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This paper asks how state attributes affect the degree to which two states' interests converge as a result of interaction within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). My previous research provides evidence that more interaction within IGOs is associated with greater interest convergence over time. However, not all pairs of states are expected to experience the same degree of convergence. In this paper, I propose that different types of similarity between two states can make state agents predisposed to the acceptance of new ideas from one another and thus enhance the degree to which intra-IGO interaction may lead to state interest convergence. Dyadic attributes hypothesized to condition the effects of interaction on interest convergence include regime type similarity and common culture. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a general theory of how the interaction of state agents within a number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) leads to a convergence in member state interests over time. The theory is based on the notion that, all else being equal, IGOs that facilitate more interaction between state agents from various states are conducive to greater member state interest convergence over time because there are more opportunities for agents from one or more member states to persuade agents from other member states to accept new ideas that affect how they, and ultimately key decision-makers, define their states' interests. I argue that such persuasion does not necessarily have to involve a shift in state identities, but can also involve a diffusion of ideas about cause-and-effect relationships. Also, by focusing on IGOs as structures within which state agents interact, I argue against a narrow focus on socialization as the induction of new members into community norms. I present three hypotheses regarding which institutional attributes are conducive to member state interest convergence. However, due to current data limitations, only one of the hypotheses is tested in this paper. The test of whether joint membership in IGOs with six or fewer members is conducive to member state interest convergence provides preliminary support for that hypothesis. The paper concludes with a discussion of the larger project, including a brief description of the data that is currently being coded for testing of the other hypotheses. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper asks whether domestic electoral institutions mediate the effect of increased trade on welfare state spending. According to Ruggie (1982), the advanced industrial states accomplished trade liberalization in the post-WWII period by offsetting domestic adjustment costs with certain domestic policies aimed at achieving public support for free trade. However, many scholars have found that the relationship between increased trade and welfare state spending is weak at best. Hays, Ehrlich, & Peinhardt (2005) argue that these findings are an artifact of poor operationalization of the key concepts. Rather than looking only at trade openness, which is based on both exports and imports, they advocate examining the effect of imports on government spending since the costs of greater free trade are mainly borne by those in the import-competing sector. In addition, rather than looking only at government spending in the aggregate, they focus on policies that are targeted at these losses in the import-competing sector (Hays et al. 2005). Hays et al. indeed find support for the embedded liberalism thesis using these measures. However, they do not examine what role domestic institutions play in this process. Taking up where Hays et al. left off, this paper examines the relationship between the proportionality of electoral systems and the degree to which governments committed to international free trade regimes implement policies to offset the negative effects of trade on the import competing sector. In other words, this paper asks whether domestic institutions mediate the effect of globalization on welfare state policy. The existing literature does not provide definitive evidence that would allow us to answer the question of whether electoral institutions affect economic policy outcomes. Some scholars have found a relationship between proportional representation (PR) electoral systems and trade openness while others find that PR systems are associated with higher government spending. This paper examines the effect of proportionality on the link between trade liberalization and spending. Using a cross-sectional time series of 17 OECD countries for the period 1960-2000, I analyze the effects of the proportionality of electoral systems on the degree to which domestic policies are used to offset the costs of trade liberalization. The more proportional a system of electing representatives to the national legislature, the more likely it should be that each legislator depends on a narrower and more homogenous group for his/her reelection. Therefore, it is argued that high proportionality of electoral systems will cause legislators to be more responsive to the demands of specific interest groups hurt by liberalization and thus to implement policies aimed at offsetting the costs of increased imports to these groups. These effects are expected to be greater in industrial than in post-industrial economies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper asks whether and under what conditions EU-level organizations of national interest groups have an independent influence on EU policy. The agricultural policy network is examined and hypotheses are generated for testing across issue areas. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]