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In a recent Journal of Politics article, Daniela Campello and Cesar Zucco argue that Latin American voters credit and blame presidents for economic outcomes unambiguously exogenous to their policy choices, a claim that undermines broadly held understandings of how voters hold politicians accountable. While we concur on the importance of the global economy to politics in the region, we challenge their study on two grounds. First, we question their designation of economies as fitting a low-savings commodity-exporting profile as the key factor shaping the influence of world markets on presidential success. Second, we contend that the impact of the world economy on domestic politics depends instead on the degree of control exercised by national policy makers. In particular, the region's unprecedented experiment with economic policy regimes informs voters' assignment of responsibility to policy makers. A series of analyses provides support for our argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What led to the boom of Chinese development cooperation in Latin America? This article provides a systematic analysis of China's foreign behavior, motives, and policies regarding development cooperation toward the region between 2000 and 2014. I propose a comparative framework that defines Chinese development cooperation as a tool of economic diplomacy. Drawing on empirical evidence from AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset and Chinese white papers on foreign aid, the findings evidence that China was motivated by multiple and conjunctural factors in providing development cooperation. In the realm of theory, the article contributes to the literature on economic statecraft—filling in gaps in understanding the relationship between economics and politics. Empirically, it provides a set of tools for understanding the important role that development cooperation plays in a nation's statecraft. Regarding Chinese foreign policy studies, it offers insight into the financial dimension of China's international economic relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past half century, Chile has fluctuated wildly in terms of economic prosperity and democratic health. Using 78 surveys archived at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, we document the evolution of Chileans' perceptions of their personal, family, and national economic conditions during major political and economic changes. The data show that prior to the Pinochet dictatorship, despite a growing economic crisis, Chileans' perceptions of their family's economic situation—particularly among the lower socio-economic class—improved, suggesting that Allende's social and economic policies may have had their intended effect. In contrast, through the democratic transition and the contemporary period, economic evaluations typically tracked objective economic conditions. We conclude by discussing how these patterns can inform public opinion research in Latin America and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study an age-old question in political economy: does government spending on welfare ensure peace? This question was at the heart of the European Welfare State model of the early 20th century, and remains relevant today in face of rising inequalities and political conflict. Yet there is limited empirical evidence about this question. We make use of a panel of 12 Latin American countries over the period 1970–2010 to show that welfare spending has led to substantial reductions in conflict across the region. This effect is more pronounced when associated with reductions in inequality and increasing social and institutional trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using an original database of legislative and presidential electoral results from the democratic transitions of the 1970s and 1980s to the present day, we provide a new assessment of electoral volatility in Latin America. Following a model established in studies of other regions, we decompose volatility into two subtypes: party replacement and stable party volatility. We demonstrate the relevance of this approach to Latin America and, further, document that volatility has persisted rather than waned in Latin America’s posttransition period largely because of party replacement. We then examine the contested link between economic performance and volatility and document temporal instability in this relationship: our analysis affirms previous conclusions regarding a connection in the 1980s in Latin America but uncovers scant evidence of a relationship between the economy and volatility for the 1990s to present day. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The impact of institutions on the economic vote stands as a well‐established proposition for the advanced democracies of Europe. We know less, however, regarding the institutional effects on the economic vote in the developing democracies of Latin America. Carrying out an analysis of presidential elections in 18 Latin American countries, we offer evidence that the usual Eurocentric conceptualization of the clarity of responsibility is not ideal for understanding the economic vote in this region. There does exist a powerful effect of institutions on the economic vote within Latin American democracies, but one uniquely associated with its presidential regimes and dynamic party systems. Rules for these elections—such as concurrence, term limits, and second‐round voting—suggest that we should reconceptualize the notion of the clarity of responsibility in Latin America, focusing more on individuals in power and their constraints, and less on the political parties from which they hail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political economy theory expects politicians to use budget deficits to engineer an election-timed boom, known as the political business cycle. We challenge and contextualize this view by incorporating the financial constraints faced by governments into an electoral framework. We argue theoretically that the extent of ownership dispersion among creditors has important effects for governments’ policy autonomy. Specifically, we contend that when highly indebted governments become more reliant on international bond markets—as opposed to traditional bank lending—politicians alter the way they respond to domestic constituents. In an econometric test of 16 Latin American countries, from 1961 to 2011, we show that financial decentralization breeds austerity. More specifically, we find that politicians exhibit more fiscal discipline when they fund a greater share of their spending through decentralized bond markets. Furthermore, we find this disciplining effect to be particularly strong during election periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the promise and accomplishments of New Social Movement (NSM) theory for understanding recent social movements in Latin America. After delineating and critiquing the key premises and concerns of NSM analyses, we demonstrate how a conceptual frame combining political economy and political sociology accounts better for the origins and trajectories of the social movements, including two of the most important in Latin America, Brazil's Movement of the Landless Rural Workers (MST) and Bolivia's Movement toward Socialism (MAS). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing economic presence of China around the world is a widely recognized reality. China's expanding economic relations with other developing countries have generated both positive and negative reactions. Many believe that the increasing economic ties between China and these countries will enhance China's political influence and encourage political cooperation between China and other countries in the Global South. How strong is the economic–political link? This article examines this question in the context of Sino–Latin American relations in recent years. It finds that thus far China's expanding economic relations with the region have not had a significant spillover effect into the political realm. The article provides preliminary explanations of the missing link between the economic and the political. It calls for more nuanced ways to apply familiar international relations paradigms to understanding the implications of the rise of China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article argues that South America’s ‘revolutionary’ left turn can be best explained by its assertion of state property over natural resource extraction. The recent history of the leftist movements in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador relates to the failures of the neoliberal reforms applied in the region decades before, hence the dismantling of core orthodox policies has been critical for them once in power. This has been possible through the expansion of state action in the economy, but mainly through the governance of hydrocarbon extraction and the control of subsoil rents. Resource extraction has been central to the political economy of Andean left-wing revolutionaries, responsible for many of their successes but also their impending challenges. This rearticulation of underground governance is linked to global transformations that give prominence to emerging economies and reinforces these countries’ position in the world economy as providers of primary commodities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the duration and dissolution of cabinets in presidential democracies in Latin America in relation to the dissolution of cabinets in parliamentary systems. Topics include political polarization of cabinets in relation to political parties, the impacts of economic crises on cabinet dissolution, and the effects of electoral volatility on cabinets. It is said that the improvement of a nation's economy tends to lend stability to a cabinet, while economic crises do not create the results predicted by stochastic event theories.