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The adoption of the shared prosperity goal by the World Bank in 2013 and Sustainable Development Goal 10, on inequality, by the United Nations in 2015 should strengthen the focus of development interventions and cooperation on the income growth of the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution. This paper contributes to the incipient literature on within-country allocations of development institutions and assesses the geographic targeting of World Bank projects to the bottom 40 percent. Bivariate correlations between the allocation of project funding approved over 2005–14 and the geographical distribution of the bottom 40 as measured by survey income or consumption data are complemented by regressions with population and other potential factors affecting the within-country allocations as controls. The correlation analysis shows that, of the 58 countries in the sample, 41 exhibit a positive correlation between the shares of the bottom 40 and World Bank funding, and, in almost half of these, the correlation is above 0.5. Slightly more than a quarter of the countries, mostly in Sub-Saharan Africa, exhibit a negative correlation. The regression analysis shows that, once one controls for population, the correlation between the bottom 40 and World Bank funding switches sign and becomes significant and negative on average. This is entirely driven by Sub-Saharan Africa and not observed in the other regions. Hence, the significant and positive correlation in the estimations without controlling for population suggests that World Bank project funding is concentrated in administrative areas in which more people live (including the bottom 40) rather than in poorer administrative areas. Furthermore, capital cities receive disproportionally high shares of World Bank funding on average. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops two-stage inverse data envelopment analysis models with undesirable outputs to formulate resource plans for 16 Chinese listed commercial banks whose outputs are increased and overall efficiency is kept unchanged in the short term. We use these models to meet three different output targets, namely, increasing both the desirable and undesirable outputs by the same percentage, increasing these outputs by different percentages, and increasing only the desirable outputs while keeping the undesirable outputs unchanged. We find that operation cost and interest expense are more flexible than labor in the adjustment process and that deposits have no obvious law of change. The findings of this work provide some suggestions for bank managers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we designed a delayed payment mechanism in laboratory second price auctions (SPAs), under which subjects received a cash endowment two weeks after the experiment day and had to use their own money to pay the experimental losses (if any) on the experiment day. We compared the effect of delayed payment on overbidding in the induced value SPAs with the conventional “on-the-spot” payment mechanism where the subjects received an endowment on the experiment day, and the prepaid mechanism where the subjects received the endowment two weeks before the experiment day. Each auction was repeated for 20 rounds to provide sufficient learning opportunities to the bidders. Our results showed that bids converged to the corresponding values over auction rounds and overbidding was reduced by previous losses, consistently with the adaptive learning theory. Moreover, overbidding seems to depend significantly on bidders’ cash holding, and the magnitude of the payment treatment effects depends crucially on liquidity constraints. In the presence of liquidity constraints, both delayed and prepaid payment mechanisms reduced overbidding, while in the absence of liquidity constraints, only the delayed endowment mechanism reduced overbidding. Furthermore, when controlling the degree of liquidity constraints, subjects with higher GPAs were less likely to overbid and the delayed endowment mechanism significantly reduced overbidding compared to other payment mechanisms. These results suggest that overbidding in SPAs might be caused by bounded rationality and could be reduced by adaptive learning especially when overbidding becomes “truly” costly to subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]