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This article argues that the intelligence sector is a privileged vantage point to observe and analyse a transformation of the State in France, as this transformation deeply affects the heart of the executive power and the French intelligence and security apparatus. Traditionally, intelligence was not conceived in France as a functional tool in the hands of the decision-maker but was rather defined as a ‘regalian power’. Intelligence activities were derived from a very specific conception of the State, and especially the particular notion of ‘reason of State’ (raison d’État). The current intelligence reform prompts speculation as to whether it represents more than a ‘simple’ functional reorganisation or in fact could signify that intelligence is now recognised as a tool in the hands of a ‘État de droit’ (‘liberal state’). The idea of a French ‘exceptionalism’ is addressed through a theoretical approach of the way France redefines intelligence and surveillance in relation with a major evolution of the notion of ‘reason of State’ itself. Then the article illustrates the assumption of a ‘lost tradition’ of reason of State through an analysis of the current reform of the intelligence sector in France. This reform is based on processes of rationalisation, centralization, modernisation and normalisation of both intelligence activities and intelligence services in France. As a conclusion, the article addresses the reactions to the January and November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, and asks whether resilience towards terrorism requires to accelerate the pace of the transformation of the French intelligence sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Oral questions are usually seen as a procedure designed for political conflict. Yet question time may serve other purposes depending on the institutional setting, the political context and the policy field. By comparing the use of oral questions on the defence issue in the national parliaments of four Western democracies, the paper identifies a specific characteristic of questioning in each lower house: political conflict in Germany, internal dissent in the United Kingdom, reward of policy expertise in Spain and local issues in France. Such diverse uses of questioning procedures impact differently on the quality of the accountability process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]