Search

This 24 month study evaluated the effect of dietitian coaching combined with minimal endocrinologist follow up on the glycemic control and cardiovascular risks of diabetic participants, compared with conventional endocrinologist follow up. Participants with type 1 or type 2 diabetes were assigned to either the control group with conventional endocrinologist follow up (C; n = 50) or the dietitian-coached group (DC; n = 51) with on-site diabetes self-management education every 3 months combined with annual endocrinologist followup. Over the 24 month intervention, weight (-0.7 vs. +2.1 kg; p = 0.04), BMI (+0.3 vs. +0.7 kg/m2; p = 0.009), and waist circumference (-1.3 vs. +2.4 cm; p = 0.01) significantly differed between the DC and control groups. HbA1C dropped significantly in participants of the DC versus the control group (-0.6% vs.-0.3%; p = 0.04). This was accompanied by improved overall energy intake (-548 vs. -74 kcal/day; p = 0.04). However, no link associated glycemic control to nutrient intake or intensiveness of pharmacotherapy. Coaching by a dietitian improves glycemic control and reduces certain cardiovascular risk factors in diabetic subjects, demonstrating that a joint dietitian-endocrinologist model of care provides a convenient strategy for cardiovascular risk management in the diabetic population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We question results claiming to extend non-cooperative models of legislative bargaining to the theoretically general and substantively typical case with an arbitrary number of disciplined parties. We identify problems with both the derivation of formal results and empirical evaluation of these. No empirically robust formateur advantage is observed in field data on bargaining over government formation. Given this theoretical and empirical impasse, we reconsider the substantive premises that should form the foundation for any new attempt to model this fundamental political process, arguing that models should be grounded in binding constitutional constraints on the government formation process in parliamentary democracies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presented is theoretically grounded in the office-seeking approach to the study of coalitions. It takes the most influential theories of portfolio distribution in the executive and legislature (voting weights, proportionality, formateur) and tests it on the data pertaining to coalition negotiations in the Czech Republic between 1992 and 2010. We follow the distribution of portfolios in the government, in the presidium of the Chamber of Deputies, as well as in the presidiums of permanent parliamentary committees. The approach based on voting weights seems best for studying portfolio distribution in the Czech Republic, although it is not entirely satisfactory. In the theoretical discussion of the results, we also point out that the voting weights approach is somewhat less rigorous than others. At the same time, we show that even ostensibly exact approaches to the study of coalitions can lead to arbitrariness on the part of the researcher, as theoretical assumptions about portfolio distribution operate with decimal numbers, whereas in reality one operates with natural numbers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advocates of consensual political institutions, i.e. institutions that promote compromise and powersharing among political parties, claim that these institutions promote moderation in government policy outputs. To date, however, there exists little research – either theoretical or empirical – that evaluates whether consensual institutions promote moderation in parties' policy declarations. We develop a multiparty spatial model with policy-seeking parties operating under proportional representation, in which we vary the extent to which government policies reflect power-sharing among all parties as opposed to being determined by a single party. We determine parties' optimal (Nash equilibrium) policy positions and conclude that power-sharing does not typically motivate parties to moderate their policy declarations; in fact, policy positioning under power-sharing appears to be similar to or more extreme than under single-party dominance. Consistent with previous research, however, we find that power-sharing does promote moderation in government policy outputs. Our results have implications for parties’ election strategies, for the design of political institutions, and for representative government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]