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The least understood aspect of the ongoing war in Iraq is what caused America to invade the country in the first place. The Bush administration's reasons for going to war are still subject to intense controversy. Popular explanations for the war, stressing America's need for dominance or its desire for Iraq's oil, are erroneous or secondary. This article argues that a careful reading of accounts of White House decision-making point to one overriding rationale: the war on terrorism. The single most important factor in the decision to go to war was the change in President Bush's position towards Iraq after September 11. This convinced the administration that toppling Saddam Hussein was essential for three basic reasons: a military rationale of eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, based on the assumption that Saddam Hussein could pass his presumed WMD to terrorists; a psychological rationale of demonstrating American resolve and discrediting perceptions of American weakness; and most importantly an ideological rationale of transforming the political culture of the Middle East, beginning with a democratic regime in Baghdad to serve as a model for other Arab countries and Iran. The specific nature of these factors reinforces the uniqueness of the Iraq war. It is highly unlikely that the US will undertake similar action against other foes such as Iran, North Korea or Syria in the foreseeable future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How, in the absence of any link between Iraq and the events of September 11, 2001, was the Bush administration able to go to war against Iraq with widespread political support? Well before the terrorist attacks of September 11, the public was concerned about terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and Iraq. In the immediate months after the attacks, the public was supportive, at least hypothetically, of military action to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Nonetheless, the Bush administration concluded that such support would be difficult to sustain without an aggressive domestic mobilization campaign. This article examines the influence of four critical factors that enabled the administration to frame the case for war in Iraq: (1) executive-branch information and propaganda advantages, (2) executive cohesion, (3) oppositional fragmentation, and (4) the nature and history of the Iraqi regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deals with the interest of Australian Prime Minister John Howard to focus on foreign policy after the terrorist attack that occurred in the U.S. on September 11, 2001. Decision by the Howard government to involve Australia in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan; Activism and alignment of Howard with Australia's allies; Involvement of Australia in the Iraq war.

The United States is at a critical crossroads in its foreign policy and its relationship to the international community. Indeed, the very existence of an international community, rooted in the authority of the United Nations and capable of enforcing its resolutions, is from Washington's contemporary perspective an issue of contention. The foreign policy of the administration of George W. Bush has demonstrated, both before and after the tragic events of 11 September 2001, a willingness to undertake major initiatives unilaterally when these are deemed to be in the vital interest of the United States specifically or of international order generally. In light of the inability of the United Nations to exercise collective will in the effort to disarm the aggressive regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, 1991-2003, Washington's determination to act alone or in coalitions-of-the-willing to secure international order is a welcome alternative to the international community as it is presently constituted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]