented at BISA 2007) of the theoretical framework chapter for a longer project with the working title 'Consequentialist evaluation of security for cooperative International Society'. This project builds on my existing work where I have argued that security studies must be concerned with the consequences or effects of securitisation and desecuritisation, making a case for the existence of positive and negative securitisation and desecuritisation. Positive and negative hereby are derived from what in moral philosophy is known as a consequentialist ethic whereby an action's moral rightness is to be judged by its consequences, for security thus, the hitherto largely ignored question of securitisation for whom takes centre stage. So far, I have completed this, what I call 'consequentialist evaluation of security' for the environmental sector of security only [Floyd, Rita (2007) 'Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security: Bringing together the Copenhagen School and the Welsh School of Security Studies, Review of International Studies 33(2) & Floyd, Rita (2007) Typologies of Securitisation and Desecuritisation: The case of US environmental security 1993-2006 unpublished doctoral thesis University of Warwick]. My paper for presentation at this conference is the theoretical framework for the consequentialist evaluation of security for the remaining sectors of security, identified by the Copenhagen school of security studies as military, societal, economic and political security [Buzan, Barry et al (1998) Buzan, Barry; Waever, Ole; de Wilde, Jaap (1998) Security: A New Framework for Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner)]. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of cultural intimacy, as defined by anthropologist Michael Herzfeld, expresses those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of international criticism for the state, but are nevertheless used to provide insiders with a sense of national comfort, understanding, and self-reflexive, ontological security. Cultural intimacy helps illuminate how states present themselves internationally and how they understand themselves domestically. It can also explain the seeming discrepancies and contradictions between a state's domestic and international identities. Cultural intimacy, in other words, explains the mutual reproduction of different levels of identity. Using the concept of cultural intimacy as a departure point, this paper develops a framework for understanding incongruities in the domestic and international facades of state identity. We argue that there is a structural component to the level of discomfort caused by negative appraisals of the international image of a given state. Structural position determines whether the domestic sources of cultural intimacy will cause shame, embarrassment or guilt if criticized by the international community, and therefore also indicate how that negative image will be handled by any given state. The theoretical argument is illustrated with reference to the cases of Serbia, Croatia, and the Netherlands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper utilizes three central English school concepts (international society, institution, and world society) to explore the colonization of Africa. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper employs the concepts of international society and norm localization to explore the status of the emerging "responsibility to protect" principle among African governments. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, the historiography of the academic discipline of IR, ever since its institutionalization (1919−), has been divided into three great debates. As a legacy of these debates the 'behavioralists', or those who believed in the methods of the natural sciences, left their mark on the field in the 1950s and 1960s. Although the positivistic approach is not anymore prevalent within the discipline, there's a clear indication that the IR theory has, even today, an exaggerated interest in the scientific explanation. This article will argue that the scholarly study should lean more on 1) historical analysis and there should be room for research agenda that is less focused on 'presentism', i.e. on contemporary history and current policy issues. Secondly, too much emphasis is put on Eurocentrism: important research topics outside the Occidental world are hence disregarded. As a result a distorted image emerges of how the modern international system came about. Perhaps more importantly, this state of affairs, to which the 'English school' has paid attention on its part, limits the understanding of classical concepts such as the balance of power, sovereignty, or even diplomacy reducing them exclusively to the domain of European states system. The aim of the paper is thus to examine the mutually beneficial interplay between history and IR theory by analyzing the 2) interstate relations in the Ancient Near East during the Late Bronze Age. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While recent research on humanitarianism suggests that a new humanitarian norm has emerged in the wake of the Cold War, I argue that activities that could be loosely described as "humanitarian" have taken place for centuries. Yet discussions about humanitarianism are usually limited to the relatively recent past. Furthermore, humanitarian activity is commonly viewed as the exception, rather than the rule, in that it is viewed as contingent upon the interests of powerful states. This explanation, however, does not account for the ways in which humanitarian ideas and state interests are mutually constituted. Hedley Bull identifies limitations to war as a primary institution of international society, in that such limitations minimize war as a manifestation of disorder, yet he does not explain how these limitations came to be. The goal, therefore, of this paper is to investigate efforts to limit the effects of war in the early modern era, in order to show how humanitarian practices evolved alongside and contributed to the emergence of international order. The paper examines the case of French and Dutch Protestant refugees in England during the reign of Elizabeth I. The investigation of early forms of humanitarian practice will help to shed light on how beliefs about moral obligation are are constituted by historically embedded notions of identity and power. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a conceptual framework for thinking about international hierarchy based on Weberian ideas about social stratification and mechanisms of social closure. The model allows us to categorise hierarchical international systems in terms of three dimensions: the primary axis of stratification (class, status or authority); the basis for the legitimation of the distribution of authority (charismatic, traditional or rational-legal); and the form of closure through which the hierarchy is maintained (collectivist or individualist). This framework is then used to analyse the changing nature of diplomacy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, from a charismatic status hierarchy based on a collectivist method of exclusion, to a rational-legal bureaucratic hierarchy based on a more individualist form of closure in the form of credentialism. The conclusion discusses how this perspective opens up new research questions in the comparative-historical analysis of international order and the normative analysis of international justice. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1940s both Carl Schmitt and Hans J. Morgenthau contemplated the destruction of the old European states-system. Schmitt's major work in this connection is The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, first published in 1950, (first English ed. 2003) but written in the early 1940s; Morgenthau wrote extensively on the subject, but the text that will form the focus of this paper is "The Twilight of International Morality" drawn from Politics among Nations and published in Ethics in January 1948. Although the language employed is very different, and Schmitt's emphasis on the spatial dimension of the European international order is largely absent in Morgenthau, there are striking points of agreement between these two German legal philosophers whose personal histories were so different; they agree in regarding the "bracketing" of war as a duel between sovereigns, characteristic of the old order, as the most effective basis for restraints on the use of force, and agree that in the current international order these restraints have been undermined. They disagree dramatically, however, when it comes to the reasons for this change; for Schmitt, it is the universalism and liberalism of the new internationa law associated with the US and, to a lesser extent, Britain that undermined the old European order, while for Morgenthau it is the combination of universalism and nationalism that has been crucial in challenging the universal ethics of the old order. Schmitt?s account is obviously self-serving but it has some resonance in terms of 21st century international politics, especially with respect to contemporary critiques of Western 'humanitarianism'; Morgenthau's account appears on the face of it to be rather less sophisticated than Schmitt's, but, arguably, actually goes deeper to the roots of the problem. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International systems are constituted by rules. These rules are established and enforced by the principal actors in the system, who use them to perpetuate their interests and status. I demonstrate this argument by reference to the international system of early modern Europe, in which dynastic monarchies were the leading actors and dynastic inheritance functioned as the system's constitutive principle. Wars in the early modern system were fought mainly to enhance the prestige of dynastic rulers and secure their dynastic rights, and the pursuit of these goals reinforced the constitutive effects of dynastic legitimacy. As the power of states began to displace that of monarchs in the eighteenth century, the dynastic principle was undermined. The dominant states began to search for new international rules that could protect their own interests, which were distinct from those of the dynastic rulers they were supplanting. Analyzing international systems in terms of their constitutive rules offers important advantages over neorealism, whose deductive approach detaches IR theory from history. In contrast, the approach proposed here reconnects IR theory to history by showing how international systems can be explained in terms of the historically specific interests of the actors that comprise them. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses how the contemporary global international society came about as a result of the expansion to planetary scale of a novel type of a society that emerged in Europe. A global international society may emerged from various civilizational cores of the ancient and classical world and from the takeover of the whole system by one of the civilizational cores. It outlines the classical expansion story in English school literature, as well as how the expansion literature is evolving.

Balance of power was one of the central institutions posited by Hedley Bull in the functioning of international society. And, indeed, in the emergence of an early modern society of European states, balance of power was a critical feature of that society, both positively and normatively. In the late modern and postmodern periods, however, the great powers have not ?balanced,? nor (despite lingering rhetorical uses of the term) have they seen balance as a normatively desirable goal. The decline of balance of power as a political and social institution can be understood in terms of the rise and decline of other institutions ? most obviously the rise of liberalism and of nationalism and the decline of trinitarian conceptions of political violence. Balance of power as a critical institution in the functioning of international society thus needs to be understood as historically contingent. As continued attempts to understand international society and the behavior of the international system in terms of balance suggest, theorists of international relations have been slow to appreciate this, or to explore the emergence of other institutions that serve an analogous function to balance of power in late modern and postmodern international society. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]