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The article delves into the significance of stepparent-stepchild relationships, advocating for the recognition of stepparents as moral parents. It challenges societal norms that prioritize biological or adoptive parents and proposes a moral commitment account of parenthood that includes stepparents. The text explores various forms of parenting, including biological, step, and surrogate parenting, while addressing ethical implications such as gamete donation and custody issues. The article provides a comprehensive examination of the complexities surrounding parenthood and emphasizes the importance of gestational ties over genetic connections. [Extracted from the article]

We vindicate the widespread intuition that there is something morally problematic with for-profit corporations providing care to young children and elders. But instead of putting forward an empirical argument showing that for-profit corporations score worse than not-for-profits when it comes to meeting the basic needs of these vulnerable groups, we develop a philosophical argument about the nature of the relationship between a care organisation, its role-occupants, and care recipients. We argue that the correlation between profit and lower-quality care is a result of intrinsic features of a for-profit model, combined with conceptual features of meaningful caring relationships, such that non-profits are the most reliable institutional providers of adequate care. Our claim is that care requires a kind of commitment that for-profit institutions are constituted to avoid, and that non-profit institutions are constituted to embrace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I investigate the relationship between carefreeness and the valuable goods that constitute a good childhood. I argue that carefreeness is necessary for children to develop positive affective responses to worthwhile projects and relationships, and so is necessary for children to endorse the valuable goods in their lives. One upshot of my discussion is that a child who is allowed to play, who receives an adequate education, and who has loving parents, but who lacks the psychological disposition of carefreeness leads an impoverished life, even if she might lead a good life in adulthood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophical discussion about citizenship has traditionally focused on the questions of what citizenship is, its relationship to civic virtue and political participation and whether or not it can be meaningfully exercised at the supra-national level. In recent years, however, philosophers have turned their attention to the legal status attached to citizenship and have questioned existing principles of citizenship allocation and withdrawal. With regard to the question of who is morally entitled to citizenship, philosophers have argued for principles of citizenship allocation that go beyond birth and lineage and have focused instead on the value of political attachment and located life plans. These principles have several advantages over existing legal principles, but they suffer from being under-specified, as well as being over and under-inclusive. With regard to loss of citizenship, philosophers have primarily denounced citizenship withdrawal as a form of punishment by appealing to principles of fair and equal treatment. However, theories purporting to show that denationalization is always wrong have trouble explaining why loss of citizenship is so problematic for persons who have committed the most horrendous crimes against their fellow citizens and who, in so doing, have in effect self-excluded from the political community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Denationalisation – withdrawing citizenship from a person – is a practice with a long historic pedigree that continues to affect the lives of many people today. Are there conditions under which denationalisation is morally justified? If so, what are they? And can legal and political norms that authorise states to engage in citizenship withdrawal be justified? This article provides answers to these questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this essay, I argue that the privileging of romantic and familial ties by those who believe in the liberal state's right to exclude prospective immigrants cannot be justified. The reasons that count in favour of these relationships count equally in favour of a great array of relationships, from friends to creative collaborators, and whatever else falls in between. The liberal partialist now faces a dilemma, either the scope of the right to exclude is much more limited or much broader than she previously assumed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An excerpt of the article "Book symposium on Debating Brain Drain: May Government Restrict Emigration?" is presented with showcases the need for legitimate states to impose coercive measures in restricting skilled workers' emigration.

In this essay, we focus on the moral justification of a highly controversial measure to redress medical brain drain: the duty to stay. We argue that the moral justification for this duty lies primarily in the fact that medical students impose high risks on their fellow citizens while receiving their medical training, which in turn gives them a reciprocity-based reason to temporarily prioritize the medical needs of their fellow citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the successful campaign to have the burqa and niqab banned from public use in France, and the continuing advocacy to have these garments banned in other Western liberal societies, I examine whether the two strongest challenges to the burqa and niqab succeed in justifying a ban on these forms of veil. Although I argue that they both fail in supporting a ban, the fact that some Muslim women may be coerced into full veiling gives liberal states a moral duty to interfere. In the light of this, I propose a comprehensive approach, which is better suited to ensure that the necessary conditions are in place for Muslim women to be the authors of their own lives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Denationalisation – withdrawing citizenship from a person – is a practice with a long historic pedigree that continues to affect the lives of many people today. Are there conditions under which denationalisation is morally justified? If so, what are they? And can legal and political norms that authorise states to engage in citizenship withdrawal be justified? This article provides answers to these questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]