Search

Australia's new government is committed to delivering the next defence white paper in 2015. The two previous white papers took a predominantly risk-management approach to Southeast Asia, generally ignored the strategic opportunities in the region, treated it as a stand-alone region largely unrelated to developments in East Asia and failed to link Australia's policies in Southeast Asia with the broader goal of helping to ensure greater strategic stability in Asia by putting constraints on Chinese assertiveness and encouraging its peaceful rise. After offering a summary of recent Australian defence thinking on Southeast Asia, this paper outlines why managing China is the key variable when it comes to strategic stability in the region. It then examines how China's strategy and behaviour can be shaped and influenced by events and relationships in Southeast Asia, and offers some suggestions as to the role Australia can seek to play in Southeast Asia that relates to Canberra's China-focused objectives and strategic stability in Asia more broadly If that can be achieved in the 2015 defence white paper, Australia - which is often criticized for being preoccupied primarily with managing the relationship with its superpower ally the United States - will demonstrate to itself and Asia that its heavy reliance on the ANZUS treaty is no barrier to strategic creativity in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Singapore's post-independence leaders perceived the country's vulnerability in terms of its miniscule size, lack of resources and hinterland, fragile ethnic harmony and geo-strategic location surrounded by larger, and potentially hostile, neighbours. Given such odds, Singapore sought to become a global city by tapping into international flows of goods and trade. Becoming a core node in the global economy also enhanced Singapore's strategic relevance, upping major powers' interest in its survival. However, due to its global connectivity Singapore's exposure to rapidly spreading global risks, such as pandemics and financial crises, has become increasingly noticeable. This paper seeks to uncover a paradox in Singapore's ambition to become a global city as new vulnerabilities emerge from its highly globalized status. Through a discourse analysis of policy-makers' statements and speeches, it reveals that a recurrent theme of perceived vulnerability today relates to the extensive global maritime, aviation and financial flows on which Singapore's continued prosperity depends. The paper concludes that the critical infrastructure that underpin its global connectivity - its airport, maritime port hub and financial centre - can also unwittingly circulate and import global risks such as pandemics, Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation, financial contagion and terrorist financing, adding a new dimension to how its leaders perceive vulnerability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Problems of violent youth groups have escalated in Indonesia, following economic recession, unemployment, and weakened state institutions. Young people have beers hit by the lack of income and broken expectations In consequence, youth groups emerge and arrange for members' economic revenue as well as identity creation and confidence. Religion in some cases is used to legitimize violence and to strengthen the boldness of group members. The paper offers a brief overview of gangster (preman) traditions in Indonesia. Empirical findings on violent youth groups in the two selected provinces are presented within a multi-factor analytical framework, where the need for income and identity strengthening, political élite interests, and the lack of law enforcement contribute to explaining criminal and vigilante violence, Interviews with leaders and members of movements engaged in violent actions offer insights into a problem that threatens national security and control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the symbolic significance of Singapore's policy of ‘multiracialism’ by bringing it in connection with the city-state's post-colonial problematic of national identity. Against the currently dominant, nativist rhetoric which aims to construct Singapore as an authentically ‘Asian’ nation diametrically opposed to its ‘Western’ counterparts, this paper stresses the necessary and inevitable hybridity of Singaporean identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International justice is characterized by the global articulation of basic human rights and peremptory norms outlawing crimes against humanity. In the twenty-first century, an international obligation of states to pursue individuals who bear responsibility for gross violations of human rights has formalized. Since the 1999 independence referendum, Timor-Leste has struggled to achieve substantive justice for the human rights violations committed during Indonesia's 25-year de facto administration. Timor-Leste provides a unique case study on the international dimensions of pursuing justice in a post-conflict transitional context, particularly as many alleged perpetrators of rights violations have been shielded by Indonesia. This presents a challenge for Timor-Leste in balancing its various international and domestic priorities: while domestic political order and rule of law necessitates the pursuit of substantive justice, Timor-Leste's external security interests require a positive relationship with Indonesia. This article examines the world's first bilateral Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Indonesia-Timor-Leste Commission of Truth and Friendship. It then analyses the implementation of the Commission's recommendations by Indonesia and Timor-Leste. The paper argues that the Commission was primarily a political mechanism designed to support international priorities rather than substantive justice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the involvement of a range of diverse for-profit actors in providing port and border security in Indonesia. Using the port of Belawan, Medan, as a case study, the article demonstrates the critical, albeit controversial, role that private security providers play in security governance in Indonesia. After a discussion of port security and the notion of ports as borders, the paper provides an overview of the large number of state and non-state actors involved in providing security in the port of Belawan. Among the for-profit actors are guards hired by the state-owned port operator Pelindo I; Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) with links to the Indonesian military; and members of Pemuda Pancasila (PP), known to be involved in illegal activities in the port they help secure. The article argues that while some private actors do contribute to port security, the involvement of so many different types of state and non- state agencies has actually lessened security in Belawan. This is in part due to the nature of some of the agents involved -- particularly the members of PP -- and the problematic relationship and lack of cooperation between the different state and non-state actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to challenge the view that Indonesia's geographical and population size account for its rising regional and global profile. Instead, it makes three inter-related arguments. First, the manifestations of Indonesia's foreign policy and global profile have always been based on its ability to harness the country's normative and moral voice. Second, while democratization since 1998 has allowed Indonesia to restore its reputation in world affairs and provided it with a new source of "soft power", it has also complicated foreign policy-making. Third, Indonesia's large geographical size and population have been a source of persistent internal security threats, and because the government has been unable to meet national defence requirements, the growth in its defence diplomacy activities reflect the country's continuing strategic weakness rather than its strength. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite calls over the years for the Asia-Pacific region, or some subset of it, to develop a regional security regime, no deliberate action to achieve this has been taken. This paper considers the possible ends of a regional security regime and the means towards achieving them. The ends themselves would differ according to whether any regime focused on security, traditionally and narrowly conceived, on comprehensive security or on human security. No matter which approach is taken, if the regime is to be successful in any sense beyond that of rhetoric, some of the region's cherished norms such as non-intervention as that is currently interpreted will have to be at least modified, if not completely scrapped. Even if the region collectively decides it needs a security regime and can agree on its ends, there are many alternative ways of achieving the ends and the processes of working out detailed rules will be difficult and time-consuming. None of this is to say that establishing a regional security regime will be impossible. It is to say that it will involve a lot of work, and a lot of compromise by state policy-makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the evolution of the American-led global campaign against international terrorism in Southeast Asia. During the initial stage of the campaign, the United States was pragmatic and circumspect as it cooperated with its Asian allies in neutralizing terrorist groups and other transnational criminals. The campaign generated a positive trend towards cooperative security as Washington provided military and intelligence assistance to several countries threatened by homegrown and international terrorist movements. However, this paper contends that the Bush administration's 2002 national security strategy has radically transformed the war on terror in Southeast Asia and might create a major problem in America's efforts to foster cooperative security since states in the region seem averse to the strategy of pre-emptive defence. The article concludes that the best way to counter terrorist organizations is through the cooperative security or functionalist approach rather than the strategic/military mode, which tends to generate conflict among state actors who are faced with a common security challenge -- international terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many interpretations of Thailand's May 1992 mass movement and military crackdown dwell on middle-class democracy formulae and/or mobacracy threats to national security. The paper argues that the two most interesting aspects of the May Events — non-violent tactics and non—governmental organizations - challenged not just the soldiers, but the whole military-directed discourse of political organization in Thailand. Utilizing feminist theory's notion of oppositional consciousness, the non-governmental organization/non-violent action dynamic is framed as a motivating force behind the social movement of April—May 1992. This challenge can be called post-modern because, with its multi-centred organization and centrifugal forces, it jams the discourse of ‘normal’ Thai politics leaving openings for a more participartory democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to examine and evaluate the extent to which the New Economic Policy (NEP) has been effective as an instrument for national integration in Malaysia. Based on a comparison of the situation before and after the implementation of the NEP, it is argued that although national development has been moving towards the achievement of the NEP objectives, ethnic tensions and conflict remain serious. While economic factors are important in preventing ethnic conflict, they are not sufficient to promote ethnic integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both the Hawke and Keating Labor governments (1983-96) gave some attention to the development of Asia-Pacific "security regionalism" as a means of strengthening the regional focus in Australia's security policies. While the rhetoric has changed, in terms of substance the Howard coalition government has continued many of the policies of its predecessor. At the same time, this government has had to adjust to the changed circumstances in Indonesia, and particularly the crisis in East Timor. Papua New Guinea, especially Bougainville, has been a concern for both governments; new problems have also arisen in Fiji and the Solomon Islands. The emphasis on security regionalism complements the continuing importance of Australia's security relationships with both the United States and New Zealand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 2010s, South Korea has increased its official development assistance (ODA) to Myanmar. Previous studies have highlighted the economic benefits of ODA to both South Korea and Myanmar, but the political motivations of Seoul's ODA policy towards Naypyidaw have received less scholarly attention. To fill this literature gap, this article analyses the three political factors underlying South Korea's increased ODA to Myanmar over the past ten years: Seoul's considerations regarding North Korea; South Korea's geopolitical competition with China and Japan; and the domestic constituents of ODA policymaking in South Korea. Adopting the concepts of realism and soft power, this article argues that national security interests and political motivations, including the intentions of ODA policymakers led by the president, have been important drivers of South Korea's increased ODA to Myanmar. In examining the role of domestic policymaking dynamics, this article uses as a case-study the K-town project in Myanmar which figured in the 2016 Choi Soon-sil-Gate scandal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With fishery incidents emerging as a major threat to peace and stability in the South China Sea, a better understanding of the underlying causes of these incidents becomes important. Mainstream media, and a substantial body of academic literature, attribute these fishing incidents, and the growing presence of Chinese fishermen in the South China Sea, to China’s strategic and political motives, claiming that these fishermen are actually fishing militia. Through revisiting the prevailing fishing militia narrative, this article argues that much wider economic and social factors are at work domestically in China, and that the international and regional scenes are more complex than the picture painted by purely viewing developments with China’s fishing militia in isolation. This article also makes the case that fishing disputes in the South China Sea have been heavily securitized with profound implications for the ongoing territorial and jurisdictional disputes in those waters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Achieving civilian control of security forces through constitutional reform processes has been a major challenge for young democracies or democratizing countries in Southeast Asia. In many cases, governments seeking to establish or consolidate civilian control have been faced with coups d'état or the threat of coups. The successful enshrinement of laws reining in security force adventurism has often accompanied compromises which at most provide militaries with considerable latitude in their areas of decision-making or at least protect soldiers from judicial prosecution. Ultimately, the constitutional incorporation of security forces into embedded political life is no easy task. This article examines two country cases of "defective" democracies. In each case, security forces have moved towards becoming more integrated under the constitutions of civilian-led regimes. This study poses four questions. First, how did the institutionalization of security forces under civilian-led constitutions occur? Second, how did these experiences vary? Third, to what extent do these security forces today possess differing degrees of enshrined powers? And fourth, based upon these experiences, how might civilian control be sustained over time? The article argues that constitutional change acceded to by security forces more often than not results from informal bargaining and concessions by civilians. However, the initial bargain can later transform itself towards more or less security force interventionism depending upon three variables: the heritage of authoritarianism; the relative unity of civilians as opposed to the security forces; and threat environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several states in Southeast Asia have long attempted to produce their own armaments, both to support national security and to aid in national economic and technological advancement. In most cases, however, such efforts have been decidedly disappointing, and few local arms industries have been economically or technologically self-sustaining. Nevertheless, we may be witnessing a new phase of renewed interest among several Southeast Asian nations in expanding their capabilities for indigenous arms manufacturing, as evidenced in particular by new defence-industrial initiatives in Indonesia and Malaysia. These efforts have been supported by a long-term growth in defence expenditures and new efforts to utilize industrial offsets (such as technology transfers and localized production) as a part of arms acquisitions to build up local arms industries. It is unlikely, however, that these efforts alone will suffice to create economically viable local defence industries. Consequently, countries in the region will still have to make tough decisions about the future course of their defence industrial bases. Most likely, they will have to either invest considerably greater resources into developing their defence sectors (which may beyond their capacities and which are still no guarantee of success) or else they have to scale back their ambitions and choose to concentrate in niche areas where they have a better chance of being competitive in the global arms marketplace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the normalization of Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1991, Vietnam's China policy has been shaped by a combination of approaches which can be best described as a multi-tiered, omni-directional hedging strategy. The article argues that hedging is the most rational and viable option for Vietnam to manage its relations with China given its historical experiences, domestic and bilateral conditions, as well as changes in Vietnam's external relations and the international strategic environment. The article examines the four major components of this strategy, namely economic pragmatism, direct engagement, hard balancing and soft balancing. The article goes on to assess the significance of each component and details how Vietnam has pursued its hedging strategy towards China since normalization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Illegal cross-border fishing is an important maritime security issue in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian states, along with other states with interests in the region, have created three new multilateral fisheries- relevant arrangements of agencies with overlapping but different memberships: the Regional Program of Action on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing; the ASEAN-Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center Strategic Partnership; and the Coral Triangle Initiative. Each of these multilateral arrangements has the potential to help Southeast Asian states deal with fisheries-based security issues more effectively by building polycentric coalitions and capacity. So far, however, they have had a limited impact. This is partly because they are still principally technical support bodies rather than management organizations. In addition, states need to make greater strides towards settling outstanding border disputes and address fisheries overcapacity and overfishing in waters under their jurisdiction. States are unable to address these problems adequately because the fishery sector is typically low in national priority. Moreover, national interest in fisheries remains concentrated on immediate food and economic needs, and, in international relations, on jurisdictional rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary maritime security threats such as piracy, smuggling and illegal fishing are major concerns in Southeast Asia. Responding to these threats have long been seen as the responsibility of governments. This article demonstrates how new actors have become involved in addressing national and regional maritime security threats in Southeast Asia. Focussing on three distinct types of new actors -- for-profit actors, not-for-profit actors and multilateral institutions -- the article provides an understanding of the (sometimes controversial) nature of their responses to threats and the relationships between these new actors and the state. By revealing the contribution made by new actors in Southeast Asia -- a region where governments are particularly protective of their sovereignty -- this article shows how and why established patterns of security governance in Southeast Asia are changing and offers new insights into alternative methods for tackling maritime security threats. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines why Asia's multilateral defence diplomacy has been a relative laggard when compared to other forms of institutionalized security dialogue, and what explains its recent rise. It argues that explanations that stress the "catalytic role" of external shocks such as the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) or changes in the distribution of power or threats are underdetermining. Rather, Asia's new multilateral defence diplomacy reflects strategic emulation on the part of ASEAN elites, who localized ideas initially put forward by outsiders in order to maintain ASEAN's central place in the regional security architecture. Its rise has also been helped by the changing role of militaries h7 some East Asian states and its rapid institutionalization owes much to historical contingency, in particular the interests of two influential ASEAN Chairs in Indonesia and Vietnam. The final part of the article briefly assesses the future prospects and influence of regional multilateral defence diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The maintenance of safe and secure sea lanes, particularly those that link the United States with its partners in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, is at the very core of US interests. Therefore, US maritime strategy seeks to sustain credible combat power in the Western Pacific and Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean so as to preclude attempts at interrupting vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and commerce. Given these strategic imperatives and the capability of both state and non-state actors to disrupt the Indo-Pacific sea lanes critical to global prosperity, the United States has renewed its commitment to maritime security in Asia. In recent years, the United States has made significant adjustments to its defence posture in order to bring more maritime forces closer to Indo-Pacific sea lanes and defence officials have stated their intention to further enhance US posture in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean while maintaining US presence in Northeast Asia. Recognizing that the expansive nature of Indo-Pacific maritime territory and the complexity of the region's maritime challenges prevent any one country from resourcing the operations necessary to provide sea lane security, the United States is also strengthening cooperation with its maritime partners by expanding relationships and trust-building efforts, contributing to the capacity of its partners and enhancing interoperability. At the same time, the United States is supporting the strengthening of maritime symposiums and regional organizations as the foundations for the security architectures necessary to ensure the security of Indo-Pacific sea lanes and sustain regional prosperity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on security developments of the Southeast Asia region. Topics include foreign relations between the U.S. and China, the dispute between countries in the region over the disputed territory of the South China Sea, and an increase in U.S. relations with other countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia. It is suggested that the U.S.-Chinese relations can challenge the unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Malaysia's policy towards southern Thailand has always required a balance between the country's internal security and concern about a neighbouring Muslim minority linked not only by religion but also ethnicity and culture. Security was a paramount concern at independence in 1957, with the southern provinces used as a base by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), the Communist Party of Thailand and Malay irredentists. But after Parti Islam made inroads against the ruling United Malays National Organization by capturing Kelantan (a state adjacent to Thailand) in the 1959 elections, the two premier Malay parties competed to present themselves as the protector of Thailand's Malay Muslims. Security concerns eased with the surrender of the CPM in 1989, but re-emerged in late 2001 with the resumption of conflict in southern Thailand, and the surfacing of militant Islamic groups in Malaysia. Though initially supportive of Thai security interests, Malaysia's delicate balance swung towards focusing on the well-being of Thailand's Malays in 2004: the tragic 28 April Krue Se mosque and 25 October Tak Bai incidents led to strong Malaysian protests, an unprecedented parliamentary debate and a general willingness to push the envelope on intervention in Thailand's internal affairs. Tensions remained high through much of 2005, with Thailand alleging that Malaysia was complicit in southern violence. Nonetheless Malaysia ensured Thailand was not embarrassed in international forums such as the Organization of Islamic Conference or A SEAN, and relations improved late in the year. Changes in Thai policy after the September 2006 coup were largely welcomed in Malaysia, but since then Thai-Malaysian cooperation to address the problem has made little headway. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews recent developments in the southern Thai conflict, noting that following the implementation of tougher security measures in 2007-08, levels of violence declined somewhat before increasing again. In the wake of their failure to find sustainable methods of containing the conflict, the Thai military is now trying to claim that many of the violent incidents in the region are the result of "ordinary" crime. Despite these attempts to discredit the essentially political motives that underpin the violence, the authors argue that the conflict reflects a crisis of state legitimacy in the far south. To date, the Democrat-led government has failed to engage seriously with political solutions to the southern conflict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines recent trends that have incrementally transformed the US-Philippine alliance as a hedge against an ascending China. It traces the revival of the alliance in the face of China's military modernization and expansionism in the South China Sea in the mid- 1990s. It then discusses the revitalization of the US-Philippine alliance post-9/11 in the fight against global terrorism before moving on to discuss China's attempts to drive a wedge between the two allies through its soft-power diplomacy. The US has deepened its security relations with the Philippines through the provision of military and economic assistance to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), regular consultations and defence policy reviews between the two countries' defence departments, the conduct of combined military exercises and the implementation of new defence initiatives such as the Security Engagement Board (SEB) and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs). In conclusion, the article argues that the deepening of the alliance has two implications: first, it ensures that the US will remain the Philippines' sole strategic ally for the foreseeable future; and second, that the alliance has been transformed into a hedge against the challenge of growing Chinese power in East Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dominant perceptions of the academic literature on relations among security and law enforcement institutions in Indonesia tend to be negative. In part, academic works on the past behaviour of security forces in some of Indonesia's conflict areas inform the perceptions of the literature. Research on conflict zones often suggests that unclear boundaries of jurisdiction and poor internal command and control frustrated the efforts to coordinate security forces in such areas. While these conclusions may be accurate in places that are or were riven by high conflict, this article questions if such conclusions are accurate for the large parts of Indonesia that have only experienced low levels of security problems. The evidence presented in this article suggests that coordination and an effective division of labour does exist among government security agencies in a low conflict environment. This article outlines relations between the three primary law enforcement and security actors — the National Police, territorial units of the Indonesian military and regional government — in three district case studies in Yogyakarta. This article finds that while agencies at the subnational level are highly autonomous, their autonomy does not present an obstacle for cooperation. In the case studies presented, government law enforcement and security actors acknowledge jurisdictional boundaries between one another. Where inter-institutional cooperation does take place, regional government plays an important, facilitative role. Despite this, the Indonesian police remain the lead agency in combating most threats to order and stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the most part, the theory of security sector governance does not comport with extant Southeast Asian realities owing to its Western assumptions and expectations. Singapore's security sector resembles that of other ASEAN countries in its technocratic, illiberal and comprehensive security-oriented aspects, where governance is exercised solely in a top-down fashion ("governance by national government"). Against this common wisdom, we argue that the Singapore case can, with qualifications, also be understood in terms of both "governance with multiple governments" and "governance without government", categories that better fit Western industrial democracies. For example, growing regionalism in Southeast Asia suggests, not inconceivably, that the future management of the region's security sectors, not least Singapore's, could be a multi-tiered, shared enterprise involving not only national governments, but regional organizations such as ASEAN as well as non-official mechanisms ("governance with multiple governments"). Moreover, the highly professionalized fashion in which Singapore manages its security sector differs markedly from the "new! developmental professionalism" of other ASEAN security sectors. Borrowing from Michel Foucault's ideas of disciplinary intervention and self-formation, we show how Singapore's security is in part reliant on habits and rituals of self-governance among ordinary Sin gaporeans ("governance without government"). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the complex crisis in Thailand's Muslim-majority border provinces now in its 5th year and a grim legacy of over 3,000 deaths, opinion is divided over the prospects of substantial improvement, though the authorities claim that headway is being made. This article offers a critical review of policy, key events and discourses surrounding the crisis in the south from the coup of September 2006 to the first months of the new civilian government under Prime Minister Samak. It argues that the southern situation remains intractable for a number of key discursive/political and military/operational reasons, including: the difficulty of combating a war against clandestine, cell-based insurgent groups that employ propaganda as much as violence and show no desire to negotiate; a politics of denial among single-issue groups who continue to avoid confronting the full realities of insurgent violence while condemning state officials as principal aggressors; and the difficulties confronted by authorities in pursuing a dual policy of law-enforcement and "peaceful development" in the face of incomplete intelligence and suspicious villagers. It is unlikely that the lessening of violence will be any more than incremental in the foreseeable future, or that the meaning, causes and solutions to the "fire in the south" will be any less contested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Neorealists argue that Japan's response to the rise of China has been to draw closer to the United States in order to balance Chinese power. In practice, the Koizumi and Abe administrations differed in their responses to the growth of Chinese power in East Asia. While Prime Minister Koizumi sought to consolidate the US-Japan alliance, Prime Minister Abe adopted a dual-track approach, combining enhanced bilateralism with enhanced regionalism. Although buttressing the US-Japan alliance, this strategy aimed to balance China by building a containment coalition with other Asia-Pacific states. Japan's signing of a security declaration with Australia in March 2007 was an important element of Abe's strategy, and marked a subtle shift in Japanese security policy from exclusive bilateralism to modest minilateralism. Although congruent with US strategic interests, this move supported Prime Minister Abe's ambition to exercise more autonomous influence over the regional security order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent changes of government in Australia and Japan, and a pending one in the United States, signifies a historical crossroads in these three allies' security politics in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, all three countries have tended to rationalize their strategic collaboration on the need to build innovative and competitive-oriented "strategic geometries" as a means to counter China's growing power and to meet new types of threats in the region. Yet the Australian Government under John Howard simultaneously pursued a hedging strategy, exploiting its growing economic relationship with China while strengthening its diplomatic and strategic profile with the United States. Despite Tokyo's own substantial economic relationship with Beijing, recent Japanese leaders were unable to pursue the same type of "dual track" strategy to the same extent as Howard. With Kevin Rudd's election as the new Australian Prime Minister and Yasuo Fukuda's ascent to power in Japan, prospects for Australia and Japan to cultivate more independent politico-security ties with Beijing have strengthened. If so, the evolving regional security postures of both these US allies may compel the United States to reassess its own traditional skepticism towards multilateral security groupings in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is about the motivations and reasons for the United States and Singapore to sign an FTA, prompted by little trade expansion and snailpaced financial market opening within ASEAN, the Japanese-led resistance to the full flowering of APEC, the chronic breakdown of the WTO's recent trade liberalization negotiations, the structural changes in Singapore's economy, as well as unsettled security environment in Southeast Asia. Soon after the FTA went into effect, Singapore and the United States signed a strategic ("defence") partnership agreement. Since 9/11, the two countries have found strong complementarity in each other's strategic visions -- how to define the evolving security landscape for Southeast Asia, how to coordinate security responses for the region, and how bilateralism can be a viable full-back position in cross-border trade and finance. The article also examines the inadequacies of the theories of old regionalism and suggests different ways to theorize new regionalism, identifying the domestic, regional, and global factors which have led to the paradigm shift in Singapore's strategy for future growth and survival and which have shaped the future East Asian policy of the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With September 11, terrorism has come to dominate the security concerns of nation-states, especially in asia, affecting both inter- and intra-regional relations significantly. Though for many asian countries terrorism was nothing new, threats of transnational terrorism introduced new security challenges, which significantly changed the nature of domestic politics and state-society relations of the regional states and relations among them and with states in other regions. in the new dynamics, the traditional bilateral alliance systems that underpinned much of the security structure and relations in the past are found to be inadequate to deal with the challenge of transnational terrorism. There is thus a need for cooperation among the nations in the region and greater engagement with extra-regional partners through multilateral arrangements. both india and Southeast asia grapple with an array of security threats including those from transnational terrorism. ironically, terrorism provides unique opportunities to both to work together. This article argues that the common desire to fight terrorism could be the imperative that would establish foundations for mutually beneficial partnerships both in their economic and security relations. india and Southeast asia have substantial experience to deal with terrorism. both could leverage their mutual expertise to deal with the threat decisively. besides, economic cooperation between india and the countries in Southeast asia has the potential to accelerate the pace of development, which in turn could help them to resolve both intra- and inter-regional tensions and to develop the quality of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the relationship between global and regional governance in tackling terrorism in Southeast Asia, with particular reference to the security of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological (NBCR) materials. Part one describes the global multilateral non-proliferation instruments established since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 - particularly United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 - analysing the extent to which ASEAN members have been fulfilling the binding legal obligations that they entail. Part two assesses the role of three of Southeast Asia's regional security frameworks (APEC, ARE, and ASTOP) in setting the regional non-proliferation and counter-terrorism agenda, charting their successes and failures in promoting compliance with global instruments, and in ensuring that pledges made by ministers in international and regional forums are followed through at the national level. It argues that ASEAN perceptions of West-centric security agendas, combined with frustrations that regional and global institutions are insensitive to local particularities, are undermining opportunities for achieving effective regional governance, even though concerted efforts are being made in the area of capacity-building. Bilateral security arrangements and single-issue multilateral discussions have been more successful than more ambitious regional frameworks at building trust and confidence and fostering genuine security cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses the impact of decentralization and deregulation reforms in Indonesia on security and law enforcement. The research draws on qualitative and quantitative data from interviews, focus group discussions and household surveys in four selected districts. The main conclusions are that local security bodies are being developed without control by the central government or local level democratic bodies. There is a total lack of transparency and accountability in security affairs and much power is concentrated in the hands of the district heads, the bupati. Policy recommendations include increased central government control over policing, security organizations and law enforcement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the evolution of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) since its establishment in 1971 to the present day. It details the evolution of the FPDA's three main pillars: the Integrated Area Defence System (IADS), the architecture for political-military dialogue, and the exercise programme. In addition, the article tries to place the FPDA in the context of the security roles played by ASEAN, the ARF, intra-regional bilateral military ties, and the defence relationship with United States. It argues that, while the FPDA's role in upholding regional security cannot be equated to the military contribution of the United States, and the grouping certainly faces significant challenges, it nevertheless contributes positively and innovatively to the ability of Malaysia and Singapore to address not only conventional threats, but increasingly asymmetric and non-conventional security challenges as well, thereby contributing to the overall maintenance of regional security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysing national security entails both its substantive and rhetorical dimensions. In its substantive form, the concept suffers from distortion given that it is subject to the psychological processes of human cognition. As rhetoric, it justifies state actions, including issues that do not reflect, but which are not totally divorced from, reality. These themes, examined in the Malaysian context, highlight the external and internal dimensions of national security, the substantive aspects being more pronounced in the former, and rhetoric being more salient in the latter. While the security of the political regime is a determinant of both domains, its influence was greater in the internal-rhetorical quadrant of Malaysia's national security. However, in the post-Cold War period, strategic and economic imperatives have tended to blur the distinction between the internal and external realms of the state, resulting in domestic politics becoming more susceptible to the dominant values of the international system. This development, taken together with localized socio-political change, has induced greater plurality in Malaysian politics. While the rhetoric of national security still has its instrumental value, it is however becoming more problematic for political élites to advance their interests in the name of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philippine support for the American-led global campaign against terrorism has reinvigorated Philippine-American relations. The two countries are presently involved in combating terrorism in the southern Philippines through a joint military exercise called Balikatan 2002-1. Reinvigorated Philippine-American relations have implications for regional security because an American military presence is reestablished not only in the Philippines but also in Southeast Asia. When the United States withdrew its military forces from the Philippines after the termination of the Military Bases Agreement in 1991, it created a power vacuum in the region. The United States now finds it imperative to re-establish its presence in Southeast Asia because of reported al-Qaeda activities in the region. However, China is wary of the U.S. military presence, arguing that it is intended to deter not only terrorism but also China's moves in Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Asia-Pacific is in the early stages of the sort of strategic transformation that in the past had produced acute tensions, high levels of armament, and a significant risk of serious conflict. The region closely exemplifies Hedley Bull's "anarchical society", that is, states compete for power and influence in an international arena still relatively free of multilateral constraints. Trends in relations between the key major powers suggest that allowing security outcomes to be determined by the free play of the "security market-place" will be a high-risk strategy. A stronger determination to boost multilateral security processes, to take charge collectively, should be seen as a key element of a strategy to improve the prevailing odds attached to the security outlook for the AsiaPacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses challenges faced by Southeast Asian countries after the regional economic crisis of 1997. Issues affecting regional security; Political and other activities of civil society.

Vietnam's interests in the South China Sea may be divided into traditional national security interests, and interests linked to the broader category of human security. This article examines Vietnam's policy in the South China Sea and its use of the Law of the Sea. Vietnam has doggedly upheld its claim to the whole of the Paracel and Spratly areas (Hoang Sa and Truong Sa) and has spent considerable resources in modernizing its naval and air forces. However, there seems to be a move away from a narrow focus on national security to a more broad-based concern for human security. This is connected with a trend towards a greater regional, less nationalist approach, which may give Vietnam a key role in resolving the multiple disputes in the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on security in Northeast Asia, citing the regions bilateral accomplishments and multilateral tasks. Identification of two trends in the contemporary Northeast Asian security; Information on an agreement between Russia and the former Central Asian states of the Soviet Union; Details on regional problems in Northeast Asia.

Cites information on three alternative strategies used by the United States in its national security policy towards China, citing their implications. Analysis of the China policy debate in the US; Problems faced by the US in light of threats by the Chinese to use force against enemies; Information on the strategies.

Focuses on the national security challenges in the Philippines. Concept and practice of national security; Developments on claims for the Spratlys; Maintenance of cooperative and mutual relations with neighboring countries through diplomacy; Modernization program of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.