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Regulatory failure occurs in diverse and complex circumstances, especially in environmental regulation. The response of policy-makers and regulators to regulatory failure often follows a predictable pattern, with the imposition of increased prescriptive regulatory approaches. This phenomenon has been described as regulatory pendulum swing. If the regulatory failure causes immediate and obvious harm to people or the environment such an approach may be appropriate. However, where the community loses trust in regulatory regimes where harm is less evident, a response of this nature may do little to restore trust. This research examined a case study of coal seam gas regulation in New South Wales, Australia, using a regulatory trust typology. The typology's dimensions of expertise, stewardship and transparency provided a useful framework to understand regulatory failure and regulatory trust, and for evaluating the responses of policy-makers and regulators to public concerns over coal seam gas development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The widely held view is that effective action on climate change requires commitment by national governments to international agreements. Developed nations like Canada and Australia continue to fall short in their commitments to emissions reduction targets established under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. Australia refused to ratify its Kyoto commitments until 2008 and Canada withdrew its commitment in 2011. Subnational governments in both countries have been active in developing policy responses to climate change yet remain largely excluded as serious policy partners in national mitigation and adaptation initiatives. This paper utilizes Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework to consider why subnational governments address climate change and the main factors shaping their policy choices. The experiences of the Australian state of Victoria and the Canadian province of Ontario provide examples through which to explore the factors contributing to climate policy opportunities and constraints faced by subnational governments in these countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia is one of the largest coal exporting nations in the world and its economy is underpinned by the availability of cheap fossil fuels. It is well documented that it has failed to act on climate change, and that the conservative Howard government was particularly hostile to international action. It is also well documented that 2007 was an agenda-setting period when climate change was elevated to national prominence. This paper details and interrogates the ultimately successful Labor national governments' efforts to establish an Australian carbon pricing mechanism. It considers whether irresistible normative forces for climate policy change overcame the previously immovable object of economic and political self-interest, and the power of the carbon lobby. In explaining complex climate policy dynamics, temporal scales and politics, it finds great utility in John Kingdon's pragmatic 'policy window'1 as an explanation for Australia's climate policy change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reflects on the initiative of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) not to include greenhouse gases on its revised National Pollutant Inventory. The inclusion was proposed at the Environment Protection and Heritage Council meeting, which was held on June. During the meeting, COAG agreed that the National Pollutant Inventory (NPI) would not be used as a means for reporting greenhouse gas emissions and that no further research be undertaken by the Environment Protection and Heritage Council on incorporating greenhouse gas emission reporting in the NPI.