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Whereas hackathons are widespread within and outside academia and have been argued to be a valid pedagogical method for teaching interdisciplinarity, no detailed frameworks or methods are available for conceptualizing and organizing educational hackathons, i.e., hackathons dedicated to best achieving pedagogic objectives. This paper is dedicated to introducing EDUCational Hackathons for learning how to solve Interdisciplinary Challenges (EDUCHIC) through: (1) defining the fundamental principles for framing an activity as an EDUCHIC, integrating principles from pedagogical methods, hackathon organization, and interdisciplinarity processes; (2) describing general properties that EDUCHIC possess as a consequence of the interaction of the fundamental principles; (3) developing operational guidelines for streamlining the practical organization of EDUCHIC, including an exhaustive end‐to‐end process covering all the steps for organizing EDUCHIC and practical frames for carrying the key decisions to be made in this process; and (4) a demonstration of these guidelines through illustrating their application for organizing a concrete EDUCHIC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, it has been argued by several scholars that we have moral reasons to limit our procreation due to the harmful environmental consequences it entails. These calls for procreative restraint are typically made in relation to other lifestyle choices, such as minimizing driving and air travel. In such comparisons, it is assumed that the environmental impact of procreation encompasses the lifetime consumption of the child created, and potentially that of further descendants. After an overview of these arguments, I go on to provide an examination of the main benefits of procreation, in relation to those of consumption, i.e., other lifestyle choices. My normative assumption is that benefits hold moral relevance, alongside harms. Procreation may benefit procreators and may provide more collective benefits. Some benefits tend to preempt the environmental impact associated with procreation. I conclude that the benefits of procreation are substantial and typically greater than those of consumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the discussion on e-cigarettes being uniquely close substitute to combustible cigarettes. Topics include emphasizing substantially lower health risks for individuals users in comparison with combustible tobacco; and emphasizing the FDAs regulatory opportunities in promoting population health.

The debate for and against making e-cigarettes available to smokers is to a large extent empirical. We do not know the long-term health effects of vaping and we do not know how smokers will respond to e-cigarettes over time. In addition to these empirical uncertainties, however, there are difficult moral issues to consider. One such issue is that many smokers in some sense choose to smoke. Though smoking is addictive and though many start young, it does not seem impossible to plan for and implement cessation. Yet many choose not to do so and we arguably have some reason to respect this choice. I propose that liberal opposition to strict tobacco control, based on respect for choice, is mitigated when e-cigarettes are available, since they are such a close substitute. Making e-cigarettes available to smokers might therefore not only enable switching in practice, but may make tougher tobacco control more justified. Another moral issue is that making e-cigarettes widely available might induce many people to vape, who would otherwise have neither vaped nor smoked. If this is so, the price of using e-cigarettes to accelerate smoking cessation may be a long-term vaping epidemic. Since vaping is less harmful than smoking, both individuals and society will have less reason to end this epidemic and so it may endure longer than the smoking epidemic would otherwise have done. This raises further questions around the weighing of reduced harm to current smokers against increased harm to future vapers. Implications: Because they are a close substitute, e-cigarettes makes tougher tobacco control more morally and politically feasible. Because e-cigarettes are less harmful than combustibles, making them available may accelerate smoking cessation but also lead to a long-term vaping epidemic, as we have less reason to combat vaping, once established. Moral evaluation of this possible scenario requires considering at least three things: (1) the cost of addiction to autonomy, in addition to health effects, (2) possible distributional effects due to differences between current smokers and future vapers, and (3) the fact that a possible vaping epidemic affects mainly future people and future society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The traditional liberal view on conflicts between care for wellbeing and respect for choice and desire is that we should look to degrees of competence and voluntariness to determine which moral imperative should take priority. This view has likely influenced the common view that children's choices should be considered only to the extent that this promotes their future autonomy and helps us determine their best interests. I reject both the general traditional liberal view and its application to children. Competence and voluntariness, as well as maturity, are at best proxies for what really matters, which is wellbeing, choice and desire. We typically have reason to respect children's choices, irrespective of any further positive consequences. If we should more often make children do what they do not want to do, this is mainly because, though we should care about respecting their choices, we should care even more about their wellbeing and future autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I challenge the widespread presumption that a child should have exactly two parents. I consider the pros and cons of various numbers of parents for the people most directly affected – the children themselves and their parents. The number of parents, as well as the ratio of parents to children, may have an impact on what resources are available, what relationships can develop between parents and children, what level of conflict can be expected in the family, as well as the costs involved in parenting and the experience of parenting a child. Indirectly, there is also an effect on who will have the opportunity to be a parent, as well as on wider social issues that I mention but do not discuss. Having considered all these factors, I conclude that there is some reason to believe that three or more parents is usually better than one or two, especially if children are to have siblings, which is typically beneficial. However, these reasons are not strong enough to support a general presumption in favor of any particular number. We should therefore jettison the two‐parent presumption and make different numbers of parents more socially accepted as well as legally possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this comment on Kenneth Iserson's article, "Do You Believe in Magic? Shove, Don't Nudge: Advising Patients at the Bedside," I discuss the definition of and the moral evaluation of nudging. I propose that using persuasive descriptions and intentionally building trust in patients by one's demeanor is a form of nudging. I argue that nudging is not necessarily morally problematic, but that it can be controlling and can limit liberty, despite proponents'claims to the contrary. I agree with Iserson that clinicians should give their patients explicit advice, but add that they should ideally also be aware of the more subtle psychological effects of advice giving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objectives: Hereditary cancer has implications not only for patients but also for their at-risk relatives (ARRs). In current clinical practice, risk disclosure to ARRs involves collaboration between patients and healthcare providers (HCPs). However, the specific responsibilities of each party are intertwined and at times unclear. In this study, we explored public attitudes regarding moral and legal responsibilities to disclose familial risk information to uninformed ARRs., Design: In an online cross-sectional survey, participants were prompted with a hypothetical scenario where a gender-neutral patient learnt about their familial risk of colorectal cancer. The patient was advised to regularly undergo colonoscopy screening, and this recommendation was extended to both their siblings and cousins. While the patient informed their siblings, they had not spoken to their cousins in 20 years and did not want to contact them. The survey assessed respondents' views on the patient's and HCPs' ethical responsibility and legal obligation to inform the cousins (ARRs)., Participants: A random selection of 1800 Swedish citizens 18-74 years of age were invited. Out of those, 914 (51%) completed the questionnaire., Results: In total, 75% believed that HCPs had a moral responsibility to inform ARRs, while 59% ascribed this moral responsibility to the patient. When asked about the ultimate responsibility for risk disclosure to ARRs, 71% placed this responsibility with HCPs. Additionally, 66% believed that HCPs should have a legal obligation to inform ARRs, while only 21% thought the patient should have such an obligation. When prompted about a scenario in which the patient actively opposed risk disclosure, a majority believed that HCPs should still inform the ARRs., Conclusion: Our study indicates that the Swedish public ascribes moral responsibility for informing ARRs to both the patient and HCPs. However, contrary to current practice, they believe HCPs hold the ultimate responsibility. The majority of respondents support disclosure even without patient consent., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2024. Re-use permitted under CC BY. Published by BMJ.)

Advances in genetic diagnostics lead to more patients being diagnosed with hereditary conditions. These findings are often relevant to patients' relatives. For example, the success of targeted cancer prevention is dependent on effective disclosure to relatives at risk. Without clear information, individuals cannot take advantage of predictive testing and preventive measures. Against this background, we argue that healthcare professionals have a duty to make actionable genetic information available to their patients' at-risk relatives. We do not try to settle the difficult question of how this duty should be balanced against other duties, such as the duty of confidentiality and a possible duty not to know one's genetic predisposition. Instead, we argue for the importance of recognising a general responsibility towards at-risk relatives, to be discharged as well as possible within the limits set by conflicting duties and practical considerations. According to a traditional and still dominant perspective, it is the patient's duty to inform his or her relatives, while healthcare professionals are only obliged to support their patients in discharging this duty. We argue that this perspective is a mistake and an anomaly. Healthcare professionals do not have a duty to ensure that their patients promote the health of third parties. It is often effective and desirable to engage patients in disseminating information to their relatives. However, healthcare professionals should not thereby deflect their own moral responsibility., Competing Interests: Competing interests: None declared., (© Author(s) (or their employer(s)) 2020. Re-use permitted under CC BY-NC. No commercial re-use. See rights and permissions. Published by BMJ.)