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This paper focuses on the use of different forms of power by a (leader/patron/hegemonic) state to get the other (non-leader/client) states cooperate with its policies: the use of different forms of power in obtaining cooperation from other states in exercising economic sanctions against a target state. Most of the literature on cooperation operate on the level of bargaining power where the policy changes are directly visible to or observable by the researcher. In this paper, I attempt to show how bargaining power model is not adequate in capturing the complete picture of the relationship between Turkey (a non-leader/client state) and the US (leader/patron state) in their cooperation and non-cooperation with regard to Iraq during the Gulf Crisis and the US War Against Iraq, respectively. In that regard, I attempt to show that the three levels of power (Krause 1991) is a much better and more comprehensive framework in understanding and explaining the power relationship between Turkey and the US. There are three main objectives of this study: (1) to shed more light on the cooperation process, (2) to challenge the conventional wisdom in the area of cooperation that states? cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors are best understood or explained on the bargaining level, and (3) to challenge the utility of paradigms, in this case the rational choice, in the discipline. This study attempts to show why a client state cooperates with a patron state even when this does not look as the best interest to that state, i.e., that state?s first preference is not to cooperate or that state does not have a dominant strategy to cooperate. Similarly, this study also aims at showing why a client state does not cooperate with a patron state even though cooperation seems to be the best interest to the client state. My working hypothesis is that Turkey?s cooperation (or non-cooperation) with the US with regard to the Iraq issue can not be fully understood or explained by using solely a bargaining model which focuses on directly observable (visible) results of a policy or an observable policy change that, for example, could be utilized by either empirical non-quantifiable, or empirical quantifiable data. Lisa Martin?s (1992) game theoretical model is a good framework to look at the relationship between the two states on the bargaining level. But it does not take into consideration the two other levels of power, i.e., it focuses on bargaining power, and omits structural power and hegemonic power. A comprehensive framework of different forms of power relationship between a patron state and a client state is needed to explain the cooperative/non-cooperative behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the adoption of the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction in December 2002 a radical overhaul of US and international preventive nuclear non-proliferation policy has occurred. This paper argues that policy measures have yielded the legalization of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Under US leadership, the UN Security Council has been endowed with the role of a legislating and adjudicating third-party mechanism sanctioning non-compliance with core norms of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). An operational law-enforcement and policing mechanism to interdict suspicious trade was created and international law amended to criminalize proliferation-related trading or smuggling. On this background, the paper conceptually discusses legitimation strategies ideal-typically predominant in hegemonic versus imperial social orders and evaluates what strategies have predominated with the Bush administration during the adoption and implementation of two policy innovations addressing the supply-side of proliferation: the Proliferation Security Initiative of 2003 and UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The three hegemonies of the modern world-system have been the Dutch in the seventeenth century, the British in the nineteenth century and the hegemony of the United States in the twentieth century. Sociologists and political scientists have carefully studied the process of hegemonic rise and decline. Recent research by Rennstich (2001) retools Arrighi’s (1994) formulation of the organizational evolutions that have accompanied the emergence of larger and larger hegemons over the last six centuries. Modelski and Thompson (1996) argued that the British successfully managed to enjoy two power cycles, one in the eighteenth and another in the nineteenth centuries. With this precedent in mind Rennstich considers the possibility that the US might succeed itself in the twenty-first century. Rennstich’s analysis of the organizational, cultural and political requisites of the contemporary new lead industries ? information technology and biotechnology ? imply that the United States has a large comparative advantage that will most probably lead to another round of U.S. pre-eminence in the world-system. But important resistance to genetically engineered products has arisen as consumers and environmentalists worry about the unintended consequences of introducing radically new organisms into the biosphere. This paper will examine the agricultural biotechnology industry as a new lead industry and will consider its possible future impact on the distribution of power in the world-system. This will entail an examination of the loci and timing of private and publicly funded research and development, biotechnology firms that are developing and selling products, and the emergence of national and global policies that are intended to regulate and test genetically engineered products. The recent history of environmental impacts of genetically engineered products will be reviewed, as well as the contentious literature about the supposed risks of agricultural biotechnology. Several scenarios regarding the timing of the onset of biotech profitability and their potential impact on US economic centrality will be developed, and data on both the business history and the emergence of resistance will be employed to examine the likelihood of these possible scenarios. Draft (v. 5-51-03) 4026 words Proposed for presentation at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 17-20, Montreal. An earlier version was presented at the Division of Social Science Seminar, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michel Foucault’s analysis of biopower and its new technologies centred on life and the living lack a clear definition of the concept of life. While Giorgio Agamben’s reformulation of biopower has differentiated between two concepts of life, zoe and bios, bare life and politically qualified life, Agamben’s notion of zoe has often been equated with the Foucauldian understanding of life. This paper will show that the conflation of life and bare life, the zone of indistinction they enter erases the space for political action, for processes of re-subjectivation. To this end it draws on a Deleuzian understanding of life and confronts it with Foucault’s and Agamben’s. Deleuze introduces a different notion from both Agamben’s zoe and Foucault’s life, that of a life or ‘impersonal life’, life which cannot be attributed to a subject, which only exists in a matrix of desubjectivation. The challenge of abject life is that of its status as excluded, downcast life and therefore cannot be based on a biopolitics of impersonal life. In this understanding of life, biopolitics needs to be exposed as desubjectivating, as erasing political differences and short-circuiting political claims on the status of the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how secondary states experience unipolarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that a political reading of mobility is instrumental for understanding the role of democracy within globalised structures of power. Relegated to a socio-economic background that prompts new engagements with democracy, mobility has been neglected as a condition of possibility and as a form of democratic practice. Drawing on Georg Simmel's sociology of money, we show that practices of transversal mobility constitute democratic moments in relation to structures of power that are constituted across the territorial circumscription of national states. Mobility works directly upon structures of power through universal rights and the politics of the 'mob'. As democratic practices, both rights and mass politics rely on the principle of equality. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dislodged from its initial disciplinary locations in law, sociology and political studies, reference to citizenship (and rights) is insidiously slipping into the conceptual discourse of a wider array of disciplines. Anthropologists, for example, apply the term as a means to bypass the homogenizing and reifying implications of well used concepts such as ethnicity and culture. At least part of the intention in conceptual substitution may arise from efforts to think more globally on the one hand, and to better account sociologically for internal differentiation amongst so-called ethnic, and cultural groups marked as other through the migration process. Certainly, anthropologists have moved far beyond the simplifying equations of migration as precipitated in rupture followed by a clean break. Citizenship needs similar attention for its elasticity; migrants are not simply moved from one national container to another . On this point, concepts such as transnationalism and long distance nationalism remind us of the multiplicity of boundary crossing attachments and obligations migrants carry with them (economic, political, legal, social, familial and subjective). How might such an unlocking of people and place be applied to a mobile concept of citizenship? In this paper I will critically examine the theoretical and methodological implications of the conceptual turn to citizenship with a view to identifying discursive elisions. The paper is particularly concerned with processes of migration, development and the question of class. Racism and gender exploitation also need to be relentlessly examined for their persistent reworking in the global sites where migrants locate themselves. Do new vocabularies of citizenship distract attention from the ever present processes of class, gender and racialized differentiation which attend migration, both in migrant sending and receiving contexts? What is gained from this new lens and what is obscured. Examples are drawn from ethnographic research on Philippine gendered labour migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the transformations/distortions that the concept of the ‘rentier state’ has experienced as it has been detached from its context and reworked by the hegemonic epistemological and methodological practices of Political Science. In this paper, I argue that the hegemonic epistemological stance, and methodological practices in Political Science has evacuated this concept’s theoretical and social content by reducing it to a narrow understanding of ‘taxation without representation’. In this paper, I first explore the conceptual history of the ‘rentier state’ from its original usage - where it was the core concept employed to explain the democracy problem in the Middle East by referring to the social formations it perpetuated and the social struggles it shaped - to its contemporary metamorphosed usage by mainsteam Political Science. The form it takes in this mainstream approach is embodied in the idea of ‘taxation without representation’, which itself is utilizaed in a reduced form. After describing the historical development of this concept, I aim to explain the phenomenon. The explanation focuses on two distinct aspects of hegemony in the discipline: first, on the very specific understanding of the western epistemological tradition to which it submits; and second, the particular methodology it implements. Finally, I will demonstrate how this concept - which originated in the Middle East, was mediated by the hegemonic practices of the field, and was exported back to the Middle Eastern - has lost its explanatory capacity in its original context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the first step in a multi-year project to investigate the concept and dimensions of the purported “crisis” of global governance, the existence of which is commonly asserted but less commonly examined in detail. The purpose of this paper is ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines what geography, sociology and political economy contribute to our understanding of one key concept in IR, the state. The paper makes use of recent literature that seeks to conceptualize and theorize state transformation in Europe. In p ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thinking from the margins or the peripheries (be they geographical, epistemological, cultural, or political) of International Relations has traditionally been discouraged by disciplinary discourses that have sought to take command of what it means to be true, objective, normal, valid, just, or simply topical. This control of meaning at the center of the discipline has been done on allegedly scientifically verifiable, or empirically manifest, or theoretically relevant methodological and ontological grounds. As Michel Foucault has argued, beyond so-called scientific, normative, or intellectual reasons advanced to impose a dominant voice at the center of a discipline (any discipline), what is at stake in the control of the center?and the corollary silencing of the margins?is a disciplinary decision over what can be said or pronounced and how it can be said or pronounced. More than producing truths, disciplines and those who position themselves at their centers are interested in the production, management and perpetuation of the ?true,? that is to say, of that discursive domain where certain linguistic, rhetorical, and narrative criteria established as normatively essential by some voices in the discipline must be used and reproduced in all sorts of explanations. Moving beyond Foucault, and bringing in the supplementary figures of thinkers like Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci, one could say that ideology and hegemony are never far behind such discursive controls often found at the center of disciplines. One also would have to recognize that such hegemonic controls also require ideological exclusions. In other words, the formation of a periphery or margin on ideological bases is a necessary part of enterprises interested in imposing dominant or hegemonic languages and accompanying regimes of truth. This paper argues that the current practice and theory of IR at the center (in the geographic West?and the United States above all?but also through the supposedly pressing contemporary empirical and conceptual issues that the discipline is said to have to deal with) provides yet another obvious instance of hegemonic discursivity put to the service of ideological distancing and silencing. What I call tabloid geopolitics is a dominant discursive formation, increasingly adopted by so-called mainstream IR scholars in the West mostly, that claims to be able to make sense of?and perhaps provide solutions to?the problems faced by the world of IR in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the US war in Iraq. Adopted by scholars of all theoretical stripes (from classical realists to die-hard idealists), tabloid geopolitics is particularly aggressive in its discursive exclusion of the margins of the discipline as it urges, sometimes openly, at other times more softly, but in all cases ideologically, scholars, students, and even lay people concerned with the fate of the ?free world? in an age of global terror to only focus on a few, essential, supposedly vital issues, such as the preservation of democracy, the destruction of terrorism, and the propagation of Western style neoliberal freedoms. The hegemony over discourse (what can be said or not said after 9/11, for example) emphasized by tabloid geopolitics not only occludes marginal voices but, moreover, sometimes integrates some of those voices or alternate possibilities into that which must be abjected, attacked, or even annihilated in the context of the global war on terror. Thus, this paper argues, critical thinking/voicing in IR coming from so-called margins?whatever they may be?must be involved in practices that seek to redefine what the margins or peripheries can mean or look like (and what they can say too) so that distancing, silencing, or even destruction by the tabloid geopolitical center can be challenged... ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper aspires to bring everyday life and social repetition under the spotlight of political theorising, and examine their emancipatory potential. To do so it engages with two competing understandings of hegemony in radical political theory; one based on transcendence and social antagonisms and the other based on immanence and everyday life. The main thesis of the paper is that in order to understand the ontological foundations of hegemony we need to shift our focus from social antagonisms and hegemonic representations onto social repetition. The paper starts with an exposition of Laclau's radical theory of hegemony and its limitations. It then develops a counter ontological reading, an 'ontology of social repetition', based on the work of Maurice Blanchot and Gilles Deleuze. The paper concludes by examining what kinds of agency are present in social repetition, and how these can be translated in social action and strategies for social change. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A broad array of approaches emerging out of the Third Debate in international relations could be broadly understood to be constructivist. They share a critique of social scientific methods that assume a fixed and objective world, as well as an assumption that international relations is constructed, and thus changeable. Despite the initial ?celebration of difference,? constructivism has since acquired a more narrow meaning, accompanied by debates that more clearly demarcate constructivism, post-structuralism, Critical Theory, etc. This paper will explore the emergence of the demarcations and the ideas that distinguish various constructivisms, including that between construction and performativity, construction and deconstruction, conventional and critical constructivism, and the influence of the philosophers or social theorists such as Wittgenstein, Habermas, Foucault and Derrida. The paper will analyse what is at stake, both positively and negatively, in these acts of boundary construction. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As constructivists and other advocates of constitutive theories have often noted, the natural world is very different from the social one. Our ideas about the social world not only reflect that world, but help shape and create it; we are part of the reality we try to describe and explain, not external to it, and we therefore have the potential to alter the reality a theory is merely intended to describe or explain. Our theories about the social world may thus become self-fulfilling prophecies or autogenetic in character. And yet while constructivists often make this point in epistemological debate, there have been relatively few attempts so far to address its empirical implications. With that objective in mind, this paper examines three prominent IR theories – the democratic peace theory, the interdependence equals peace thesis and the ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis – arguing that each has a self-fulfilling character rather than being true or false in any objective or timeless sense; each is, to paraphrase the now time-honored expression, what the relevant actors make of it. The paper also probes the processes by which theories become self-generating, stressing the role of opinion entrepreneurs in fashioning explanatory and predictive theories which become popularized – usually because they seem to fit the nature of the times in some way - so that people begin to believe that a theory explains reality in a naturalistic sense and that its predictions are therefore bound to hold. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the transnational political role and activities of two new diasporas: the Acehnese and East Timorese in Australia, North America, Portugal and Scandinavia. It traces their South to North movement and long-distance influence on self-determination conflicts in their country of origin. Sociology and political science research theorizes that diasporas are international players with a capacity for political action in both the host state and the country of origin. This paper tests this hypothesis and examines how and why diaspora goals and strategies of political action as well as the repertoires of political action change over time and through a fusion of national identities and adopted transnationally-defined norms. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While students of international relations have over the last two decades fleshed out the logic of the democratic peace, they have devoted hardly any attention to the effects of war on democracy. Existing approaches, derived from foundational work in macrohistorical sociology, appear to have reached conclusions very much at odds with each other. Some suggest that war preparations underlay the emergence of the absolutist state in Europe, while others maintain that the mobilization of national resources for war has compelled states to bargain with their populations and broaden citizenship. War and war mobilization have thus been portrayed as both inimical and beneficial to democracy. These contending narratives, however, both tell stories of near-uniform effects. They understate the degree of variation with regard to the rapidity with which and the extent to which executives have expanded their authority and liberties have been infringed in times of war and crisis as well as with regard to the lingering postwar impact of such wartime changes. This paper suggests that different kinds of war have different effects (in both degree and kind) on different dimensions of democracy in different kinds of democratic regimes and with different degrees of postwar persistence. The paper will unpack this claim, suggesting and illustrating a number of provisional hypotheses. One implication of the analysis: total wars, on balance, bolster liberal democracy, but the long-run impact of limited wars?including the current ?war on terror??should be a matter of great concern. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper sets out to present a (rationalist) theoretical model, which predicts and explains behavioral changes that different institutional designs of CSR-PPPs in weak states cause on participating companies. It asks: Which institutional design of CSR-PPPs causes what behav-ioral changes on participating companies? The model focuses on three independent variables: Institutional design of CSR-PPPs, the pre-ference structure of companies that participate in CSR-PPPs, and the strategic environment (consisting of competitors, NGOs and business associations; their preferences and action al-ternatives) within which companies make decisions. A set of hypotheses is generated â€" each focusing on the effects of one variable while the other two are held constant â€", which define minimum requirements for, as well as conditions for more and less, behavioral changes of participating companies. To illustrate how constellations of these variables translate into hy-potheses, consider:H1: If companies face a cooperative collective action problem with respect to CSR-policies, a necessary condition for the institutional design of a CSR-PPP for behavioral change is â€" in case that no other relevant actors like NGOs and business associations are present â€" that it entails CSR-standards which are formulated with high degrees of precision and obligation and that it employs monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms.H2: If participating companies can achieve competitive advantages through a CSR-policy (e.g. in certain cases of HIV-treatment programs), CSR-PPPs need to offer "legitimate" benchmarks or managerial support (e.g. management systems) to have an impact.The applicability of the model will be demonstrated by illustrating examples. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nature and conditions of the internationally relating self are of paramount importance when seeking to understand how it is that we 'know' the world. My intention in this short paper is to offer some thoughts about what it might mean to move towards something like a travelling epistemology for IR scholarship. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the speech act of security, the concept of 'act' draws attention to a dual aspect of securitising: the actualisation of a decision with political gravity and the exceptionality of acts of securitising. The decision to securitise enacts the world through a centre of gravity where multiplicity can be brought together around an upping of the bet into a test of the will to survive. At this point a political critique of securitising becomes possible based on assigning political responsibility, demanding political accountability, and the legitimacy of authorisation based on claims of exceptionality. When looking more closely at analyses of surveillance, risk management and precautionary practice, among others, one tends to encounter a highly diffuse process of securitising and its contestation in which decisive acts with gravity are effaced. What can the politics of insecurity be if securitising is a highly diffuse process which effaces 'acts' as the actualisation of a decision with gravity? I propose a political analytics of little nothings that focuses on the critical capacity of mediating actants in situations of disagreement over justifications pertaining injustices and understands these disputes as an ordinary, frequent part of a scattered and scattering process of securitising. It is the basis for a political sociology of securitising in which the distinction between the normal and exceptional, the everyday and the security elite, the habitual and the extra-?-ordinary, which are central to the conception of speech acts of security, no longer organise the politics of insecurity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper seeks to analyse the relation between the declaration of exception and its contemporary practices with the form of governmentality in which this declaration is embedded. It wants to refute the Schmittian, Agamben arguments of exceptionalism and sovereignist view and to propose a more sociological approach of the routines which enact the possibility of the declaration of exception. It is a relational view, analysing from below and not from above the exception. It comes back to a relational approach versus a decisionist one and insists on the importance of Nancy and Foucault. It finished by a critical discussion of the relation between the governmental and the political. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There have been many requirements that theorists have sought to satisfy in developing theories of IR, including explanatory criteria, an ability to predict, and some relevance to policy-making. The use of one form of conventionalism, a view that has received little attention in the social sciences, holds out much promise for solving many of these problems. This paper lays out some of the strengths of such an account of IR theory. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As David Held observes: “There is nothing more central to political and social theory than the nature of the state, and nothing more contested.” "The state" is routinely defined and employed to suit the normative and/or empirical ends of scholars and pra ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

History is our repository of information about the past, and, as such, offers explanations about the present. As a repository it has the special capacity to reveal the hidden facts of injustice. More indirectly, history is critical to the creation of ethnic groups and nations, given that shared past experience, or the perception of shared past experience, is the strongest rationale for the existence of the group. In addition, history texts, monuments, museums and other forms of public history provide a sense of stability and tradition that assist the legitimation of the existing regime. Beyond their role in group creation and legitimation, history and memory provide material for group myths that are a source of social cohesion because they supply operational codes and a system of ethics. Finally, history and memory are the containers for grievance. If grievances are not addressed, they can be a powerful tool of mobilization by political leaders. The capacity of historical memory to coalesce politicized groups cannot be understood fully without recognizing that simultaneously, historical memories play several critical roles in the lives of individuals. History is a way of recording and remembering traumas of past generations that have an emotional or physiological impact, and possibly a material impact, on their descendants. Trauma that has affected groups is repeatedly relived by the group, contributing to group identity while creating an ongoing sense of victimization. Because of the individual?s biological dependence on the group that supports it, the individual will identify with the group in order to receive what is offered to group members, absorbing cultural elements and a shared sense of the past. In addition, in the process of developing a consistent sense of self, people use historical material to select mental constructs by which to connect inner and outer experience. ..ASA-For all the above reasons, historical memories are deeply rooted in a society and are tenacious. Introducing a different history means challenging psychological and sociological patterns that are of long duration. The instrumental purposes historical memories serve society suggest that contentious history cannot be separated from politics and power relations. To the degree that the political life of a society remains contested, historical memory will be intertwined with that contestation. And yet the need to address the problem of contentious, chauvinist history is crucial for post-conflict reconstruction and the prevention of future conflict. Devotion to ?the truth? is a core aspect of a society?s dedication to justice, even if all acknowledge the difficulties in reaching ?the truth?. Establishing a basis of historical truth in a society places some limit on the possibilities for chauvinist leaders to distort the truth for political ends. A culture of historical debate makes it more likely that past injustices will be brought to light and will be addressed. Acknowledgement of the traumas of the past are a first step in mourning and are essential for individuals and the society as a whole to find healing and move forward. All these processes will assist in the development of a new narrative. At the same time, a rethinking of the past can enable intercultural understanding by helping groups remove their negative stereotypes and accept the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Small states are characterised by a deficit of power. Due to their limited capabilities they lack both the capacity to influence other actors and to prevent these actors from influencing them. To overcome this dilemma small states have to choose between e ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the last few years a spate of books has rekindled the debate as to the status of American hegemony (eg., P.Khanna, The Second World; F. Zakaria, Post-American World, etc.), and returned systemic inquiry to the earlier 1980s analyses of Robert Gilpin Wa ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My presentation will tackle a rather general issue. Its starting point will be the fact that what distinguishes Bourdieu and other sociologists most visibly from political scientists is that they take an overall perspective on society (or, in Bourdieuan terms, on the social space). Bourdieu is not a specialist for politics but he is a specialist for society as a whole, of which politics is but a part. So what he should be able to offer to political science is an idea about the place of politics within the overall structure of society. This expectation might be disappointed when we turn from national politics to world politics and from the idea of a national society to the idea of world society or of a global social space. Bourdieu´s theory, like that of other sociologists, refers to a national society. It entails a concept of the overall structure of national societies, but it doesn´t tell us how to conceive of a global social space. On this issue I will make a few suggestions. More specifically, I will argue on two different planes: first with reference to sociology in general and then with reference to Bourdieu. In sociology, I will suggest, there are at least three different possible concepts for a world societal structure: First, stratification, second, division of labor (or, in Bourdieuan terms, differentiation into fields), third, differentiation into a plurality of nation states or national societies. Each of these societal structures assigns a different role to world politics. I will then shortly discuss which of them might be favored by Bourdieu. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]