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Cross-Strait economic activities are no longer unidirectional. The Taiwanese government opened the doors to Chinese investment in 2009. This paper addresses the following crucial question: What is the impact of Chinese investment on Taiwan's high-technology industrial development? Two further questions immediately follow: Will Chinese investment put Taiwanese industrial development at risk? Will an influx of Chinese investment lead to a turning point for Taiwanese industry? The paper first reviews Chinese investment in Taiwan under the framework of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and then explains why we have chosen to focus here on the high-technology industry in Taiwan. It then outlines the main elements of Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) before seeking to answer the above research questions. Fieldwork for this paper was conducted from December 2014 to March 2016. Interviewees include Chinese investors, along with consultants from a Taiwanese institute created to promote industrial development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because of the complex and special political relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan. Cross-Strait trade is influenced by many variables, there has been a view that trade relations between Mainland China and Taiwan are more influenced by political factors. However, between the Cross-Strait, the trade volume has generally shown an upward development trend, especially since 2001. Therefore, the political factors can hardly explain the facts, and economic factors, especially industrial structure factors in Mainland China play an important role in Cross-Strait trade. Based on the small sample data since 2001, this study employed Grey Relational Analysis （GRA） method to verify the evolution of Mainland China's industrial structure and Cross-Strait trade. Based on the results show that the evolution of Mainland China's industrial structure strongly impacts the development of Cross-Strait trade. The tertiary industry has the strongest correlation with Cross-Strait trade, followed by the secondary and primary industries. Furthermore, the evolution of the mainland's industrial structure will expand as well as accelerate the imbalance of Cross-Strait trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates the impact of ongoing cross-strait economic integration on the development of China and Taiwan. The overall impact has been positive for both economies. Taiwan's industrial employment remains robust even as it transforms into a knowledge-based economy. Taiwanese investment has spurred China's technological development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S. military's engagement with maintaining security in Taiwan and its evaluation of a possible Taiwan Strait crisis. Topics include how the U.S. became committed to resisting changes to Taiwan through the "Taiwan Relations Act" of 1979 and how U.S. military assessments consider the potential use of force by the People's Republic of China (PRC) against Taiwan. Additional information is presented on how the PRC will likely not attack if it believes it cannot deter the U.S. from defending Taiwan.

The article examines mutual non-denial within the context of cross-strait relations between mainland China and Taiwan. Information on the evolution of cross-strait relations from 1949 to present is provided. The views of Chinese President Ma Ying-joeu on the effectiveness of the concept of mutual non-denial approach in handling complex and sensitive cross-strait relations are explained. The relevance of the state of relations between the two countries to international law is also analyzed.

Taiwan poses a unique challenge to China's domestic stability, the political survival of its leaders and its relations with other countries. Unlike most external problems, this challenge calls for fundamental and systemic reforms to accommodate Taiwanese appeals. Yet, even if China makes these painful changes, there is no guarantee that the island polity will embrace Beijing's ultimate strategic goal of national reunification. When Taiwan's independence forces induce a crisis, China's leaders are forced to act harshly; on the other hand, when no crisis is imminent, Beijing can afford concessions. When Hu Jintao officially became the leader of the People's Republic of China (PRC), his first political initiative was to institute the controversial Anti-Secession Law, the so-called "legal weapon" to fight Taiwan's secessionism. A longitudinal comparison between Hu and his predecessors' policies reveals that the Anti-Secession Law was more conciliatory than is perceived by the West. This paper examines why the leadership in China felt the need to enact the "anti-secession" law instead of more radical "unification" legislation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses national identity in Taiwan as of September 2012, focusing on an analysis of the nation's identity politics and democratization process which reportedly began in 1987. The institution of general political elections in Taiwan is addressed, along with an examination of the cross-Strait relations between mainland China and Taiwan. The cultural origins of China are assessed, as well as the evolution of socio-political developments in both Taiwan and China. Former Chinese President Lee Teng-hui is also mentioned.

The article informs on the conflict between Taiwan and China during 1950. It is mentioned that the Communist forces of China had moved Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist regime in Taiwan out of the mainland and former U.S. president Harry S. Truman refused to provide aid to Taiwan. However, the war at Korean Peninsula changed the war scene, as Truman sent Seventh Fleet of the U.S. Army, under the command of Charles M. Cooke, to Taiwan Strait to avoid the invasion of Taiwan.

The article focuses on the relation between China and Taiwan, as well as South and North Korea. It examines the success of China and Taiwan in functionalist cooperation and exchange despite its failure to shift economic cooperation into political cooperation through a neo-functionalist political package deal. It also explores aspects that influence the regression of the economic cooperation and human exchanges between North and South Korea. It notes the move of China and Taiwan in utilizing functionalism to augment economic cooperation without touching the issue of sovereignty. Furthermore, it cites integration patterns of divided countries basing on inter-Korean and cross-Strait relations, and discusses their implications on regional integration theories.

Chen Shui-bian achieved an international reputation for his promotion of Taiwan independence. Whilst that reputation may have been well earned, the analyses on which this conclusion is based are frequently flawed in two ways. First, by using an undifferentiated notion of independence, they tend to conflate sovereignty with less threatening expressions of Taiwanese identity and pro-democracy discourse. Second, by failing to take into account the impact of immediate strategic context, analysts ignore a fundamental element of democratic political communication. In our empirical analysis of more than 2,000 of Chen's speeches, we seek to avoid both flaws by unpacking the concept of independence and taking into account Chen's strategic relationship with his primary audiences. Our findings challenge popular portrayals of Chen, but more importantly they have strong implications for policy makers and students of political rhetoric with regard to current and future ROC presidents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the authors discuss the issue of democratization as it applies to Hong Kong. It is the contention of the author that the transfer of power over Hong Kong to the Chinese state has not decreased democratic government in the region and that there has been an improvement in the transparency and accountability in Hong Kong since the 1997 hand over of power. The article attempts to explain these factors and includes a discussion of the implications for China and Taiwan and the international relations between the two countries.

This article discusses the increasing political roles of Taiwanese business people, called taishang, in the relations between Taiwan and China under the policy of Hu Jintao, president of the People's Republic of China. This article explains why the efforts of China to use Taiwanese business people to gain political leverage over Taiwan will most likely not work. The 2008 election of new Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou signaled a new effort to promote increased interaction and economic integration with China, hoping that it would lead to eventual peace between the two governments.

Since Chinese president Hu Jintao took office in March 2003, Beijing has gradually developed a new approach to the Taiwan issue. The new strategy appears to be “speak softly and carry a big stick” toward proponents of Taiwanese independence and relying on Washington to rein in the proindependence Democratic Progressive Party on the one hand, and, on the other hand, actively seeking reconciliation with the anti-independence Chinese Nationalist Party by offering economic benefits to Taiwan and making limited concessions on some difficult bilateral issues—including the sovereignty issue—to promote better economic and social relations and to undercut support for Taiwanese independence. Although the new approach has contributed to the current reconciliation, there is no change in Beijing's fundamental principles, and the current rapprochement is largely limited to the area of economic cooperation. The long-term impact of the rapid economic integration should not be underestimated. Taiwan may also become socially and culturally integrated with the People's Republic of China, and the foundation will be laid for eventual reunification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's Taiwan policy has been one of coupling intimidation (the "stick" approach) with coercion (the "carrot" approach), a policy mix which, in the near term, is not likely to change, as is evidenced by the passage of the "Anti-Secession Law" in March, 2005. However, under Hu Jintao, the focus has been on pragmatism. The warm atmosphere that presently reigns in the Taiwan Strait area is unprecedented. Further talks are expected before the two cross-Strait leaders are slated to step down, simultaneously, in 2012. An era of reconciliation and negotiations has dawned. For the first time there is consensus regarding norms of interaction between the two sides. Cross-Strait relations have stabilized after years of tumult. More open, stable and predictable cross-Strait relations are in the interests of both sides. Difficulties surely lie ahead, but they will be dealt with in a different manner than what has been witnessed in the past. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Taiwan's 2008 presidential election, both candidates advocated signing a peace agreement with China, and Chinese leaders have also expressed interest in reaching such an agreement. Although substantial obstacles remain in the way of a cross-strait peace agreement, this increased interest on both sides of the Taiwan Strait suggests that a closer examination of an agreement's possible dimensions and consequences is warranted. This analysis considers what an agreement might look like, whether and how it might be effective in reducing the possibility of cross-strait military conflict, the relevant barriers to an agreement, and whether an agreement--if reached--would be likely to endure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the long-term implications of the January 2007 launching of China's first successful antisatellite missile into space on China-U.S.-Taiwan relations. While the launch caused alarm across the Taiwan Strait, views in the United States were mixed as to whether the launch was the beginning of the militarization of space or a bid to force the United States to sign a treaty to avoid a costly arms race. The article examines these views in the context of historical tensions between China and the United States over Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]