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The rules governing the choice of Canada's prime minister are obscure; it would seem that the prime minister is simply the leader who holds the most seats in the House of Commons. However, the constitutionality of the choice of prime minister is actually much more complicated, and involves principles such as the rule of law, responsible and representative government, and the need for effective government. Although rarely ever called upon to exercise such judgement, ultimately (and theoretically) the choice is made by Canada's governor general. This paper outlines the constitutional rules governing the choice of prime minister, in particular those that apply when no one party holds a majority in the House of Commons. The paper raises several issues as to whether the current configuration of the office of governor general provides the appropriate political authority for choosing a prime minuster were there ever to be a challenge or uncertainty as to who should be chosen. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In June of 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin was returned to Parliament with a minority government. In order to survive, his Liberals would have to rely on the support of their political rivals. This reliance on rival support should have a modifying impact on the formation of the government?s policy agenda, on policy-making, and on decisions taken. International policy seems to be case in point. The first piece of legislation to fall under Martin?s new government dealt with the separation of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. There was a distinctly conservative bent to the April 2005 International Policy and Defence Policy Statements. The Layton-Martin budgetary pact had an impact on Canada?s Official Development Assistance envelope. This is not the first time a Canadian prime minister has faced the challenge of managing a minority government while acting abroad. John Diefenbaker (1957-1958 and 1962-1963), Lester B. Pearson (1963-1965 and 1966-1968), Pierre Elliot Trudeau (1972-1974) and Joe Clark (1979-1980) all carried pluralities short of majorities in the House of Commons. This paper examines the degree to which minority governments have had effects on the formation of international policy (defence, diplomacy, development and commerce) by examining spending patterns, policy statements and policy outcomes from these six periods. It is argued that, while minority governments cause short term fluctuations in funding and outputs, they do not differ greatly from longer term patterns in Canada?s international policies. One has to look elsewhere to explain foreign and defence policy change. This paper will also offer a brief comparative overview of other developed democracies and the effects of parliamentary structure on foreign and defence policy. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jean Chrétien came to power, in 1993, after a campaign during which he advocated that his foreign policy would be quite different from Brian Mulroney’s. Indeed, under Chrétien’s leadership, Canada’s role and influence declined sharply as tensions between Ottawa and Washington grew. When asked to support President Bush’s war against Iraq, Canada turned down the invitation although it had accepted to be involved in the solving of the Kosovo crisis. Why did the Chrétien government offer two different answers to these two international challenges? What role did the domestic values play in the framing of each of the answers given? What weight did international factors play? Was the government simply inconsistent or were the two answers reflecting a same logic that was applied to sharply different situations? Through the analysis of official responses given by key government spokespersons (Prime Minister, Minister of Defence, and Minister of Foreign Affairs) we will be able to determine what were the key factors evoked and establish if Canadian foreign policy is based on continuity or if it is crafted on an ad hoc basis to answer each case it faces. The answer this research provides will help us predict if Canada is a reliable partner or if its stance varies to answer domestic political pressures. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Canadian government developed Indian Residential Schools in the 1800s to assimilate Aboriginal peoples and, according to Canada's first prime minister, John A. MacDonald, get rid of the "Indian problem." The negative impact of nearly 100 years of residential schooling on Aboriginal children and, through them, on Aboriginal communities was profound. Since the late 1990's, residential school survivors have filed approximately 13,000 lawsuits against the government claiming sexual and physical abuse at the hands of the personel hired by the government and churches to run the schools. In response, the Canadian government, in 2004, designed an alternative dispute resolution system (ADR) to address the large number of lawsuits with a faster, easier, more efficient alternative to the courts. Although ADR offers the residential school survivors more choices, I argue that the state-designed ADR has been co-opted to the extent that it offers no real alternative to the courts. Further, Sen's work raises questions as to whether the residential school survivors have the freedom to choose from a "diversity of options, and not via pre-selected models of rationality" (Viens, 2003). Analyzing the state-defined ADR using Sen's concept of freedom may contribute to understanding how the aftermath of mass violence can be addressed in a manner that contributes to the well-being of communities involved. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]