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This article examines the current attempt by the European Union and Japan to negotiate a Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA). Sitting alongside negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), this SPA represents an attempt to reignite bilateral relations between these two global powerhouses. Still confined by the origins of their institutionalised partnership in 1991, this article argues that both sides find it hard to break away from earlier functional and normative assumptions about their relative significance and about each other, in order to forge a new meaningful, overarching partnership. It examines the development of Japan–EU relations building up to the preparations for this SPA, against the background of path-dependent processes of engagement. Path dependency in its various forms ‘views institutions as ‘carriers of history,’ which maintain existing behavioural norms and cultural patterns throughout time’. Despite some of the problems such claims elicit, as will be explored below, this article proposes that path dependency – and a particular focus on ‘imprinting’ – offers a useful starting point for explaining the apparent institutional inertia and incremental change that characterise much of this bilateral relationship today. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Japanese government faces many competing challenges as it seeks to balance its multilateral and bilateral relationships within and beyond the region: whilst addressing its rapidly changing contentious domestic politics, there is pressure for it to realign relations with the USA, manage the rise of China, strengthen links with its region and continue to deal with its lingering historical legacy. All of these demands are now set against the backdrop of a so-called 'lost decade' of economic woes and global economic recession. This article demonstrates how the Japanese government is apparently adopting a de facto multilevel foreign policy, attempting to engage in a range of bilateral and collective initiatives simultaneously and to assume a regional leadership role whilst having to manage difficult bilateral relations, notably with the USA and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introduction to the articles that follow considers the impact of the apparent decline of the West and the likely impact of China's rise on the region in this period of surprising flux. We provide a brief analysis of the main issues that are affecting the Asia-Pacific's three most significant states - the United States, China and Japan. Key questions for all of them and for the rest of this collection are about the very nature and identity of the region itself, and its relationship to the global sphere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the types of region–to–region dialogue evident in relations among the states of the European Union and East Asia, with a particular focus on ASEM and the EU–ASEAN dialogue. It examines how the EU utilizes interregionalism as one mechanism for managing economic and political relations with a growing yet disparate region. For the states of East Asia, ASEM offers a means of dealing collectively with twenty–five European states, provides a first–hand examination of the practices of regional integration and establishes a framework in which East Asia can present itself as a regional political and economic entity and realize the ‘third side’ in a global triangle of regional blocs. Building upon a particular historical trajectory of relations among the states of the EU and East Asia, ASEM represents an important space for articulating not only the nature of region, but also the role of non–state actors, which have increasingly come to occupy a significant position in transnational affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japanese government interests in Southeast Asia continue to expand. Official speeches refer to the growth of a 'community that acts together', while institutional linkages have been strengthened with the creation of the ASEAN Plus Three process and by a proliferation of bilateral arrangements. These developing networks raise questions about Japan's future orientation towards its wider region. This article assesses recent developments, by challenging some of the fundamental assumptions about Japan's regional behaviour. First, it examines how a tendency to render mutually exclusive bilateral and multilateral forms of behaviour serves to obfuscate a focus on the fundamental processes of regional engagement. Second, this article delineates Japan's changing orientation towards the region as part of a process of 'complex regional multilateralism', in which a range of often ad hoc engagements have resulted in a loose framework for interaction. In so doing, it suggests that Japan's current policy-making approach towards Southeast Asia may be regarded as a continuation of policy that is, nevertheless, being buffeted by a range of - primarily regional - external influences. The resulting set of perceived strategies demonstrates not an either/or approach to regional engagement but, rather, shows how the Japanese government manages changing circumstances to carve out a new role for itself in Southeast Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Kosovo crisis of 1999 took place on the European continent and was dominated by US-led NATO actions aimed at assisting Kosovo in its struggle against what was considered to be ethnic cleansing by the Serbian government. While many observers may be unaware that the Japanese government had a role to play in the unfolding events, this article examines how and why that participation is important for an understanding of Tokyo's contemporary foreign policy orientation. To this end, the article assesses how Japanese participation in the international efforts aimed at restoring peace to the region were channelled through specific multilateral fora. In particular, it assesses the development of Japan's role as part of the United Nations, NATO and the G7/8 processes, and it examines the opportunities introduced by the cessation of NATO bombing raids after May 1999. The article also explains how this participation can be understood to illustrate an orientation towards 'complex engagement', as the Tokyo administration seeks to assert its international profile more actively in the pursuit of non-military objectives. This concept, which is developed throughout, will be shown to represent an underlying trend in the changing formulation of Japanese foreign policy. Its still tentative foundations rest upon a state-society cooperation used to eschew the pursuit of active military diplomacy in favour of a multi-layered, non-military orientation which rests upon the notion of human security. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]