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Increasing scholarly attention has recently been focused upon the origins and fortunes of Islamic parties. This paper examines the individual determinants of support for these parties utilizing the fifth wave of the World Values Survey. It is argued that the distribution of individual preferences along political cleavages like left-right, secularism-Islamism, and regime-opposition are critical explanatory variables. The cases under investigation are Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco. The results of the multinomial logit show that Islamic parties obtain support from a broad spectrum of voters and this support base is best understood in relation to the distribution of voter preferences for rival parties. Furthermore, left-right and Islamism appear to be the most important cleavages in the electoral markets under investigation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkey is the only example of a majority Muslim country to have become a secular-democracy. Yet, in Turkey, political Islam has been on rise since the 1990s. This paper analyzes the rise of political Islam (mobilization) in Turkey within the framework of contentious movements literature, according to the political process model. The following research question is examined: Why has political Islam, which has been part of Turkish politics since the 1970s, been on rise since the 1990s, but not before? The paper focuses on four political Islamist parties (the Welfare Party [WP], its successor the Virtue Party, and its successors’ the Happiness Party and the Justice and Development Party), as the actors of the movement. The era under analysis is from 1983 (the WP’s entrance into the Turkish political scene) to the present. The rise of political Islam in Turkey occurred as a result of three interrelated factors. First, the secular military created the ‘Turkish-Islamic synthesis’ (TIS--a mixture of Sunni Islam and nationalism), in the aftermath of the third military intervention (September 12, 1980) in order to unify the citizens due to the threat of communism. The TIS was kept up by civilian rule starting in 1983. As a result of the state’s TIS policy, the WP found the opportunity to strengthen its organizational network (formal and informal) legitimately. Second, even though the problem of malfunctioning secular state was already present in the 1970s, the problem has become intense than ever starting by the 1990s as a result of massive corruption, clientelism, unequal distribution of wealth, and division within mainstream right-wing and left-wing political parties. The malfunctioning secular state has become a source for exploitation by ideologically motivated political Islamists. Finally, the WP and its successors’ strong organizational networks that can answer to the demands of the urban- and rural-poor classes, played an important role on the movement’s mobilization in Turkey. If the first stage of the movement’s mobilization (1983-1990) occurred as a result of political opportunities (the TIS), the second phase of the movement’s mobilization (1990-) occurred due to both political opportunities (the malfunctioning secular state) and organizational dynamics (the Islamist political parties’ strong organizational networks due to the TIS). There is a gap between studies of contentious movements in liberal democratic systems and those in the rest of the world. The Muslim world is almost entirely absent from the contentious movements literature. Expanding the research agenda on contentious movements, by adding more cases from the Muslim world, will enable one to have a better understanding of the reasons for political Islam’s mobilization in Muslim states--a movement that is likely to remain strong in the region for years to come. This paper, by analyzing a case from the Muslim world, aims at contributing to the contentious movements literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a single-case historical analysis of the "democratic past" in Syria. While the current regime in Damascus is exclusively authoritarian, Syria before the rise of the Ba'th and the ruling Asad family witnessed a brief period of constitutional discourse, vibrant civil society, and democratic and electoral politics. The roots of this activity can be traced to Syria's experience in the late Ottoman Empire and specifically its encounters with officials from the French Mandate. This paper utilizes extensive archival research from the U.S. Department of State Central Files on internal politics in Syria to account for this activity, and document why it failed to materialize. This analysis provides insights into the significance of ill-advised Western foreign policy and the impact of regional and international considerations on democratic political development. By studying this period, we are moreover better able to situate the discourse of the current pro-democracy movement and political opposition in Syria, and gauge the potential impacts of a "democratic past" on political development from a cursory comparative perspective of other relevant cases. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that labor activism in the 1960s and 70s has shaped the current political landscape in Turkey. Labor movement activism, for instance, helps explain why political Islam in Turkey differs from Islamist mobilization in other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past decade, we have seen a proliferation of economic crises in the developing world. These crises have had disastrous effects on national economies as entire banking sectors collapse, currencies devalue, financial institutions recall loans, and on a human scale, millions fall below the poverty line. At different points in history, economic crises have led to democratic breakdown or to democratic transition. These periods corresponded roughly with Samuel Huntington’s “waves of democracy.” However, the literature has been quiet on the key issue of how economic crises affect regime change in third wave democracies. This is the question I address in my paper. I argue that while financial crises may engender regime change in authoritarian countries, in third wave democracies, economic crisis will not generate regime change but instead a regime shift. I define regime shift as a movement among alternatives within the democratic structure. For example, if the right is in power when an economic crisis hits and they fail to quickly remedy it, one may see left and far left parties winning seats in the next election. In order to test this hypothesis, I employed multivariate analysis using the most similar systems case study methodology. I chose the three cases of Turkey, Poland and the Philippines carefully to ensure sufficient variation among them both geographically and transitionally (i.e. whether their democratic transition was controlled from above vs. spurred from below). I believe this choice of cases is significant, for it refutes the argument that the regime shift phenomenon is region specific. In other words, there is great potential for generalization. The results of this study suggest that a robust correlation exists between economic crisis and regime shift. This analysis can strongly affirm two factors: first, there is no backshift. Third wave democracies are not collapsing in the wake of economic crises. Second and perhaps more telling, during economic crises, incumbent parties and candidates are typically rejected in favor of alternatives to the status quo. In Turkey, far right and Islamic parties made substantial gains during the three economic crises, becoming coalition partners and leaders. In Poland, the Solidarity party was defeated during each economic crisis in favor of the former communist SLD. In the Philippines, the presidential candidate from the establishment party, the LDP, was rejected in favor of the most anti-establishment candidate on the ticket. These findings will, I hope, make a contribution to the literatures on economic crises and democratic transitions. Most notably, it will show that the third wave democracies are not reverting back to authoritarianism when they hit rough periods. Instead, they are showing the first signs of democratic consolidation. In times of crisis, they are not calling for a reversion to the days of authoritarian rule. Rather, they are holding their leaders accountable for failing to rectify painful economic situations and choosing from the systemic alternatives available. This shows that they have faith in the democratic institutions of government to rectify their problems. For the third wave democracies, this finding is indeed promising. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Indonesia and Turkey, political Islamic parties have emerged as the new viable voice that is no longer a threat but rather as a surrogate for political dispossession and dispositions. Voter turnouts in both countries showed that these parties have slowly gained general popular support. Nonetheless, some of critics argue how can a party with religious and inclusive ideologies be a proponent of democracy? Can it advocate equality and plural representations through its campaign promises? Yet, AKP of Turkey and Partai Keadilan of Indonesia are examples on how political Islamic parties mediate its own premises confronting the real challenge of secular systems in place. In one way, they try to position themselves as reformers but in other way they still retain their traditional and conservative moral values. Thus, no surprise both AKP and Partai Keadilan carry the connotation of “justice” in their names. Focusing on their party structures, grassroots and electability, this paper will attempt to make a comparative study of political Islamic parties’ attractiveness and sustainable support in these two countries, where Islam is the majority of religions and the extension of religious influence in politics are prone to be prohibited. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The accession of Turkey has become a central controversy in the ongoing expansion of the European Union. The purpose of this paper is to compare public opinion on democracy and religiosity in Turkey with old and new EU member states. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent studies of Islamist movements in Muslim societies have drawn upon the alluring paradigm of alternative modernities depicting such formations as emblematic of a civil Islam, indigenous modernization etc. Such studies have nonetheless refrained from a hermeneutic exercise in critically revising the concepts drawn from western political theory. The underlying hermeneutic naïveté has contributed to the conception of intellectual siege by activists of the Generation of Qur’an movement. In response to the promotion of a mild Islam compatible with liberal democracy in Turkey represented as the model country in the Middle East via such globalist schemes of democratization as the Greater Middle East Project, this radical movement juxtaposes a purified Islamic identity to contemporary processes of postmodern hybridization and identitarian eclecticism. This project examines emerging Islamist forms of counterhegemonic resistance to the axiomatic power of the democratization discourse, thereby tracing local efforts at defamiliarizing the democratic paradigm which call into question the self evidence of the universal value of impassionate and moderate citizenship cherished in democratic theory and the recent literature on Islamism. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Muslim states such as Turkey and Pakistan face a unique set of challenges in constructing consolidated democratic systems. In order to understand the prospects for democratic deepening in these two states we compare the interaction of liberal and illiberal institutions in each context. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Republic of Turkey’s most recent attempt to gain membership into the European Union (EU), which culminated in the 12-13 December, 2002 Copenhagen European Council, was stymied by a request by the European Council for further compliance with EU standards. Despite the lobbying efforts of both Turkey and the United States, Turkey is therefore obliged to continue making adjustments and reforms required by the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria before further consideration of their candidacy. Expanded upon in the first Accession Partnership for Turkey of 8 March 2001, those requirements include the “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities,” the “existence of a functioning market economy,” and the “ability to take on the aims of [the] political, economic and monetary union.” High expectations, perhaps; nonetheless, Turkey began complying with a series of reform packages passed by the Turkish Parliament, the most recent on July 31, 2002. However, some of the EU’s requirements have come into conflict with the fundamental fabric of Turkish society, and domestic voices have risen in opposition to elements of the reform packages. Additionally, members of the European Union have expressed caution over the contents of the packages, increasing the frustration of the Turkish government. In order to attain its goal of candidacy status, and, eventually, inclusion into the European Union, the Turkish government and the EU must work together to balance the requests of the European Union with the fears of loss of sovereignty and culture arising from the Turkish populace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkish politics presents an interesting case for the discussion of attitudes towards democracy. Ironically, the pro-Islamist incumbent party has been increasingly identified with pro-democratic attitudes, while the age-old social democratic main opposition party has been accused of totalitarian tendencies. Whether these are part of campaign strategies or actual transformations of the attitudes towards democracy has been underexplored. This study explores these attitudes through a content analysis of two newspapers which voice the messages of the incumbent and opposition parties and the statements of core party members. It is expected to find significant differences between two parties in their attitudes as well as contradictions between the statements and media messages. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A case study of Turkish women will be utilized in order to fully examine the complexities and nuances of the ongoing confrontation between secularism and democracy. The emergence of veiled women in the hallowed halls of secularism has produced an ons ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We seek to investigate the underlying reasons for Turkey’s pro.Islamic JDP's paradoxical success and ask why and how the AKP’s victory signifies a major shift in the balance of forces in Turkish politics in the direction of "conservative globalists." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Defining religious parties as either moderate or extreme thwarts our attempts to understand their transformation in electoral competitions.I use the case of JDP to illustrate why moderation needs to be seen as a multi-dimensional process. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]