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This paper tests the hypothesis that the links and dependency relationships between China and her special regions have changed over the past 20 years with the industrialisation of China, and the emergence of Taiwan as a source of investment and sophisticated manufactures, and Hong Kong as financial centre and supplier of services. Has this changed the size and direction of spillovers in the region, and has it curtailed or eliminated American economic leadership? We use time-varying spectral methods to decompose the links between six advanced Asian economies and the US. We find: (a) the links with the US have been weakening, while those within a bloc based on China have strengthened; (b) that this is not new – it has been happening since the 1980s, but has now been reversed by the surge in trade; (c) that Taiwan is more integrated with, and dependent on, the Chinese economy, while Hong Kong continues her separate development based on specialisation and comparative advantage; (d) that the links with the US are rather complex, with the US able to shape the cycles elsewhere through her control of monetary conditions, but the China zone able to control the size of their cycles; and (e) there appears to be no real evidence that pegged exchange rates encourage convergence; in fact the reverse may be true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the Cold War, arms control negotiations have been strictly a bilateral affair between Washington and Moscow. But as times have changed, so must this dynamic. Enter China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the essence of China's Taiwan policy has not changed from the era of Jiang Zemin to the present, the era of Hu Jintao, Jiang's and Hu's attitudes are different. Jiang was impatient with the delay in the unification of China and Taiwan, talking about timetables for unification; however, Hu has so far been patient, saying that he is not afraid of delaying unification. The purpose of this paper is to explain why their attitudes are different. I argue that two factors combine to result in Jiang's impatience and Hu's patience: conflicting ‘perceptions of Taiwan's domestic politics and Taiwan's China policy’ and differing ‘perceptions of the US behavior and attitude regarding Taiwan’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the U. S. role in cross-strait relations before and after the political power transition in Taiwan during 2008. It explores the question of whether a new dynamic is shaping the Beijing-Taipei-Washington trilateral relations with the significant relaxation of cross-strait relations, and how that affects Washington's ability to influence the direction of cross-strait relations in the future. More specifically the paper analyzes the role the United States played in shaping the new reality in the Taiwan Straits, and the evolving thinking on Taiwan in American strategic and political circles. It will also discuss how Washington has managed the cross-strait relations so far as well as how Beijing and Taipei have handled the American factor on some sensitive issues. Finally it will look at the potential benefits and limitations that the United States could contribute to achieving a higher level of reconciliation and integration between the two sides across the Taiwan Straits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Washington's Taiwan policy has been a controversial issue for U.S. policymakers and politicians for decades. At the core of the Taiwan issue is the question of establishing sovereignty. However, there is no "silver bullet" for resolving cross-Strait issues, especially the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty. This paper first presents a chronological review of the components of the U.S. government's "one-China policy" and then examines a definitional problem found in the debate on sovereignty and its implications for Taiwan's sovereignty. A preliminary assessment will be made of the US. perception of Taiwan's sovereignty by analyzing key documents and interviews which have been conducted in Washington. This paper will then conclude with a discussion of some of the implications for the future of cross-Strait relations. Iris argued that for the United States, Taiwan's sovereignty is defined as "one policy, three sovereignties, and five perceptions." The United States is reluctant to define Taiwan's sovereignty, and as interviews conducted in Washington indicate, Taiwan's status is clearly unsettled. The United States challenges neither the Republic of China's (ROC) governance of Taiwan, nor Beijing's position on Taiwan's sovereignty. In brief the United States does not take sides on this issue, but is still bound to a certain degree by its domestic law, the Taiwan Relations Act. The United States' foremost concern is to strike a delicate balance between helping Taiwan to practice its consent, while at same time not violating its own national interests (which implies avoiding a military confrontation with China). This clearly takes precedence over getting involved in defining Taiwan's sovereignty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In its relations with Taiwan and China, Washington has begun to implement separate dual strategies in order to simultaneously deter unilateral action while balancing out the rival political and military forces of each side. A simple standard strategy just is not sufficient to maintain the status quo. The way to maintain peace is for Washington to keep its role as a moderator between the two sides while preventing both from taking unilateral steps toward goals that would naturally provoke the other. US policy has to mirror the duality of the cross-strait arena by implementing dual balancing and deterrent strategies. It is also imperative that policymakers realize the complexity of the situation so as not to unwittingly provoke either side. This paper is an analysis of the emerging US strategy of deterring both sides of the Taiwan Strait from taking unilateral action while maintaining a balance of military and political forces, and gives some suggestions as to the further development of this strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the U.S. military's engagement with maintaining security in Taiwan and its evaluation of a possible Taiwan Strait crisis. Topics include how the U.S. became committed to resisting changes to Taiwan through the "Taiwan Relations Act" of 1979 and how U.S. military assessments consider the potential use of force by the People's Republic of China (PRC) against Taiwan. Additional information is presented on how the PRC will likely not attack if it believes it cannot deter the U.S. from defending Taiwan.

The article informs on the conflict between Taiwan and China during 1950. It is mentioned that the Communist forces of China had moved Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist regime in Taiwan out of the mainland and former U.S. president Harry S. Truman refused to provide aid to Taiwan. However, the war at Korean Peninsula changed the war scene, as Truman sent Seventh Fleet of the U.S. Army, under the command of Charles M. Cooke, to Taiwan Strait to avoid the invasion of Taiwan.

While much is to be celebrated since Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou's inauguration in 2008, cross-Strait relations are not without challenges. One such crucial test is Ma's call for Chinese leaders to stop isolating Taipei in the world community and give Taiwan adequate 'international space'. Because the issue strikes at the heart of the fundamental differences between Taipei's and Beijing's positions regarding the island's sovereignty, it needs to be handled carefully by both governments for better cross-Strait relations. This study analyzes the approaches adopted by both Beijing and Taipei regarding Taiwan's status in the international community. Utilizing discussion with Chinese scholars and government officials and the analysis of several waves of survey data conducted in Taiwan, it argues that Beijing's flexibility in its application of the 'one China' principle and the Ma administration's practicality in making its requests are critical to the realization of Taipei's demand for international space and hence cross-Strait stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines US policy toward the improving relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China. It also analyzes several policy options that the Barack Obama administration may wish to consider. In conclusion, the author suggests that, despite some arguments to the contrary, continuing the current policy supporting the growing rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei is in the best interest of the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mainstream approaches perpetuate the Taiwan–China ‘crisis’. They do so by following Cold-War concepts and prescriptions, despite the rise of new realities and new visions for cross-strait relations. We draw on Hirschman's identification of ‘loyalty’ and ‘voice’ to describe the mainstream discourse on cross-strait relations in Taiwan, mostly directed by the United States. But a third option is now emerging. It offers the possibility of a paradigmatic breakthrough or ‘exit’ based on articulations of a postcolonial subjectivity for Taiwan and its relations with China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Traditional analyses of Taiwan crises have relied mainly on deterrence theory for their explanatory power. This approach fails to account for China's risk-taking behavior, which can be explained by prospect theory. We suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use more risky military coercion against Taiwan's pro-independence movements within a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime faces serious domestic and international challenges to its security. Conversely, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ less risky political pressure to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when the security of China's regime is not challenged. We conclude that maintaining a good US-China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to help prevent military crises in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the long-term implications of the January 2007 launching of China's first successful antisatellite missile into space on China-U.S.-Taiwan relations. While the launch caused alarm across the Taiwan Strait, views in the United States were mixed as to whether the launch was the beginning of the militarization of space or a bid to force the United States to sign a treaty to avoid a costly arms race. The article examines these views in the context of historical tensions between China and the United States over Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]