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The COVID-19 outbreak is not the first nor last series of recent real or potential catastrophes - be they natural disasters, terrorist attacks or pandemics - that have taken by surprise governments, globalised firms and the citizenry. 1Yet, due to its near-unprecedented impact on the highly interconnected but vulnerable systems that define the modern world, this pandemic has been testing our ability to govern risk more than any other crisis before. The last time the world responded to a global emerging disease epidemic of the scale of the current novel coronavirus without having access to vaccines was the 1918-1919 H1N1 influenza pandemic. 2Ironically, the measures mobilised today to counter COVID-19 - the so-called “non-pharmaceutical interventions” 3- are essentially the same as those deployed a century ago, and that despite significant social, technological as well as governance differences between 1918 and today. 4

The existence of adat law community has been recognized since Dutch Colonial Era until today. State recognitions towards adat law community are dynamics. This paper is written based on legal normative research to describe dynamics of adat law community recognition. In the early of Indonesia independent, adat law community was considered as foundation of Indonesia nation state establishment. Since 1957 and during New Order era, there was systematic effort to abolish adat law communities because adat law was perceived as symbol of backwardness. After the amendment of the Constitution, adat law community and their traditional rights are recognized by law and enforced through court decision. Adat law community can determine their type of recognition to strengthen their legal capacity to manage Adat Forest; to organize Adat Village; or to hold communal land rights. Intisari Eksistensi masyarakat hukum adat telah diakui sejak zaman Pemerintahan Kolonial Belanda hingga hari ini. Pengakuan negara terhadap masyarakat hukum adat bersifat dinamis. Tulisan ini ditulis berdasarkan penelitian hukum normatif untuk mendeskripsikan dinamika pengakuan masyarakat hukum adat. Pada awal kemerdekaan Indonesia, masyarakat hukum adat merupakan dasar terbentuknya negara bangsa Indonesia. Sejak tahun 1957 dan selama periode Order Baru, ada upaya sistematis untuk menghapuskan masyarakat hukum adat karena hukum adat dianggap sebagai simbol keterbelakangan. Pasca amandemen konstitusi, masyarakat hukum adat dan hak tradisionalnya diakui melalui hukum dan ditegakkan oleh pengadilan. Masyarakat hukum adat dapat menentukan jenis pengakuan yang dapat menguatkan kapasitas hukum mereka dalam mengelola hutan adat; mengorganisasi Desa Adat; atau dalam menyandang hak komunal atas tanah. Abstract Abstract The existence of adat law community has been recognized since Dutch Colonial Era until today. State recognition s towards adat law community are dynamics. This paper is written based on legal normative research to describ e d ynamics of adat law community recognition. In the early of Indonesia independent, adat law community was considered as foundation of Indonesia nation state establishment . Since 1957 and during New Order era, there was systematic effor t to abolish adat l aw communities because a dat law was perceived as symbol of backwardness . After the amendment of the Constitution, adat law community and their traditional rights are recognized by law and enforced through court decision. A dat law community can determine th ei r type of recognition to strengthen their legal capacity to manage Adat Forest; to organize Adat Village; or to hold communal land rights.

The chapter is focused on the protection of whistleblowers under Czech law within the context of the Directive on the protection of whistleblowers for persons who report breaches of Union law (2019/1937). Specifically, the chapter deals with all seven previous and current proposals for legal regulation of whistleblower protection. The authors provide a detailed discussion of the current draft of law to transpose Directive 2019/1937. The authors deal with the definition of the scope of the bill, retaliation measures, breadth of the obligation to implement a notification system, status of the responsible/concerned person in the notification system, absence of motivational measures and problematic aspects of public control. The project is co-financed by the Governments of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the Fund is to advance ideas for sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe.

International audience; This article analyses the political significance of the protests that have arisen in Tunisia since the ʻrevolution’ and the establishment of a parliamentary regime. This is what the protests studied have in common: they belong to neglected regions in the country’s hinterland; that they mobilise young local populations; they claim rights over their territories’ soil and subsoil resources exploitation; they occupy a strategic location for a relatively long period of time; and they set up democratic mechanisms for these locations’ self-management, in the form of ‘coordinations’. The description of social logics and the way populations resist, as well as the authoritarian rationality of government action and the inability of elected officials to mediate conflicts, reveal differences between protesters who seek autonomy from state control, while others refer to a rent-centred understanding of the claim. It also shows the emergence of a ‘protest democracy’, itself an expression of a crisis of ‘governmentality’. These two phenomena are symptomatic of a demand for integrating populations and new ways of governing that break with the reeks of past authoritarianism and current representative democracy.

The European response to COVID-19 has revealed an inconvenient truth. Despite having integrated public health concerns across all its policies – be it agriculture, consumer protection, or security –, the Union cannot directly act to save people’s lives. Only member states can do so. Yet when they adopted unilateral measures to counter the spread of the virus, those proved not only ineffective but also disruptive on vital supply chains, by ultimately preventing the flow of essential goods and people across the Union. These fragmented efforts in tackling cross-border health threats have almost immediately prompted political calls for the urgent creation of a European Health Union. Yet this call raises more questions than answers. With the aim to offer a rigorous and timely blueprint to decision-makers and the public at large, this Special Issue of the European Journal of Risk Regulation contextualizes such a new political project within the broader constitutional and institutional framework of EU public health law and policy. By introducing the Special, this paper argues that unless the envisaged Health Union will tackle the root causes of what prevented the Union from effectively responding to COVID-19 – the divergent health capacity across the Union –, it might fall short of its declared objective of strengthening the EU’resilience for cross-border health threats.

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) in a variety of research fields is speeding up multiple digital revolutions, from shifting paradigms in healthcare, precision medicine and wearable sensing, to public services and education offered to the masses around the world, to future cities made optimally efficient by autonomous driving. When a revolution happens, the consequences are not obvious straight away, and to date, there is no uniformly adapted framework to guide AI research to ensure a sustainable societal transition. To answer this need, here we analyze three key challenges to interdisciplinary AI research, and deliver three broad conclusions: 1) future development of AI should not only impact other scientific domains but should also take inspiration and benefit from other fields of science, 2) AI research must be accompanied by decision explainability, dataset bias transparency as well as development of evaluation methodologies and creation of regulatory agencies to ensure responsibility, and 3) AI education should receive more attention, efforts and innovation from the educational and scientific communities. Our analysis is of interest not only to AI practitioners but also to other researchers and the general public as it offers ways to guide the emerging collaborations and interactions toward the most fruitful outcomes.

Ten years after the introduction of participatory democracy as one of the democratic foundations of the European Union, this introductory chapter to "Citizen Participation in Democratic Europe" provides some theoretical background on the role citizens play, and should play, within the EU democratic system. As such, it offers a contribution about the place of citizen participation in the wider, ongoing debate about how to develop the EU’s democratic system in a post-pandemic Europe. It sets the scene for the subsequent chapters written, again, not only by academic scholars but also civil society advocates and practitioners from across Europe who experience on a daily basis the realities of EU citizen participation. Ultimately, this edited volume argues how Europe’s long-standing democracy challenge can be addressed through the emergence of a new model of EU citizen participation, and a set of democratic innovations emerging bottom-up across the continent. To do so, it offers a re-evaluation and systematisation of EU level citizen participation and its future development, which remains largely underexplored.

Europe has largely been absent from the US-dominated debate surrounding the introduction of nudge-type interventions in policy-making. Yet the European Union and some of its Member States are exploring the possibility of informing their policy action with behavioural insights. While a great deal of academic attention is currently been paid to the philosophical, ethical and other abstract implications of behavioural-informed regulation, such as those concerning autonomy, dignity and moral development, this chapter charts and systematizes the incipient European Nudge discourse. Besides a few isolated initiatives displaying some behavioural considerations (e.g. consumer rights, revised tobacco products directive, sporadic behavioural remedies in competition law), the EU – similarly to its own Member States – has not yet shown a general commitment to systematically integrate behavioural insights into policy-making. Given the potential of this innovative regulatory approach to attain effective, low-cost and choice-preserving policies, such a stance seems surprising, especially when measured against growing citizen mistrust towards EU policy action. At a time in which some EU countries are calling for a repatriation of powers and the European Commission promises to redefine - in the framework of its Better Regulation agenda - the relationships between the Union and its citizens, nudging might provide a promising way forward. In the aftermath of the Brexit vote, this promise has not only been shared by the 27 remaining Member State but also represents one of their major priorities . Yet with promises come challenges too. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets the scene by discussing the growing appeal of nudging among policymakers within and across Europe. Section 3 introduces the notion of behavioural policymaking and contrasts it with that of nudging. Section 4 describes the early and rather timid attempts at integrating behavioural insights into EU policymaking and identifies some domestic experiences. Section 5 discusses the institutional and methodological efforts undertaken by the EU and some of its member states to embrace behavioural policymaking. In turn, section 6 discusses the major difficulties of integrating behavioural insights into EU policymaking and offers some concluding remarks.

Recent contributions in the domains of governance and regulation elucidate the importance of rule-intermediation (RI), the role that organizations adopt to bridge actors playing regulatory or “rule-making” (RM) roles, and those adopting target or “rule-taking” (RT) roles. Intermediation not only enables diffusion and translation of regulatory norms, but also allows for the representation of different actors in policy-making arenas. While prior studies have explored the roles that such RIs adopt to facilitate their intermediation functions, we have yet to consider how field-level structuring processes influence (and are influenced by) the various and changing roles adopted by RIs. In this study, we focus on the mutually constitutive relations between field-level change processes and the evolving roles of RIs by studying the rise of ICLEI (International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives/Local Governments for Sustainability), an RI serving as a bridge for sustainable urban development policies between the United Nations and urban authorities. Using ICLEI as an illustrate case, we theorize four different processes of regulatory field consolidation and fragmentation including: problematization, role specialization, marketization and orchestrated decentralization. We discuss their implications for the RI roles in the field and further theorize the changing dynamics of trickle-up intermediation processes as an RI gains power and influence. This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Bothello, J. and Mehrpouya, A. (2018), Between regulatory field structuring and organizational roles: Intermediation in the field of sustainable urban development. Regulation & Governance, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12215. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Use of Self-Archived Versions.

International audience; The paper is focused on new educational activities focused on attracting young people for technical education. The idea is based on realization of the project under Erasmus+ Strategic Partnership (Key Action 2). The project based on exchange of good practices involves seven partners. Three of them represents sector of higher education and four are schools located in the neighbor of the technical university. Partners exchange ideas how to increase number of students who starts education in technical area, which seems a bit difficult, but engineers are very expected by the industry. The second project goal is to examine possibilities how the university can contribute in increasing quality of technical education at schools. Main project ideas and results of realized project activities are reported in the paper.

COVID-19 is a matter of common European interest since its very first detection on the continent. Yet this pandemic outbreak has largely been handled as an essentially national matter.This article makes a first attempt at unpacking how such fragmented, uncoordinated national responses to COVID19 came into being under the EU legal order. To do so, it systematizes the European response into separate stages. Phase 1 – the emergency – has been characterized by the adoption of national emergency risk management measures that, albeit country specific, were inspired by a common objective of pandemic suppression, i.e. to reduce disease transmission and thereby diminishing pressure on health services, under the by now well-known ‘flatten the curve’ imperative. Phase 2 – the lifting – is about the attempt at relaxing some of the national risk responses in a coordinated fashion to avoid creating negative spillovers or distortions – be they sanitary and/or financial – across the Union.The article argues that contrary to conventional wisdom the resulting uncoordinated EU response to Covid-19 shouldn’t be seen as the inevitable consequence of the EU’s limited competence in public health. Against this backdrop, it strives to define the regulatory policy framework that might be governing the next phases of the European risk management response to this pandemic as they will emerge from a widely undefined yet unescapable dialectic between the Union and its member states. Ultimately, it predicts that by testing the outer limits of the EU public health competence COVID-19 is set to go down in history as a major catalyst in the advancement of EU health emergency action.

We investigate how Activist Short Sellers (AShSs) expose publicly listed firms in an increasingly popular form of “research reports” openly denouncing alleged frauds, flawed business models, accounting irregularities, and wrongdoings. We focus on six AShSs that issued research reports that often led to a strong negative market reaction. Our empirical analysis exploits both qualitative and quantitative methods for a comprehensive dataset of 383 research reports targeting 171 unique firms, and three first-hand interviews with AShSs. Drawing on Aristotle’s rhetoric, we first examine how AShSs use narratives in striving to convince other investors that the target firms are overvalued. Specifically, we search the documents produced by AShSs for stylized narratives related to credibility-based (ethos), emotions-based (pathos), and logic-based (logos) rhetorical strategies. To assess the impact of these strategies, we examine the extent to which the AShSs’ rhetorical strategies resonate in 3,665 press articles. As expected, the press often refers to logos-based arguments. Interestingly, the press also brings up frequently pathos-based and ethos-based statements. Considering the importance of the press in shaping investors’ opinions, our study points to AShSs’ narratives playing a major role in policing financial markets. Theoretically, we show that AShSs, as dissenting market participants, produce narratives that go beyond the language of formal rationality – as they strive to reveal new information and frame it persuasively, in order to destabilize the extent of trustworthiness surrounding target firms.

This study, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs and requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, assesses the impact of disinformation and strategic political propaganda disseminated through online social media sites. It examines effects on the functioning of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights in the EU and its Member States.The study formulates recommendations on how to tackle this threat to human rights, democracy and the rule of law. It specifically addresses the role of social media platform providers in this regard.

This paper contains the on on-line appendix to the paper with the same title forthcoming in ILRR.; Is the Bayh-Dole intellectual property regime associated with more and better academic entrepreneurship than the Professor Privilege regime? The authors examine data on US PhDs in the natural sciences, engineering, and medical fields who became entrepreneurs in 1993–2006 and compare this to similar data from Sweden. They find that, in both countries, those with an academic background have lower rates of entry into entrepreneurship than do those with a non-academic background. The relative rate of academics starting entrepreneurial firms is slightly lower in the United States than in Sweden. Moreover, the mean economic gains from becoming an entrepreneur are negative, both for PhDs originating in academia and non-academic settings in both countries. Analysis indicates that selection into entrepreneurship occurs from the lower part of the ability distribution among academics. The results suggest that policies aimed at supporting entrepreneurial decisions by younger, tenure-track academics may be more effective than general incentives at increasing academic entrepreneurship in general.

This time was supposed 'to be different', at least this was the motto of the 2014 European Parliament elections campaign. With less than a year before the next European elections, the time is ripe to examine how different this EU political cycle has actually been. Emboldened by the Spitzenkandidaten process – which established for the first time a link between the outcome of the EU elections and the presidency of the EU Commission –, the Juncker Commission emerged as the most political yet. To shrug off the label of technocratic institution – historically insulated from citizens’ preferences –, the new Commission asked EU citizens to judge its operation by its ability ‘to deliver solutions to the big issues that cannot be addressed by the Member States alone’. While the Better Regulation Agenda might have improved the Commission’s public accountability – with both citizens and stakeholders being better informed about and engaged with EU policy-making –, without however increasing its responsiveness to public preferences. This is the case at the input, throughput and output stage. Rather, the techno-political approach to policymaking – which characterizes the Juncker’s Better Regulation – might have paradoxically led to a compression of participatory democracy and somehow chilled stakeholder engagement. At a time of unprecedented contestation of the EU project – a trend which is combined by a record-demand for new forms of political representation –, it appears paradoxical that the EU – an early promoter of participation – is missing out the chance to seize the momentum to diversify and redesign its participatory structures being busy delivering on its electoral promises no one will ever judge.At the very same time the Juncker Commission has been striving to develop its own, autonomous democratic credentials, its choice to embrace a set of well-defined institutional mechanisms that reward expert judgment over political adjudication appears at odds with its newly-acquired political nature.

The EU’s approach to fake news, as epitomised by the European External Action (EEAS) Service East Stratcom Disinformation Review, violates the rights to freedom of expression and due process of those accused of distributing disinformation. The EU Disinformation Review is a publication of the European External Action Service (the European Union’s diplomatic service) to target fake news and online disinformation. Following our request for access to documents, EEAS conceded that the EU Disinformation Review uses an “ad hoc” methodology for conducting its fact-checks, which makes it an outlier in the international fact-checking community led by the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN). Despite being a well-intentioned initiative to respond to the challenges posed by pro-Kremlin disinformation, the EU should ensure the respect of fundamental rights when engaging in fact-checking. The EU Disinformation Review seeks to control the right to freedom of expression by labelling publishers as “disinforming outlets” and their content as “disinformation,” creating a chilling effect on the work of journalists that is central to democracy. The right to freedom of expression is expressed in Article 11.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01) and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The labelling of publishers as “disinformation outlets” is contrary to principle of the freedom of press established by the European Court of Human Rights: “[a] general requirement for journalists systematically and formally to distance themselves from the content of a quotation that might insult or provoke others or damage their reputation is not reconcilable with the press’ role of providing information on current events, opinion and ideas.” In addition, the methodology used by EEAS in the EU Disinformation Review is “ad hoc,” which constitutes a violation of the fundamental right to good administration in Article 41 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. Specifically, the ad hoc design and operation of the EU Disinformation Review fails to ensure the review acts “impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time.” First, publications are not provided with the right to be heard or proper notice. The EU Disinformation Review’s homepage offers an opportunity to contact the Task Force report a suspected mistake in a fact-check but the page is only available in English, in violation of the principle of multilingualism, and no notice if given to outlets accused of being “disinforming outlets” before or after fact-checks of their content are published. Second, the EEAS does not fulfil its duty to motivate. EEAS is given a broad margin of discretion to identify disinformation, but fails to do so according to a consistent methodology. Therefore, EEAS cannot justify, on the basis of objective criteria, its choice of which content to review and how to determine its truth or falsehood. To comply with EU law and ensure the respect of fundamental rights, the EEAS should develop and make public (1) a methodology for selecting partnerships and reviewing fact-checks in line with international standards and (2) a notice and response mechanism for journalists, publishers and citizens whose content is being reviewed. If EEAS is unable to comply with the above, the EU Disinformation Review should be shut down.

Does distributive injustice increase the likelihood of joint venture (JV) termination? JVs display social exchange characteristics, and are, therefore, assessed not only based on economic rationale but also based on distributive justice which acts as a norm governing social exchanges. This paper draws on social exchange theory to redefine distributive justice in JVs, and explains the pathway from the emergence of distributive injustice to the eventual JV termination. We suggest that while both economic and justice considerations determine joint venture termination, they have different implications for JV termination mode. Based on a sample of 284 joint ventures formed between 1996 and 2010, we find evidence that distributive injustice increases the likelihood of termination of the JV in general, and the likelihood of acquisition of the JV, in particular.

This article focuses on changes in leadership’s discourse about the “triple bottom line” in Ben & Jerry’s ice cream from its founding days through to its acquisition by and integration into Unilever. For this study, we analyzed CEO claims about “who we are” from their letters in annual reports (what we label projected identity). A sample of employees (both long-service and relative newcomers) were interviewed about their perceptions of Ben & Jerry’s over the 30 years covered. Findings reveal that successive CEOs stressed different “logics” about the business and what would make it successful over the years with the founders emphasizing a strong linkage between the economic, product, and social components of the company’s triple bottom line and their next three successors decoupling these components and pushing, each in different ways, for stronger financial returns. As a result, organization members were “whipsawed” between their CEOs’ different logics and identity claims. The CEO letters exhibit a progression over time from a more normative to utilitarian tone familiar in the organizational identity literature. The messaging shifts, however, when a fifth CEO takes charge and reintegrates the firm’s triple bottom line. Thus, the firm’s projected identity evolved in a U pattern starting with an integrated triple bottom line logic, shifting to a more linear logic where the economic mission dominates, and then reintegration where multiple bottom lines are embraced once again. Here, we explore both the strategic (external) and personal (internal) challenges informing the different CEOs’ messages over years, the whipsaw effect on staff, and the longer term evolution of projected identity in the company and reemergence of its integrated triple bottom line. This study contributes to the corporate social responsibility and organization identity literatures by documenting how CEOs (and their company) must struggle with maintaining an integrated triple bottom line in the context of commercial challenges and major changes involved in mergers and acquisitions. It also speaks to the practical matters of keeping normative traditions alive amid competing pressures for change.

International audience; As a French-German research team we conducted a survey with a sample of academic libraries and graduate schools in France and Germany to determine the current situation and trends in the publishing of electronic PhD theses and dissertations (ETDs) under Open Access (OA). The percentage of OA theses varies depending on the country, the research field, and the institution. Not all ETDs are available in OA for a variety of reasons, including confidentiality, embargoes, author-imposed restrictions, and a lack of encouragement and/or requirement by libraries and graduate schools. The survey reveals qualitative and structural differences between France and Germany in this area. Here we discuss the survey findings, the methodologies used in the survey, and the various policies (or lack thereof) and their impact on ETDs and OA. A strategy is outlined for moving towards ensuring that publishing ETDs under OA becomes routine, and an electronic version becomes the only manifestation of a thesis.

At a time in which behavioural science has gained increasing attention for the design of population-wide health interventions, this chapter discusses its potential contributions to the prevention and control of Non-Communicable-Diseases (NCDs). Given the largely preventable nature of NCDs, any lifestyle intervention faces the challenge to induce behavioural change. By highlighting the role of social and physical environments in shaping our behaviour, applied behavioural science provides policymakers with a new understanding of human decision-making and, as a result, may support an innovative approach to the promotion of behaviour change leading to healthier lives. While only a combination of policy instruments, such as legislation, regulation, and even financial and fiscal incentives, may induce behaviour change to the scale required to reduce the burden of chronic disease at the population level, a behavioural informed approach may valuably complement the current regulatory mix. In particular, an analysis of the WHO NCD Action Plan and its accompanying strategies suggests an increased awareness of the roles played by environmental and social factors on behaviour change. Although the language employed falls short of operationalizing the major behavioural insights into the NCD agenda, it clearly highlights that their integration into the current regulatory mix appears fundamental today for the design of any lifestyle policy intervention. As behavioural change is progressively becoming the focus of health promotion efforts, the lesson learned is that there is more to behaviour change than merely empowering the targeted individuals, communities and populations with the necessary information.

Entrepreneurship studies have attributed to over-confidence decisions to start a new venture. Many decision situations, through which over-confidence is measured, entail some degrees of uncertainty, (e.g., related to own skill or to competition). The aspect of uncertainty is largely neglected in over-confidence studies or entrepreneurial research. Both uncertainty and over-confidence influence individuals’ likelihood perceptions. Nevertheless, these two aspects are seldom jointly investigated, and the little evidence provides inconclusive results. In this study, we experimentally investigate how uncertainty, as a property of the situation, and over-confidence, as a characteristic of decision makers’ beliefs, influence choice behavior. Our findings with Executive MBA participants show that over-confident decision makers choose less uncertain options for low likelihood outcomes and more uncertain options for high likelihood outcomes, contrary to neutral confidence decision makers, whose choices are in line with standard Prospect Theory predictions.