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Escalating tensions in South China Sea have epitomized US–China relations for nearly a decade. Warning signs of a possible collision between a rising China and steadfast US, bring to light the need to think about ways that can halt and reverse the intensification of their confrontational moves. The historical trends regarding the freedom of the seas suggest that a way out of this predicament is possible through negotiations. The tenets of the freedom of the seas seem to prevail once they begin to serve the challenger's interest. Yet, the path toward interest alignment between the challenger and the norm‐maker, in this case between China and the US, depends on their ability to avoid any miscalculation that can provoke further escalation of tensions, which in turn may lead to violent confrontation between nuclear powers. A particular historical precedent between the US and Soviet Union demonstrates that a compromised solution can be found in upholding the normative framework based on the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). Emulating this approach may help the parties to avoid an unnecessary and avoidable military gamble in South China Sea. Instead of relying on dangerous activities that can further exacerbate the conflict, the challenge is to encourage meaningful action through cooperation and interest alignment. Prolonging the tug‐of‐war while waiting for another 'bumping incident' to sort out the tensions is an unnecessary and dangerous gambit for two nuclear powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: The article departs from a much needed clarification about the 2 overlapping conflicts in South China Sea: sovereignty dispute between China and ASEAN countries, and freedom of navigation dispute between China and the United States. Although both are well documented and covered by an extensive range of academic and policy‐relevant analyses, the lines between the 2 have often been blurred, yielding a very limited set of options for proper conflict management. This paper looks at the actual reasons behind Chinese defiance toward the United States, and how can this be reversed. In order to avoid a potential clash in the South China Sea, this paper looks at how similar situations, where the United States was challenging the excessive maritime claims of other nuclear powers, were managed peacefully in light of an inevitable clash. A surprisingly underscrutinized precedent of “bumping incident” form 1988, when U.S. Navy vessels were rammed by Soviet ships and “bumped” back to the international waters is used as a template for a potential solution in the ongoing Sino‐American conflict. This paper examines the limits and opportunities of this type of solution and shows how another “bumping incident” does not need to happen before a bilateral solution is explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]