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We study the impact of nationalism and interstate frictions on international economic relations by analyzing market reaction to adverse shocks to Sino-Japanese relations in 2005 and 2010. Japanese companies with high China exposure suffer relative declines during each event window; a symmetric effect is observed for Chinese companies with high Japanese exposure. The effect on Japanese companies is more pronounced for those operating in industries dominated by Chinese state-owned enterprises, whereas firms with high Chinese employment experience lower declines. These results emphasize the role of countries' economic and political institutions in mediating the impact of interstate frictions on firm-level outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, a territorial dispute between Japan and China, has long been regarded as a ticking bomb, capable of blowing up the already volatile Sino-Japanese relations at any time. Would the differences over the islands lead China and Japan into major military confrontations, if not all-out war? This article argues that there is cause for optimism and that the Sino-Japanese relationship has displayed a remarkable level of resiliency through the years. In examining the three major diplomatic crises of 2004, 2010, and 2012 (and beyond) surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute, this article shows that Japan and China have successfully engaged in bilateral crisis management by operating political, diplomatic, and military exchanges to prevent further escalation. Our analysis calls for a more informed and balanced view within academic discourse, so as to encourage accurate threat perceptions between China and Japan, mitigate the security dilemma, thereby eventually fulfilling the optimistic theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship between political tensions and economic relations? In this study, we explore this question by examining how Japan's nationalization of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, a territory much disputed with China, has affected bilateral trade between the world's second and third largest economies. Using monthly data, we find that the nationalization imbroglio has negatively affected the amount of goods Japan exports to China, with the effect being most pronounced for highly salient and visible products such as automobiles and cameras; these experienced immediate and dramatic drops lasting up to 12 months. In contrast, raw materials and intermediate goods were not affected at all; some even experienced increased exports. These findings suggest that consumer and corporate responses to political tensions may follow different logics. For consumers, certain political tensions, especially those involving enduring territorial disputes, could override entrenched economic interests and preferences, at least in the short term. In these instances, it will no longer be business as usual. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent years have seen a deterioration in political relations between China and Japan, in particular over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and history-related problems. Commentators have noted an attendant decline in trust between the two sides and have stressed the need for confidence-building measures in order to address the trust deficit. This article explores the origins of declining trust between the Chinese and Japanese leaderships. It argues that attempts to build a friendly and trusting relationship in the early post-war and post-normalisation periods began to fail in the 1980s, and have been in a gradual state of decline ever since. Using the concepts of trust and friendship, the article suggests that the lack of trust properties such as empathy, bonding, reliability and predictability have contributed to the deterioration of trust at both elite and popular levels. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper highlights the issue of the recognition of the existence of a dispute between China and Japan regarding sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao, identifies such a recognition, and comments on the implications flowing from that recognition for Japan and China, as well as for other States, especially the United States, and argues that in light of the well-known US position of taking no view on sovereignty over Diaoyu Dao, Article V of the US-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty cannot apply to the island. Some comments are also offered on Japan's "nationalization" and other measures and China's response measures and/or counter-measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that as opposed to the conventional wisdom of Japan’s hedging policy, Japan has been constantly taking balancing behavior vis-à-vis China since the end of the Cold War; however, the incremental shift to explicit balancing began after the 2010SenkakuBoat Collision Incident. The shift was accelerated by the 2012 Japanese Government Purchase of theSenkakuIslands. Since then, Japan has attempted to engage in both internal and external balancing by taking more security burden-sharing with the United States through the relaxation of Japan’s constitutional and political constraints on its military capabilities and the enhancement of security linkages with other regional states, such as Australia and India. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on the legal significance of Diaoyu and Senkaku Islands dispute for the international legal community. Topics discussed include rightful ownership of the Diaoyu and Senkaku Islands by analyzing each country's historical and legal arguments, China and Japan's roles as world powers may prevent peaceful resolution and types of international law such as maritime law, international treaties, and customary laws regarding legal territorial acquisition.

This paper draws on extensive island examples with a view to offer 'creative' solutions to the ongoing dispute over the Diaoyu/Diaoyutai/ Senkaku Islands between China (and Taiwan) and Japan in the East China Sea. In spite of the rhetoric and apparent intractability of island conflicts, there are various examples from the past (and the present) that suggest how island disputes may be decided, and in 'win-win' ways, to the satisfaction of the different parties involved. The resolution of island territorial problems can benefit greatly from a critical appreciation of how other small islands, also contested, have had their situation resolved in non-zero-sum ways. In such cases, sovereignty has been shared, split/divided or expunged; in other cases, sovereignty disputes have been put aside in order to co-develop and co-exploit natural resources. There is also one example of a UNESCO World Heritage Site consisting of a string of small islands and surrounding waters whose management is shared between three countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As China’s active assertion of its claim to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has increasingly crowded the surrounding waters and airspace with military and paramilitary forces, the risk of a Sino–Japanese crisis has reached unprecedented heights. Neither side wants conflict, but the increased frequency and proximity at which vessels and aircraft encounter one another means that overall risk has grown proportionately. Were a miscalculation or even an unintended low-level incident to occur, de-escalation would hinge on each side’s respective internal crisis management capabilities and political leaders’ ability to communicate expeditiously. This article analyzes China’s side of the ledger. Specifically, it assesses the extent to which institutional reforms since the 2001 US–China EP-3 crisis have ameliorated longstanding weaknesses in China’s crisis management capabilities and its ability to communicate via hotlines with Japan. While significant issues and obstacles to further urgently needed improvements remain, with the establishment of a Central National Security Commission (CNSC) and other recent reforms, Beijing may finally be achieving modest improvements. Bilaterally, however, no Sino–Japanese crisis hotline exists to date. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

2012–2013 witnessed a renewed flare-up of anti-Japanese sentiment in Mainland China, followed by a toughening of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Diaoyu Islands policy. Did popular nationalism influence the PRC’s military escalation? A lack of transparency in elite Chinese decision-making puts a definitive answer to this question beyond our reach. However, this article utilizes qualitative and quantitative analyses of anti-Japanese discourse and deeds in both cyberspace and on the streets of urban China to argue that the circumstantial evidence is compelling: nationalist opinion is a powerful driver of China’s Japan policy. The demands of nationalist legitimation appear to pressure the elite to respond to popular nationalism. Should one or more Chinese die at the hands of the Japanese navy or air force, therefore, the popular pressure for escalation and war will likely be more than China’s leaders can manage. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The intensifying disputes between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands today have reminded both academia and the general public of the Ryukyu problem. Reportedly, during the Cairo Conference in 1943, Chiang Kai-shek let slip opportunities to recover the Ryukyus, which later resulted in Japanese control of the Diaoyu Islands. Until now, scholarship has maintained that Chiang narrowly missed regaining Okinawa at Cairo, which never again appeared on his agenda. However, a more nuanced historical account can be found in rarely accessed primary resources such as Chiang's diaries and presidential papers, which yield a different conclusion—that he was, in fact, committed to the Ryukyu issue throughout his political career. However, Chiang lost multiple opportunities to resolve the issue as a result of competition with his communist rival, the security dynamics of the Cold War, and his personality. Chiang eventually failed to stop America from returning the Ryukyus to Japan, which, thereafter, generated the Diaoyu Islands disputes and continues to serve as a primary source of nationalist friction today in Sino–Japanese relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For the last ten years, Japan and China have tried to work together toward a “mutually beneficial relationship” based on common strategic interests but have failed to accomplish this for a number of reasons. The two historical neighbors are separated by no more than a strip of water and have come a long way to be the third and the second largest economies in the world, respectively. Along with political economic aspects, relations between the two countries are of critical importance in regional and global security contexts. With that in mind, the following paper will: (1) overview trends in Sino–Japanese relations over the last ten years; (2) look at trends in China's military capabilities and activities and the implications; and (3) discuss key issues and courses of action for Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines Russia's position on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. It focuses particularly on the claim that Russia and China are forming an anti-Japanese territorial front. Looking closely at official statements and actions, as well as Russian-language media and scholarship, it finds that Russia, while retaining a position of formal neutrality, clearly considers China's claims more favourably. While this could be seen to have alarming implications by arraying China and Russia on one side against Japan and the USA on the other, the article also finds that Russia's support is not without qualifications and that its place in the conflict is not yet entrenched. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses relations between Japan and China in the last four months of 2014. Topics discussed include summit of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe with Chinese President Xi Jinping during Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Beijing, China, negative public opinion about the other in both countries, and Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying emphasizing Diaoyu Islands and affiliated islands are inherent territory of China.

The article describes the geography of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands and discusses the history of the territorial dispute between China and Japan which initially surfaced due to the discovery of large oil reserves around the islands.

The article focuses on the approval of the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) in the East and South China Seas in 2014. Topics include the Chinese government's implementation of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, the dispute between Japan and China over the ownership of the Senkaku Islands, and tensions in the South China Sea.

The article discusses the social, political, and legal aspects of a sovereignty dispute between China and Japan in relation to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea as of 2014, focusing on Sino-Japanese relations and protests in places such as Guangzhou, China. Potential military conflicts and Chinese newspapers are mentioned, along with Exclusive Economic Zones and the maritime border between China and Japan. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is examined.

Rare earth elements (REE) captured a startled world's attention during the 2010 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands crisis, when it appeared that China withheld access to them during its border dispute with Japan. China asserts that its sovereign right to environmental regulation and national production quotas is unassailable. However, China's trade measures appear to be inconsistent with WTO rules, as well as with environmental protection and conservation, since they incentivize illegal mining and smuggling practices. In an upcoming case (DS431), the United States, the European Union, Japan and 16 third parties will argue before the WTO that China's trade measures on rare earths, tungsten and molybdenum constitute discriminatory behaviour and are illegal. This raises the question of whether China is inappropriately using the environment as a defence against allegations that its rare earth trade policies are in violation of its WTO obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article investigates Japan’s current role in the Senkaku Islands. The government maintains administrative control of these tiny, uninhabited islands and rocks at the frontier of Japan, but both the governments of China and Taiwan dispute Japanese claims to sovereignty and claim sovereignty over the islands themselves. Whilst much of the extant literature examines these competing claims, this article instead explores the relationship between risk, sovereignty and governance at the frontiers of Japan. It seeks to demonstrate in particular how the governance of Japan’s maritime frontiers reflects a broader process of the recalibration of risk by the Abe Shinzō government as part of ending the postwar regime. Its main purpose is twofold: first, to illuminate how the government carries out administrative control and governance of a remote, uninhabited territory when sovereignty is challenged and in dispute; and second, to elucidate how the government’s recalibration of risk generates a range of costs for the Japanese market and society as a result of the deterioration of relations with China arising from the way risk is being recalibrated. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article reflects on the role of international law in the dispute between China and Japan over control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Topics discussed include historical background of the islands, the international law governing the dispute and how the applicable international law interacts with nationalism and state interests to the detriment of a peaceful solution.

My aim in this article is to shed light on some domestic dimensions of the maritime dispute between China and Japan in the East China Sea, in particular those of the Japanese side. The domestic dimensions are important because many actors are involved and the dispute is multidimensional. We may need to set longer time frames in order to find exit strategies and at least mitigate the influence of this seemingly intractable dispute, I suggest mid- to long-term alternative approaches to resolving it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this analysis of the Senkaku/Diaoyu, including the US role, I employ the framework of Western theories of international relations (IR). The analysis turns to the prisoner's dilemma to find a possible solution to the present impasse. The key task for negotiators and IR theorists is to find an equation that satisfies three factors simultaneously: China does not enter Japan's territorial vt/aters; Japan continues the three nos of "not to land, not to investigate, and not to build"; and confidence-building measures are instituted to avoid direct military collisions. So far, the prisoner's dilemma has not succeeded in finding that equation, so perhaps more attention should be paid to the Eastern concept of face saving or giving face, which in addition to the other three factors might enable the two sides to reach a modus vivendi. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While China's rising power is certainly an important variable in Sino-Japanese relations, it cannot explain either why the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute broke out anew in the fall of 2012 or why the Chinese response was so strong. China read Japan's move to nationalize the islands as an in-your-face move designed to show disrespect for China and make Japan's sovereignty over the islands a fait accompli, in this article I borrow from Robert Putnam's notion of two-level games to argue that there are two levels of face politics going on in this case: one between domestic actors in Japan and in China, the other between the two countries. A solution to the territorial dispute can only be found when both sides' "face needs" are recognized and met at both levels of analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction to the special issue is presented in which the author discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute, the need for China and Japan to agree on three basic issues before any comprehensive agreement on the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute can be reached, and the 2012 island nationalization issue and the Sino-Japanese fallout.

The East China Sea (ECS) is gaining an increasingly central role in Sino-Japanese relations as it is crucial to the economic development and political affirmation of both countries, for whom the main sea routes crossing the ECS offer vital arteries for trade and energy imports. For the past year and a half, the ECS has attracted considerable international attention because of the flare-up of tensions over the sovereignty of the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands. This small group of islands is also claimed by the authorities in Beijing and known in Chinese as Diaoyu. Is war looming? Are we seeing an escalation spiral that will ultimately set the two countries on a collision course? The article argues that the current tensions should be seen in the wider context of the increased strategic significance of the ECS. For there are two different types of disputes here. One concerns sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; the other concerns the demarcation of the Chinese and Japanese maritime borders and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) as defined by the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This distinction is important because sovereignty on land is different from sovereignty at sea. The former is connected to a vital national interest and historically, represented a primary reason for war. The latter focuses on functional rights over bodies of water included in the EEZ, not on the actual ‘ownership’ of the maritime realm. Accordingly, the article argues that seapower is going to play a crucial role in the projection of Japanese and Chinese power and status in the ECS and in the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations more generally. Significantly, Naval Defence doctrines in both countries have evolved greatly over recent years. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The potential roles played by local governments in Japan regarding Sino-Japanese relations are often neglected. Drawing upon a few representative case studies by highlighting the interaction between local and international politics, the article aims at analyzing the possible impacts of Japan's local governments on Sino-Japanese relations in the future. First, it reviews the theoretical framework of sub-national or paradiplomacy and the relevant literature on Japan's local governments in such framework. Second, through showing how their local leaders attempted to pursue local or personal interests by taking Sino-Japanese relations as hostage, it uses four local governments in Japan that have peculiar interaction with China as case studies. Finally, it previews some patterns as derived from the cases, in order to draw some implications for both Tokyo and Beijing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of public opinion in Japan in directly influencing the Japanese government's decision to nationalize the Senkaku Islands in 2012. The public mood in Japan is becoming increasingly nationalistic. Although this does not immediately mean the return of militarism in the country, such a mood is especially evident with respect to China. The nationalization of the Islands took place within this nationalistic domestic environment. In the case of the nationalization, public opinion was channeled most notably through Tokyo Governor Ishihara. His plan to purchase the Islands and strong public support for his plan eventually forced the central government's intervention. Prime Minister Noda simply could not force Ishihara to give up his plan because going against such a popular politician who was enjoying strong public support would almost certainly have caused a strong public backlash and resulted in electoral punishment. On the other hand, Noda was also concerned that Tokyo's successful acquisition of the Islands would lead to severe criticism of his government for not properly protecting Japan's territorial integrity. There was also a more serious concern that Ishihara's control of the Islands might lead to a change of the status quo and thus dangerously provoke China. Therefore, Noda had no choice but to intervene and nationalize the Islands. If he was also seeking to mobilize public opinion in his favor, he was not entirely successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cool-headed decision of China and Japan in the 1970s to shelve contentious issues such as Japan's wartime record and the question of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has been overturned. In its place, leaders and publics are indulging in nationalism and an inclination toward irrational or risky behaviour. Both nations have invested much more in their claims to the islands than is justified by their value or the costs of an open conflict over them. Neither the cultural and linguistic affinities between the two countries nor their economic interdependence preclude the possibility that the dispute over the islands could escalate and even lead to war. In this Adelphi William Choong argues that there is a pressing need for China and Japan to work out bilateral arrangements to prevent a further deterioration in relations. To identify such steps, he explores their disputes over historiography and territory, and how these are affected by their military postures, the US-Japanese alliance and the regional security architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The cool-headed decision of China and Japan in the 1970s to shelve contentious issues such as Japan's wartime record and the question of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has been overturned. In its place, leaders and publics are indulging in nationalism and an inclination toward irrational or risky behaviour. Both nations have invested much more in their claims to the islands than is justified by their value or the costs of an open conflict over them. Neither the cultural and linguistic affinities between the two countries nor their economic interdependence preclude the possibility that the dispute over the islands could escalate and even lead to war. In this Adelphi William Choong argues that there is a pressing need for China and Japan to work out bilateral arrangements to prevent a further deterioration in relations. To identify such steps, he explores their disputes over historiography and territory, and how these are affected by their military postures, the US-Japanese alliance and the regional security architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The cool-headed decision of China and Japan in the 1970s to shelve contentious issues such as Japan's wartime record and the question of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has been overturned. In its place, leaders and publics are indulging in nationalism and an inclination toward irrational or risky behaviour. Both nations have invested much more in their claims to the islands than is justified by their value or the costs of an open conflict over them. Neither the cultural and linguistic affinities between the two countries nor their economic interdependence preclude the possibility that the dispute over the islands could escalate and even lead to war. In this Adelphi William Choong argues that there is a pressing need for China and Japan to work out bilateral arrangements to prevent a further deterioration in relations. To identify such steps, he explores their disputes over historiography and territory, and how these are affected by their military postures, the US-Japanese alliance and the regional security architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The cool-headed decision of China and Japan in the 1970s to shelve contentious issues such as Japan's wartime record and the question of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has been overturned. In its place, leaders and publics are indulging in nationalism and an inclination toward irrational or risky behaviour. Both nations have invested much more in their claims to the islands than is justified by their value or the costs of an open conflict over them. Neither the cultural and linguistic affinities between the two countries nor their economic interdependence preclude the possibility that the dispute over the islands could escalate and even lead to war. In this Adelphi William Choong argues that there is a pressing need for China and Japan to work out bilateral arrangements to prevent a further deterioration in relations. To identify such steps, he explores their disputes over historiography and territory, and how these are affected by their military postures, the US-Japanese alliance and the regional security architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The cool-headed decision of China and Japan in the 1970s to shelve contentious issues such as Japan's wartime record and the question of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has been overturned. In its place, leaders and publics are indulging in nationalism and an inclination toward irrational or risky behaviour. Both nations have invested much more in their claims to the islands than is justified by their value or the costs of an open conflict over them. Neither the cultural and linguistic affinities between the two countries nor their economic interdependence preclude the possibility that the dispute over the islands could escalate and even lead to war. In this Adelphi William Choong argues that there is a pressing need for China and Japan to work out bilateral arrangements to prevent a further deterioration in relations. To identify such steps, he explores their disputes over historiography and territory, and how these are affected by their military postures, the US-Japanese alliance and the regional security architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The cool-headed decision of China and Japan in the 1970s to shelve contentious issues such as Japan's wartime record and the question of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has been overturned. In its place, leaders and publics are indulging in nationalism and an inclination toward irrational or risky behaviour. Both nations have invested much more in their claims to the islands than is justified by their value or the costs of an open conflict over them. Neither the cultural and linguistic affinities between the two countries nor their economic interdependence preclude the possibility that the dispute over the islands could escalate and even lead to war. In this Adelphi William Choong argues that there is a pressing need for China and Japan to work out bilateral arrangements to prevent a further deterioration in relations. To identify such steps, he explores their disputes over historiography and territory, and how these are affected by their military postures, the US-Japanese alliance and the regional security architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The cool-headed decision of China and Japan in the 1970s to shelve contentious issues such as Japan's wartime record and the question of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has been overturned. In its place, leaders and publics are indulging in nationalism and an inclination toward irrational or risky behaviour. Both nations have invested much more in their claims to the islands than is justified by their value or the costs of an open conflict over them. Neither the cultural and linguistic affinities between the two countries nor their economic interdependence preclude the possibility that the dispute over the islands could escalate and even lead to war. In this Adelphi William Choong argues that there is a pressing need for China and Japan to work out bilateral arrangements to prevent a further deterioration in relations. To identify such steps, he explores their disputes over historiography and territory, and how these are affected by their military postures, the US-Japanese alliance and the regional security architecture. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recently, Japan has been increasing tensions with China regarding the Pinnacle Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Due to the Chinese military development, Japan has been working on its political and military strengthening in Asia. This essay presents two possible scenarios for Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses a maritime boundary dispute and potential naval conflict between China and Japan regarding the Senkaku Islands or Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea as of January 2014. Topics include the modernization of China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), conflict between the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG), and China's creation of an East China Sea area Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). Japan's naval policy and its alliance with the U.S. are addressed.

The article explores the bilateral relations between Japan and China as of 2013. China marked the first anniversary of Japan's nationalization of the Senkaku Islands on September 11 by reasserting its claims to the islands and conducting Coast Guard patrols in the area. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe repeatedly called attention to China's military modernization that included 10% increases in the defense budget for over 22 years and its intrusions into Japan's air and sea space.

Despite numerous channels for communication and abundant supply of information, misperceptions occur in international politics, and the recent interaction between Japan and China over a group of disputed islands is a case in point. Their quarrel has intensified, leading to a sudden deterioration of civil and official ties, with effects felt in the political and economic realms, and repercussions on the overall relationship. Although some would argue that both sides do not have a better choice, their interaction reveals certain misperceptions and therefore other possibilities. This article surveys the actual conditions after Japan's decision to nationalize the disputed islands in 2012, illustrates misperceptions on both sides in their interaction based on those findings, and probes into the possible causes of such misperceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses Japan-China relations which show no signs of improving due to territorial disputes in the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island regions and further complicated by history issues, Japanese security policy and the East China Sea conflict. Also discussed in the article are its implications on economics such as the first time upturn in automobile sales after Japanese nationalization of Senkaku Islands, sharp drop in Chinese tourists, and a decrease of 13.8% of Japanese exports to China.

The article discusses the significance of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island group in the East China Sea in creating tension in relations between China and Japan. It examines the deterioration of relations between the two nations following the September 11, 2012, purchase of the island group by the Japanese government in agreement with Japanese businessman Kunioki Kurihara. The article discusses the history of contention over the islands, including U.S. administrative responsibilities for the islands, and the Ryukyu Island Chain, following World War II. The article discusses the geopolitical aspects of sovereignty of the islands, particularly the concept of residual sovereignty, negotiations between the U.S. and Japan concerning the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, during the administration of former U.S. president Richard Nixon, and the U.S. neutrality doctrine.

The article discusses the territorial dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands of Diaoyu Islands. Topics covered include history of the dispute, maritime boundaries of Japan in the East China region, and historical memory of Japanese war crimes in China and conflicting nationalisms.

The article discusses Japan-China relations by the end of 2012 which is dominated by their sovereignty dispute over the maritime space over the Senkaku Islands. It mentions the anti-Japanese riots across China following the Japanese purchase of three Senkaku Islands and the cancellation of events to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the normalization of relations between the two countries. It says that prospects for resolution are dim as both governments refuse to negotiate on the Senkakus.

The article offers information on the relations between China and Japan which was gravely affected by several issues that erupted in 2012. The author talks about the celebration of 40 years of Japan-China relations in 2012, the controversy sparked by Nagoya Mayor Kawamura Takashi on the 1937 Nanjing Massacre and the naval standoff between the Chinese State Oceanic Administration Agency and the Japanese Coast Guard over the exercise of sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.

This article first examines specific recent issues facing the two countries, namely the Senkaku Islands fishing boat incident and the relocation of the Futenma Marine air base in Ginowan city, Okinawa, and then proceeds to make some observations on the larger issue of the future of the alliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relations between Japan and China as of 2009. It states that Japan-China relations paused when Japan President Hatoyama Yukio became prime minister. Issues between the two countries involved the East China Sea, the Senkaku Islands, security, human rights involving the Uighur activist in Japan and the Yakusuni Shrine. "Xinhua News" predicted that China-Japan relations would not change under the government of Hatoyama.