Search

China's defense white papers have long been dismissed as lacking substance and offering little useful information on China's real strategic intentions and military capabilities. Nevertheless, since 1998 Beijing has continued to issue defense white papers on a regular two-year frequency. Indeed, in recent years it has accorded greater importance to these documents. This paper argues that China's defense white papers warrant more attention than they have received so far. An examination of the making of the white papers, the functions designated for these documents and their evolving content and structure reveals not only the different nature and purpose of the Chinese white papers compared with their counterparts in Western countries, but also important changes and continuities in China's strategic outlook and its evolving perceptions of the role of the use of force in the context of the country's re-emergence as a major player in international affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia's new government is committed to delivering the next defence white paper in 2015. The two previous white papers took a predominantly risk-management approach to Southeast Asia, generally ignored the strategic opportunities in the region, treated it as a stand-alone region largely unrelated to developments in East Asia and failed to link Australia's policies in Southeast Asia with the broader goal of helping to ensure greater strategic stability in Asia by putting constraints on Chinese assertiveness and encouraging its peaceful rise. After offering a summary of recent Australian defence thinking on Southeast Asia, this paper outlines why managing China is the key variable when it comes to strategic stability in the region. It then examines how China's strategy and behaviour can be shaped and influenced by events and relationships in Southeast Asia, and offers some suggestions as to the role Australia can seek to play in Southeast Asia that relates to Canberra's China-focused objectives and strategic stability in Asia more broadly If that can be achieved in the 2015 defence white paper, Australia - which is often criticized for being preoccupied primarily with managing the relationship with its superpower ally the United States - will demonstrate to itself and Asia that its heavy reliance on the ANZUS treaty is no barrier to strategic creativity in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author surveys the review of Japan's defense programs and several other key defense-related documents the Liberal Democratic government initiated in 2013. She focuses on the pivotal points of Japan's Defense White Paper and on the current state and prospects of military cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the United States northern neighbor, Canada serves as a NATO ally and a strategic partner with Washington through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Canadian forces have fought honorably and bravely in concert with American forces in many wars. Canada's Government, however, has been less consistent in promoting a credible vision of Canadian national security policy and geopolitical interests in its defense white papers. These documents have often contained idealistic rhetoric about adhering to a rules-based international order and defending freedom. In reality, Canadian governments of varying political parties have consistently failed to provide the sustained funding and coherent national security strategy to make Ottawa an effective partner with the U.S. and the NATO alliance in addressing historical and emerging national security threats. This article examines Canadian defense white papers for several decades and recommends ways Canada can ensure its defense policy planning can have greater credibility in the national security policymaking corridors of its allies and with potential adversaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author comments on Australia's Defense White Paper entitled "Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030," which was released in May 2009. It is suggested that Australia's new defense policy was created in response to the rapid speed of globalization and increasing economic interdependence, as well as the declining power of the U.S. The author also argues that the policy document is beset with contradictions and there are no details of immediate challenges.

In this article the author discusses military policy in Great Britain. At issue is an examination of a British government report on military matters released during a period of continuing developments in national security. The author urges an expansion of Great Britain's strategic forces and considers aspects of deterrence and coercion in place of more traditional military actions. The article asserts that there is a need for a clear understanding of the motivation of Great Britain's potential adversaries.

In 2000 the Howard government formed a consultative committee to review defence policy and gauge public opinion on defence issues. It concentrated on the impact of budgetary stringency and dramatic strategic change and supported increased defence spending on equipment to cater for high-level threats. Was there a thorough review? Inconsistencies occurred in the reports developed from the review and statements made by senior policy-makers while it was being conducted. The way the review was undertaken points to conceptual tensions in Australia's strategic culture and serious problems with entrenched interests in the services. Unless these challenges are addressed, a thorough review of defence policy cannot be undertaken. The review process itself needs to be reviewed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On November 23, 2015 the United Kingdom (UK) released a defense white paper detailing its national security strategic objectives. This work examines the geopolitical, economic, and strategic implications of this document and compares it with recent and historical defense white paper documents issued by the British government. It scrutinizes the text of these documents and relevant scholarly literature analyzing them while also examining the national security threats facing the UK at the time of their issuance and assesses whether the 2015 document will be supported with requisite political will, military personnel, and financial support to carry out its objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of International Journal of Legal Studies ( IJOLS ) is the property of International Institute of Innovation Science-Education-Development in Warsaw and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper explores the UK's future Indo-Pacific policy by looking into the newly published Integrated Review (IR) and comparing it with the French and German policy papers. The "Indo-Pacific tilt" is one of the most highlighted themes in the IR, but a reading of the review suggests that the UK remains Euro-Atlantic centered when it comes to defense and security policy. It is only after the internal and external security issues are addressed that the UK pursues its "global interest" through diplomacy and trade. Hence, while the geopolitical and economic importance of the Indo-Pacific is acknowledged, and the stance of the UK towards the region appears more ambitious and confident than that of France and Germany, it remains a question as to the degree to which the UK may commit to the Indo-Pacific. The UK defines China as a "systemic competitor" rather than a "threat," suggesting that while the challenges China poses may be comprehensive and profound, they are not taken as immediate and urgent. This designation is peculiar. On the one hand, it differs from the US policy, which sees China (and Russia) as threats to its national security. On the other hand, compared with the European counterparts, the UK is the only one that calls out China, expressing a stronger will to counter China when necessary. Therefore, it is suggested that the post-Brexit UK is likely to side with the US in the US-China-EU triangular relations. Being very much a middle power, however, the UK's space for maneuver is limited. It pledges to compete against China and seek the latter's cooperation simultaneously, but such a stance requires power and will that the country may be lacking. The deployment of HMS Queen Elizabeth to the Indo-Pacific, for instance, has been described as an expression of the UK's commitment to the rules-based international order. Yet Prime Minister Johnson's emphasis on not antagonizing anyone and the decision that the Carrier Strike Group will not sail through the Taiwan Strait indicates a concern about China and consequently difficulty implementing the "co-opetition" strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2013 White Paper talks a great deal about reform in Defence. It is notable, however, that the areas of reform that are discussed relate primarily to processes of accountability, planning, reporting, consultation and reviewing. Some advances have been made in these fields. However, their effect has largely been to tune long-standing and well entrenched administrative systems. Deeper strategic or root and branch reform to achieve world's best practice in efficiency and effectiveness is hardly mentioned. If Defence is to win the internal functional savings directed by the 2009 Defence White Paper, much more rigorous and thorough-going processes of reform lie ahead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Sudan's decade-old defence policy is dated. In this article, Brian Adeba argues that a new defence policy which is tethered to a national security framework that accounts for evolving security challenges and addresses missed opportunities for professionalising the Sudan People's Liberation Army is necessary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper suggests that the economic security may require more than maintaining the economy at a growth level and addresses the use of economic instruments to achieve the national security and foreign policy goals. In this paper, we determine how we could define, recognize, and exercise the "economic power". So far, we have focused on one aspect of the economic security - the far-reaching consequences of economic policies on national security. Yet "the economic security" has another dimension - the economic consequences of national security policies. Defense policies are more directly involved here. The economic consequences of national security policies have two components: first, the ways in which military instruments can be used to generate economic effects, and second, the ways in which economic instruments can be used to replace or supplement instruments in order to achieve the security objectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses the strategic dimensions concept and content analysis of nine key defence white papers published between 1957 and 2010 to assess which factors most influence declaratory policy. The paper also notes that the development of defence policy has been accompanied by the “muddling through” vs. decisive choice debate which reflects the tensions within policy between the thesis of strategy and the antithesis of fiscal parsimony. The paper maintains that defence policy is ultimately contingent upon external threats and it is these, rather than the desire to economise, which are the key policy drivers. It concludes that this extrinsic factor will determine the outcome of the next SDSR and though this is not necessarily incongruent with the desire to economise, events may prove otherwise. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The principles and formalities of modern U.S. Defence planning stem from the 1960s and have largely served well. This paper, however, is about the special challenges that arise when major changes have been needed, some even transformational in character. It discusses how changing realities, independent studies and analysis, events, leaders, and political processes have led to changes not easily instigated within normal processes. Several examples are discussed for the period 1976-2016. Today, the United States and allies again face major challenges that require major military changes. Those have not yet been decided, much less accomplished. The paper draws on lessons from earlier periods to identify obstacles to and mechanisms for change. The last section focuses on defence analysis, which has sometimes been an obstacle but can be part of the solution. The paper urges a new ethic for analysis and the analysts who perform it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to redefine the concept and status of hybrid warfare through a comprehensive analysis and discussion of various aspects of future warfare. Also the definition of the construct of the hybrid threat and an analysis of the applicability of hybrid warfare in the Korean Peninsula Theater (KPT) is provided in this paper. In addition, on the premise of hybrid threats in the KPT, this paper sets the overall direction of the capability and methods of strategic concept development and concept realization. It suggests a possible direction of improvements for establishing effective and practical, united means for the Republic of Korea (ROK) Armed Forces. In this respect, this paper aims to contribute to creating and proliferating general consensus on balanced, evolutionary development for the inception and employment of appropriate strategy against possible hybrid threats it the KPT. It is also expected that this will assist in establishing or improving the government policy in connection with hybrid threats and in promoting consistency in works related to hybrid threats by setting an appropriate direction for such policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States military Civil Affairs community desires to increase its relevance to future operations and missions of the U.S. Army as part of the joint force. To do so, it must adapt to the changes and challenges of the dynamic and uncertain operational environments in which the joint force operates. One key component of these environments concerns the ability of the joint force to reestablish and maintain security in the wake of crises and catastrophes. This paper demonstrates that the concept of security itself has evolved and continues to do so in ways that require fundamental changes in the ways and means that the Civil Affairs community goes about its security tasks. Prominent among these changes is the fracturing of the concept of security into specialized forms, especially Human, Environmental and Informational Security. This paper provides some possible adaptations that the Civil Affairs community can make to accommodate these changes in the security environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors have over 50 years' experience of working on defence in Central and Eastern Europe. They have been intimately involved in trying to reform over 10 national defence organisations including Ukraine. During this work, they often faced intractable resistance and scepticism or conversely, apparent unbounded support, but following this, a complete lack of any actual implementation work by officials. This paper addresses some of the findings and observations identified by the authors that appear to cause these responses and the consequent failure of reform. A new research approach has been taken by using the business and culture tools from Schein, Hofstede and Kotter to try and unravel the underlying causality of that failure. The second part of the paper produces a new process for change based upon the research conclusions to help other advisers and consultants working on reform in the post communist defence arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intensification of U.S.-China relations marked by severe competition and sanctions in the Trump administration has continued in the Biden administration. As stated in the United States' 2018 National Defense Strategy, strategic competition with China has become Washington's top defense policy priority. Against this backdrop, United States' competition with China over the space domain will require much of the world's attention, as Washington continues to augment its space power in the context of its overall security strategy against China today. Therefore, it is crucial for countries like South Korea to understand how the United States is constructing its own space power and how this may influence South Korea's national security in the years ahead. The purpose of this paper is thus to analyze the current state of U.S. space power in the context of increasing U.S.-China security competition and provide relevant policy recommendations for South Korea. This research suggests South Korea 1) to establish a military organization with space security focus to promote the country's prospective space power augmentation and maximize the effectiveness of its joint military operations, 2) to construct its own space power and enhance its strategic value in the midst of U.S.-China space competition, and 3) to implement specific U.S.-South Korea space cooperation plans to develop advanced space technology and space industry capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper engages with the security dynamics underlying the use of drones and their impact on security subjects – individuals and groups that are the ultimate recipients of specific security policies, regardless of whether these have beneficial effects on them. Using Mark Duffield’s distinction between the insured Global North and the non-insured Global South, this paper discusses how drones generate a radical dissociation between the intervener and the intervened that ultimately produces new security environments at the margins of the international system. These new security environments are defined by the articulation between space, technologies and bodies: bodies of invisible subjects; bodies that are uninsurable. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Discusses the history of the civil defense program of the U.S., from 1944 to 1984. Reason given by the government on the establishment of a civil defense program; Studies conducted on the potential impact on a typical American city of the hydrogen bomb; Creation of the U.S. Federal Civil Defense Administration; Ways used to educate the public on civil defense; Implementation of the Interstate Highway Act of 1956.

The paper argues that a significant change in Japanese post-Cold War security policy has occurred, as compared to its Cold War security policy. Instead of relying solely on power-based realist variables, this paper argues that a significant change is taking place because of the shift in Japan's security identity from a 'peace state' to an 'international state'. What this refers to is that Japan sees itself as playing a more active role in military-strategic affairs in the post-Cold War period due to the normative structure shift within Japan in relation to the practices and role(s) in the regional and international security environment. To show change in Japan's security identity and its resultant security behaviour, norms in three areas that define and shape its security policy are contrasted - Japan's definition of national security; its contribution, in military terms, to regional and international security affairs; and the level of agency (control) Japan has in its security policy. The international-state security identity is increasingly recognised by the members of Japan's security policy-making elite and is used to formulate Japan's security policy in the post-Cold War period. It is also gradually being accepted by the larger Japanese society and has become a permanent feature of Japan's security discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes as a point of departure a notion of reorganization as a way of managing risk. It examines the reorganization process in the Norwegian central administration for homeland security. As a central theme the paper explores why the proposal to radically reorganize the administration by replacing a network model with a hierarchical model resulted in a much more modest change to a hybrid agency model. The descriptive part of the paper traces the reorganization process, starting with the initiative taken by the Ministry of Justice in 1999 to establish a public commission and ending with the final parliamentary resolution in 2002. Despite the 9/11 terrorist attack that occurred in the middle of the process and its implications for security, only minor changes were made to existing arrangements. A striking feature of the process was negative coordination, indicating that the wish to coordinate was greater than the willingness to be coordinated. To understand why this was so, we look at bureaucratic politics and bargaining between different interests, at institutional identities and strong cultures and traditions within different governmental bodies. We focus especially on framing processes within and between organizational fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the advent of the post-Cold War era, the Arctic has emerged as a region for sustainable future growth and the coexistence of various forms of cooperation and conflicts as mutual interests between coastal states become established in a variety of ways. In particular, as the Arctic development and advancement has continued since the 2000s, aspects of military strategy have been highlighted in Russia. Regarding this situation, there has been an analysis that a new Cold War between the United States and Russia in the Arctic might take place. However, President Vladimir Putin of Russia stated that military exercises, including the modernization of a military base in the Arctic, after the adoption of the "Russian Federation Maritime Strategy 2020" in July 2001, is aimed at strengthening defense capabilities and national security. In this context, this paper seeks to investigate the current status of Russia's Arctic policy in terms of military security and examine its implications. From a Russian perspective, the modernization of military infrastructure, base construction and military exercises in the Arctic region are intended to effectively respond to security threats and take a leading role in a national emergency. These also serve as a breakthrough to overcome adverse economic conditions due to Western sanctions imposed against Russia after the Ukrainian crisis, and are measures to further strengthen non-military aspects, such as climate change, sustainable Arctic development, environmental protection and economic security. In this respect, the possibility of war and military conflict between the United States and Russia in the Arctic region is quite low. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studies on the democratic control and legitimacy of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) have thus far mostly focused on formal institutions. However, a comprehensive analysis requires including the ‘sociocultural infrastructure’ in which such formal institutions are embedded. Students of democracy have argued that the public sphere is a crucial dimension, if not a precondition for all mechanisms of democratic control in general. This paper investigates whether and in which ways Europeans participated in transnational European communication on humanitarian military interventions (1990–2005/2006). The paper analyzes a full sample of 108,677 newspaper articles published in leading newspapers of six EU member states, and the US as a comparative case. It demonstrates that the ‘national’ arenas of political communication are intertwined and allow ordinary citizens to make up their minds about common European issues in the highly controversial and normatively sensitive realm of humanitarian military interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]