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"Felt understanding" is a crucial determinant of positive interpersonal and intergroup relationships. However, the question of why felt understanding shapes intergroup relations has been neglected. In a pre-registered test of the process in intergroup relations with a sample from East Asia, we manipulated felt understanding (understood versus misunderstood by an outgroup) in an experimental study (N = 476). The results supported the expectation that felt understanding would lead to a more positive intergroup orientation and action intention. The results of parallel mediation analyses showed that felt understanding indirectly predicted intergroup outcomes through felt positive regard, intergroup overlap, and outgroup stereotypes. Furthermore, the results of post-hoc sequential mediation analyses indicated that felt understanding indirectly predicted intergroup outcomes sequentially through felt positive regard and intergroup overlap, followed by outgroup stereotypes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the late 2010s, Japan has said publicly that it will provide foreign assistance to protect its national interest. A systematic text analysis reveals, however, that Japan had announced this objective as far back as 1969. From the 1970s through the 1990s, the connection of aid to the national interest was indirect and long-term, with the belief that global stability would lead to prosperity. In the 2000s, the suspension of aid to China and the reconstruction of Iraq became major topics of discussion. In recent years, securing the national interest through aid has diverged from the mercantilist approach of the past, which revitalized the Japanese economy. The presence of China as a competitor for infrastructure aid in Asia is the primary reason Japan has emphasized the national interest in its aid policy. The data demonstrate that Japan's actual aid allocation behavior has been significantly influenced by its emphasis on the national interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines a transnational network of advocates for Kampō (traditional) medicine in Japan, occupied China, and Manchukuo during the Sino-Japanese War (1931–1945), shedding new light on collaborationism, Asianism, and the modernization of traditional medicine in East Asia. In the 1930s, despite deteriorating Sino-Japanese relations, the Kampō revival movement in Japan joined forces with the struggle to preserve traditional medicine in China. In 1938, the Association of East Asian Medicine was founded in Japan, gathering together Chinese, Korean, and Japanese advocates under the banner of 'East Asian medicine'. This article delineates the evolution of what I call 'medical Asianism' and how it was institutionalized in different parts of the Japanese empire. Participants in this network differed in their priorities and ideological commitments, yet they tactfully utilized the Japanese imperial infrastructure and wartime circumstances to promote traditional medicine. Their work laid important intellectual and institutional foundations for the postwar development of traditional medicine across East Asia. This study also contributes to a more nuanced understandings of collaborationism. The type of collaboration examined in this article was preceded by a long history of intellectual exchange, based on a shared body of knowledge and morals, motivated by mutual empathy, and for a cause that was much valued in postwar Asia. As a result, unlike most Chinese collaborators who were prosecuted as 'traitors', protagonists in this study continued to prosper professionally and became valuable assets in the postwar rebuilding of Sino-Japanese relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Feudal Japan was one of the countries within the cultural space of Chinese characters and maintained a "tributary diplomacy" relationship with China. However, although it was part of the Chinese tribute system, Japan was not a typical tributary state like Korea or Vietnam at that time. Therefore, Japan's tribute activities with China, in addition to the similarities inherent in this activity, also had many unique characteristics. This article places Japan's tribute activities in the context of the region and compares them with China's tribute activities of Korea and Vietnam at the time to draw out similarities and differences. At the same time, the article derives the characteristics and essence of Japan's tribute activities at that time, contributing to an understanding of the nature of Japan–China relations in the past and present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been written on how an increasingly assertive China has sought to challenge the incumbent players in the global and regional arenas. Japan, as East Asia's regional hegemon, is said to be throwing its weight behind the US because it has much to lose in an era of China rising. Nevertheless, how much of this resembles reality? This article seeks to unpack some commonly held assumptions, focusing on the political/security as well as economic choices facing Japan. It argues that the Japanese have seemingly forged a rather strong alignment with the US in the sphere of politics/security, often with an eye to limit the influence of China. However, the situation is less clear cut when it comes to opportunities and challenges in the economic realm. Indeed, in some of Japan's most prominent industries, one observes complementarity effects and close interdependence with the Chinese economy. These findings illustrate that China-Japan competition is more complex than commonly portrayed, in addition to raising questions about the complicating effects that economic interdependence can have in a nation's "strategic" policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an effort to counteract China's maritime expansionism, Japan has endeavoured to be a prominent player in the South China Sea dispute over the past decade. While previous studies have emphasized the limitations of Japan's South China Sea policy, one question still remains: to what extent has Japan's policy been successful? By utilizing Baldwin's analytical framework for foreign policy evaluation--which takes into account factors such as stakes, effectiveness and costs--this article argues that Japan's policy has achieved moderate success. Despite its limitations, Japan's policy has been relatively successful as it helps to maintain America's military presence in the region, and creates normative and diplomatic obstacles for China's activities in the South China Sea without damaging Sino-Japanese relations. Additionally, Japan's policy helps uphold the rules-based order by strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of selected Southeast Asian states. The costs of the policy to Japan are acceptable, particularly given that it has little impact on the waters surrounding the country. Conversely, the policy imposes increased material, normative and time costs on China. Given China's uncompromising historical and security position in the South China Sea, the qualified success of Japan's policy should be acknowledged. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Japan is commonly regarded as a strong proponent of the existing liberal international order championed by the US in the Indo-Pacific, sometimes it has been half-hearted in opposing a Sino-centric order and been rather supportive of Chinese diplomacy. In particular, it has to some degree supported the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) implemented by Beijing, effectively offered its endorsement to the international legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) without problematizing human rights issues, and severely restricted the enhancement of its own defense capabilities. These policies have been shaped by pro-China individuals and groups who hold privileged positions inside the government, and their privileged positions have been determined by haphazard domestic political factors which have little to do with Sino-Japanese relations. This means that, although on the surface Japan may seem to have rationally calculated its international strategic interests and implemented hedging as a coherent strategy amid Sino-US rivalries, its implementation of what seems to be a hedging strategy has actually been incidental. Its policy has turned out to resemble what has been regarded by International Relations (IR) theorists as a hedging strategy, due to haphazard domestic political factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the structure of the political framework that defines the relationship between Japan and China? In the early 2000s, a little before the thirtieth-year anniversary of normalization of the bilateral relationship, experts from the two countries argued over the importance of issues regarding history in the framework of bilateral relations. By discussing the formation of the debate on the so-called "1972 system," and its background and subsequent development, this article indicates that China's argument is transforming from rational to more nationalistic. The two consistent features of China's strategic theory toward Japan are (1) China shares with Japan an understanding of where the issues in Sino-Japanese relations lie; and (2) China differs in many respects from Japan in its political interpretation of the issues and seeks setbacks from Japan in a manner consistent with guiding domestic public opinion in China. This implies that Japan and China can potentially share a common understanding of the issues at stake, despite political friction on the surface. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the timeline of the China-Japan relations as of September-December 2022 including Yomiuri poll reports that 81 percent of respondents view China as a threat; 15 percent do not; fuel required for ammunition storage facilities on Nansei Island; and China's semiconductor industry.

This preliminary study focuses on the change in the regional security order caused by the U.S.-China competition and its impact on South Korea-Japan relations. The ongoing U.S.-China relations has expanded beyond the discussion of cooperation and competition between existing and emerging powers, as well as the debate over the influence and resilience of the U.S.-led liberal international order. The significance of the U.S.-China competition in the security order in East Asia depends on whether China will accept the existing U.S.-led bilateral alliance system and take a status quo attitude. As a result, the U.S. allies, South Korea and Japan, need to respond sensitively to the changing nature of the security order. In this vein, this study explains the East Asian security order as elements of power structure, institutions, and actors. In addition, it explains the emergence of China as a new hegemonic power due to the U.S.-China competition, the hub-and-spokes system changes according to the U.S. rebalancing policy, and the emergence of Trumpism. Through this, the author argues two claims. First, the change in U.S.-China relations has led to different expectations between Seoul and Tokyo for cooperation with the U.S., which has hindered bilateral cooperation between them. Second, divergent views on China also hinder South Korea-Japan cooperation. Through the Senkaku dispute between Japan and China and the missile deployment dispute between South Korea and China, the two countries later showed different directions in their policy toward China. In the current competitive situation, restrictions on South Korea-Japan relations are inevitable. However, if the opportunity to promote security cooperation between South Korea and Japan is sought, it will be able to show the cooperation of middle power countries that can develop the security order to mitigate the intensity of U.S.-China competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reviews Japan-China private trade from the 1950s to the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in 1972. Under the Cold War in East Asia, private actors were responsible for trade and business exchanges on behalf of the government in Japan-China relations. Both Japan and China promoted private trade with different political agendas. Japan's objective was to expand Japan-China exchanges with the concept of separation of politics and economics, while China used private trade as a strategic tool to attract Japanese public opinion toward China. This article will clarify how the intentions of the two countries affected private trade, and how private trade expanded as various trade groups competed with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: In most of the scholarship on diplomacy, whether historical or contemporary, the governmental elite-based perspective has consistently dominated. The societisation of diplomacy is the process of legitimisation of foreign policy deliberations between state and society, both domestically and internationally. This article argues that there are two types of societisation: internal and external. It defines the former as a dynamic political communication process comprising diplomatic policy deliberation and legitimisation between state and society in a domestic context. The internal dimension is yet to receive sufficient academic and practical attention. This article fills the gap in the literature on the internal societisation of diplomacy through an empirical case study of Japan's diplomacy towards China. It shows that the unsuccessful internal societisation of diplomacy has had moderating effects on Japan's diplomacy towards China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's increasingly active economic diplomacy in recent years has often been deeply linked to its geostrategic interests. Japan is said to be watching this development with alarm. Analysts have often claimed that this has resulted in Sino-Japanese rivalry, where the Japanese see any gains made by China in zero-sum terms, and make concerted efforts to counter China's growing influence. This article, however, is critical of such views. While elements of rivalry may indeed be visible in some aspects of Sino-Japanese relations, it would be premature to apply this perspective to economic statecraft, which is inherently multifaceted. This article claims that too much attention has been paid to the strategic aspects of Chinese economic statecraft at the expense of economic/commercial ones that could foster cooperative relations between Beijing and Tokyo. It argues that Japan does not hold a monolithic view that Chinese diplomatic activities in the economic realm are an axiomatic threat to Japanese security interests, and it remains premature to say that Japan and China are 'rivals' in the realm of economic statecraft. Future analysis in this area needs to pay greater attention to the complicating effects that economic interdependence can have in strategic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study takes the argument that nontraditional security (NTS) diplomacy can provide the essential window of opportunity for China and Japan to move beyond traditional diplomatic history. However, NTS issues have become dominant in reforming bilateral relations between China and Japan, though there is no fixed edge in nontraditional security. To reveal, it explores the NTS diplomacy with the importance of nontraditional security issues as substance for the expansion and development of two leading economies. The non-military and transboundary character of NTS threats have constrained courtiers to pursue more substantial levels of security integration. This study argues that the significance of NTS diplomacy is twofold; first, it avoids sensitive historical hostilities and finds common ground for cooperation on NTS threats that traditional approach of diplomacy apparently is unable to envisage. Second, security interdependence approach can turn traditional diplomatic relations of China and Japan into a more conciliatory and prominent path. While NTS threats like natural disasters, environment degradation, and economy crisis have been taken as case studies to provide empirical evidence and significant opportunities for both rival states. This article, to some extent, describes the dynamic between traditional, nontraditional, and nontraditional security diplomacy through China-Japan relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Critical media studies have long understood the role of the media in not just illuminating disputes between nations but in inflaming them. The media can be used to inform or distort the background and causes of conflict and arouse public opinion. This article surveys the potentially calamitous decline of public perceptions in China and Japan toward the other and asks if the media is a monitor of this decline or a party to it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping's long-expected and often postponed--even before the pandemic--state visit to Japan was not even spoken of during the reporting period. In the closing days of the year, the defense ministers of the two countries met virtually but, at least according to published accounts, simply reiterated past positions and hopes for cooperation in the interests of regional stability. Japan did not receive the assurances it sought on the implications of the PRC's new Coast Guard law. China repeatedly pressed the Japanese government for support for the Beijing Winter Olympics, expressing dissatisfaction with the lack of official representation announced by Tokyo. Although trade was brisk, economic growth in both countries remained impacted by quarantines and the uncertain investment climate in China. China complained about closer Taiwan-Japan relations even as it stepped up pressure on the island and both China and Japan continued military upgrades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores I n recent years, the development of bilateral ties between China and Japan has generally maintained a positive momentum, as both countries make joint efforts to manage their remaining disputes and expand cooperation. In order to study this relationship more efficiently in the new era, we need to conduct targeted and systematic analyses in various aspects.

What factors have driven South Korea’s and Japan’s strategic approaches toward China? In contrast to scholarly claims that the Sino-Korean and Sino-Japanese relationships have generally been exacerbated since 2010, we argue that the relationships have shown a consistent pattern of resilience and moderate development over the last two decades. An examination of the security and diplomatic relations from 2008 to 2019 shows that bilateral relationships remained at a manageable level, barring episodic stagnations. The findings indicate that converging factors—economic interdependence and the presence of the United States (US)—have consistently motivated Japan and Korea to accommodate China. Major economic entities in South Korea and Japan have prevented their countries from applying irreversible pressure on China. Further, the strong security commitment of the US toward Japan and South Korea has served as a bulwark preventing security dilemmas by reducing fears of Chinese military threat in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Japan continued to vie over a wide variety of issues including economic competitiveness, jurisdiction over territorial waters, World War II responsibilities, representation in international organizations, and even Olympic and Paralympic medals. The Japanese government expressed concern with the increasingly obvious presence of Chinese ships and planes in and around areas under its jurisdiction, with Chinese sources accusing Japan of a Cold War mentality. Nothing was heard of Xi Jinping's long-planned and often postponed official visit to Tokyo. Also, Chinese admonitions that Japan recognize that its best interests lay not with a declining United States but in joining forces with a rising China were conspicuous by their absence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the impact of nationalism and interstate frictions on international economic relations by analyzing market reaction to adverse shocks to Sino-Japanese relations in 2005 and 2010. Japanese companies with high China exposure suffer relative declines during each event window; a symmetric effect is observed for Chinese companies with high Japanese exposure. The effect on Japanese companies is more pronounced for those operating in industries dominated by Chinese state-owned enterprises, whereas firms with high Chinese employment experience lower declines. These results emphasize the role of countries' economic and political institutions in mediating the impact of interstate frictions on firm-level outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In recent years, the dispute over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, which had been modestly managed with no significant challenge to Japan's effective control, has developed into a new phase, with heightened tensions and a risk of clashes. A notable trend is that the intrusions of China Coast Guard ships into the Japanese contiguous zone and territorial sea off the Senkaku islands have become more frequent and their stay in these waters has become longer. China appears to have shifted its strategy from a regular presence in these waters to the exercise of law enforcement authority in sovereign waters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indo-Pacific region is now home to at least two competing regionalism road maps, China's Belt Road Initiative (BRI) and Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP). Through comparing their respective development trajectories, this article examines the relationship between these two regionalisation initiatives. Key lines of enquiry include the following: Is the interaction between the BRI and the FOIP Vision reactive, proactive or both? Why has each initiative changed its trajectory? How can we characterise these competing initiatives? This article employs a regionalism matrix analysis that compares two different approaches, integration from a 'rational-legal perspective' with an emphasis on broad cooperation and state sovereignty from a 'process-oriented perspective' with a focus on exact goals. It finds that the BRI focuses on both a high degree of state sovereignty based on a 'process-oriented perspective' and exact cooperation. In contrast, FOIP stresses integration through a 'rational-legal perspective', broad cooperation and a shared rules-based order. Furthermore, there is a reactive interplay between these two regionalism frameworks that shapes their orientation and influences their focus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Senkaku Islands dispute is a litmus test for the state of relations between Japan and China; with the dispute often coming to the fore at times when relations are in decline. The state of the dispute itself is subject to a wide variety of contributing factors including historic claims. This article will briefly examine the dangers inherent in the dispute and then focus on the historic claims of both parties. The disputed claims of the two parties demonstrate the complexity of verifying sovereignty when conflicting historic claims are involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the changing perspectives of Japanese gardens from foreigners, starting with their first encounters with Japanese gardens in the 16th century to the present day. It covers the wave of interest in Japanese gardens during the Japonisme movement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, which led to the construction of Japanese-style gardens around the world.

Perhaps the biggest news of the last third of 2020 was that Xi Jinping's often-postponed state visit to Japan will not take place in spring 2021 and may be postponed to September 2022, in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations. Both countries' economies recovered well from the pandemic, with robust trade between them even as they continued to snipe at each other politically and upgrade their military capabilities. China continued to expand its presence in waters of the East China Sea claimed by Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Politically, the major news in Japan-China relations was that Xi Jinping's long-anticipated state visit was postponed. While the coronavirus was a factor, the two sides had also been unable to agree on the text of the Fourth Communiqué, and there was considerable opposition within Japan to the visit due to issues between them. Several major Japanese companies announced major investments in the People's Republic of China, even as the Japanese government agreed to subsidize companies to move their supply chains out of the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's primary objective of the 'free and open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) strategy is to shape and consolidate regional order in the Indo-Pacific region based on the existing rules-based international order. The concept initially aimed to achieve two different objectives—shaping a regional order in the Indo-Pacific and ensuring the defence of Japan; however, Japan has gradually shifted its strategic focus onto the former, separating national defence from the FOIP concept, which reflects a change in the degree of its commitment to the two objectives. On the one hand, as its overall security strategy, Japan has determined to steadily enhance its national defence by increasing its own defence capabilities and strengthening the US–Japan alliance, while transforming its partnerships with like-minded states, such as Australia and India, into a diplomatic, and potentially military, alignment. This has been brought about by shifts in the regional balance of power, particularly the rise of China and the relative decline of the United States. On the other hand, as part of its FOIP strategy, Japan's attempts to build a new regional order in the Indo-Pacific region aim to defend the existing rules-based order established by the United States from challengers, particularly China. Yet, given the strategic uncertainty over Japan's international coalition-building efforts to create a new regional order, Japan has made its approach flexible; Tokyo is using its ambiguous FOIP concept to gauge other states' responses, understand their perspectives, and change its strategic emphases accordingly—so-called 'tactical hedging'. Japan has pursued similar means to achieve the two key objectives. Nevertheless, the country's core interest, the defence of Japan, is more imperative than building a regional order in the Indo-Pacific region, and Japan faces different types of challenges in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trade and consumption of food in the Sino-Japanese context connects the two countries' tense political relationship to the everyday lives of its citizens. Previous research has shown how food-related incidents have imbued Sino-Japanese relations with political and moral discourse that connects security concerns to everyday fears. This article explores how young Chinese people in Japan navigate multiple moral economies related to food. Through analysis of "products" (chanpin/shipin) and "cuisine" (cai/liaoli), this article shows the differing meanings of Chinese moral economies of food from the perspective of young Chinese people living in Japan. In the Sino-Japanese context, products embody more metonymic and nationalised values associated with modernity, whereas the metaphoric possibilities of cuisine afford young Chinese people to negotiate dominant moral economies of food in Japan. Using this example, I argue that greater semiotic attention needs to be paid to the multiple meanings of food and its moral economies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the severe restrictions of the Cultural Revolution, China restarted widespread imported film distribution in 1978. Between 1978 and the start of the revenue-sharing quota in 1994, more than 600 imported films from over 50 nations screened across China. For much of this era, Japan was the most favored importer—exciting industry personnel and audiences alike. The Sino-Japanese connection, which combined political-cultural reciprocity with popular film content, was an ideal match for an industry in the midst of a transition between a Planned Economy past to a market-based future. Since moviegoing in China reached all-time heights during this period, the legacy of several of the most popular Japanese imports has endured for decades. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Free and easy access to an unusually rich variety of sources (primarily books, newspapers, and periodicals) is the hallmark of the Database of Sources Concerning the War of Resistance against Japan and Modern Sino-Japanese Relations (Kang Ri zhanzheng yu jindai Zhong Ri guanxi wenxian shuju pingtai), launched in 2017. Continuously expanding with new uploads, this database contains both familiar and rare sources for the study of not just the two topics that make up the database name but also many other aspects of Republican China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's new treaties with the Western powers came into force in the summer of 1899. These signified Japan's recognition as a modern state, but also opened the whole of Japan to residence and commerce for the nationals of the Western powers. This article examines Japan's legislative response to this new era of both political equality and expanded foreign intercourse and exchange. This comprised two new laws, Japan's first nationality law and new entry restrictions, both of which defined the boundaries of Japanese identity. The West played a paramount role in the crafting of these laws, but often forgotten is the role played by China. By examining the international contexts and the debates that attended the passage of these laws, this article shows that each law enacted a form of exclusion: the former sought to mitigate Western influence, while the latter sought to minimize Chinese immigration. Together, they reflected Japan's international position between two others: China and the West. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks on the objective of Shinzo Abe, prime minister of Japan, for the protection of Japanese people and revision of National Defense Program Guidelines in Japan which includes advancement of defense diplomacy, procurement of defense equipment, and expansion of security cooperation network. It focuses on the capabilities, motives and consequences of Japan's Self-Defense Policy. The bilateral relations between China and Japan are also discussed.

Japan's security posture is unique: it is at once a pacifist nation, controls one of the world's largest militaries, is heavily reliant on its alliance with the United States and remains in nearly continuous political conflict with its nearest neighbours over historical issues. The authors surveyed in this book review essay suggest that Japan's security policy-making has undergone a significant transformation that will reverberate for decades. Andrew L. Oros suggests that Japan is experiencing a security renaissance, and is a much more active player now than during the Cold War. Sheila A. Smith believes that rising nationalism among Tokyo's conservative elite has made Sino-Japanese relations more contentious than ever. Brad Glosserman and Scott A. Snyder state that diverging national identities have driven the increase in tensions between Japan and South Korea. Robert D. Eldridge and Paul Midford assert that the key to success of Japan's Ground Self-Defence Force has been its ability to reinforce peaceful postwar norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much of Japan's defence policy through the period of detente until the end of the Cold War, was designed by Vice-Minister of Defense Seiki Nishihiro. Minister Nishihiro was responsible for drafting two key documents—the National Defence Program Outline (NDPO) and the Japan–US Defence Guideline (Guideline)—which have underpinned Japan's defence policy since the mid-1970s. Diplomatic normalization by Japan and the United States with the People's Republic of China meant (PRC) meant that military buildup against the PRC was no longer necessary. However, the NDPO rationalized the existing level of Japan's military capabilities as being required to meet the security environment and justified the incremental buildup of capabilities as necessary in case of an emergency. Though revised several times, the two documents still effectively outline Japanese defence policy and its relations with the US today. Currently, Japan faces two difficult challenges: the rapid growth of Chinese military power in the last two decades and North Korea's development of nuclear warheads. In order to meet these challenges, Japan has recently further updated the two documents to improve military capabilities and effectiveness. It will be key for Japan to remember its success in defence policy during the Cold War and stay confident with its posture while maintaining enhanced military cooperation with the US. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elite and public doubts in Japan about the country's economic and security relationships with both the United States and China, changes in the regional threat environment and the enhanced influence of revisionist conservatives in leadership positions over the past five years make conditions ripe for more muscular internal and external balancing by Japan. Despite this, recent changes to Japan's overall grand strategy and military posture remain incremental and focused on longer-term transformation. We argue that despite a degree of convergence in threat perceptions between the Japanese public and elites—and despite a greater tolerance of debate on controversial security issues—the increased political influence of revisionist conservatives arouses suspicion owing to the interlinkages between their political, social and security agendas. This, in turn, the article argues, complicates moves towards a more robust, responsive and flexible Japanese deterrence posture and an approach to alliance deepening suitable for minimizing contemporary geopolitical vulnerability and risk. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study analyses the influence of technical barriers to agricultural trade carried out by Japan on China's fruit exports. In order to measure the tariff equivalents of technical barriers, the price wedge method is utilized. Based on the utility function specified in the study, the constructed model is adopted to evaluate the elasticity of substitution between the imported fruits and Japanese domestic fruits, and the consumers' preference parameters for different kinds of fruits. Sample data are chosen from the beginning of 2002 to the end of 2015. Based on the estimated preference parameters and elasticity of substitution, the results show that Japanese consumers prefer domestic fruits to the imported fruits. Besides, the results reveal that although the substitution and preference parameters are higher for the improved quality of imported fruits in the context of the positive list system, the scales of tariff equivalents of technical barriers are larger than the regular custom tariffs, and the technical barriers would cause extra huge costs for the imported fruits. Especially, in the three consecutive years after the implementation of the positive list system, tariff equivalents of technical barriers almost reached 150%, and then gradually decreased in the following years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars tend to overlook the overseas Chinese press as a communicative tool for Chinese nationalism. This paper takes media history as its focal point to demonstrate the contextual influences that shaped the operations of Chinese print media and gave rise to the manifestation of the overseas Chinese (huaqiao) identity in Japan. In particular, it emphasises that the mobilisation of the modern Chinese nationalism movement of the time was not the sole determinant of Chinese identity. It was also influenced by the way in which Chinese ethnic boundaries came to be shaped and reshaped in different historical periods through the dynamics between overseas Chinese communities and Japanese society. I use two overseas Chinese publications from different periods to illustrate the impacts of modern Chinese nationalism and the changing social and political context of Japan on the Chinese press. Finally, I present a synthetic narrative to account for the history of the overseas Chinese press in Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract:The post-Cold War context has accompanied the ascent of East Asian economies and consumer markets, as exemplified by China, while Japan's experience has been marked by the struggle with an economic slump after the collapse of the so-called bubble economy. Japan has been actively promoting ‘cool Japan’ instead of the economy, but even more notable is the rise of the Korean Wave. Joined together with political contestation over historical issues, anti-China/Korea sentiments have been growing, as is the accompanying hate-speech movement against resident Koreans in new-millennium Japan. Growing East Asian rivalry along with the relative decline of Japan, the widely shared sense of socio-economic predicament and the upsurge of digital media communications have been conjoined to generate the hunt for proximate enemies – China, Korea, and resident Koreans in Japan – as the object of expressions of hate. How to develop better uses of digital media towards the cultivation of dialogic cultural citizenship is an imperative issue. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Following Japan's invasion of China in 1937, Japanese bureaucratic and intellectual elites constructed a volatile image of the munitions worker as trickster. Within this discursive realm, the worker became an object of hope, fear, and rage for the guardians of an idealized home front struggling to bolster war production while still adhering to wartime goals of national austerity. In the cultural fantasies and nightmares of the Japanese home front, the munitions worker fluctuated between the valorized “industrial warrior” laboring for the nation and a violent delinquent ready to wreak havoc on society. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Abe cabinet enjoys rich tangible political resources particularly in the aftermath of the overwhelming victory in the Upper House election in July 2016. However, Abe is also constrained by the less visible intangible uncertainties of his intangible political resources. From the perspective of Japanese internal dynamics, Sino-Japanese relations tend to be on a track of new normal of continued tension with low intensity and sustained dialogue of low quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Philippines and Japan have evolved a security partnership in the face of China's maritime expansion in the South and East China Seas. The two countries pursue this security partnership through regular bilateral consultations among Philippine and Japanese heads of states, political leaders, defense ministry officials, and high-ranking military officers; joint naval exercises; and exploratory discussions for arms transfers and negotiations for a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Japan and the Philippines. Initially, Article 9 of Japan's 1947 Constitution hindered this security partnership. However, a recent reinterpretation of the pacifist constitution now allows Japan a collective self-defense “particularly to export arms to its allies and security partners and to deploy the JSDF overseas when necessary. Now, the challenge for Japan and the Philippines is to ensure the viability of their security partnership in the light of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte's efforts to improve his country's relations with China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]