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In 2002 and 2003 in the run-up to the war in Iraq, the U.S. and Europe experienced the most jarring deterioration in the transatlantic partnership since the Suez crisis of 1956. When attempting to diagnose the causes for the recent spate of ill will, the temptation is to look to the current inhabitants of elective office. For those who followed disputes over landmines, climate change, the International Criminal Court and other issues, it is clear problems go beyond George W. Bush, Jacques Chirac, and Gerhard Schroeder. The first section of the paper, through illustrative counter-factuals (What if Al Gore won the election? What if Europe had been bombed on September 11th?), examines the extent to which present difficulties are a product of contingent developments. The second section examines the deeper reasons for the divide. A number of authors have identified deeper sources by looking to differences in underlying material conditions and cultural values. However, these explanations typically are far too deterministic. Neither the end of the Cold War nor material differences in military capabilities determine a country?s choice of foreign policy approaches. Similarly, while values differences between the U.S. and Europe may be real, these should not obscure the commonalities of culture and interest that remain strong, particularly in light of vast differences between the democratic West and the authoritarian rest of the world. Section three makes the case that materialist and cultural arguments miss or minimize the the ways in which political distance itself may be the main cause of difficulties in the post-Cold War era. Political distance between governing elites is ultimately derived from differences in ?domestic? decision-making processes shape which interests and values exercise influence in political life. These internal institutions establish constraints on European and American decision-makers in international fora that may exacerbate differences between the two. The paper concludes by emphasizing that recent difficulties are as much a product of choice as they are driven by structural constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-Cold War era, climate change, landmines, debt relief and a number of other issues emerged to re-shape the agenda of decision-makers in the advanced industrialized world. The primary advocates of these normative issues are motivated not by their own material self-interests but broader notions of right and wrong. What is the primary logic that contributes to the domestic acceptance of these moral commitments? International relations scholars identify persuasion as the primary way in which states are ‘convinced’ that a norm-based policy is worth accepting. How should we characterize this process of persuasion? Is this the right term to describe the actions of transnational protest movements? Through a case study of the Jubilee 2000 campaign for developing country debt relief, I offer an account of persuasion based on strategic framing by advocates to get the attention of decision-makers. This paper emphasizes the rhetorical and framing strategies that are used to try to tip the political balance in support of normative agendas but ultimately ascribes these a different character than either coercion or Habermasian communicative action. Such strategic but not narrowly self-interested activity allows weak actors to leverage existing value traditions to build broader coalitions of political support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]