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Much recent research demonstrates that the structural conflict between the propertied and the poor in non-communist authoritarian states affects the likelihood, timing, and outcome of democratization. In highly unequal societies, democratization has a strongly redistributive effect.The effect of transition in postcommunist democracies was quite different. Given the absence of private property in most means of production, the deliberate policies of wage compression, the widespread availability of income-support mechanisms, and the importance of collective consumption funds in such social goods and services as housing, healthcare, education, transportation, cultural goods and recreation, both income and consumption differentials were narrow compared with democratic capitalist societies at similar development levels. The transition, therefore, brought substantial increases in aggregate income inequality to the post-communist countries, with some post-communist countries reaching levels higher than those of some West European countries.Much political economy literature suggests that democratization is expected to make government more responsive to wider segments of society, more inclined to supply universal collective goods and services such as security of person and property, health care, education, and infra-structure, as well as to provide some minimum level of social insurance against the hazards of catastrophic income loss. These public goods and services should foster productive behavior on the part of economic agents, and thus growth, as well as the mitigation of extremes of poverty and inequality.However, collusion in rent-extraction by post-transition elites might be consistent with high rates of economic growth under some circumstances. If the elites take advantage of the new institutional environment of a post-communist state and capture control over productive assets for themselves, they might well use them to increase their own incomes, yielding rapid aggregate growth the benefits of which are concentrated in a narrow elite. The institutional advantages of democratization and property rights might be restricted to those holding monopolies over property, and not broadly shared. Their policies would lead to higher growth rates after an initial period of disorganization was overcome. But the benefits of the growth would be distributed unequally. An oligarchic democracy would complement an oligarchic form of capitalism. This paper examines the effects of the dual political and economic transition on income inequality trends, taking Russia's subnational regions (the subjects of the federation) as the units of observation. Noting that the regions differed widely both in their starting conditions and in the increase in income growth and differentiation as a consequence of the transition, it seeks to identify the political mechanisms that explain variation in income and inequality growth following the transition. Using both direct and instrumental measures of democracy by region, the paper finds evidence consistent with the "oligarchic democracy" model. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent distributional theories of democracy postulate that structural conflict between rich and poor affects the likelihood, timing and outcome of democratization. Regime transitions in postcommunist states also featured distributional conflict, with wide differences in economic growth and income distribution resulting from the interaction of policy choices, regime characteristics, and inherited legacies of material and human assets. Through analysis of Russia’s regions, this paper examines the effect of the dual political and economic transition on incomes and income distribution. It finds that, even accounting for the inherited conditions, regions with more open political regimes have enjoyed greater economic growth and a faster reduction in poverty; however, at every level of income, more democratic regions also have higher levels of income inequality. The results are consistent with the theoretical conjectures in recent distributive accounts of democracy that in transitions where middle-income strata are allied with the rich, a partial version of democracy results, where policy-makers are accountable not to the median citizen, but to a restricted set of political and economic elites. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Borderline democracies are political systems in transition, which have made tremendous progress in their democratic development, experienced some reversals on the way, and have arrived at an important historical juncture that will determine the future path of democratization. A borderline stage of democracy means that a democratic regime is still fragile and vacillating. To maintain a steady democratic advancement, such regimes may benefit from political science theories and the practices of other democratic regimes. This paper builds upon the relevant Western literature on democracy and applies it to the case of Russia. Russia represents a nascent democracy with unique cultural attributes and an adequate legislature and democratic institutions (the constitution, elections, and the constituency base). These institutions and written laws, however, lack full practical implementation and need further strengthening by grassroots movements. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract:We argue that there is a similar situation between today Russia and Weimar Germany because similar factors lead from a defective electoral democracy to an electoral autocracy. We demonstrate that a structural explation with socio-economic factors is not appropriate to explain democratic breakdown in the "crucial cases" of Weimar Germany and Post-Soviet Russia. We show that 1. a considerable lack of democrats on the elite level as well as on the population level and 2. an ill-defined form of government, that allows the president to rule without the parliament in combination with an nondemocratic actor which gets elected for president are sufficient reasons for a country to experience an authoriarian regression. In the second and third part of the paper we take a look on the question, when an electoral semiautocracy is in danger to get a fascist ideocracy. In the second part we show that there is fertile ground for fascism in Russia today. We demonstrate that as in Weimar Germany we can find in today Russia strong fascist actors and a widespread nationalism among the population. But in the third part we we will show, that all in all, ironically, in current Russia, in distinction to Germany 1. a manipulated party system and a underdeveloped third sector, 2. a strong semiautocratic president make it difficult for the country to become a liberal democracy, but make it also improbable that the Russian regime will transgress into a fascist autocracy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses original survey data from national elections in Russia in 2000 and 2004 to explore the sources of electoral support for Putin, an example of a strong hybrid regime leader. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a theoretical framework for analyzing the rise of dominant parties in non-democracies as a commitment problem between state leaders and other elites. The paper draws on examples and evidence from Russia under Vladimir Putin to illustrate its points. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories of interest intermediation in advanced industrial democracies have focused on a range of different ways in which organized labor is integrated into politics through such institutions as tripartite bargaining and labor based political parties. This paper shows how attempts to imitate such institutions in the post-Communist lead to unexpected outcomes in which unions are used as political resources by regional political elites both in their bargaining with national leaderships and in the competition for power at the regional level. The collapse of Communism in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe brought with it a host of new representative institutions with the avowed purpose of creating democracy. Many of the institutions, such as competitive elections, and many organizations, including most political parties, were truly new and have transformed the way politics and society operate throughout the region. Scholars, however, have noted that these new institutions were introduced not into a context of tabula rasa, but rather into a world already replete with institutions that were in varying stages of atrophy, decline, reform or revolutionary change. As a result, relationships between actors and their political and institutional connections with important social groups were not made entirely anew by the institutionalization of competitive elections and the writing of new constitutions. Instead the institutional apparatus of the old regime was often refracted through the lens of transition, creating new structures that affect patterns of mobilization and interest representation in the new democracies. This process of refraction, I argue, has had important consequences for the nature and quality of democracy in the post-Communist world. To date scholars have spent some time analyzing how previously existing institutions have affected subsequent developments, particularly in the economy. There has also been some work on the way in which former Communist political parties have either transformed themselves or not. However, most of the work remains to be done if we are to understand the implications of institutional legacies and changes for the way in which different interests are aggregated and represented in the post-Communist states. In this paper I look at how one important institution has evolved through the transition, and has come to assume a rather surprising role in the new politics. Taking the example of Russia, I show how labor unions have been transformed into tools for coordinating political strategies among elite actors, rather than developing into representative organizations for workers. A curious institutional arrangement combining some of the features of Leninist “transmission belt” unions with elements of West European style social democracy has emerged. This transformation of labor unions into political machines for regional executives is one of the reasons that predictions of organized labor opposition to economic reform and expectations of a social explosion have gone unfulfilled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vladimir Putin enjoys a 70% approval rate. Under his leadership, Russia continues to experience stability and has reemerged as an active player on the world scene and is once again a serious factor in the global economy. In a three part essay, the author utilizes a psychoanalytic framework in an attempt to delineate the essence of Putin's leadership style and the psychological interaction he has with the Russian people. In part one, the author discusses the significance of Putin being reared as an "only child." Part two highlights Capitalist ideology, Putin's leadership approach and the subsequent resurrection of Russian social institutions. Part three focuses on the conceptualization of a "money and commodity exchange" paradigm and the impact it has on the Russian collective conscious. The author concludes that though Russians may be warming to capitalism, they are not particularly interested in furthering democracy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New Russia Barometer surveys from 2004 and 2007 together with Russian Foreign Policy Elites survey 2004 indicate that Russian elites and masses are rather similar in their opinion of democracy. Only representatives of the executive branch and the military are less supportive of democratic ideals. Improved state of economy, both for individuals and the country, make people feel more content with democracy. But a pessimistic outlook (affiliated with a lack of control or responsibility over one's life) leads to dissatisfaction with democracy. If the government focuses on curtailing corruption to build public trust in state institutions instead of focusing on the state itself under the banner of 'sovereign democracy;' if the masses and elites become further informed about democratic ideas; if people take responsibility and see opportunities in life, then democracy will succeed in Russia. Both democratically-minded and democratically-active population is needed. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public support for minority rights plays an important role in minorities actually securing and protecting those rights. In countries like Russia where public support for minority rights is low, how can attitudes be changed? Our research shows that institutions such as the Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, and State Duma have the potential to persuade about a quarter of otherwise intolerant Russians to move toward supporting rights. We seek to explain this important shift among this subpopulation. Paradoxically, we find that a usually unpalatable characteristic, deference to authority, among the intolerant is significantly related to their potential to be persuaded to support rights. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dominant legislative parties - parties that control the policy-making process in the legislature - have long been a focus of scholarly inquiry. Previous work has focused on the electoral logic by which an organization evolves into a dominant legislative party. We argue that while an elections-centric approach may explain some cases, it does not address the numerous cases in which parties build a dominant position in the legislature over the course of several elections through a combination of strategic behavior between and during electoral contests. Using a computational method for estimating uncovered sets using legislator preference data, we show how dominant legislative parties can emerge from legislative proceedings. We illustrate our theory with data from Israel, Russia, and Ukraine. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does realist theory predict a constant struggle for influence between Washington and Moscow on the international political stage? Serious competition will remain a fixture in the U.S.â€"Russian relationship for the foreseeable future. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study critically evaluates different conceptual approaches to the operationalization of political institutionalization which have been offered in the literature on the subject. The author develops a detailed theoretical framework and operational indicators which help to measure the degree of institutionalization of a party system in a democratic country. The analysis focuses on two broad dimensions of political institutionalization, autonomy and stability, and proposes several feasible and precise indicators which allow the criteria of institutionalization to be operationalized. On the basis of this conceptual framework, the study measures levels of political institutionalization of the party systems in the five post-Soviet transitional countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analysis of panel data from Brazil, Mexico, and Russia suggests that presidential campaigns have ambiguous effects on inequalities in mass-level political knowledge. In all three campaigns, the gap in political knowledge between individuals with fewer socioeconomic resources and those with more resources stayed the same or widened. At the same time, less affluent, less educated citizens who paid a great deal of attention to the campaign learned more than equally attentive high-status citizens. These findings suggest that electoral campaigns have the potential to mitigate the knowledge gap, even if they fail to do so in practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A debate exists as to what really gives constitutional courts legitimacy and authority in new democracies. Is it the initial formation (judge selection, structure, powers) of the courts, or the actions of these courts after they are formed in terms of what cases are heard, their decisions, and the interactions of these courts with other areas of the state? This paper will focus on courts in three countries (Hungary, South Africa, and the Russian Federation) to consider this question, and their relationships with the institutions at the center as well as regions and local government. While formation had a definite effect on all the courts of these three countries, it is clear that the later actions of these courts, particularly in the cases of South Africa and Russia, changed the real authority of these institutions. Research on judicial independence, power and legitimacy may therefore have to take a long-term view to evaluate the real authority of constitutional courts, and consider their behavior as well as their structures. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to conduct a comprehensive empirical study of the ways in which social capital is present and facilitates the undemocratic ends of organized crime groups in Russia. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, the question of whether we are witnessing the authoritarian restoration in Russia is becoming increasingly relevant. One group of scholars (Cohen, Figes, Kagarlitsky, Pipes, Tacker and Huskey) sees Russia’s post-Communist democratic development as incomplete at best and nominal at worst. Authoritarianism restoration camp believes that after a brief democratic interlude in the early 1990s Russia was destined for an inevitable authoritarian counter-revolution. The second camp refutes the return of authoritarianism thesis. Malia downplays authoritarian tendencies and singles out international norms and Russia’s desire to cooperate with the West as powerful constrains on the elite’s anti-democratic aspirations. He also believes that the political fragmentation of Russian post-Communist state all but precludes single-person rule. McFaul acknowledges significant progress in creating and developing formal democratic institutions in Russia, but warns that the weak civil society, uncertain federalism, unsettled state-business relations, and absence of the rule of law may jeopardize the country’s democratic future. With the election of Putin as the Russian president, the fears that Russia is sliding back to authoritarianism have intensified. We argue that Putin’s assessment by actors who openly declare their own authoritarian, nationalist, and anti-democratic identities is a good indicator of the Russian president’s alleged or actual authoritarianism. If these actors see Putin as an ally and a partner, one can assume at least some degree of congruence between the authoritarian-nationalist program and Putin’s agenda. In this paper we examine the attitudes of Russia’s nationalist and anti-democratic press towards President Putin and his policies. The ultra-nationalist and anti-democratic segment of Russian political spectrum usually has a semi-legal or underground status and has to struggle with institutionalization, visibility, community impact, and, more importantly, financial support. Despite these difficulties, at least one ultra-nationalist periodical in post-Communist Russia, the weekly newspaper Zavtra [Tomorrow], managed to appear on a regular basis and secure external funding. It enjoys significant visibility due to respectable circulation numbers and an official website. Zavtra is a source of systematic and easily accessible data on the state of contemporary Russian ultra-nationalism and authoritarianism, their goals, strategies, and perceived allies. To determine the attitudes of Russian nationalist and anti-democratic actors towards President Putin we use quantitative content analysis of Zavtra’s weekly editorials. Our research covers Putin’s tenure as Russian Prime Minister and his entire first presidential term. We isolate two time intervals crucial for comparison - the early phase of Putin’s presidential career (1999-2001) and the most recent period (2003-early 2004). Content analysis of Zavtra’s coverage of Putin’s presidency demonstrates that after initial approval of Putin’s policies, the Russian ultra-nationalist and anti-democratic press now expresses disappointment in the governing regime. According to Zavtra, Putin, once a potential ally, failed to fulfill his promise. Even though the nationalistic and anti-democratic actors eventually started to criticize Putin as not going far enough in the authoritarian and xenophobic directions, they stress that his presidency, at least initially, had a potential for reversing Russia’s tenuous democratic and tolerant course. We conclude that there are grounds for concern about the future of democracy in Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My theoretical argument is inspired by main arguments that Boix (2003) makes in Democracy and Redistribution. Boix’ argument is that the challenge to the ruling elites comes from the lower classes, who wish to change the re-distributional equilibrium in the society (p. 171). He perceives three possible re-distributional outcomes: 1) Right-wing authoritarian regimes, in which practically no transfers take place (also, limited taxes); 2) Democracies, which have more redistribution of wealth, based on the aspirations of the median voter; 3) Revolutionary regimes, which are prone to the follies of nationalization and central planning, eventually leading to corruption and economic stagnation (p. 3). Asset specificity plays into the hands of the “revolutionary” regimes such as those we usually see in Russia, because oligarchs like Khodorkovsky, Abramovich and may others cannot move them out of the country, they are immobile. That’s why they are very vulnerable targets for re-distribution either by democratic regimes through taxation, or authoritarian regimes through expropriation (which is the case in Russia). The latter helps to strengthen the hands of the authoritarian regime in Russia, which acts recklessly domestically and int-ly. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among the most thoroughly documented behavioral phenomena in the social sciences is the propensity for well-educated citizens to eschew racism, homophobia, and political intolerance. The modern consensus holds that education builds tolerance by exposing students in open societies to the liberal ideals of the national political culture. Social learning cannot, however, explain the liberalizing effects of education among Russian citizens educated in the Soviet system. This finding suggests the existence of alternative cognitive mechanisms that connect educational attainment and tolerance attitudes. This study tests the novel hypothesis that tertiary-level Soviet education fostered tolerance by routinely exposing students to novel problem solving exercises and, as a consequence, activating individual dispositions to cognitive flexibility. Evidence from a national sample surveys fielded in 1992 and 1996 suggest the joint effects of education and cognitive flexibility mold tolerance judgments to a larger extent than support for democracy or cognitive sophistication. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I will assess Russian political parties, civil society, democratic prospects. I will also take a future view of Russian foreign and military policy. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the growing literature on federal institutional stability, we draw a theoretical prediction where, in order to preserve territorial integrity, the quality of democratic political competition has to be either very high, or very low, with seve ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study attempts to use a comparative approach of institutional and behavioral factors that contributed to failures of democracy in some transitional countries. I examine Belarus and compare it with Ukrainian and Russian models of transition. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russia's democratization process is stalled because the transition to democracy has been confounded by the adoption of an asymmetric districting regime which is antithetical to the institutional foundations of a free market federal democracy. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzing the dynamics of the ongoing civil service reform implementation in Russia, its challenges, and preliminary results, I argue that major change in the administrative apparatus is an important component of any democratic transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For a liberal democracy to succeed, citizens must be willing and able to challenge their governments in court, but in developing democracies citizens have no models to emulate or socialize them to the possibility of litigation. How then does the idea to redress grievances in court first occur? Who are the pioneers in taking legal action against governments? Although one could infer from the judicial politics literature that the use of courts depends on expectations of procedural fairness rather than satisfactory outcomes, we hypothesize that the reverse is true for developing democracies where expectations of winning may be the only factor motivating some post- authoritarian citizens to take on their governments. The Moscow theater hostage case provides the perfect laboratory for testing this hypothesis. Hundreds of individuals shared a similar grievance, and some initiated Russia’s first class action lawsuit while others opted out. Our results are based on surveys with 326 of the theater victims, or approximately half of former hostages and next-of-kin of deceased hostages, completed very shortly after the initial announcement of the lawsuit thanks to an NSF Small Grant in Exploratory Research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]