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"Felt understanding" is a crucial determinant of positive interpersonal and intergroup relationships. However, the question of why felt understanding shapes intergroup relations has been neglected. In a pre-registered test of the process in intergroup relations with a sample from East Asia, we manipulated felt understanding (understood versus misunderstood by an outgroup) in an experimental study (N = 476). The results supported the expectation that felt understanding would lead to a more positive intergroup orientation and action intention. The results of parallel mediation analyses showed that felt understanding indirectly predicted intergroup outcomes through felt positive regard, intergroup overlap, and outgroup stereotypes. Furthermore, the results of post-hoc sequential mediation analyses indicated that felt understanding indirectly predicted intergroup outcomes sequentially through felt positive regard and intergroup overlap, followed by outgroup stereotypes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Feudal Japan was one of the countries within the cultural space of Chinese characters and maintained a "tributary diplomacy" relationship with China. However, although it was part of the Chinese tribute system, Japan was not a typical tributary state like Korea or Vietnam at that time. Therefore, Japan's tribute activities with China, in addition to the similarities inherent in this activity, also had many unique characteristics. This article places Japan's tribute activities in the context of the region and compares them with China's tribute activities of Korea and Vietnam at the time to draw out similarities and differences. At the same time, the article derives the characteristics and essence of Japan's tribute activities at that time, contributing to an understanding of the nature of Japan–China relations in the past and present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, the tension between Japan and China is quickly escalating. One of the critical sources of conflict is the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands. The goal of this study is to examine how Japanese citizens develop policy preferences toward China in the issue of the Senkaku Islands. Regarding this matter, it is possible to suggest two scenarios. First, realist concerns among Japanese citizens will boost support for a hawkish approach against China as defending territories is one of the most important concerns for states in the international system. The second scenario prescribes that economic interdependence between Japan and China will undermine the support for a firm approach against China. This perspective is based on the idea that economic interdependence prevents states from going to war with each other. The present research examines the validity of these two competing hypotheses. Statistical analysis relying on the survey data from Japan lends support to the realist perspective. Dissecting the process through which Japanese citizens develop their policy preferences toward China, this study makes an important contribution to the literature of international relations, thus generating critical implications that are highly useful in the real world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the importance of political factors in the development of China-Japan economic relations over the last four decades. The China-US reconciliation and the rise of the pro-China Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei (1972–1974) led to the normalization of China-Japan relations in 1972. The bilateral political rapport was further consolidated in the face of the common threat in the Soviet Union. With the strengthening political relations, the bilateral economic exchanges were gradually developed. Nonetheless, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, mounting Sino-US tension, China's growing assertiveness, and rising nationalism in both China and Japan, the Sino-Japanese bilateral political relations have been deteriorating. The escalating political tensions have impacted bilateral economic relations, including declining Japanese investment in China, weakening bilateral trade, and decreasing Japanese visitors to China. Despite improving bilateral political relations in recent years, it is uncertain how long these friendly gestures by the leaders of the two countries may last given several unsettled territorial and historical issues. The growing tension between the United States and China further adds uncertainty to China-Japan relations in the future. Without strong political relations, weakening economic ties cannot be easily restored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until recently, there have been differing opinions on the provenance of the Western Han style mirrors (WHSM) of the Yayoi period. Some researchers thought these mirrors were from today's Xi'an city (ancient Chang'an city, the capital of the West Han dynasty), while others argued that they may be from Korea. In this paper, eight bronze mirror samples, which were excavated from the Linzi district, Zibo city, Shandong Province, North China, were analyzed by SEM-EDS and MC-ICP-MS methods. The microstructure and SEM-EDS results indicated that, all of the samples were cast with high tin and low lead content. The lead isotopic results showed that, the lead material of these eight bronze mirrors had two different provenances: one from the Zhaoye region (Zhaoyuan and Yexian), which is a place near the Linzi area, North China, and the other was from the geochemical provinces of Yangtze, South China. Comparing with previous results, it indicates that the WHSM and imitative Han style mirrors (IWHSM) of the Yayoi period share the same alloy technology as the Linzi bronze mirrors. More importantly, all the WHSM and IWHSM share the same lead isotope ratio with the first group of Linzi bronze mirrors. This research inferred that the chemical composition and provenance of the WHSM and IWHSM were the same as those of Linzi bronze mirrors. All of these WHSM mirrors were probably cast in the Linzi area firstly and then exported to Japan. The exportation route was likely from Linzi through the Liaodong Peninsula to the Korean Peninsula and then finally to Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study provides a longitudinal analysis of the news coverage on Japan and Sino-Japanese relations between 2001 and 2015 by China’s most influential official media, the People’s Daily, by drawing upon framing theory. The results of the content analysis demonstrated that most of the time the People’s Daily did not disseminate anti-Japanese content as around 70% of the article frames were not related to conflict between China and Japan. Furthermore, the People’s Daily framed the boundary of Sino-Japanese conflicts within the political arena while portraying other fields of bilateral relations as benign and cooperative. In addition to framing Sino-Japanese conflicts as politically oriented rather than full-scale, more importantly, the People’s Daily narrowed down the bilateral conflicts to an either-or choice between historical disagreements or controversies over contemporary interests, rather than a combination of these situations. This reduction suggested that the People’s Daily, as the dominant actor of framing Japan in China’s political communication space, attempted to de-radicalize the antagonistic sentiments towards Japan and stabilize Sino-Japanese relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the causal associations between domestic Japan's socio-psychological indices and people's perceptions toward territorial disputes with China and South Korea. The triangulation analyses do not support most of the hypotheses except the explanatory variables of age, level of educational attainment, and Japan's future projection: The higher the age group, the stronger the territorial sovereignty conviction; the higher the level of education, the weaker the support for the Japanese government's hawkish policy; and the more pessimistic the future confidence of Japan, the bigger the threat perception of China. The causality could be established only when the probability level was relaxed from 0.05 to 0.10. This research finds a weak overall causal association between domestic state of affairs and territorial perceptions. The public opinion on territorial claims remains more or less the same largely independent of domestic socio-economic conditions. This observation leads to a call to revise the conventional conflict cycle theory (i.e., status quo > provocation > rise of tension > conflict relaxation) in order to reflect more of simultaneous and interactive nature of inter-state conflict (i.e., action [tension/status quo/reconciliation] > reaction [tension/status quo/reconciliation]). The intra-state affairs have become more vulnerable to unexpected and hard-to-control contingencies which defy the procedural progression of conflict management. This implies that the elites can no longer monopolize the decision on foreign affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the spatial and temporal migration feature of Chinese registered in Japan from a geographical perspective. First of all, we briefly review the migration history and regional distribution of overseas Chinese in the world and discuss the process of Chinese migration comparing with Korean and population characteristics of age and gender based on Statistics on the Foreigners Registered in Japan published by Japan Immigration Association. Secondly, we apply the logistic equation to predict the growth of Chinese registered in Japan and their population scale in the future. Finally, for clarifying mechanism of migration of Chinese, we verify the main emigrated regions in China and immigrated areas in Japan and discuss the change of migration in each period. We also apply the migration model expressed by production-constrained spatial interaction model to analyze the mechanism of migration based on the origin-destination data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Sino-Japanese relations have again reached to the lowest point since Koizumi's rule. Contrary to the conventional literatures which explaining the dynamic relation from the international dimensions, this special issue highlights the different domestic actors in Japanese politics who contribute significantly to the foreign policy-making process, notably regarding Japan's Chinese policies. While there is a significant rightward shift in domestic politics and a growing discrepancy between central and local level politicians, the quest for discursive power between the opposing camps in the relevant areas will heavily determine future Sino-Japanese relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The potential roles played by local governments in Japan regarding Sino-Japanese relations are often neglected. Drawing upon a few representative case studies by highlighting the interaction between local and international politics, the article aims at analyzing the possible impacts of Japan's local governments on Sino-Japanese relations in the future. First, it reviews the theoretical framework of sub-national or paradiplomacy and the relevant literature on Japan's local governments in such framework. Second, through showing how their local leaders attempted to pursue local or personal interests by taking Sino-Japanese relations as hostage, it uses four local governments in Japan that have peculiar interaction with China as case studies. Finally, it previews some patterns as derived from the cases, in order to draw some implications for both Tokyo and Beijing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of public opinion in Japan in directly influencing the Japanese government's decision to nationalize the Senkaku Islands in 2012. The public mood in Japan is becoming increasingly nationalistic. Although this does not immediately mean the return of militarism in the country, such a mood is especially evident with respect to China. The nationalization of the Islands took place within this nationalistic domestic environment. In the case of the nationalization, public opinion was channeled most notably through Tokyo Governor Ishihara. His plan to purchase the Islands and strong public support for his plan eventually forced the central government's intervention. Prime Minister Noda simply could not force Ishihara to give up his plan because going against such a popular politician who was enjoying strong public support would almost certainly have caused a strong public backlash and resulted in electoral punishment. On the other hand, Noda was also concerned that Tokyo's successful acquisition of the Islands would lead to severe criticism of his government for not properly protecting Japan's territorial integrity. There was also a more serious concern that Ishihara's control of the Islands might lead to a change of the status quo and thus dangerously provoke China. Therefore, Noda had no choice but to intervene and nationalize the Islands. If he was also seeking to mobilize public opinion in his favor, he was not entirely successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite numerous channels for communication and abundant supply of information, misperceptions occur in international politics, and the recent interaction between Japan and China over a group of disputed islands is a case in point. Their quarrel has intensified, leading to a sudden deterioration of civil and official ties, with effects felt in the political and economic realms, and repercussions on the overall relationship. Although some would argue that both sides do not have a better choice, their interaction reveals certain misperceptions and therefore other possibilities. This article surveys the actual conditions after Japan's decision to nationalize the disputed islands in 2012, illustrates misperceptions on both sides in their interaction based on those findings, and probes into the possible causes of such misperceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the relationship between anti-Japanese popular nationalism and China's approach towards Japan amid Sino-Japanese political tension from 2001 to mid-2006. Among various factors that may affect the relationship, this research focuses on the interaction between the government and the public expressions of anti-Japanese nationalism in China. Throughout most of this period, Sino-Japanese political relations were seriously strained by historical, territorial and other controversial issues, which stirred up anti-Japanese sentiment in China. However, it was only between 2003 and the spring of 2005 that mass anti-Japanese protests were allowed, or at least tolerated, by the Chinese authorities and played a role in Beijing's handling of Japan-related controversies. The paper examines China's domestic political situation during the leadership transition from the third to fourth generation of leaders, which it claims drove the Chinese government's lenient response to popular anti-Japanese protests and enhanced the prospects for popular nationalism to affect the government's approach towards Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

2004 was the year when the Japanese public's affinity with China dropped dramatically, to 37.6 %, due to anti-Japan riots in China. Now more than 70 % of the Japanese public does not feel an affinity with China. How could such a strong anti-Chinese sentiment influence Japan's policy toward China? This paper considers this question by examining Japan's decision-making process on terminating the much-criticized yen loans to China. Yen loans are a type of Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by the Japanese government to countries lacking sufficient funds for economic development. China is one of the top yen loan borrowers, and the loans have contributed to China's economic growth and increasing openness. However, in March 2005, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura told Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing that Japan intended to phase out the yen loans before the 2008 Beijing Olympics and reached an agreement on the matter. Two-and-a-half years later, Japan terminated its yen loans to China, as the foreign ministers had agreed. Through mainly firsthand documents and interviews with government officials, this paper will clarify the following two points: (1) While it is true that the Japanese government significantly reduced its yen loan package to China from 2001 onward due to domestic criticism of China, as pointed out by previous studies, it was not planning to terminate the yen loans as of summer 2004. Instead, the Japanese government was contemplating how to keep providing yen loans to China; (2) Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, who was appointed in September 2004, had pushed for the termination of yen loans to China only after anti-Chinese sentiment rose dramatically in summer 2004, because he felt that continuing the much-criticized yen loans would not benefit stable Japan-China relations. This paper sheds light on the background of the termination of yen loans to China, a major milestone in postwar Japan-China relations that had been unclear until now. Having said this, the more important point of this paper may be that it also shows the influence of strong anti-Chinese sentiment on Japan's policies toward China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While Sino-Japanese relations are quite stable presently, it was as recent as 2004–2005 that the two nations slid into the worst bilateral quagmire in decades. When in 2007 Japan was China’s third largest trading partner and China surpassed the US to become Japan’s largest trading partner, what is eating these two otherwise very pragmatic traders? History, nationalism and face, enabled by recent changes in the strategic environment, are the factors that have been most salient in bringing about the plunge in Sino-Japanese relations in 2004–05 and though Sino-Japanese relations have been much better since, these factors hang like a storm front over Sino-Japanese relations today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the “contextual turn” in the interpretation of Chinese classics: the contextuality of Confucian classics in China was latent, tacit, and almost imperceptible; however, it became salient and explicit once the Confucian classics were introduced to Tokugawa Japan. Many a Japanese Confucian took ideas and values expressed in the Chinese classics and transplanted them into the context of Japanese politics and thoughts, in light of which the Japanese scholars staked out new interpretations of the classics. This “contextual turn” involved issues of two levels: the material political order (especially the Chinese-barbarian distinction) and the abstract political thought (especially the ruler-subject relation). It is pointed out that the Chinese empire was the Japanese Confucians’ “political foreign country” and “cultural homeland,” and the tension was evidenced by their interpretations of the term “Zhong’guo” appearing in the Confucian classics. The usual strategy adopted by the Japanese Confucians in interpreting Chinese classics was to “de-contextualize” them and then to “re-contextualize” them in their own Japanese environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests the hypothesis that the economic relationships between China and her major trading partners have changed over the past 20 years with the industrialisation of China, and the emergence of Japan as a source of investment and network trade in sophisticated manufactures, and the US as a source of finance and investment assets, supplier of services and an apparently inexhaustible demand for consumer and intermediate goods. Has this changed the size and direction of spillovers in the region, and has it curtailed or eliminated American economic leadership? We use time-varying spectral methods to decompose the links between the two leading Asian economies and the US. We find: (a) the links with the US have been weakening, while those based on China have strengthened; (b) that this is not new—it has been happening since the 1980s, but has now been reversed by the surge in trade; (c) that the links with the US have been rather complex, with the US able to shape the cycles elsewhere through her control of monetary conditions, but the China zone able to control the size of their cycles; (d) that Japan remains linked to (and dependent on) the US; and (e) there is no evidence that pegged exchange rates encourage convergence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan and China argued for oil and gas in the East China Sea. The issue flared up in 2003. Between 2004 and 2007 the two sides held 11 rounds of official talks in order to resolve the issue. They sought demarcation of the sea and joint development in the disputed area. The gap between positions remained wide. China claims its continental shelf; Japan proposes a median line. By closely monitoring different rounds of talks, remarks, developments, maneuvers, negotiators and dates, it is possible to construct a broad picture of the issue to measure progress and predict outcomes. It is found that improving relations not only facilitate negotiations but somehow exert pressure for a settlement. The general relationship did affect the pace of talks, which could produce a partial solution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Sino-Japanese dispute over the East China Sea maritime resources was triggered by the unsettled maritime boundary and the territorial dispute over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The dispute has been ascribed by many to intensified competition between China and Japan over energy supply. However this article attributes the fundamental cause of the conflict to power politics and political distrust, which are deemed to have the key role in preventing the two governments from finding a solution. The article analyses the origin and the causes responsible for the Sino-Japanese dispute over the East China Sea gas exploration, and then proceeds to investigate the diplomatic dialogues to reveal the key obstacles in the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article revisits a conventional interpretation of Sino-Japanese energy relations from geopolitical and zero-sum viewpoints. Contemporary Sino-Japanese disputes over the East China Sea and their scramble over a crude-oil pipeline from Russia have drawn global attention to the intensification of the rivalry between the two giant energy consumers. Beijing and Tokyo, however, have gradually found common interests resulting from business opportunities, environmental countermeasures, etc. Russia’s failure in driving a wedge between China and Japan, and the United States’ proactive engagement in Asia-Pacific energy issues, appear to provide new opportunities in which the East Asian powers’ energy rivalry can be reduced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The current state of China-Japan relations is characterized by two seemingly contradictory developments adjacent to each other: while economic and cultural relations have experienced an unprecedented and continuous improvement since the 1980s, Chinese and Japanese public perceptions of each other have been deteriorating. This raises interesting questions. How do we explain this discrepancy and what are the sources of the increasing public animosity in China or Japan toward the other country? Can China and Japan maintain amicable relations and continue economic cooperation in spite of the enduring mistrust between their peoples? What is the role of public perception and memory of history in the foreign policies of East Asia? This paper addresses these questions, focusing especially on the last one — the role of history and collective historical memory in international relations and the interaction between public sentiment and government foreign policies. Through a detailed study of recent events and the issue of Japanese textbooks, the author argues that public perception of history can and should be guided toward more positive directions. Otherwise, it will be increasingly difficult to maintain amicable relations between the two countries, especially when new nationalism is on the rise in both counties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]