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In this paper, the Researcher has endeavored to test the hypothesis that the Indian ballistic missile defense system (BMDS) erodes the sense of mutual vulnerability. It seems that the BMDS provides a false sense of security to India. For this reason it is felt that the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) can therefore be launched against Pakistan in an attempt to actualize a disarming strike. Consequentially, the BMDS disturbs the India-Pakistan crisis and deterrence stability. Indian policymakers should realize that firstly, the operationalization of the CSD crosses Pakistan's nuclear threshold and it requires Islamabad to unleash strategic and tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs); secondly, the Pak-India crisis and deterrence stability is functional due to the sense of mutual vulnerability; thirdly, the credibility of nuclear deterrence has not been tested and fourthly, the deterrence stability solidified the crisis and strategic stability. The BMDS deployment in South Asia will certainly result first in quantitative and qualitative nuclear proliferation; second, it weakens the NPT and; third, it may break the nuclear taboo based on non-use of nuclear weapons. India needs to understand that Pak-India can survive the long persisting threat of conventional and nuclear war because of the mutual vulnerability of counter value and counterforce targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India’s interest in developing Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) originates from its desire to counter ballistic missiles threats emanating from its traditional rivals in the region. Therefore, in 2001, India positively responded to United States of America’s offer of BMD, which created consternation among the regional countries particularly in Pakistan about its effects on the prevailing strategic stability and prospective arms race in the region. India’s ability to develop a BMD has been debated due to fallibility of the system particularly taking the lessons from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty 1972, when USA and former USSR decided to enter into the treaty due to the weakness of the shield and degeneration of nuclear deterrence, which could provoke a nuclear war. This article analyses India’s rationale and current ability to develop the ‘defensive shield’ and questions the assertion that BMD as a concept is a ‘defensive mechanism’ given India’s geographical vulnerabilities and availability of cost-effective offensive strategies to counter BMD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As India intends to complete its ambitious deterrent force projects such as the development of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Multiple Independently Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), nuclear powered submarines, aircraft carrier, and a number of nuclear reactors as part of its would-be modified Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND), it is imperative to analyze whether or not India's shift in its deterrent force posture including that of ambitious deterrent force projects remains consistent with minimum deterrence India earlier conceptualized. This article conceptualizes the rationale of India's evolving nuclear strategy under the conceptual essentials of minimum deterrence and the limitations to and challenges of India's ambitious deterrence force posture. Also, the article explores the key factors how and why India might be shifting away from its deterrent force posturing it earlier conceived. However, this article finds that India may not remain consistent with its broader nuclear policy of minimum deterrence conceptualized in its earlier nuclear drafts if it continues to successfully develop these mega deterrent force projects bolstered by sophisticated delivery systems amidst India's increasing strategic partnership with the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India is developing new nuclear force options in response to what it perceives as a deteriorating strategic environment. New Delhi has historically adhered to the nuclear strategic concept of "credible minimum deterrence," defined as maintaining a small, survivable nuclear force at low readiness in peacetime, which poses a credible risk of nuclear retaliation to adversaries but does not guarantee it. However, India's stated commitment to credible minimum deterrence is currently challenged by four specific developments: the gradual weakening of elite support for India's no-first-use policy; the decision of its defense scientific agency to pressure policy makers by publicly announcing it can field tactical nuclear weapons; the shift of Indian Air Force planning toward potential counterforce strikes; and New Delhi's unclear intentions concerning ballistic-missile defense. This article concludes that India faces a choice between two distinct nuclear-policy pathways: retaining its adherence to credible minimum deterrence, or permitting increasing ambiguity surrounding its true nuclear doctrine and posture. The article evaluates these nuclear-policy options and concludes that credible minimum deterrence remains more consistent with Indian national-security and foreign-policy goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the broad contours of India's nuclear doctrine were announced within the days of May 1998 nuclear tests, the formal doctrine was made public only five years later. This article will critically examine the evolution of India's nuclear doctrine in terms of the 1999 Kargil conflict and the 2001-2002 military confrontation with Pakistan. This article concludes that the one-page nuclear doctrine of 2003 remains sketchy and subject to varied interpretations. It would therefore be best to formally update or elaborate upon the nuclear doctrine, keeping in view key issues such as India's development of a Ballistic Missile Defence system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the evolution of India's Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program. Key issues discussed include the primary factors that are driving India's efforts to acquire missile defenses, the democratic and domestic context of the country's decision to pursue a BMD program and the issues' implications for the defense policies of India.