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Global scarcity of COVID‐19 vaccines raises ethical questions about their fair allocation between nations. Section I introduces the question and proposes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share globally scarce COVID‐19 vaccines. Section II distinguishes justice from charity and argues that beneficiaries of unjust structures incur duties of justice when they are systematically advantaged at others expense. Section III gives a case‐based argument describing three upstream structural injustices that systematically advantaged wealthy countries and disadvantaged poorer countries, contributing to global disparities of COVID‐19 vaccines. Section IV examines more closely the duties of justice owed, including a duty to relinquish holdings, restitute victims, and restore relationships. Section V concludes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share COVID‐19 vaccines with poor nations and to restore relationships damaged by injustice. All nations should take steps to transform unjust structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for global sharing of COVID‐19 treatments during the COVID‐19 pandemic and beyond based on principles of global solidarity. It starts by distinguishing two types of COVID‐19 treatments and models sharing strategies for each in small‐group scenarios, contrasting groups that are solidaristic with those composed of self‐interest maximizers to show the appeal of solidaristic reasoning. It then extends the analysis, arguing that a similar logic should apply within and between nations. To further elaborate global solidarity, the paper distinguishes morally voluntary, sliding‐scale, and mandatory versions. It argues for an all‐hands‐on‐deck approach and gives examples to illustrate. The paper concludes that during the COVID‐19 crisis, global solidarity is a core value, and global sharing of COVID‐19 treatments should be considered a duty of justice, not of charity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Is there a rational and ethical basis for efforts to rescue individuals in dire straits? When does rescue have ethical support, and when does it reflect an irrational impulse? This paper defines a Rule of Rescue and shows its intuitive appeal. It then proceeds to argue that this rule lacks support from standard principles of justice and from ethical principles more broadly, and should be rejected in many situations. I distinguish between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons, and argue that the Rule of Rescue qualifies only in a narrow range of cases where agent-relative considerations apply. I conclude that it would be wise to set aside the Rule of Rescue in many cases, especially those involving public policies, where it has only weak normative justification. The broader implications of this analysis are noted. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]