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The dualist Śaiva doctrine considers that mala is that which obstructs the true nature of the self and sets in motion the operation of bondage. Though many dualist Śaiva tantras discuss the concept of mala, only the Pauṣkara presents a detailed exposition supported by numerous arguments. This article aims to closely report those arguments and to search within the Pauṣkara for answers to certain questions that the concept provokes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses a peculiar Sā n ˙ khya-Yoga theory of transformation (pariṇāma) that the author of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra created by drawing upon Sarvāstivāda Buddhist theories of temporality. In developing his theory, Patañjali adaptively reused the wording in which the Sarvāstivāda theories were formulated, the specific objections against these theories, and their refutations to win the philosophical debate about temporality against Sarvāstivāda Buddhism. Patañjali's approach towards the Sarvāstivāda Buddhist theories was possible, even though his system of Yoga is based on an ontology that differs considerably from that of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism because both systems share the philosophical view that time is not a separate ontological entity in itself. Time is a concept deduced from change in the empirical world. This agreement results from the common philosophical orientation of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism and Yoga, which takes the phenomenon of experience as the basis of philosophical enquiry into the structure of the world. The intention that guided Patañjali's adaptive reuse was twofold. On the one hand, he aimed at winning the debate with Sarvāstivāda Buddhism about how the problem of temporality can be solved. He thus integrated four mutually exclusive theories on temporality into a single theory of transformation of properties (dharma) involving a second-level and a third-level theory on the transformation of the temporal characteristic mark (lakṣaṇa) and on the transformation of states (avasthā), respectively. On the other hand, Patañjali intended to achieve philosophical clarification regarding the question of how exactly properties relate to their underlying substrate in the process of transformation of the three constituents or forces (guṇa) sattva, rajas and tamas of matter (pradhāna) that account for all phenomena of the world except pure consciousness (puruṣa). Patañjali's theory of transformation is thus of central importance for his Sā n ˙ khya ontology, according to which the world consists of 25 categories or constituents (tattva), i.e., of primal matter (prakṛti) and its transformations and pure consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates the concept of intermediate existence in the early Buddhist theory of rebirth. The main sources investigated for this article are the Pāli canonical and commentarial literature. My main thesis is that early Buddhist discourses contain instances that suggest a spatial-temporal gap between death and rebirth known as 'intermediate existence' (antarābhava), in contrast to the idea of Theravāda Buddhist theory that rebirth takes place immediately without a spatial-temporal gap. In order to prove this, I argue that the 'one who liberates in interval' (anarāparinibbāyī) attains Nibbāna in the intermediate existence and the concept of gandhabbā in early Buddhist discourses refers to a being in intermediate existence, not to a dying consciousness (cuti-viññāna), and there are indirect inferences to an spatiotemporal gap between death and rebirth in the early Buddhist discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to take up three closely connected questions. First, does consciousness essentially involve subjectivity? Second, what is the connection, if any, between pre-reflective self-consciousness and subjectivity? And, third, does consciousness necessarily involve an ego or self? I will draw on the Yogācāra–Madhyamaka synthesis of Śāntarakṣita (eighth century common era) to develop an account of the relation between consciousness, subjectivity, and the self. I will argue, first, that phenomenal consciousness is reflexive or self-illuminating (svaprakāśya). Second, I will argue that consciousness necessarily involves minimal subjectivity. Third, I will argue that neither the reflexivity nor the subjectivity of consciousness implies that there is any entity such as the self or ego over and above reflexive consciousness. Fourth, I will argue that what we normally think of as ‘the self’ is best understood as a complex, multi-layered process (ahaṁkāra, ‘I-making’) that emerges within the pre-egoic flow of subjective consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

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As scientists advance knowledge of the brain and develop technologies to measure, evaluate, and manipulate brain function, numerous questions arise for religious adherents. If neuroscientists can conclusively establish that there is a functional network between neural impulses and an individual's capacity for moral evaluation of situations, this will naturally lead to questions about the relationship between such a network and constructions of moral value and ethical human behavior. For example, if cognitive neuroscience can show that there is a neurophysiological basis for the moral appraisal of situations, it may be argued that the world's religions, which have traditionally been the keepers and purveyors of ethical values, are rendered either spurious or irrelevant. The questions point up broader dilemmas in the interface between science and religion, and raise concerns about the ethics of neurological research and experimentation. Since human beings will still arbitrate what is 'moral' or 'ethical,' how can religious perspectives enrich the dialogue on neuroethical issues and how can neuroscience enrich dialogue on religion? Buddhist views on the nature of consciousness and methods of practice, especially meditation practice, may contribute to discussions on neuroscience and theories about the interrelationship between consciousness and ethical awareness by exploring the role that karma, intentionality, and compassion play in Buddhist understandings of the interrelationship between consciousness and ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within the field, the ‘innovative’ study of Buddhism as a socio-historical phenomenon and the ‘traditional’ study of Buddhist texts and doctrine exist in an uneasy tension. In this paper this tension is ‘resolved’ by taking the story of the development of the nineteenth-century European view of and subsequent reactions to Buddhism configured particularly around the notion of ‘nirvana’ and showing in parallel, how through an Abhidharmic perspective it is a story of how an object comes to consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pike's phenomenology of mystical experiences articulates sharply where theological content may enter the structure of Christian mystics' experiences (as characterized in their own words). Here we look to Buddhist (and other) accounts of 'pure' or 'nibbanic' consciousness attained in experiences of deep meditation. A contemporary 'modal' model of inner awareness is considered whereby a form of pure consciousness underlies and embraces further content in various forms of consciousness, including mystical experiences in different traditions and experiences of 'full union' (with God). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dependent-origination, possibly the most fundamental Buddhist philosophical principle, is generally understood as a description of all that exists. Mental as well as physical phenomena are believed to come into being only in relation to, and conditioned by, other phenomena. This paper argues that such an understanding of pratītya-samutpāda is mistaken with regard to the earlier meanings of the concept. Rather than relating to all that exists, dependent-origination related originally only to processes of mental conditioning. It was an analysis of the self, not of reality, embedded in the Upaniṣadic search for the ātman. The teaching also possessed important ontological implications regarding the nature of the relation between consciousness and reality. These implications suggest that rather than things being conditioned by other things, they are actually conditioned by consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes philosopher William James' studies on Buddhism. Parallelism between James' and the Buddhist conceptualization of consciousness, integration and criteria of truth claims; Interaction between American thought and Buddhism during the 20th century.

The author discusses a retreat with Zen teacher Thich Nhat Hanh, also known as Thây. During the retreat, attendees were instructed to refrain from considering killing, stealing, cruel speech, and irresponsible consumption and sexual activity. Thây conducted dharma talks based on Anapasati Sutta, a breathing technique of Buddha designed to bring calm. Thây urged using meditation to confront the mind consciousness and convert negative emotions to joy.