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Why does the general demeanor of others change as soon as they begin to "talk shop" or do something else that puts them into "work-mode"? We propose that such phenomena reflect an instance of incidental priming in which environmental cues activate actional "sets" formed through extensive training in a particular domain (e.g., music). Accordingly, we demonstrated that, by activating a "musician set," incidental musically-related stimuli prime musicians to spend more time on a domain-irrelevant task rehearsing nonsense words as compared to controls or non-primed musicians, as this set should involve a tendency towards deliberative practice. This finding provides additional evidence for a central tenet of social cognition research--that the mere presence of ambient stimuli influences behavioral dispositions systematically, in ways that often escape one's awareness. (Contains 1 figure.)

Does the mere presence of the things we have tended to influence our actions systematically, in ways that escape our awareness? For example, while entering a tool shed, does perceiving objects that we once tended to (e.g., tools, musical instruments) influence how we then execute a simple action (e.g., flicking the shed's light switch)? Ancient traditions (e.g., "feng shui") and contemporary approaches to action production (e.g., "continuous flow" and "cascade" models) hypothesize that the answer is yes. Although relevant to several fields (e.g., motor cognition, social cognition), for various reasons this hypothesis cannot be tested by traditional choice-response time interference paradigms, which involve more complex processes than our tool shed scenario. Using new paradigms that resemble detection tasks, three studies demonstrated that "very incidental" action-related distracters systematically interfere with simple, repeated actions that involve minimal response selection and decision-making processes. In Study 2, incidental musical notation interfered more with the simple actions of expert sight-readers than with the same actions of non-musicians. A similar pattern of effects was obtained with a fully experimental design. The implications for theories of action production, environmentally-driven automaticity, and social cognition are discussed. (Contains 6 figures and 1 table.)

We propose that deviancy aversion—people's domain-general discomfort toward the distortion of patterns (repeated forms or models)—contributes to the strength and prevalence of social norms in society. Five studies (N = 2,390) supported this hypothesis. In Study 1, individuals' deviancy aversion, for instance, their aversion toward broken patterns of simple geometric shapes, predicted negative affect toward norm violations (affect), greater self-reported norm following (behavior), and judging norms as more valuable (belief). Supporting generalizability, deviancy aversion additionally predicted greater conformity on accuracy-orientated estimation tasks (Study 2), adherence to physical distancing norms during COVID-19 (Study 3), and increased following of fairness norms (Study 4). Finally, experimentally heightening deviancy aversion increased participants' negative affect toward norm violations and self-reported norm behavior, but did not convincingly heighten belief-based norm judgments (Study 5). We conclude that a human sensitivity to pattern distortion functions as a low-level affective process that promotes and maintains social norms in society [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Informed by theories of embodied cognition, in the present study, we designed a novel priming technique to investigate the impact of spatial diversity and script direction on searching through concepts in both English and Persian (i.e., two languages with opposite script directions). First, participants connected a target dot either to one other dot (linear condition) or to multiple other dots (diverse condition) and either from left to right (rightward condition) or from right to left (leftward condition) on a computer touchscreen using their dominant hand's forefinger. Following the spatial prime, they were asked to generate as many words as possible using two‐letter cues (e.g., "lo" → "love," "lobster") in 20 s. We hypothesized that greater spatial diversity, and consistency with script direction, should facilitate conceptual search and result in a higher number of word productions. In both languages, word production performance was superior for the diverse prime relative to the linear prime, suggesting that searching through lexical memory is facilitated by spatial diversity. Although some effects were observed for the directionality of the spatial prime, they were not consistent across experiments and did not correlate with script direction. This pattern of results suggests that a spatial prime that promotes diverse paths can improve word retrieval from lexical memory and lends empirical support to the embodied cognition framework, in which spatial relations play a crucial role in the conceptual system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the feelings-as-information account, a person's mood state signals to him or her the valence of the current environment (N. Schwarz & G. Clore, 1983). However, the ways in which the environment automatically influences mood in the first place remain to be explored. The authors propose that one mechanism by which the environment influences affect is automatic evaluation, the nonconscious evaluation of environmental stimuli as good or bad. A first experiment demonstrated that repeated brief exposure to positive or negative stimuli (which leads to automatic evaluation) induces a corresponding mood in participants. In 3 additional studies, the authors showed that automatic evaluation affects information processing style. Experiment 4 showed that participants' mood mediates the effect of valenced brief primes on information processing.

By stipulating the existence of a system 1 and a system 2, dual-process theories raise questions about how these systems function. De Neys identifies several such questions for which no plausible answers have ever been offered. What makes the nature of systems 1 and 2 so difficult to ascertain? The answer is simple: The systems do not exist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]