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Feudal Japan was one of the countries within the cultural space of Chinese characters and maintained a "tributary diplomacy" relationship with China. However, although it was part of the Chinese tribute system, Japan was not a typical tributary state like Korea or Vietnam at that time. Therefore, Japan's tribute activities with China, in addition to the similarities inherent in this activity, also had many unique characteristics. This article places Japan's tribute activities in the context of the region and compares them with China's tribute activities of Korea and Vietnam at the time to draw out similarities and differences. At the same time, the article derives the characteristics and essence of Japan's tribute activities at that time, contributing to an understanding of the nature of Japan–China relations in the past and present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an effort to counteract China's maritime expansionism, Japan has endeavoured to be a prominent player in the South China Sea dispute over the past decade. While previous studies have emphasized the limitations of Japan's South China Sea policy, one question still remains: to what extent has Japan's policy been successful? By utilizing Baldwin's analytical framework for foreign policy evaluation--which takes into account factors such as stakes, effectiveness and costs--this article argues that Japan's policy has achieved moderate success. Despite its limitations, Japan's policy has been relatively successful as it helps to maintain America's military presence in the region, and creates normative and diplomatic obstacles for China's activities in the South China Sea without damaging Sino-Japanese relations. Additionally, Japan's policy helps uphold the rules-based order by strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of selected Southeast Asian states. The costs of the policy to Japan are acceptable, particularly given that it has little impact on the waters surrounding the country. Conversely, the policy imposes increased material, normative and time costs on China. Given China's uncompromising historical and security position in the South China Sea, the qualified success of Japan's policy should be acknowledged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Japan is commonly regarded as a strong proponent of the existing liberal international order championed by the US in the Indo-Pacific, sometimes it has been half-hearted in opposing a Sino-centric order and been rather supportive of Chinese diplomacy. In particular, it has to some degree supported the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) implemented by Beijing, effectively offered its endorsement to the international legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) without problematizing human rights issues, and severely restricted the enhancement of its own defense capabilities. These policies have been shaped by pro-China individuals and groups who hold privileged positions inside the government, and their privileged positions have been determined by haphazard domestic political factors which have little to do with Sino-Japanese relations. This means that, although on the surface Japan may seem to have rationally calculated its international strategic interests and implemented hedging as a coherent strategy amid Sino-US rivalries, its implementation of what seems to be a hedging strategy has actually been incidental. Its policy has turned out to resemble what has been regarded by International Relations (IR) theorists as a hedging strategy, due to haphazard domestic political factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: In most of the scholarship on diplomacy, whether historical or contemporary, the governmental elite-based perspective has consistently dominated. The societisation of diplomacy is the process of legitimisation of foreign policy deliberations between state and society, both domestically and internationally. This article argues that there are two types of societisation: internal and external. It defines the former as a dynamic political communication process comprising diplomatic policy deliberation and legitimisation between state and society in a domestic context. The internal dimension is yet to receive sufficient academic and practical attention. This article fills the gap in the literature on the internal societisation of diplomacy through an empirical case study of Japan's diplomacy towards China. It shows that the unsuccessful internal societisation of diplomacy has had moderating effects on Japan's diplomacy towards China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For more than two decades, China and Japan have worked to eliminate the chemical weapons that Japan abandoned in China at the end of World War II. The process has involved numerous challenges, such as excavating corroded munitions that had been buried in the city of Beian along with sensitive explosives; working in the aftermath of an accident that sickened more than 40 people in Qiqihar; establishing innovative destruction technologies in Nanjing; and, at Haerbaling Mountain, embarking on the clean-up of the largest burial site for abandoned chemical weapons in China. Though bilateral tensions have sometimes strained the destruction process, Sino-Japanese cooperation has ultimately provided a useful model for nations elsewhere engaged in the disposal of abandoned chemical weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, the tension between Japan and China is quickly escalating. One of the critical sources of conflict is the territorial dispute over the Senkaku Islands. The goal of this study is to examine how Japanese citizens develop policy preferences toward China in the issue of the Senkaku Islands. Regarding this matter, it is possible to suggest two scenarios. First, realist concerns among Japanese citizens will boost support for a hawkish approach against China as defending territories is one of the most important concerns for states in the international system. The second scenario prescribes that economic interdependence between Japan and China will undermine the support for a firm approach against China. This perspective is based on the idea that economic interdependence prevents states from going to war with each other. The present research examines the validity of these two competing hypotheses. Statistical analysis relying on the survey data from Japan lends support to the realist perspective. Dissecting the process through which Japanese citizens develop their policy preferences toward China, this study makes an important contribution to the literature of international relations, thus generating critical implications that are highly useful in the real world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes discursive strategies of China and Japan to integrate newly emerging Central Asian (CA) states into their internal and external policies, norms and concepts, according to which they justify both their actions in CA and CA responses to these policies. This article elaborates the concept that to a certain extent, the interests of China and Japan in CA are similarly focused on mineral resources and political stability. However, these countries employ different discursive strategies to frame their approaches and goals. This article also emphasizes that the discourse of competition for regional domination prevalent in the English language, Russian and some CA media is largely an imposition of a zero-sum vision of international relations that is not proven by any empirical evidence. On the contrary, many of the projects conducted both by China and Japan are compatible – if not supplementary – and do not necessarily imply exclusivity of interest. At the same time, both China and Japan have different ways of reasoning their CA engagements, resulting in a rivalry of discourses for the 'hearts and minds' of the CA population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Studying unpublished documents from the Russian archive provides new information on the Sino-Japanese rivalry over Korea at the end of the nineteenth century, a very complicated period in the modern history of Korea. These documents help researchers understand Qing China's relations with Korea and analyze Chinese methods for preserving control of the country. Rivalry over Korea occurred against the backdrop of military and economic expansion of the European powers, which further complicated China's position as a suzerain of Korea. The main milestones in the political dialogue between Qing China and Japan are discussed with a focus on specific Sino-Korean interactions. Qing authorities attempted to consolidate China's control over Korea by deploying the ancient Chinese diplomatic practice of "using barbarians to control [other] barbarians." Transferring this archaic method of maintaining political power into the modern environment of capitalist state expansion in eastern Asia failed. Qing China's loss of control over Korea was the logical result of instituting this erroneous policy. Russian documents reporting China's dialogue with Japan demonstrate that Qing China prioritized preserving traditional forms of contact with Korea, whereas Japan favored opening Korea to economic expansion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's primary objective of the 'free and open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called 'tactical hedging'. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trade and consumption of food in the Sino-Japanese context connects the two countries' tense political relationship to the everyday lives of its citizens. Previous research has shown how food-related incidents have imbued Sino-Japanese relations with political and moral discourse that connects security concerns to everyday fears. This article explores how young Chinese people in Japan navigate multiple moral economies related to food. Through analysis of "products" (chanpin/shipin) and "cuisine" (cai/liaoli), this article shows the differing meanings of Chinese moral economies of food from the perspective of young Chinese people living in Japan. In the Sino-Japanese context, products embody more metonymic and nationalised values associated with modernity, whereas the metaphoric possibilities of cuisine afford young Chinese people to negotiate dominant moral economies of food in Japan. Using this example, I argue that greater semiotic attention needs to be paid to the multiple meanings of food and its moral economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates whether the People's Republic of China and Japan perceive each other as rivals in Latin America (LA; both the Chinese and Japanese governments tend to refer to the region as Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), but for the purposes of this article we focus mainly on LA), and what impact such a perception might have on their foreign policy decision-making. We take LA as a case study because China's and Japan's recent (re-)engagement there began almost simultaneously in the early 2000s, and has developed against the background of domestic leadership transitions, growing demands for energy and markets, as well as international political agendas in which LA might play a key role. Developing the work of Thompson [(1995). Principal rivalries. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39 (2), 195–223; (2001). Identifying rivals and rivalries in world politics. International Studies Quarterly, 45(4), 557–586] and Vasquez [(1993). The War Puzzle. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press; (1996). Distinguishing rivals that go to war from those that do not: Aa quantitative comparative case study of the two paths to war. International Studies Quarterly, 40 (4), 531–558] on rivalry, in combination with perception theory [Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press], the article suggests three indicators by which to measure the extent to which China and Japan might perceive each other as rivals. Drawing on content analysis of a range of Chinese- and Japanese-language official writing, news reports, and academic analysis, the article argues that, despite some media representation of China and Japan as competitors for resources and power in LA, in fact mutual perceptions concerning rivalry have not affected LA policy decisions of these two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, with the world in search for new economic engines, China and Japan have explicitly given their answer through their expansion of overseas infrastructure investments. This study focuses on the flagship sector of high-speed railways (HSR) and examines what kinds of development financing China and Japan have adopted in making these investments. It asks the following questions: What similarities are there in the Chinese and Japanese approaches to investments in overseas infrastructure, and how do they differ from traditional Western development financing? Also, in what ways have China and Japan changed their approaches to overseas infrastructure projects during this process? It argues that in the process of expanding overseas infrastructure investments and competing for infrastructure projects, China and Japan have become 'competitive partners' in challenging the traditional norms of development financing represented by the Washington Consensus and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). To be more specific, China and Japan have adopted each other's practices of tied commercial financing, heavy government involvement, focusing on physical infrastructure and industrialization, and showing respect for host-country forms of governance. In particular, by joining China in the new game of exporting infrastructure and through its own 'quality infrastructure investment' initiative, Japan has broken out of the constraints of DAC norms as an aid donor and endorsed some fundamental Chinese approaches to development and development cooperation, which in their turn were inspired by earlier Japanese practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2008 the Japanese government has become more responsive to the exercise of Chinese economic, diplomatic and military power in Southeast Asia, suggesting an intensifying rivalry. The Japanese government has thrown off any reticence about self-promotion by more forcefully positioning Japan as a sensitive and sustainable strategic partner for Southeast Asian nations in a strategic contrast with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Rather than trying to contain China, Tokyo is seeking to mediate how China turns its material resources into influence. Despite an increasing asymmetry in material resources between China and Japan, this article argues that Japan maintains a surprising ability to influence the preferences of Southeast Asian nations and responses to exercises of PRC power, which in turn has allowed Japan to influence China's regional strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea, China, and Japan have history and territorial disputes in each of their bilateral relationship. These issues have existed for several decades, but they have not surfaced all the time. In the recent past, however, both China and Japan adopted policies that caused friction. Why did they do that? That is because of China's aggressive foreign policy based on the strong economy and Japan's rightwing shift for domestic political reason to appeal to nationalism. In addition, these countries adopted aggressive foreign policies to pursue national interests at the price of their neighboring states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's security posture is unique: it is at once a pacifist nation, controls one of the world's largest militaries, is heavily reliant on its alliance with the United States and remains in nearly continuous political conflict with its nearest neighbours over historical issues. The authors surveyed in this book review essay suggest that Japan's security policy-making has undergone a significant transformation that will reverberate for decades. Andrew L. Oros suggests that Japan is experiencing a security renaissance, and is a much more active player now than during the Cold War. Sheila A. Smith believes that rising nationalism among Tokyo's conservative elite has made Sino-Japanese relations more contentious than ever. Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder state that diverging national identities have driven the increase in tensions between Japan and South Korea. Robert D. Eldridge and Paul Midford assert that the key to success of Japan's Ground Self-Defence Force has been its ability to reinforce peaceful postwar norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the state of the alliance between the U.S. and Japan, Japan's new strategic partnerships in Asia, and Japan's outreach to the U.S. and China.

Much of Japan's defence policy through the period of detente until the end of the Cold War, was designed by Vice-Minister of Defense Seiki Nishihiro. Minister Nishihiro was responsible for drafting two key documents—the National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) and the Japan–US Defence Guideline (Guideline)—which have underpinned Japan's defence policy since the mid-1970s. Diplomatic normalization by Japan and the United States with the People's Republic of China meant (PRC) meant that military buildup against the PRC was no longer necessary. However, the NDPO rationalized the existing level of Japan's military capabilities as being required to meet the security environment and justified the incremental buildup of capabilities as necessary in case of an emergency. Though revised several times, the two documents still effectively outline Japanese defence policy and its relations with the US today. Currently, Japan faces two difficult challenges: the rapid growth of Chinese military power in the last two decades and North Korea's development of nuclear warheads. In order to meet these challenges, Japan has recently further updated the two documents to improve military capabilities and effectiveness. It will be key for Japan to remember its success in defence policy during the Cold War and stay confident with its posture while maintaining enhanced military cooperation with the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elite and public doubts in Japan about the country's economic and security relationships with both the United States and China, changes in the regional threat environment and the enhanced influence of revisionist conservatives in leadership positions over the past five years make conditions ripe for more muscular internal and external balancing by Japan. Despite this, recent changes to Japan's overall grand strategy and military posture remain incremental and focused on longer-term transformation. We argue that despite a degree of convergence in threat perceptions between the Japanese public and elites—and despite a greater tolerance of debate on controversial security issues—the increased political influence of revisionist conservatives arouses suspicion owing to the interlinkages between their political, social and security agendas. This, in turn, the article argues, complicates moves towards a more robust, responsive and flexible Japanese deterrence posture and an approach to alliance deepening suitable for minimizing contemporary geopolitical vulnerability and risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, the development of trilateral institutions among China, Japan and South Korea has begun to take shape. This study analyzes its strengths and weaknesses with regard to the nexus between trilateralism and bilateralism. A well-functioning trilateral grouping needs to overcome two structural limitations – dilution effects and bilateral constraints – both of which are triggered by embedded bilateral approaches. The critical juncture approach is effective in terms of elevating the payoffs of cooperative trilateralism during times of exigency. However, once common crises have dissipated, trilateralism has revealed starkly different performances with respect to functional and political-diplomatic cooperation. This article adopts a dichotomous approach between the two. Functional trilateralism has been steadily growing, and has proven to be less subject to fluctuations in the nations’ political relationships. Its outcomes are positive and worthy of praise. However, the outcomes of trilateralism have been less convincing in fields of middle and high politics. Trilateralism is overwhelmingly subject to fluctuations when its embedded bilateral relations change, and cooperative outcomes within a trilateral grouping are prone to being diluted by bilateral approaches. China–Japan–Korea trilateralism at diplomatic levels remains more an extension of bilateral relations than a mature form of minilateral arrangement. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

There are numerous studies on China's Resistance War against Japan, most of which focus on mainland China. By contrast, there is very limited knowledge on the role of Hong Kong in the Anti-Japanese War in the 1930s. My research uncovers that the contribution of a British colonial English newspaper, the South China Morning Post in the anti-Japanese war has been largely neglected. I argue that while China had been invaded by Japanese military forces, the journalists, readers and lots of advertisers of the South China Morning Post focused on the pro-China reporting and essentially supported China's Resistance. Within the article, I disclosed how the board members and editors debated about the press freedom and the business profit issues, as well as the connections of the South China Morning Post with political parties such as the China Communist Party and the China Nationalist Party. As result of unique social position of the South China Morning Post, it became a fl agship newspaper of the anti-Japanese invasion. As a result, international and local newspapers quoted and reprinted the South China Morning Post's war news and editorials. In brief, the South China Morning Post has a pivotal role in the history of China's Resistance War against Japanese invasion, which had been largely neglected in previous studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars tend to overlook the overseas Chinese press as a communicative tool for Chinese nationalism. This paper takes media history as its focal point to demonstrate the contextual influences that shaped the operations of Chinese print media and gave rise to the manifestation of the overseas Chinese (huaqiao) identity in Japan. In particular, it emphasises that the mobilisation of the modern Chinese nationalism movement of the time was not the sole determinant of Chinese identity. It was also influenced by the way in which Chinese ethnic boundaries came to be shaped and reshaped in different historical periods through the dynamics between overseas Chinese communities and Japanese society. I use two overseas Chinese publications from different periods to illustrate the impacts of modern Chinese nationalism and the changing social and political context of Japan on the Chinese press. Finally, I present a synthetic narrative to account for the history of the overseas Chinese press in Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following Japan's invasion of China in 1937, Japanese bureaucratic and intellectual elites constructed a volatile image of the munitions worker as trickster. Within this discursive realm, the worker became an object of hope, fear, and rage for the guardians of an idealized home front struggling to bolster war production while still adhering to wartime goals of national austerity. In the cultural fantasies and nightmares of the Japanese home front, the munitions worker fluctuated between the valorized “industrial warrior” laboring for the nation and a violent delinquent ready to wreak havoc on society. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since 2012, China’s assertion of its sovereignty claim to the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has significantly raised the risk of a potentially escalatory political-military crisis with Japan. As circumstances worsen, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has championed major institutional reforms aimed at centralizing Japanese security policy decision-making and vastly improving crisis management. This article assesses these reforms’ significance for ameliorating Japan’s long-standing internal crisis management weaknesses, and enhancing its ability to communicate with Beijing promptly under challenging conditions. While significant issues remain, recent developments – especially the establishment of Japan’s first-ever National Security Council – demonstrate significant progress. Bilaterally, however, important firebreaks remain conspicuously absent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contributes to the relational IR literature on identity politics and Sino-Japanese relations. Theoretically, we develop Rumelili's framework for studying modes of differentiation by incorporating the sectoral characteristics of key discourse signs. Empirically, we apply this framework to the construction of Self and Other in the official Japanese security discourse regarding the Senkaku Islands dispute from 2010-2014, a period of dispute climax that is meaningful for studying the (re)production of Japan's understanding of China. The inclusiveness of the discourse signs that Japan uses to construct China possibly opens up for a positive evolution of Sino-Japanese relations, as there is space for progress if China's behavior-and Japan's interpretation of it-proves to be more peaceful, transparent, and law-abiding. The findings also suggest, however, that the strong sense of superiority in Japan (and China) vis-à-vis a subordinate Other may not bode well for Sino-Japanese relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As most studies on Middle East–East Asian relations focus on the interregional dimension, the manner in which relations between East Asian powers influence, and are influenced by, their policies in the Middle East are largely overlooked. Attempting to add another layer to the study of Sino-Japanese relations, this article explores whether Sino-Japanese rivalry extends to the Middle East. This undertaking requires a conceptual distinction between measures related to Sino-Japanese competition in the Middle East and measures which are related to their rivalry. Building on a minimal definition of interstate rivalry, the article argues that neither the effort to secure energy supply nor their economic or political competition there is shaped by their rivalry. The only field that can be associated with that rivalry is Japan's quasi-military activity in the Middle East, which may enhance its security policy's revision. That, in turn, causes much concern and criticism in Beijing, thus assigning the region a certain role in their relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article operationalizes Japanese leadership in foreign and security policy, specifically the Abe administrations’ consistent China balancing. It will do so to dispel instances of Premier-centered diplomacy and posit that Abe's diplomatic agenda has rested on a ‘hybrid’ policy-making authority, where the leverage enjoyed by the Prime Minister's office (the Kantei) rested on little-appreciated politicized personnel appointments and demotions within the bureaucratic apparatus, specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, successful Japanese leadership has functioned especially when operating within the scope of the US strategic framework towards East Asia. While structural constraints, such as the ever-present influence of the USA and bureaucratic coordination, may constrain options, effective leadership in foreign policy-making can indeed make a difference within those boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent years have seen a deterioration in political relations between China and Japan, in particular over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and history-related problems. Commentators have noted an attendant decline in trust between the two sides and have stressed the need for confidence-building measures in order to address the trust deficit. This article explores the origins of declining trust between the Chinese and Japanese leaderships. It argues that attempts to build a friendly and trusting relationship in the early post-war and post-normalisation periods began to fail in the 1980s, and have been in a gradual state of decline ever since. Using the concepts of trust and friendship, the article suggests that the lack of trust properties such as empathy, bonding, reliability and predictability have contributed to the deterioration of trust at both elite and popular levels. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Japan has been overlooked as a ‘cyber power’ but it now becoming a serious player in this new strategic domain. Japanese policy-makers have forged a consensus to move cybersecurity to the very core of national security policy, to create more centralized frameworks for cybersecurity, and for Japan’s military institutions to build dynamic cyberdefense capabilities. Japan’s stance has moved rapidly toward the securitization and now militarization of responses to cyber challenges. Japan’s cybersecurity stance has bolstered US–Japan alliance responses to securing all dimensions of the ‘global commons’ and extended its defense perimeter to further deter but potentially raise tensions with China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Japan has recently lifted its self-imposed ban on arms imports and exports and reinterpreted its pacifist constitution to allow its armed forces to engage in military operations. This is in line with the Japanese government's readjustments of its foreign policy over previous decades, in response to various geopolitical conflicts and disputes, particularly with China. Japan's shift away from a "pure" form of pacifism is unique in modern history. What remains unclear are the future implications of this shift in shaping strategic and military relations in the region. In this article, I argue that Japan's reinterpretation of texts of its constitution, in tandem with its economic influence, has drawn many countries in the region closer to a mutually beneficial opposition to China's territorial claims. I also argue that Japan's shift has sparked the beginning of an informal military coalition and initiated a "safety in numbers" response to China, though this is being held back by unhealed political disputes. Additionally, I examine some implications for the emerging military relationships in the Asia Pacific, particularly with regards to unrestricted access to the South China Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the biggest challenges for the East Asian region today is the Sino-Japanese relationship. Starting with the fishing trawler incident in September 2010, followed by Japan's nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, this relationship is experiencing an escalation of tensions in most, if not all, areas of the bilateral relationship. In response to the intensifying competition, China and Japan have elevated the importance of South-East Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in their foreign policy strategies. Focusing on how elites from five South-East Asian states -- Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam--perceive the engagement of China and Japan with the region, this article poses two questions: (1) How do South-East Asian elites view the Sino-Japanese competition? and (2) How do South-East Asian elites view the role of ASEAN in managing the competition? The analysis here concludes that while some South- East Asian elites see opportunities in the Sino-Japanese competition, they nevertheless do not perceive it as an issue of critical significance. Instead, the concern lies generally with majorpower dynamics, and particularly with Sino-US relations. ASEAN is viewed to lack the ability to manage the negative consequences of the Sino-Japanese competition, although its external balancing function has perceptibly helped to restrain any escalation of major-power tensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the midst of rising tension between China and Japan, two powerful countries in Asia, the favorable attitudes of each country's citizens toward the other country have dropped to a historical low. The Taiwan issue, historical legacy, island disputes, and maritime resource competition are major obstacles in Sino-Japanese relations, but the most fundamental issue is a deep-seated mutual distrust and suspicion between the two countries, which result in rising threat perceptions. Beyond the structural and political elite-centered approaches, this study examines the evidence related to the three approaches (face-to-face contact, cross-cultural exposure, and social identity) to reduce mutual distrust and antipathy in the two countries. With a careful analysis of the survey data, this study sheds light on the conditions under which contact (a) results in improved attitudes toward outgroup, (b) has little or no effect on intergroup relations, and (c) yields more prejudice and hostility toward the outgroup. The findings of this study not only identify factors that could facilitate mutual understanding between Chinese and Japanese people and more favorable impressions of one another, but are also relevant to planning interventions to reduce prejudice and distrust among people from different races, religions, and countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper compares patterns of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) for Japan and China over similar periods of their integration into the global economy. From a statistical perspective, China's recent pattern of OFDI flows (2004-2010) differs from Japan's OFDI flows during a similar period of growth and emergence onto the world scene (1976- 1982). While acknowledging that the world economy is a much different place today than it was in 1982, we nevertheless argue that these differences in OFDI flows constitute an important component in any understanding of the nature of development followed by these two important Asian economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this wide-ranging interview and discussion with Kuan-Hsing Chen and Sun Ge, Mizoguchi Yūzō describes the origins of his interest in China studies and the process through which he developed his perspective on China, Japan, and the world. Mizoguchi details his break with both old-style Japanese Sinology and Western-influenced scholarship, which assumes Japanese superiority over China and takes Euro-American society and concepts as its standard. Mizoguchi suggests that historians can and should cultivate a new subjectivity for themselves and understanding of the history of the world as a whole through an approach to China that attempts to understand China’s own internal historical processes rather than assuming the universality of Western processes. He discusses his efforts to help reform the institutional structure of China studies in Japan, and further touches on the part played by Japan in China’s modern history as well as its historical relations with Taiwan and Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Why is the period from the Opium War through the Republican era in recent Chinese history treated by so many scholars of different stripes as a decline of China itself, rather than as a decline simply of the dynastic order? What is the nature of the Republican period? What role has the centralization and decentralization of power played through these years – and is it limited to the Republican period, or is it part of a much longer trend in Chinese history? Why have so many scholars fixated on the Opium War at the beginning of Chinese modernity? Mizoguchi asks these penetrating questions and makes telling comparisons with Japan over roughly the same period of time. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Why do interstate relations deteriorate and become conflictual, even under conditions where one might expect improved ties? The article seeks an answer to this question through a case study of the deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations in the twenty-first century, which took place despite the existence of several factors that might be thought likely to have led to an improvement. Existing theoretical approaches cannot fully explain this puzzle. The article argues that such deteriorations can result from disruptions to states’ reciprocally performed routinised recognition, and identifies three mechanisms through which these can occur. To facilitate this argument, the article draws on scholarship on relational identity, recognition, and ontological security to develop a theory of identity construction that takes account of how self and other routinise the ways in which they recognise each other and how they react to the other’s representational practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on recognition in International Relations has demonstrated that states are not exclusively concerned about their physical security, but also anxious to be recognised by other states. What counts as recognition and non-/mis-recognition, however, is not always clear. Scholars of recognition seem to agree that recognition theory has not yet developed a persuasive way of recognising recognition. Providing a satisfactory answer to the question of how we recognise recognition and its denial is a necessary first step towards being able to convincingly theorise about recognition. This is especially important since recognition is often treated as a dependent variable—how states are recognised by other states is seen as influencing their behaviour, sometimes with military conflict as the outcome. This article further develops the concepts of ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ recognition as it addresses the problem of how to recognise recognition. Based on an analysis of empirical material on what, in Japan, has been interpreted as Chinese non- and mis-recognition of Japan, the article shows how concrete expressions of thin and thick recognition between established states can be recognised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anthropology, religious studies, and area studies constitute sociology of religion's disciplinary neighbors through their shared interest in religion as an analytical object. Within these fields, a number of significant critiques of both how religion is defined and described and who ultimately shapes those definitions have emerged. By analyzing clusters of these critiques related to religion as a category and whether religion has essential characteristics, and emic/etic distinctions, this paper incorporates important points in each of these criticisms that have significant implications for the direction of sociological research on religion. Additionally, this paper draws on historical data from China and Japan's period of state formation and their attempts to deal with the question of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present article discusses the implications of ballistic missile defense systems for the stability and security of the Northeast Asian region. The paper aims tofind out whether the ballistic missile defense systems contribute to the stability and security of the region, or are rather detrimental to it. A constructivist approach is utilized to analyze the problem. Relying on both strategic culture and historical memory, the paper analyzes how the ballistic missile systems of Japan are perceived by China, and whether they contribute to Chinese militarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper draws on extensive island examples with a view to offer 'creative' solutions to the ongoing dispute over the Diaoyu/Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands between China (and Taiwan) and Japan in the East China Sea. In spite of the rhetoric and apparent intractability of island conflicts, there are various examples from the past (and the present) that suggest how island disputes may be decided, and in 'win-win' ways, to the satisfaction of the different parties involved. The resolution of island territorial problems can benefit greatly from a critical appreciation of how other small islands, also contested, have had their situation resolved in non-zero-sum ways. In such cases, sovereignty has been shared, split/divided or expunged; in other cases, sovereignty disputes have been put aside in order to co-develop and co-exploit natural resources. There is also one example of a UNESCO World Heritage Site consisting of a string of small islands and surrounding waters whose management is shared between three countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese-Japanese relations have become increasingly tense in recent years. It might be concluded superficially that the recent tensions originated from the historical issues and the bilateral sovereignty disputes over some islands. However, these tensions are deeply rooted in the structural contradictions of these bilateral relations, such as the conflicting national strategies of China and Japan, the relative balance of power between them, and the discrepancy of their interests in their games against the background of macro transition of the overall strategic pattern of the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, the U.S. strategic dilemma in this gaming process adds destabilizing factors to the development of China-Japan bilateral relations. The outcomes of the China-Japan tensions not only affect the rise and fall of the relative strengths of these two countries, but also have major influences over the general strategic arrangements of East Asia and the whole Asia-Pacific. Therefore, it is very meaningful to probe the deep-rooted causes of the Chinese-Japanese conflicts and to observe current China-Japan relations from the strategic perspective because some solutions might be discoverd in this way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]