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Future international relations in East Asia are likely to be largely shaped by the maritime strategies and policies of various actors. This paper examines China's policy and behavior in maritime cooperation in the East Asian region in recent years, a topic that has been insufficiently understood. I suggest that while it is necessary and useful to take into account China's naval power, more attention to Chinese intentions and policy on East Asian maritime issues is warranted to arrive at a more balanced, and arguably more accurate, understanding of China's role in East Asian maritime affairs. This paper takes stock of China's changing perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors in maritime cooperation in the region. I describe China's new policy moves in the South China Sea and East China Sea. I also address some of the major Chinese concerns for further maritime cooperation in East Asia. I conclude that while a grand cooperative maritime regime is still not possible from a Chinese perspective, China is likely to agree to more extensive and substantive maritime cooperation in many functional areas, most notably in the non-traditional security arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most interesting phenomena in contemporary international relations is the growing role of local government entities in forging and intensifying cross-border interactions in the social, economic and cultural arenas. Lamentably, this aspect of international relations, which I conceptualize as local liberalism, has not received sufficient scholarly attention. This paper attempts to fill in the gap by describing and analyzing how local liberalism has played a role in China's relations with Southeast Asia. The paper argues that local governments in Yunnan and Guangxi have played an important and positive role in cementing the relations between China and Southeast Asia. The paper suggests that debunking the China ‘black box’ to examine the different units in China, including the sub-national governments, may provide more useful insights for our understanding of China–Southeast Asian relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Vying for high-speed railway projects overseas has become a prominent feature of China's diplomacy in recent years, including in Southeast Asia. These efforts have been widely depicted within the premises of the China Threat narrative – as a part of Beijing's agenda to alter the power balance in Southeast Asia at the expense of the economic, political, and security well-being of countries in the region. This paper challenges such interpretations and concludes that these projects do not have either the intention or capacity to facilitate such a hostile and far-reaching agenda toward the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

BRI, when compared with any other connectivity project in the 21st century, can indisputably be regarded as the greatest project considering its size and diversity. Yet, the real significance of this project isn't linked to its size; it is the paradigm and the spirit behind it. Cooperation, inclusiveness and win-win approach, being the main elements of this development model, makes it a completely distinct paradigm, from what has been in practice since last over 200 years in the world, under the Colonial Culture of Domination, to benefit from the opportunities offered by the over powering trend of globalization. Although China now enjoys a greater global influence, many of the other powerful international and regional players, while may like to benefit from the project, might not reconcile with the approach that has laid the foundation of BRI. Thus, while the physical and functional aspects of the BRI would naturally attract the maximum attention, an aggressive communication strategy advancing the spirit of BRI is a prerequisite to make the project a real success. While this is important for each and every region (and country) involved in BRI, the regions and countries sharing borders with China naturally occupy special significance; since the physical connectivity cannot be achieved without taking them on board. This paper, after elaborating the above perspective discusses in the final part CPEC experience as an example in the overall context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The most challenging task in creating peace in the South China Sea is how to deal with Chinese assertive behavior. This is important since many proposals of the regional security architecture have failed to engage China in order to establish a long-lasting peace in the region. This paper seeks to explain the failure of security management in the South China Sea. Using the concept of strategic culture deriving from constructivism in International Relations, this paper argues that China's strategic culture is the main factor behind the aggressive behavior in the South China Sea. This culture is rooted from the pre-modern China's history that has distinct perspective from the Westphalian international law with regard to territorial disputes. This cultural dimension, not the material one, is the key to rethinking security management in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to examine the process of China's participation in regional cooperation in Asia and the factors that affect its participation. It focuses on a changing China-ASEAN relationship that is reshaping Asia. To build a peaceful and stable external environment, China has been making various efforts, political, economic and in the security field, to maintain and upgrade a harmonious and constructive relationship with its neighboring East Asian countries. Politically, China acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), essentially accepting the code of conduct stipulated by ASEAN and prompting other regional countries to observe this code. China has been supportive of ASEAN, playing a leadership role in East Asian regional cooperation. China and Asian regional cooperation is an evolving concept and a couple of theoretical points may be taken into account, such as how regional cooperation influences major powers' international behavior and vice versa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay traces the structural sources of Malaysia's South China Sea policy. It argues that Malaysia's 'light-hedging' approach is primarily a smaller-state's response to growing systemic pressure arising from power asymmetry, rivalry, and uncertainties. The features of this approach are: an insistence on not taking sides, concurrent adoption of open deference and indirect defiance, and an active effort to cultivate a fallback position, all aimed at reducing multiple risks associated with the uncertainties of US commitment , China's long-term intentions, and their future relations. We have arrived at three main findings. First, structural impact matters: as geopolitical uncertainty increases, weaker states hedge more deeply. Second, smaller states do have agency, even if only in a low-profile manner. Because smaller states have been disadvantaged under an asymmetric power structure, they often use a combination of diplomatic, legal, developmental, and defence means to shape favourable external conditions. Third, while hedging is chiefly a result of structural factors, the forms and degree of a state's hedging activism are necessarily a function of its threat perceptions, elite interests and other unit-level variables. These factors explain Malaysia's light form of hedging: quiet action and limited defiance alongside open accommodation in managing the South China Sea disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Viewed through the standard prisms of international politics, escalation of security tensions is the definitive feature in the evolution of relations between China and Southeast Asia over the last decade. Disagreements over territorial ownership of and rights to the South China Sea sharpened and arguably became the defining feature of regional geopolitics. Yet, China and Southeast Asia have also managed to prove predictions of fateful conflict to be premature. In this article, we study Chinese and Southeast Asian strands of security discourse, which provide political and diplomatic cover for cooperative interaction in parallel with little or no compromise on security principles. Then we select interactions between China and the Philippines and China and Vietnam as cases to illustrate our observations. We conclude by postulating that, at least in the maritime space, tension management rather than conflict resolution is more likely to be the continuing feature into the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By examining the activities of Zheng He and members of his expeditions at the Malabar Coast, Sri Lanka, and Bengal, this article argues that the Yongle emperor wanted to exert military power in South Asia in order to legitimize his usurpation at the Ming court. The essay analyzes Zheng He's intervention in the dispute between Calicut and Cochin, the armed conflict in Sri Lanka in 1410-11, and the expedition's involvement in a dispute between Bengal and its neighboring polity, Jaunpur. These episodes in South Asia make it difficult to accept the modern representations of the Zheng He expeditions as diplomatic missions intended to promote peace and harmony. Rather, they were, as the essay contends, part of the Yongle emperor's aim to establish hegemony over "all the known world under the Heaven" or the tianxia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most of the literature on state transformation focuses on China's relations with African, Asian and Latin American countries and the National Oil Companies' overseas expansion to show that China has become fragmented, decentralised and internationalised. This article contributes novel findings by focusing on China's relations with Europe and the actions of China's National Nuclear Companies (NNCs). It shows that NNCs, which have become relatively autonomous actors, often pursue their agendas of expansion into Europe without much coordination with, or even in contradiction to, other ministries' agendas and interests, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Instead of being orchestrated by the central government, their expansion reflects considerable disorganisation and sometimes undermines China's official strategy. The article demonstrates this through case studies of NNCs' involvement in the UK and Romania. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews China's diplomacy toward Southeast Asia and ASEAN chronologically from the 1990s to 2015, focusing on the changes that occurred during the second half of the Hu Jintao Administration and the further policy adjustments made during the first Xi Jinping Administration. While there are still many uncertainties regarding the policies, and many aspects are still in progress, this study provides an outline of the current period of change in China's relations with Southeast Asia and China's more active engagement in relations with ASEAN from the late 1990s through the early 21st century. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The emergence of China and India has profoundly influenced the policies of Southeast Asian countries. For a small country like Singapore, with a uniquely majority ethnic Chinese population in Southeast Asia, the process of engagement with China and India is historically entrenched and multifaceted. Historically, China and India constitute two major immigration streams into Singapore. Since the 1990s, with low total fertility rates, Singapore has viewed both China and India as sources for not only increasing its overall population to maintain its ethnic demographic profile, but also towards sustaining its economic growth. This article will examine the impact of large foreign manpower and migrant inflows from China and India into Singapore. It will argue that while the prevailing population shrinkage and manpower shortages in Singapore have been eased with migrants from China and India, at the same time they have created new socio-political fissures in Singapore’s increasingly diverse population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The governments of China and Malaysia have deployed their state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to channel investments between both countries. This is to increase private investment flows into the mainland, while in Malaysia it serves an urgent need to draw foreign and domestic investments. These state-led investments have resulted in joint ventures that have included private enterprises owned by Chinese entrepreneurs, an attempt to continue to encourage private investment in business ventures. This article provides insights into three issues. First, it deals with the question of why investments through business networks by Southeast Asian Chinese enterprises in China have not led to the emergence of this community as a global economic force. The second issue deals with the question of whether these state-led infrastructure projects, now comprising SOEs and privately owned Chinese enterprises, will inspire the latter to increase their investments in each of these countries. The third issue involves a review of the theory of transnationalism, in order to determine its applicability in explaining cross-border investment patterns involving Chinese-owned enterprises from Southeast Asia [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existing literature on foreign policy formulation suggests that individual leaders in small and politically unstable states exert a disproportionate impact on foreign policy-making. Some analysts further contend that personalized foreign policy decision-making is more likely to suffer from discontinuities. This article, however, argues that the foreign policies of small and politically unstable states exhibit considerable variation in terms of constancy. It does so by offering a comparative study of the foreign policies of the Philippines and Thailand towards China. It demonstrates that the Philippines' policy towards China underwent significant changes in the last few years of the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and that bilateral relations deteriorated rapidly after Benigno Aquino III came to power in 2010. In contrast, Thailand has maintained a cordial relationship with China despite domestic political turmoil since 2006. This article suggests that neither the shift in the distribution of capabilities nor the presence or absence of territorial disputes sufficiently explains this variation. It argues that the personalization of foreign policy and economic dependence are two important factors that determine constancy and change in the foreign policies of small states towards major powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides an overview of foreign relations developments in the Southeast Asia region during the year 2013, focusing on the policies of the major powers China, Japan, India, and the U.S. toward the region. Topics include the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the impact of rising tension between Japan and China, and economic relations. A sidebar on military relations between Japan and Philippines is included.

The history of the conflicting maritime claims in the South China Sea, focussing particularly on the recent disputes between China and Vietnam/the Philippines. The author describes how external actors, principally the US, but also India and Japan, have been drawn in as a counterweight to China. He then goes on to assess the possible impact of this political dispute on the essentially economic relationship between China and ASEAN. His conclusion is that the economic relationship is likely to prove enduring. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses conflict in the South China Sea and its Islands, focusing on a lack of resolution of disputes over sovereignty and control involving China and ASEAN countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines. The author highlights international, regional, and bilateral strategies for resolving conflict in the South China Sea, including discussions of a lack of involvement by the United Nations (U.N.), Track-2 (nongovernmental) diplomacy efforts, and foreign relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Vietnam. It is suggested that balancing strategies involving outside countries such as the U.S. may preserve the status quo in the South China Sea region.

The article discusses conflicts over issues of sovereignty and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea (SCS), focusing on the involvement of the U.S. in the region in the 21st century. The author notes that countries such as the U.S., Japan, and India have interests in the SCS and highlights both diplomatic approaches to conflict and the building of military strength in order to address conflicts through force. The SCS is highlighted as a potential threat to maritime security, and multilateral efforts to address the issue by ASEAN are noted. Other topics include China's involvement in the region; a Code of Conduct on SCS disputes; and the 45th annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) on July 9, 2012.

This article analyses China's hydro-politics along the Mekong River. It seeks to explain why China's unilateral dam-building projects on the upper reaches of the river have not been met with sustained criticism on the part of the downstream riparian countries, for which upstream dams are likely to have severe negative consequences. It is held that China has embarked on a strategy of implicit and broadly conceived actor-reversed issue linkage as a means to nip any loud disapproval of its dams in the bud. By downplaying its dam-building projects and instead promoting common development goals with the Mekong riparian countries through highly increased political and economic engagement, Beijing has successfully defused any potential counter-measures against its dams, at least for the time being. The sustainability of this strategy and its transferability to others of China's trans-boundary rivers must be questioned. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As China expands its development assistance in Southeast Asia, is Chinese aid beginning to emulate international norms and practices or sustaining its own distinct approach to development assistance? This essay argues that China's socialization into international norms varies with the thickness of the institutional environment. In Laos and Cambodia, China's enhanced collaboration with international consortia, improved transparency, and project diversity point to nascent socialization. China's aid to Myanmar, however, remains opaque and largely self-interested. At the regional level, Beijing is bolstering its influence over the norms and practices of regional developmental institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Drawing support from international institution theory, this article analyzes China's new thinking about Asian diplomacy after the Cold War. Institutionalism was flexibly utilized by China in its peripheral regions—Central Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia, which have adopted institutional models—dominant participation, deep participation, active participation, and moderate participation models. China tries to handle the presence of U.S. interests well and has responded reasonably to U.S. pragmatic institutional engagement. To realize the aim of compatibility and coexistence between China and the United States in Asia, the two countries should establish interconnecting institutions in both economic and political fields. With regard to the future interactive trends of China and the United States in Asia, the author, from the dimension of international institutionalism, works out an institutional interplay—nested and overlapping institutions—for China and the United States to achieve accommodation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]