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The post 9/11 world has generated renewed interest in the problematic implications of asymmetrical conflictual interaction between states and non state actors. This paper seeks to contribute to the growing literature on asymmetrical warfare by focusing on ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The post-9/11 move by democracies to enact security measures which appear to challenge both domestic constitutional and international legal human rights norms, such as the creation of the Guantánamo Bay prison camp, the practice of extraordinary rendition, and the use of torture in interrogations has resulted in growing scholarly concern with the problem of states of exception. These measures, whether considered justified or not, are conceptualized by some theorists as belonging to a temporal condition associated with war time emergency. Other more critical scholars, in contrast, examine exceptions in their relation to the constitution of sovereign power. In exploring these contending analytical perspectives, my paper aims to better understand the character of contemporary exceptionalism. Using American intelligence practices in both the pre and post-9/11 period as a case study, I explore the extent to which covert and clandestine state security has ever been constrained by a substantive conception of the rule of law and human rights. I ask how exceptional the current state of exception really is. In doing so, I find that norms of exception are a part of ordinary state security practice, but that an excessive focus on sovereign decision and legal black holes obscures the ambiguities of Bush administration policy. Despite the extremely troubling nature of the "War on Terror", I conclude there is hope for societal contestation and the rule of law as checks on human rights abuses. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush Administration's strategy in response to the 9/11 attacks is increasingly viewed as a failure by almost every measure. Using the decision to invade Iraq as a case study, I identify the expected steps in national security policy formation and track how the policy process in this case differentiated from past practices. For example, the intelligence assessment step usually involves weighing both the capabilities and intentions of a potential foe, while in the case of Iraq the capabilities assessment was both inept and politically-compromised, and the intentions assessment essentially not accomplished. As George Tenet recently point out, the weighing of threats and potential strategic outcomes steps were also not undertaken. I also examine how future policy-makers can employ the existing policy process to optimize strategic outcomes. Furthermore, I identify improvements to the process in light of the current threat from non-state actors. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humanitarian Intervention after ‘9-11’: The case for continuing relevanceIn the wake of the ‘9-11’, some scholars have claimed that we may very well have witnessed the ‘sunset of humanitarian intervention’. They refer to the shift in the international agenda, the troublesome relationship between the great powers following the US-led attack on Iraq, and the ineffective international response to the ongoing crimes against humanity in the Sudanese province of Darfur. This paper argues a different case. The war against Iraq has, admittedly, increased the suspicion towards intervention as such in many parts of the world, and it is also obvious that the US has lost a good deal of its credibility as a leader of collective intervention for ‘the common good’. However, this is not necessarily the end of humanitarian intervention. First, the international community and its leading powers have not renounced the right of humanitarian intervention. On the contrary, the 2005 UN Summit outcome document supported the associated principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’. Second, it is too early to rule out a humanitarian intervention in Darfur, and one should also not ignore the coercive steps taken by the UN so far. Third, depending on its policy on Iraq and the ‘war on terror’, the US might recover from the loss of legitimacy and capacity it has suffered in recent years. Finally, the institutionalization of humanitarian intervention at the UN and beyond since the early 1990’s has progressed to a stage where it will continue to serve as a signpost and a warning, and, at times, a platform on which to return for a variety of interventionist measures against atrocities. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the impact of the events of November 9, 1989, September 11, 2001 and the Iraq War on the important variables constituting the relationships that drive theories on international relations. It emphasizes the need for international relations scholars to reexamine the fundamental theoretical understandings underlying their approach to interpreting international reality and formulating international policy. It also notes that the terrorism in the U.S. left international relations theory and scholarship unprepared.

The article aims to understand the reasons for the foreign policy shift of Russia and its opposition to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. It examines the concept of positional goods in international relations theory. An overview of Russian foreign policy from the collapse of the country through the post September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks reconciliation is provided. It analyzes the opposition of Russia to the war in Iraq in light of positional goods and considers the role of the U.S. in precipitating positional conflict between itself and Russia.

The evolution in the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity has led to shifting patters of alliances in world politics. After 9/11, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to use its overwhelming military power to deal with potential or real threats. Contrary to its policy of embedded its power in the economic and security institutions of the post-1945 period, the United States increasingly views the multilateral order as an unreasonable restraint on the exercise of hegemonic power. What does this new context mean for Britain? Going back to 1997, the first New Labour government added an internationalist dimension to the traditional roles of acting as a loyal ally to the United States and serving as a bridge across the transatlantic divide. The Iraq war of 2003 showed that the bridge could not bear the weight of the disagreement between 'old Europe' and the new conservatives in Washington. As the transatlantic architecture came crashing down, the hopes of Old Labour internationalists came down with it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the conference paper "American Vincibility in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq: Future Challenges in the Domestic and Foreign Policy Arenas" presented at the "46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It examines the impact of the 9-11 terrorist attacks and the Iraq invasion on the political and economic terms of the U.S. It emphasizes that the present U.S. policies are insufficiently advancing the interests of the country in the era of globalization and national vulnerability.

The article explores the role of popular culture in producing official fear and trying to provide the people with security against the terror of uncertainty. It mentions that the paper is inspired by reading newspapers and watching news and movies since the 9/11 terrorist attacks through the Iraq war in 2003. It states that popular culture makes up a network of micro-power which circulates through individuals and becomes a strategy of biopolitical power.

The paper examines the range of international law debates on war in Iraq as they appeared in the leading journals and discussion forums. Divergent interpretations of existing rules of war contributed to a degree of conceptual and practical confusion over whether war was justified. Two lines of analysis are identified. One argument is that a fundamental change in circumstances after September 11th allows for a reconsideration and even reform of existing rules of war. A second argument sees the concepts of imminent threat and collective security as still relevant in the post-September 11th world. The author’s primary focus is on the weakness of either argument to offer fresh ideas on the meaning and goals of war in this new era and to suggest new ways of moving the field forward on such questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Bush administration’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was to declare war on terrorism. The aspects of this war that have received the most attention have been the unilateral and military nature of the US response. What has been overlooked is another part of the Bush administration’s reaction: an effort to reconfigure the international norm of sovereignty as it applies to state sponsors of terrorism. The US has adopted the view that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their sovereign right to autonomy over their territory. This has been accompanied by an effort to persuade or compel the international community to accept this view as well, as can be seen in US efforts to garner international support in the military campaigns against Afghanistan and Iraq. This raises several theoretical questions, which this paper will try to address. First, is this merely a hegemon acting to reshape the international community to suit its national interests? Realists and neoliberal institutionalists disagree about the value of international institutions; will a dominant state reject institutions that it doesn’t think serve its interests, or will it try to modify them to avoid the costs of creating replacements? Constructivists and proponents of the English School argue that the shared rules, interests, and values of the international society of states will influence the behavior of its members. US behavior over the last two years includes elements that support each of these views; it has adopted a with us or against us approach, but at the same time has worked to persuade other states to revise the norm of sovereignty. Second, can a state unilaterally reshape international norms? The US appears to be trying to change shared understandings of when states retain the sovereign right to non-intervention by other states. The US is tacitly arguing that by supporting terrorists, states forfeit their right to internal autonomy, because they have not fulfilled the responsibilities inherent in sovereignty. (This effort on the part of the US is not entirely new; during the 1990s the US government tried to shape international attitudes toward rogue states, but without arguing that these states had forfeited sovereignty.) While some studies have examined the role of individuals and international organizations in shaping international norms, the role of the state in reshaping international norms deserves further attention. This paper will contribute to this inquiry. It will examine the efforts the US has made to persuade other states to adopt a similar stance toward state sponsors of terrorism, and responses by other states and the international community in forums such as the UN and regional organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coercive diplomacy has generally focused on scenarios where there is a hegemon present (generally the United States) and the target state is a non-WMD power. But this seems to be a very restrictive model and needs to be examined in the present-day context. One of the basic characteristics of the successful conduct of coercive diplomacy is a high degree of credibility of the threat that would be carried out in the absence of the target state’s acquiescence to the demands of the hegemon. In the recent war with Iraq, the United States maintained its credibility by carrying out its threat to use force. But there is a lot more at stake here. Since September 11, 2001, the idea of regime change in certain countries has become more and more attractive to several sections of the Bush administration, in spite of a lack of a clear policy on this. Besides Iraq, there are several other countries where coercive diplomacy might be applied by the U.S. with the objective of regime change and/or a change in the WMD status of the target state. Iran, Syria, and North Korea are seen as future candidates. The ostensible objective for this course of action by the United States (either unilaterally, or in conjunction with members of the international community) is to reverse the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction by these countries. This paper examines if and how coercive diplomacy can be carried out in a situation where the target state has reached a certain level of WMD capability and weaponization. Besides the Gulf campaign this year, the other recent example of coercive diplomacy was seen in South Asia after the attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001. In that situation, India launched a massive mobilization of troops on the border with Pakistan, demanding an end to support for separatism in Kashmir. The mobilization ended almost a year later with questionable results. Nuclear deterrence in the Indian subcontinent was the main reason why India couldn’t go ahead with its threat. This is a very clear contrast with the Iraq example. A scenario where both sides have weapons of mass destruction would impede on the credibility of the threats of the hegemon. This weakens the tangibility of power enjoyed by it. With the help of potential cases like Iran, North Korea, this paper looks at how the effectiveness of coercion by the hegemon is damaged in such circumstances, and tries to propose a model through which future cases of coercive diplomacy could be examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The shock of the September 11 attacks was widely seen as alien fanaticism, an invasion from the unknown. Wars against jihadists and tribesmen in Afghanistan and Iraq have strengthened this 'cultural turn' in both the US military and public debate. While t ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses narrative analysis, research on magical thinking and positioning theory to examine the narrative constructed by the Bush administration after 9/11/01 to position the invasion of Iraq as legitimate and necessary. It argues that the ‘War on Terror’ is the creation of a new myth, which absolves America from the responsibility of questioning its own policies, or reciprocity in our historical relationship with Iraq. It further explores the deep cultural tendencies within the American national identity that rose to the surface as the narrative itself emerged. These dualistic tendencies contributed to the uptake of the narrative and its eventual hegemonic positioning. This deterministic explanatory narrative pushed the country into an intractable conflict â€" a war now in its fifth year. For a brief moment after the events of 9/11/01, Americans seemed ready to reflect and engage in the critical thinking that would not strip the 9/11 narrative of its complexity and relational nature. As the narrative unfolded, however, character essentializing, impoverished moral themes and linear plots replaced complexity. In short, we came to understand ourselves as essentially, fundamentally, different from them. But are we? The second part of this study explores that question by examining the interface of the macro narrative with the micro narratives of individual soldiers caught in the story’s uptake. Specifically, the paper seeks to discern the location of any shifts in thinking regarding the presenting narrative and the presumption of its moral justification through interviews with veterans from the Iraq War. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the September 11, 2001 attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the issue of 'state failure' has come to the fore of US policy-planning. It has since been argued by policy-makers and scholars alike that 'state failure' constitutes a threat against global security due to the supposed harbouring of terrorists in conditions already rendered fragile by the impact of globalisation. Such an approach to 'state failure' is problematic in at least three respects: 1) It focuses on the supposed symptoms of 'state failure' (international terrorism) rather than the structural conditions that permit such 'failure' to occur. This itself results from an unreflexive attitude to both scholarship and policy-making; 2) It betrays an 'externalist' conception of globalisation and a reductionist understanding of the relationship between globalisation and security in the sense that globalisation is regarded as an 'out there' phenomenon, whereas it is very much an 'in here' occurrence; 3) Finally, it is also reductionist in that it reduces the security dimension of globalisation to the threat posed by terrorism to state security, for example by seeking to understand the globalisation of security through the location of terrorist organisations within 'failed states', thereby failing to move away from the state-centrism. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How and why did the Bush administration succeed in dominating the debate in the run-up to the Iraq War, and why was the potential political opposition relatively mute? Recent accounts have emphasized that the administration's efforts to inflate the Iraq threat succeeded because of the U.S. executive's inherent advantage in shaping the public agenda, but this overestimates the president's ability to sway public opinion. More importantly, these accounts devote too little attention to the rhetorical implications of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. We will explore how, out of the range of possible meanings, a particular interpretation of 9/11 came to predominate and how it reshaped the rhetorical playing field in such a way as to silence those one might otherwise have expected to oppose the administration in its quest for war with Iraq. Theoretically, this paper focuses on the processes by which meanings become established and thus certain interpretations of international events come to seem natural and undeniable. These questions have been marginalized by the constructivist "mainstream," but they should lie at the heart of the constructivist project. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims at assessing the flaws of U.S. imperial power in the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era. The debate over the concept of ?empire?? although not new on U.S. power ? has reached a new climax with the Bush presidency, especially in the aftermath of the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Arguably, this debate has so far lacked a clear definition of the meaning of ?empire?. For some traditional authors, it mainly refers to territorial conquests and possessions. A broader definition, offered by more recent scholars, promotes the notions of influence and attractiveness and equates empire with ?hegemony?.My paper has three objectives. First a definition of ?U.S. empire? will be established on the basis of historical precedents with the British and continental European empires of the 19th century. I will argue that the U.S. clearly follows the path of such previous empires. With one major change however: its domination relies on ?informal preponderance? in the political, cultural, economic and military areas. Second, I will argue that a U.S. ?liberal? empire would generate far more stability and prosperity in the international system than a multipolar, power-balancing order. However, and thirdly, the occupation of Iraq since April 2003 has clearly demonstrated that the U.S. lacks the tools (manpower, institutions, skills?) required for managing and sustaining an imperial order in the 21st century based on ?informal preponderance? and ?liberal empire?. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The initial objective in this paper will be to conduct a multidisciplinary, theoretical-archival exploration of how the Bush administration was able to mobilize public support in the U.S. for a war against Iraq -- against substantial international disapproval -- in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, culminating in the outbreak of war in March 2003. Bodies of theory to be examined in this regard include, among others: [1] Cognitive Dissonance (Festinger, 1962). [2] Basic Human Needs (Burton, 1997). [3] Frustration-Aggression (Dollard, et al. 1939). [4] Functional Conflict (Simmel, 1955; Coser, 1956). [5] Ethnocentrism (Sumner, 1906; Tajfel, 1978, 1981). [6] Worldviews/Identity (Kuhn 1970). [7] Civilizational Rallying/Clash of Civilizations (Huntington, 1993, 1996). The primary objective is to generate hypotheses which will be tested initially against the background of media accounts of the War on Terror from September 2001, to the buildup to the War against Iraq in March 2003. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]