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There have been tectonic shifts in the Indo-Pacific region, impacting relations among international actors, including traditionally close partners like Vietnam and India. By using the approach of realism and constructivism in international relations, this paper discusses Vietnam and India's approach to the Indo-Pacific region to expand their substantive strategic relationship. The paper finds out that geopolitical changes in the Indo-Pacific directly influence the bilateral relation and create challenges as well as opportunities. By using the SWOT model, the paper analyzes driving factors and challenges to the Vietnam-India relations. Through the findings, it suggests both countries need to take advantages of the regional cooperation to further Vietnam-India's strategic comprehensive partnership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates India and Australia's respective strategic narratives of regional order in the Indo-Pacific. Despite apparently significant convergences in their terminology around the desire for a 'stable', 'prosperous', 'open', 'free' and 'inclusive' Indo-Pacific, the regional order narratives of India and Australia each promote a distinct conception of regional order, reflecting different sets of political, geopolitical, economic and institutional concerns and agendas. India's narrative promotes 'issue-based' alliances with a variety of countries including China, Russia and the United States, to promote a multipolar regional order, and reflects a long-standing desire to culturally identify and economically integrate with East Asian states. Australia's narrative seeks to perpetuate the post-World War II status quo in the region, with respect to the continuation of a dominant US presence. It promotes closer partnerships with countries like India, Japan and Indonesia, within a US-led regional order, to diversify its economic and security relationships amidst perceptions of China's growing assertiveness. It also carves out a central strategic role for Australia in a region where its leaders have traditionally felt like 'outsiders'. The analysis advances a cultural political economy (CPE) approach to strategic narratives, demonstrating how and why strategic narratives are formed, projected and received at particular junctures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France's formal accession to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), underlining its recognition as multilaterally engaged resident power in the Indian Ocean, has been warmly endorsed by India. In the context of shifting geopolitical landscape, a systematic examination of the prospects of Indo-French synergy in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and the wider Indo-Pacific, becomes of immense value. Historically, defense cooperation has been a domain of robust engagement between the two countries. The contours of their relationship now have further prospects of expansion. This paper analyses various facets of growing Indo-French synergy in the IOR, and argues that challenges not withstanding, both are well placed to further broaden and deepen their cooperation in the wider Indo-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the evolving geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific region, especially through the lens of an India–US–China trilateral/tripolar framework. At a time when ‘strategic unease’ has become a defining characteristic of the region and ‘security alignments and strategic hedging’ a prevalent diplomatic tendency, this paper captures an evolving trend of convergence in the strategic visions of the three key Indo-Pacific players – India, China and the US, and rising bilateral strategic/defence cooperation between them. Using a constructivist approach, this paper explores the feasibility of a trilateral cooperative framework among the three countries in near future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the turn of the century, India has seen itself as the dominant maritime power in South Asia and has aspired to project this power across the Indian Ocean Region. The principle of a "net security provider" has, thus far, been most applicable in South Asia and around its littorals, but it is West Asia that will really test India's diplomatic and maritime capabilities over the course of the coming years. West Asia has a complex structure of diplomatic and strategic intricacies, that India has to manoeuvre through, in order to achieve its interests. Adding to this, India has had to adopt a careful balancing act juggling its West Asian interests with those that it has elsewhere. The roles of trade, strategy, and ideology have never been as intertwined as they are in the contemporary age, and this region and the challenges it poses is the most complex weave India that is likely to face as it pushes forward into a new age of international relations. This paper addresses the bilateral realities of India and Iran in the context of India's maritime strategy, and the geostrategies of other regional players such as China and Pakistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's policy toward India since 2000 appears to be a sign of new directions in Japan's security policy since its decision to establish a strategic partnership with India is different from the previous policy of exclusive bilateralism centering on the US-Japan alliance. Nonetheless, Japan's recent security partnership with India is part of Japan's long-term effort to support the US-led liberal political and economic order in East Asia. This paper argues that Japan's policy toward India since 2000 has evolved toward becoming fully aligned with US policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. The critical shift in Tokyo's policy toward India came in spring 2005, when Japanese political leaders and policy elites came to recognize India as an important balancer against China as a result of the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. They decided to support including India into the East Asian Summit and incorporated India into their new values diplomacy. This shift in Japan's policy toward India, along with efforts to increase interoperability between Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Forces and Indian Navy, coincides with US strategy to bring India into the US-led coalition to balance against China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proponents of the Indo-Pacific concept assume that growing economic and societal linkages and the need for greater political and security cooperation and order-building are leading to the integration of the region. India and Indonesia were thought to be crucial in these processes of regionalisation and regionalism and were early adopters of the Indo-Pacific idea. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the extent to which the Indo-Pacific initiatives of India and Indonesia are leading to the integration of the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions through greater Indian involvement with the Pacific region and stronger Indonesian engagement with the Indian Ocean region. It is argued that an interlinked set of security and economic concerns drove India and Indonesia’s adoption of the Indo-Pacific idea. In both cases, a desire for economic growth and preventing Chinese economic and political dominance in the region were important drivers. However, the nature of the political economies of India and Indonesia does not readily facilitate extensive economic linkages or strategic interests beyond their immediate regions. Moreover, both countries are wary of being seen as members of anti-China coalitions due to the impact this may have on regional stability and their domestic political and economic priorities. These factors place significant limitations on the regional integration of the Indo-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Between the American rebalance strategy and Chinese Maritime Silk Road initiative, India is increasingly pressed to formulate a maritime strategy that ideally meets Indian economic and strategic objectives. This is generating major policy dilemmas for India stemming from the attraction of economic integration led by China on the one hand, versus the attraction of strategic integration offered by the United States on the other hand. This paper suggests that between these binary options, there are both opportunities and challenges for India, calling for fine-grained policymaking. The notional concept of an India–US–China maritime triangle is useful in sifting through the choices before India to meet its ambitions of development as well as retain and improve its strategic influence in the Indian Ocean and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the evolving relationship between India, Japan, and South Korea within the context of the Indo-Pacific region in the past decade. Moving beyond a historical power asymmetry, the rise of China and a shared commitment to a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" have fostered a new strategic convergence among these three democracies. This article explores the evolving bases of this partnership, focusing on areas of cooperation, such as maritime security, economic development, and technological innovation. It also acknowledges emerging challenges, including navigating a complex regional order and balancing national interests with collective goals. The analysis aims to capture the long-term trajectory of this trilateral partnership, and its potential to shape regional security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2023 marks the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties between Korea and India. On the occasion of this golden jubilee, this study aims to first understand the major determinants for Korea-India relations since the Cold War. It will then highlight the way forward for further strengthening bilateral cooperation between Korea and India from a Korean perspective. The study found that the economic aspect was the main driving force for relations between Korea and India until recently. With the emergence of the Indo-Pacific era, political and security dimensions have also become important driving forces, especially due to the China factor. However, despite upgrading their strategic partnership as "special" in 2015, the two countries have not yet formulated an action plan on how to strengthen and specifically cooperate within it. There is a need to establish a blueprint for how Korea and India will develop their special strategic partnership in the Indo-Pacific era. In this situation, this study suggests four areas where Korea and India can promote and strengthen their relations in the coming years: minilateralism such as Korea, Australia, Indonesia, and India (KAII) in the Indo-Pacific area, para and city diplomacy, cooperation in the defense industry, and economic cooperation on major Chinese export items to India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past two decades, India and South Korea have sought to create a strategic convergence in their long-term cooperation. Defense cooperation, which has been discussed bilaterally, is a key area of their partnership, should it later be transformed to companionship. As some of their efforts have materialized, South Korea has become the fifth largest exporter of conventional arms to India. Markedly, Seoul and New Delhi are on the way to restyle their regional strategies towards each other to fit into their Indo-Pacific strategies. In the course, two sides have found valid points to explore stronger partnership than in the past. The stronger driver they have now is likely to sustain in the future as they already made some meaningful progress in the last decade. In this latest move, the two sides appear to be on the right trajectory; however, the future awaits a more productive joint effort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eleven years after it was abandoned, the so-called Indo-Pacific concept is back with a vengeance in regional security debates. At the 2017 Shangri-la Dialogue, there were only five mentions of the 'Indo-Pacific' at the annual defence ministerial forum. In the following year, the figure had jumped to 92. The Indo-Pacific Four countries promoting the 'free and open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) concept share many principles, including freedom of navigation and overflight, connectivity and economic growth, and respect for the rule of law. There are, however, clear points of divergence between them, such that there are actually different Indo-Pacific strategies among the Indo-Pacific Four. Even if the Indo-Pacific Four manage to resolve these issues (and the possibility of this is low), it is not likely that ASEAN would endorse the FOIP concept. The reality remains that Indonesia and ASEAN have taken a different approach to the Indo-Pacific. The ASEAN approach is to appropriate elements of FOIP strategy which are more attractive to ASEAN (for example, connectivity and infrastructure), yet reject elements of FOIP strategy which ASEAN deems inappropriate (the exclusion of China and the loss of ASEAN centrality). This does not augur well for the adoption, in its entirety, of the FOIP concept by ASEAN. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

India’s power and interests continue to grow in the Indo-Pacific region and globally, yet its national security policymaking approaches have not kept pace. These may have been barely adequate for India’s twentieth-century experience as a regional power tending towards strategic restraint, but currently constrain India from being able to harness its considerable national capabilities to protect larger and more complex interests. This article identifies five key obstacles to a more coherent and effective approach to national security: lack of staffing depth in policy and intelligence; weak structures for ensuring inclusive consultation in policymaking; a disempowered military when it comes to strategic decisions; a lack of security expertise among civilian officials and politicians; and an absence of whole-of-government guidance in making and expressing policy. Many reforms are necessary, but two enabling early steps are identified and recommended: the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff position to elevate military coordination and authoritative input to policy, and the preparation of a National Security Strategy to define and guide overall policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There is a growing consensus among defence planners that Australia is in need of a new defence policy that better suits the strategic realties of an emerging multipolar Asia. After assessing the implications of shifting regional power balances for Australia, this article advances the argument that Australia should redirect its attention back to its immediate north: the “Indo-Pacific Arc”. Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia have always been vitally important to Australia’s long-term security and, being the gateway between the Indian and Pacific oceans, their strategic value is set to dramatically increase in the multipolar Asia. Finally, this article develops the case for Australia to partner with its neighbours to stem the political and military influence of outside powers into the Indo-Pacific Arc. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

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The geostrategic, political and military position of the Indo-Pacific region has become increasingly important to major countries, in terms of influence and opportunities for developing cooperation and strategic restraints. India is a rising power gaining more influence in the region, and the Indo-Pacific vision initiated by Prime Minister Modi is a move to assert its greater position and role in the region. In that vision, India actively raises issues related to the South China Sea (SCS) in its foreign affairs as well as conducts capacity support for littoral countries. In this context, Vietnam is putting its great attention to the policy moves and stance of India towards the region, as well as the SCS, and is taking advantage of India's policy to strengthen cooperation between Vietnam and India, especially in the SCS. The prospects for cooperation between the two countries in the future will surely be expanded further when both countries understand each other's policies and needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]