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This paper presents a re-reading of the Foucauldian analysis of professional accounting firms given by Grey in his 'Career as a Project of the Self...' (Sociology, 28,2). It argues that Grey's paper provides an exemplar of the 'desocialising' tendencies observed in some Foucauldian analysis and attempts to illustrate this desocialisation through placing Grey's data in an Eliasian rather than a Foucauldian framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper gives an overview of developments in the area of role theory which took place in West Germany between 1958 and 1980. We differentiate three periods. The first is characterized by a discussion of Dahrendorfs Homo Sociologicus, of which we highlight only the essentials. This discussion took place in the early `60s. For the second period, in the late '60s - early 70s, the role theory discussion went into a different phase as a result of the so-called `positivism debate' in German sociology. The various points of view explored in this discussion seem to have converged since the mid '70s; the contours of an integrated role theory are becoming apparent. The paper closes with an overview of both positive and negative sides of the developments outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assumption underlying most philosophical theories of science, that one can apply to any scientific theory the concept of 'truth', is, with its implication of absolute finality, a hangover from the period when Newtonian physics was regarded as an absolute end state. The hidden mourning about the passing of this ideal science gives present philosophical approaches to science and scientific method their common stamp. The alternative seems to be the retreat into a sociological relativism. The paper shows that it is possible to work out a science-theoretical paradigm which avoids the pitfalls of both philosophical absolutism and sociological relativism. It suggests that instead of discussing criteria of a fictitious absolute end-state of knowledge, one might try to discover criteria and conditions for the advance of knowledge, non-scientific and scientific. A theory of this kind has the added advantage that it can be tested by, and can serve as a guide for, empirical studies of sciences and of knowledge generally. The paper also suggests that discussions about 'value-freedom' should be abandoned in favour of enquiries into the use of scientific and non-scientific values in scientific work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is premised on the view that it is premature to write about the end of modernity. Moreover it is argued that, for all the flaws of early Enlightenment philosophy, what Jurgen Habermas has termed the 'project of modernity' should be seen as incomplete, rather than abandoned. Drawing more generally on Habermas' theories, five metatheoretical theses are outlined and elaborated. These, it is suggested, might set the parameters for a fin-de-siècle sociology, geared above all to the rationalisation of the lifeworld, which is both credible and critical in orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the comment upon the new social philosophy which has emerged from the ruins of a noisily disintegrating and over-ripe sensate culture. The sheer magnitude of Social and Cultural Dynamics, together with the prodigious research Professor Sorokin displays in analyzing all the compartments of culture over a period of twenty-five centuries without overlooking any part of the contemporary civilization, demands that a critic proceed warily. It is unfortunate in one respect that these pontifical tomes cannot be considered in their entirety, for such a possibility would relieve the impression that a few weak points have been singled out for attack. The purview of this paper is stringently confined to an examination of the author's contribution to the methodology of sociology. After a cursory discussion and definition of "culture" Professor Sorokin classifies the interrelations of the elements and traits of culture into four basic types, spatial or mechanical adjacency, association due to an external factor, functional or causal integration, and internal or logic meaningful unity.

Existential phenomenology is the synthesis of existential philosophy and Husserl's phenomeno-logical method. This paper discusses how this perspective is related to the phenomenological school of sociology and more broadly to the main sociological tradition of subjective realism. The complementarity of existential phenomenology and sociology opens up the possibility of a future general theory of social existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article author comments on sociologist James W. Woodard's classification of culture. The author wonders if "inductive" is a good term for what Woodard has in mind, and whether or not it contributes to the already great confusion brought about by the fallacious antithesis, inductive versus deductive. There is also a certain epistemological question-begging latent in the assumption that through the inductive culture, and that alone, one is brought into closer contact with "natural-world reality," whatever that may be. One also finds the most recent work in modern natural science supporting the contention that we now know no more about the nature of "reality" than in the remotest ages of the past, that technics and science have merely instrumental validity. Woodard's paper, in spite of the instrumental validity of his distinctions, is predicated upon an ingenious variant of the old rationalistic philosophy of history. He needs to demonstrate the validity of that philosophy of history if his program of action is to mean anything beyond a private pious wish. In order to do this he must show that opposing philosophies are invalid, and he must conduct this demonstration within a logical rather than a psychological frame of reference.

The article focuses on the paper Learning Anew from Old Arguments by Joseph Biel, published in the September 1990 issue of the journal Teaching Philosophy. The primary question raised in this article asks why instructors teaching the introductory philosophy course typically teach the ideas of thinkers whose conclusions have generally been found to be inadequate or misguided. The author responds that by understanding the process of reasoning, and through the exposure to new ideas, students are provided a sense of the nature of philosophical inquiry. Thus, from a pedagogical point of view, the utility of a thinker's conclusions to explain phenomena is irrelevant. In sociology, the ideas of some thinkers whose conclusions have been identified as spurious or even refuted completely are also taught. Like philosophers, sociologists continue to teach these ideas, not because of their ability to answer questions but rather because of their ability to prompt them. It is equally important that one continues to teach these notions because contemporary theory reflects, in large part, its intellectual antecedents.

Over the past decade risk society theory has become increasingly prominent within the field of environmental social theory. This perspective contends that conventional political divisions based on class arebecoming less salient and are giving way to a politics predicated upon the distribution of risk. There is much in risk society theory, especially its central contention that public anxieties about high consequence-low probability events undermine the legitimacy of science, that has a distinctly German stamp. Through a comparative analysis of how national context has differently shaped science as a public epistemology this paper suggests we should tread carefully in moving to accept the general applicability of this theoretical approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]