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The Semantic Link Network is a general semantic model for modeling the structure and the evolution of complex systems. Various semantic links play different roles in rendering the semantics of complex system. One of the basic semantic links represents cause-effect relation, which plays an important role in representation and understanding. This paper verifies the role of the Semantic Link Network in representing the core of text by investigating the contribution of cause-effect link to representing the core of scientific papers. Research carries out with the following steps: (1) Two propositions on the contribution of cause-effect link in rendering the core of paper are proposed and verified through a statistical survey, which shows that the sentences on cause-effect links cover about 65% of key words within each paper on average. (2) An algorithm based on syntactic patterns is designed for automatically extracting cause-effect link from scientific papers, which recalls about 70% of manually annotated cause-effect links on average, indicating that the result adapts to the scale of data sets. (3) The effects of cause-effect link on four schemes of incorporating cause-effect link into the existing instances of the Semantic Link Network for enhancing the summarization of scientific papers are investigated. The experiments show that the quality of the summaries is significantly improved, which verifies the role of semantic links. The significance of this research lies in two aspects: (1) it verifies that the Semantic Link Network connects the important concepts to render the core of text; and, (2) it provides an evidence for realizing content services such as summarization, recommendation and question answering based on the Semantic Link Network, and it can inspire relevant research on content computing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the Amherst papers in relation to development of Parsons' theory. A careful analysis of the Amherst papers reveals that the basic ideas and philosophical principles that Parsons followed throughout his life were already in place, some more fully developed than others, yet forming an integrally coherent pattern to a surprising degree. The clear existence in Parsons's Amherst papers of a metatheoretical framework predating his later professional writing calls into question some still existing myths about radical breaks in the development of Parsons's theory. In one version of this mythology, Parsons began his theory as a voluntarist, then became a structural-functionalist, later moved on to become a systems-theorist and ended up as a social evolutionist. Despite such claims, Parsons always was a voluntarist, even during his so-called structural-functionalist middle period. The Amherst papers reveal an amazingly complex and logically coherent theoretical system-in the mind of a twenty-year-young man-and testify to an extraordinary scope of philosophical depth, and intellectual maturity.

‘Honour killing’, the murder of women to preserve family reputation, is well recognised but infrequently systematically researched. This paper has three hypotheses. First, in families where women report an ‘honour killing’ there is more violence against women and girls, second these women are more likely to report more patriarchal gender attitudes than others, and third these families are exposed to higher levels of poverty. We asked (n = 1461) women enrolled in a trial in Afghanistan, and (n = 535) in a population-based sample in the occupied Palestinian Territories (oPT) if there had ever been an ‘honour killing’ in their family. In Afghanistan, 2.3% (n = 33), and the oPT 7.7% (n = 41), reported this. We built separate multivariable logistic regression models for each country, and for married and unmarried women in each country. Among Afghan married women, ‘honour killing’ was associated with borrowing because of hunger (adjusted odds ratio [aOR]8.71, 95%CI 2.27–33.40), easier access to money in emergency (aOR11.39, 95%CI 3.05–42.50), and violence within the family; intimate partner violence (IPV) (aOR3.73, 95%CI 1.12–12.36), and IPV and mother-in-law violence (aOR10.52, 2.60–42.56). For unmarried women in Afghanistan, ‘honour killing’ was associated with easier access money in an emergency (aOR4.06, 95%CI 0.85–19.37), household violence (hit by parent or sibling, or parent and sibling [aOR5.47, 95%CI 0.82–36.70; aOR7.37, 95%CI 1.24–43.86, respectively]); more childhood traumas (aOR1.24, 1.11–1.38), and more patriarchal personal gender attitudes (aOR1.24, 1.00–1.54). In the oPT experiencing IPV (aOR3.07, 1.02–9.23) and borrowing and experiencing IPV (aOR5.89, 1.84–18.79) were risks for married women. For unmarried women borrowing because of hunger was associated with higher risk (aOR2.33, 95%CI 1.18–4.85). Despite limitations–specifically the potential women were reporting the same ‘honour killing’—our analysis suggests ‘honour killings’ are associated with violence, patriarchy, and poverty. Research is needed for the prevention of ‘honour killing’, which must address the root causes. Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov . [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the concept of understanding (Verstehen) in the work of Max Weber. Parts of Weber's writings discussing this issue are here selected and reproduced. It is shown that in his use, the concept of understanding is part of a complex approach that tries to complement the specificities of humanistic disciplines with their exigence of a rigorous scientific approach. Weber conceives understanding as explanatory understanding, i.e the causal interpretation of a third person's action. The model he uses is that of the legal imputation of concrete effects to concrete causes (i.e. motives). According to Weber, understanding is always an hypothetical interpretation that must be confirmed by objective verification. Weber also makes a distinction between direct observational understanding [aktuelles Verstehen] and explanatory understanding [erklarendes Verstehen]. The former directly grasps the subjective meaning of a given act as such, while the latter is understanding of motivations, which consists in placing the act in an intelligible context of meaning. Both can be rational or affectively determined. Moreover, Weber distinguishes between subjective (on the level of meaning) and causal adequacy of the explanation of an action, and both must be present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How can we characterize an individual creator 'in vivo' - or, to use a more traditional category in philosophy, a knowing subject 'in the making'? While informed by philosophical modes of questioning, this paper addresses this problem using tools developed by anthropologists and sociologists of science. Based on two case studies - William X, a researcher working at France's largest petroleum company (Elf Aquitaine), and Stephen Hawking - the paper examines how these scientists came to distinguish themselves as creative geniuses. By breaking down the narrative representation of the creative process as a simple mental operation, the paper shows how creation is materially 'distributed' in specific tools, practices and social networks. Conversely, it demonstrates how and why the distribution of competences into heterogeneous practices provides an explanation of how a person becomes a singular, inventive individual. In conclusion, it proposes a new conceptualization of the knowing subject as the distributed-centred subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a re-reading of the Foucauldian analysis of professional accounting firms given by Grey in his 'Career as a Project of the Self...' (Sociology, 28,2). It argues that Grey's paper provides an exemplar of the 'desocialising' tendencies observed in some Foucauldian analysis and attempts to illustrate this desocialisation through placing Grey's data in an Eliasian rather than a Foucauldian framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper gives an overview of developments in the area of role theory which took place in West Germany between 1958 and 1980. We differentiate three periods. The first is characterized by a discussion of Dahrendorfs Homo Sociologicus, of which we highlight only the essentials. This discussion took place in the early `60s. For the second period, in the late '60s - early 70s, the role theory discussion went into a different phase as a result of the so-called `positivism debate' in German sociology. The various points of view explored in this discussion seem to have converged since the mid '70s; the contours of an integrated role theory are becoming apparent. The paper closes with an overview of both positive and negative sides of the developments outlined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to offer, through a reading of hedonism, an analytic conception of the difference which one author has referred to as the dialectic of speech and silence. In addressing the form of life of hedonism as one version of otherness and difference, the author seek not only to display an alternative conception of life and inquiry than that of hedonism, but also to show the authority or grounds of this papers possibility - even if such a showing inevitably and necessarily remains incomplete. The first section begins to make available authors understanding of hedonism as one theory of desire and difference through a presentation and consideration of two contemporary expressions of it. The Second section provides the theory, through a consideration of classical hedonism, for the practices encountered in the prior section.

This paper is a review and discussion of the two most common ways sociologists distinguish sociology from common sense in their constant dental of the perennial charge that "sociology is just common sense" Sociologists routinely exaggerate the differences between sociology and common sense by insisting that common sense is (1) false and (2) contradictory. These responses are unsatisfactory, incomplete, and often untrue. Each of these points is discussed and supported by illustrative examples from a wide range of sociological literature. The paper proposes that sociologists' handling of the sociology/common sense issue is a self-serving ideology designed to mystify their audiences in an effort to monopolize their role as experts on social life and to protect their professional autonomy. The paper ends by referring the reader to published materials' which deal more adequately with the similarities and dissimilarities of sociology and common sense and by supporting the thesis that sociology must combine the two types of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The assumption underlying most philosophical theories of science, that one can apply to any scientific theory the concept of 'truth', is, with its implication of absolute finality, a hangover from the period when Newtonian physics was regarded as an absolute end state. The hidden mourning about the passing of this ideal science gives present philosophical approaches to science and scientific method their common stamp. The alternative seems to be the retreat into a sociological relativism. The paper shows that it is possible to work out a science-theoretical paradigm which avoids the pitfalls of both philosophical absolutism and sociological relativism. It suggests that instead of discussing criteria of a fictitious absolute end-state of knowledge, one might try to discover criteria and conditions for the advance of knowledge, non-scientific and scientific. A theory of this kind has the added advantage that it can be tested by, and can serve as a guide for, empirical studies of sciences and of knowledge generally. The paper also suggests that discussions about 'value-freedom' should be abandoned in favour of enquiries into the use of scientific and non-scientific values in scientific work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to outline and examine a few basic functions which ideology performs for the individual and for society. In order to progress in this direction, it might help to agree on some basic conceptual definitions. To begin with, some effort must be made to arrive at a satisfactory definition of ideology, since that term occupies a rather central place in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his Philosophie der neuen Musik, Adorno analyses Stravinsky's music, in spite of his own "work-immanent" research method, from the conviction that Stravinsky wants to recover the authenticity of music by means of stylistic procedures, which do not result from the specific structure of the composition, its internal logic and coherence, but from its external gestures (sempre marcato). This seemingly objective purpose is, however, subjectively posited by Adorno and needs to be framed within the sociological conditions of the time, i.e. between the First and the Second World War. Although alternative interpretations of Stravinsky's music are indeed possible, it will be shown that this music inspires Adorno to interesting philosophical, psychological and sociological reflections which build, to a great extent, on his and Horkheimer's ideas in their Dialektik der Aufklärung and point forward to the thoughts of many German and French philosophers, of which some will be discussed in this paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

shared problem across the sciences is to make sense of correlational data coming from observations and/or from experiments. Arguably, this means establishing when correlations are causal and when they are not. This is an old problem in philosophy. This paper, narrowing down the scope to quantitative causal analysis in social science, reformulates the problem in terms of the validity of statistical models. Two strategies to make sense of correlational data are presented: first, a 'structural strategy', the goal of which is to model and test causal structures that explain correlational data; second, a 'manipulationist or interventionist strategy', that hinges upon the notion of invariance under intervention. It is argued that while the former can offer a solution the latter cannot. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years several approaches-philosophical, sociological, psychological-have been developed to come to grips with our profoundly technologically mediated world. However, notwithstanding the vast merit of each, they illuminate only certain aspects of technological mediation. This paper is a preliminary attempt at a philosophical reflection on technological mediation as such-deploying the concepts of 'transparency' and 'opacity' as heuristic instruments. Hence, we locate a 'theory of transparency' within several theoretical frameworks-respectively classic phenomenology, media theory, Actor Network Theory, postphenomenology, several ethnographical, psychological, and sociological perspectives, and finally, the 'Critical Theory of Technology.' Subsequently, we render a general, systematic overview of these theories, thereby conjecturing what a broad analysis of technological mediation in and of itself might look like-finding, at last, an essential contradiction between transparency of 'use' and transparency of social origins and effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, experimental philosophers challenge traditional appeals to intuition; they empirically collect folk intuitions and then use their findings to attack philosophers' intuitions. However this movement is not uniform. Radical experimentalists criticize the use of intuitions in philosophy altogether and they have been mostly attacked. Contrariwise, moderate experimentalists imply that laypersons' intuitions are somehow relevant to philosophical problems. Sometimes they even use folk intuitions in order to advance theoretical theses. In this paper I will try to challenge the so-called moderate experimental attempts to rely on intuition in order to promote philosophical theses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this journal, Welch and Mueller (WM) (2001) demonstrated a classificatory method for conceptualizing relationships between religion and economics. No judgement can be drawn from WM as to which of their four classifications might be a, or the, correct one. They conclude that the relationships are “both complex and controversial”, and that before any assessment can be apprehended adequately of how the two fields interact, “the permutations and subcategories implied by the system” used need to be identified and explored more thoroughly. This paper pursues that path, but argues that a more determinate verdict than WM's is possible. Here, an alternative interpretation of the relationship between religion and economics is investigated, in which WM's categories are assessed. In the alternative, WM's four classes are not taken to possess equal intellectual merit, as they appear to be. Using more current and comprehensive definitions of religion than WM's, a case is constructed that three of their four categories possess greater intellectual value than the remaining one. These three are here collapsed into one new mega-category regarded as that most validly describing the relationship between religion and economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the treatment of ontology offered by critical realism. It addresses much of the material elaborated upon in two editions of this journal. Three main groups of criticisms are made here of the critical realist treatment of open systems. It is argued that critical realism, particularly in the project in economics emanating from Cambridge, UK, tends to define systems in terms of events. This definition is shown to be problematic. The exemplar of a closed system provided by critical realism of the solar system is shown to be flawed in that it is not closed according to the closure conditions identified by critical realism. Second, the negativity of the definitions adopted is problematic for heterodox traditions attempting to build positive programmes. Furthermore, the dualism of the definitions is also inconsistent with Dow's approach, which has ramifications for the coherence of post Keynesianism. Third, the definitions tend to polarize open and closed systems and ignore the degrees of openness evident in reality. The polarization of systems leads to polarized methodology and unsustainable arguments to reject so-called “closed-systems methods.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the social construction of markets. This paper outlines a model of an economic market system and its operations. It further gives information on the qualifications for the social construction of markets through firms and the government. The significance of social control on the social construction of markets is explained with its effects. More topics included are the causes of change in markets, and views of Robert Heilbroner on the implications of market structure on capitalism.

The idea of this paper is to explore basic proposals of thinkers Herbert Spiegelberg and Alfred Schutz, and to shed light on their mutual relationship and their impact on phenomenology and theoretical sociology, an impact that can only become greater in the future. This brief presentation of Spiegelberg's and Schutz's basic concepts indicates that Schutz's theoretical sociology was not distant from involvement in discussion of fundamental phenomenological issues, and that Spiegelberg, who was certainly not just an editor of a thick phenomenology reader, but rather a full-fledged thinker and a serious reinterpreter of the phenomenological heritage, was inspired by Schutz's sociological use of phenomenology. There fore, it is worthwhile to examine the relationship between their theories and to learn more about what was really at stake in their philosophizing. The article presents typifications and relevance structures of Alfred Schutz's analysis of provisional, socially acquired knowledge.

In her paper, Molm raises whether behavioral sociology is an appropriate perspective for distinctly sociological analysis or does it lead to psychological reductionism. In the first section of the paper, where she distinguishes behavioral sociology from behavioral psychology, Molm adopts a sociological focus that is in agreement with my conception of it. The discussion in the second section of the paper seems to depart from the sociological perspective of the first section. Most of Molm's paper deals with microsociological studies, and her contribution which should be acknowledged is that she recognizes the dangers of psychological reductionism. In concluding her article, she notes that a main difference between behavioral and other sociologists is the methodological one that the former tend to prefer laboratory experiments and the latter research in natural settings. The nature of the explanatory theory depends on the conception of social structure. The theory seeks to explain the pattern of structure of social relations in terms of the structure or distribution of social positions.

This paper is premised on the view that it is premature to write about the end of modernity. Moreover it is argued that, for all the flaws of early Enlightenment philosophy, what Jurgen Habermas has termed the 'project of modernity' should be seen as incomplete, rather than abandoned. Drawing more generally on Habermas' theories, five metatheoretical theses are outlined and elaborated. These, it is suggested, might set the parameters for a fin-de-siècle sociology, geared above all to the rationalisation of the lifeworld, which is both credible and critical in orientation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author presents his views on an article by Augustana Kivisto. Author's paper was not about creating a sociological tradition that helps to think about moral obligations and boundaries, but about exposing the contradictions of all pompous arguments that invoke some transcendent concept of morality, in the Nieizschean sense. Kivisto is way off when he asks how one would respond to such phenomena as gay-bashing neo-Nazi skinheads" or the Asian Indian practice of sati, Author's intent was to discuss sociology. Postmodern ideas relative to the analysis of the knowledge-power articulation have little to do with deconstructionism which calls into question the foundations of western philosophy through textual analysis. Yet, that is what Kivisto seems to think postmodernism is all about. Deconstruction of metaphysics are a dead end for sociology because they lead to idealism and relativism. The twin matters of foundations and relevancy are also pertinent to the way sociology seeks to legitimate itself as a held. Currently mainstreamers argue for a number of selectively growing traditions which are actually very recent constructions in the organization of sociological knowledge.

Theorizing in economics is often associated with some form of individualism. This paper considers the nature of this association in the work of Carl Menger. I adopt this focus not only because of continuing interest in Menger's work, but because recent developments in social theory facilitate a fruitful reevaluation of his general position. I argue that a convincing link between theory and individualism is absent in Menger's work. Moreover, I argue that the various criticisms often made of his work actually relate to the ideas which underlie his individualism rather than, as is usually supposed, those arising from an adherence to a form of Aristotelianism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper describes and makes the case for sociological metatheorizing, or the systematic study of sociological theory. Three types of metatheorizing are delineated on the basis of their end products: the attainment of a deeper understanding of theory, the creation of new theory, and the creation of an overarching theoretical perspective (a metatheory). The basic problems in metatheorizing are reviewed and it is concluded that the most basic difficulty has been the lack of a clear definition of the subfield. Some thoughts on the future of metatheorizing in sociology are offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To resolve the ongoing controversy over Spencer's methodological views this paper establishes that the general philosophy set out in First Principles is a philosophy of science by documenting the influence of the Whewell-Herschel-Mill canons of good science on its structure and content. Its core ideas, the law of evolution and the persistence of force, are not metaphysical principles as most Spencer scholars claim. The law of evolution is a phenomenal law which specifies the course of transformation throughout all classes of phenomena. The persistence of force is a fundamental law which, together with its corollaries, the other first principles, explains why this is the course of transformation. This proscience interpretation of Spencer's position on the science-antiscience controversy also clarifies the role of the law of evolution and the persistence of force in his sociology. They generate a distinct kind of causal explanation, ultimate-causal explanation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces a human rights (in contrast to an ethicist) perspective into sociological investigation. Moreover, it indicates why a human rights orientation is necessary for examining genocide, politicide and other issues of organizational power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The core problems of sociological and philosophical theories of knowledge remain insoluble and unrelated as long as both theories start from static models. The problems can be solved, and the respective theories related to each other, without undue difficulties if the acquisition of knowledge is conceptualized as a long-term process which takes place within societies also considered as long-term processes. This approach has the added advantage of being in closer agreement with the evidence. The paper indicates what needs to be unlearned and what to be learned in order to prepare the way for such a unified theoretical framework which can serve as a guide to, and which can be in turn corrected by, empirical sociological studies of all types of knowledge, scientific and practical as well as non-scientific or ideological. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is sometimes useful to look at ourselves from the point of view of a completely different discipline. In particular, philosophy and sociology have a great deal to offer. In the present paper the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre is used to define the place of engineers in the world and their relationship to basic human desires and needs. Sartre sees the relationship of human beings to the physical world as having two extreme aspects. One corresponds to the instrumental action of the engineer and the other to the passive desire that motivates much of engineering production. It is concluded that engineers have too readily accepted a role in the service of the universal desire for possessions. What is now required is a redefinition of purpose in order to strive toward the satisfaction of needs and the acknowledgement of limits . This requires an engagement with the massive social and environmental problems produced by our obsession with development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]