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This paper assesses the parameters and utility of "targeted killing" in combating terrorism and its role within the norm of state self-defense in the international community. The author's thesis is that, while targeted killing provides states with a method of combating terrorism, and while it is "effective" on a number of levels, it is inherently limited and not a panacea. The adoption and execution of such a program brings with it, among other potential pitfalls, political repercussions. Targeted killing is defined herein as the premeditated, preemptive, and intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or believed to represent a present and/or future threat to the safety and security of a state through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals. The principal conclusions of this paper are that targeted killing: • Must be wholly differentiated from "assassination" and related operations involving the intentional targeting of an individual during wartime, in order to be considered properly and rationally. • Is a politically risky undertaking with potentially negative international implications. • Is the proven desire of some terrorist groups to conduct attacks involving mass casualties against innocent civilians that may, in the future, cause states to reconsider previous abstention from adopting targeted killing in order to protect their populace. • Can serve to impact terrorists and terrorist groups on a strategic, operational, and tactical level. • Has historically had both negative and (unintentionally) positive impacts for terrorist groups. • Oftentimes exposes civilians to unintentional harm. The methods of investigation include a thorough review of the available literature: books, published and unpublished essays, interviews of selected individuals (to include academics and retired members of military and police forces), and the author's independent analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Throughout the Cold War, Irish national security was detached from Western priorities and its policy attracted little academic interest. But such detachment has become increasingly problematic. This paper argues that the threat of international terrorism underlines the need for a change of attitude among security scholars and policy managers alike. Irish policy on terrorism places at risk the security of other Western states and highlights deficiencies in the European Union's fight against terrorism. New evidence is explored here regarding Irish air and sea security, intelligence systems, and immigration procedures, underlining the international implications of each. Trenchant insights and reforms emerged from Irish experience in the weeks that followed the 11 September attack. The policies framed in that period, however, have not changed in any substantial way since. Within the literature on Irish security there are three key explanations for the shape of national policy: 1) political pressures on the security agencies; 2) financial pressures on these agencies; and 3) Anglo-Irish security considerations. Domestic deficiencies create problems for broader counter-terrorism efforts, especially at EU level. This challenges the premise that individual member states will help secure the Union as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A murky line separates the tactics and objectives between counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, United Nations Peacekeeping, and international civilian policing. Deploying the wrong national security model at the wrong time can escalate or prolong violence rather than mitigate it. However, prior to 2001, very few criminal justice scholars compared state security models on any level. This paper examines all four state security models in a comparative framework. It is divided into three sections. The first section defines each national security model and provides examples. The second section examines the differences or similarities that exist between the models. Finally, the third section addresses why it is critical to understand the security context and model integration in order to achieve long-term national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the ways in which recent military experiences have affected France's approach to the use of military power, the role of allies and its vision of future warfare. In its management of strategic challenges, we identify the persistence of many traits of France's historical habits and practices. France remains a distinct, outward looking, and militarily willing and able European power. However, the threats that France has sought to address and the operational and financial constraints it has faced in the past decade in particular, have led to significant changes in its approach to and conduct of warfare. In particular, the threat of Islamist terrorism has led to a reframing of French governments' priorities around more narrowly-defined national interests. It has translated into a 'pragmatic', or 'realist' turn in foreign policy, and a move from 'wars of choice' to 'wars of necessity'. In this context, France's military alliances are being rethought around a core number of functional partnerships to compensate for capability gaps and military overstretch. Meanwhile, French armed forces are getting prepared to face the challenges posed by emerging technologies and the future of Great-Power competition. Overall, the multiple security challenges faced by successive French governments have confirmed, yet redefined, the contours of France's traditional dilemma between a desire for an autonomous defense policy and the reality of a necessary reliance on allies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The appropriateness of the United Kingdom's counterterrorism strategy, known as CONTEST, divides opinion. This article reassesses CONTEST as strategy rather than simply examining its effectiveness as policy, or critiquing its individual parts. Reviewing the development of CONTEST in the context of wider analytical discussions on what makes for good strategy, the authors argue that several important strands of CONTEST are either underdeveloped or not yet as “strategic” as some analysts and the U.K. government itself have professed them to be. Fresh thinking on aspects of counterterrorism is urgently needed to counter the challenge of contemporary and future terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article, the author address the question related to the most significant legacy left by the September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. According to him, the most significant legacies of terrorist attacks fall under three categories including the public's awareness the country is vulnerable to terrorism, significant security measures that have been implemented, and national security becoming a central political issue and governmental concern.

This article argues that risk is central in (re)producing the unaccountable commercial military/security markets that are a normal part of our political reality. The argument is twofold: first it is suggested that risk rationalities and the associated ‘preventive imperative’ has a depoliticising effect – accentuated by the impersonal spread of risk rationalities and the strategies of risk professionals – which lowers the eagerness to seek accountability. However, and second, depoliticisation is significant above all as a serious obstacle to the innovative thinking that is the sine qua non of effective accountability. The enmeshed, ‘hybrid’, nature of the market places it in the ‘blind spot’ of law and is as such fundamental to the current lack of accountability. Consequently, moving beyond established regulatory frameworks and technical understandings of accountability (that is, politicising the market) is a precondition for more effective accountability. Failing to do so, will leave the current rapid legal innovation impotent while reinforcing impunity as the focus on and confidence in established regulatory frameworks grows. The failure to politicise creates an ‘accountability paradox’ where the pursuit of accountability diminishes it. The article develops this argument with reference to Blackwater's (now Xe) role in the so called CIA ‘Killing Program’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Though the policy science movement was born with the purpose of counseling the Department of Defense on a plethora of security matters, modern research within the field of public policy has tended to neglect issues of defense and security focusing instead on a wide variety of domestic problems. This nearly exclusive focus on domestic issues remained largely intact until September 11, 2001, when the threat of terrorism propelled defense and security back onto the disciplinary research agenda. Though exceptionally slow to adjust, policy scholars are gradually coming to terms with this new reality and are beginning to focus on security and defense in a way that informs policymakers and advances policy theory. This research note is meant to introduce interested readers to this trend by exploring broad themes and exemplar works within the field over the last few years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the developments in the Canadian intelligence community after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City. It notes that the country's intelligence community gained substantial new resources and revised mandate, as well as the modification of institutional structures to focus on new threats and improve coordination, after the terrorist attacks. It states that the mobilization of resources to prevent a direct attack on Canadian citizens or Canadian infrastructure became the immediate priority of the government. The country's Department of National Defense was also increased to meet new military commitments and expanded its intelligence gathering.

The article focuses on the military responses and capabilities of the national security policy in Canada after the September 11, 2011 terror attacks in New York. It notes that Canada's federal government has tightened up financial restrictions on potential fund-raising by identified terrorist groups, introduced new legislation and bureaucratic structures focusing on security issues. The author suggests that the Canadian military is reasonably prepared for a military response to the eventuality of a terrorist incident or an act in the country.

This article explores the recent UK, US and Canadian security and intelligence efforts against terrorism. Contrasts can be readily drawn. Essentially the UK is engaged in both internal/domestic and external/international 'firefighting' against terrorism. Therefore, it has adopted a wide-ranging 'broad risk management' approach. Meanwhile the US is engaged mostly in external/international 'firefighting' against terrorism, conceived of as counter-insurgency in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Washington has adopted a narrower 'risk prevention' approach. The Canadians, confronting a smaller threat, are less embroiled in 'firefighting' activities, enabling them to adopt more of a 'risk pre-emption' approach involving some social engineering. Arguably, the Canadian model outlined in this article can offer some instructive lessons for both the US and the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at pre-crime in the context of counter-terrorism. Pre-crime links coercive state actions to suspicion without the need for charge, prosecution or conviction. It also includes measures that expand the remit of the criminal law to include activities or associations that are deemed to precede the substantive offence targeted for prevention. The trend towards anticipating risks as a driving principle in criminal justice was identified well before 2001. However, risk and threat anticipation have substantially expanded in the context of contemporary counter-terrorism frameworks. Although pre-crime counter-terrorism measures are rationalized on the grounds of preventing terrorism, these measures do not fit in the frame of conventional crime prevention. The article argues that the shift to pre-crime embodies a trend towards integrating national security into criminal justice along with a temporal and geographic shift that encompasses a blurring of the borders between the states' internal and external coercive capacities. The counter-terrorism framework incorporates and combines elements of criminal justice and national security, giving rise to a number of tensions. One key tension is between the ideal of impartial criminal justice and the politically charged concept of national security. Pre-crime counter-terrorism measures can be traced through a number of interlinking historical trajectories including the wars on crime and drugs, criminalization and, more fundamentally, in colonial strategies of domination, control and repression. The article concludes by identifying a number of challenges and opportunities for criminology in the shift from post-crime criminal justice to pre-crime national security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the deployment of conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs) by the United States military. CBMs are distinguished from ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads. An argument is presented that CBMs should be deployed as part of the prompt global strike (PGM) mission, a policy which is designed to ensure that the U.S. can respond rapidly, with precision and sub-nuclear force, to threats from terrorists or other states. Topics addressed include cost-benefit ratios, and the risk of a CBM strike being misperceived as a nuclear attack.

An effective terrorism alert system in a federal government has one central task: to motivate actors to take costly protective measures. The United States' color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) failed in this mission. In federal systems, national leaders cannot compel protective actions by setting an alert level; they must convince constituent governments and private parties that the desired actions are worth the costs. Such beliefs can be generated either by sharing the information behind an alert or by developing enough confidence in the alert system that the government's word alone suffices. The HSAS did neither, largely because it was not designed to generate confidence. Rather, the system's creators assumed that the public would trust the national leadership and believe in the utility of the system's information. Over time, as the HSAS became increasingly perceived as politically manipulated, there was no built-in mechanism to recover confidence in the system. An alternative, trust-based terrorist alert system could solve this problem. Building on the notion of "procedural fairness" from the psychological and legal traditions, this system would retain the political advantages of the HSAS, facilitate greater compliance among the requisite actors, and ameliorate many of the strategic problems inherent in terror alert systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the Czech Republic's defense policies pertaining to an international missile defense (MD) program against terrorism proposed by the U.S. in 2005. Key issues discussed include fundamental choices on allied relations and national security faced by the Czech Republic and the dilemma posed by the development of MD installations on the country's territory.

Examines the response of Japan to U.S. security policies. Key markers of progress toward the U.S.-Japan alliance; Obstacles to the reorientation of Japan's national security priorities; Background on Japan's political system; Contribution of Japan to the U.S.-led war against terrorism.

Under the Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy document, military pre-emption against 'rogue states' and terrorist groups has been elevated to official doctrine. But the conditions under which pre-emption would be undertaken remain unclear. Military action against terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, enjoys broad international legitimacy, but that consensus breaks down over the use of force against a state violating non-proliferation norms. A comparative analysis of historical cases reveals force to be as problematic as its non-military alternatives. Inadequate intelligence, concern over collateral damage to civilian populations and the fear of triggering a broader conflict have been major constraints on the use of force to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the post-11 September era, pre-emption should be a rarely invoked policy option, and successful prevention strategies, employing non-military instruments, might forestall the need to resort to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the transatlantic differences on coalition warfare with reference to the U.S.-led military campaign against international terrorism in 2001. Role of coalitions in the diplomatic and military doctrines of France and the U.S.; Impact of past coalition efforts on the planning for a U.S. military mission in Afghanistan; Conclusions.

The article presents a letter from the editor of "Interfaces" concerning the November-December, 2006 issue. The issue focuses on the United States Department of Homeland Security's Operations Research division, which aims to give the department a scientific framework for considering problems and decisions. In addition, articles within the issue also discuss other aspects of homeland security, ranging from attack detection, identification, and prevention to response preparedness in the case of successful attacks.