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Since 1957, New York courts have required contingent fee lawyers to file 'closing statements' that disclose settlement amounts, lawyers' fees, an accounting of expenses, and other information. This Article provides a preliminary analysis of these data for the period 2004-2013. Among this Article's findings are that settlement rates in New York state courts are very high (84%) relative to previous studies; that very few cases are resolved by dispositive motions; that litigated cases and settled cases have almost exactly the same average recovery; that median litigation expenses, other than attorney's fees, are 3% of gross recovery; that claims are disproportionately from poor neighborhoods; and that attorneys' fees are almost always one-third of net recovery, which is the maximum allowed by law., INTRODUCTION 1972 I. RETAINER AND CLOSING STATEMENTS 1972 II. SETTLEMENT RATES 1981 III. AMOUNTS RECOVERED 1985 IV. FEES AND EXPENSES 1988 V. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF TORT CLAIMS 1989 CONCLUSION 1992 [...]

Discovery is the formal process of exchanging information under the supervision of the courts. Since managing discovery is costly, courts have implemented case management techniques to reduce motion practice in discovery. This study examines whether case management techniques can reduce the likelihood of a discovery dispute. We attempt to untangle the impact of specific judges from the use of a particular case management technique. We focus on the use of informal discovery conferences (IDCs) in which parties meet with the judge before filing a motion to compel. The problem with simply testing whether IDCs reduce the number of discovery motions is that the use of an IDC is likely endogenous. Our solution to this endogeneity is to use the random assignment of judges. Since some judges have a higher propensity to use IDCs and some courts have begun requiring them, we have two sources of policy variation. Using this estimation strategy, we find that IDCs reduce the number and presence of discovery motions. (JEL K13, K40, K41) [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Oliver Williamson has coined the term "fundamental transformation." It captures the following situation: before they strike a deal, buyers and sellers are protected by competition. Yet, thereafter, they find themselves in a bilateral monopoly. With common knowledge of standard preferences, both sides would conclude the contract regardless if its expected value exceeds their outside options. We run an experiment to test whether additional behavioral concerns deter mutually beneficial trade. We test four concerns: If the risk materializes, another individual makes a windfall profit; she does so by intentionally exploiting another individual; the exploited individual may be her assigned partner; the individual that is let down is her contractual partner, and hence has voluntarily exposed herself to this risk. Behavioral effects are heterogeneous. About a quarter of participants from a standard student subject pool exhibit the hypothesized additional deterrent effect. This fraction is bigger than a third if participants interact with a random partner from somewhere in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine the quasi-randomization of alcohol consumption created by state-level alcohol prohibition laws passed in the United States in the early part of the twentieth century. Using a large dataset of World War II enlistees, we exploit the differential timing of these laws to examine their effects on adult educational attainment, obesity, and height. We find statistically significant effects for education and obesity that do not appear to be the result of pre-existing trends. Our findings add to the growing body of economic studies that examine the long-run impacts of in utero and childhood environmental conditions. (JEL I18, D10, N41, N42), 'John P. Lennon, treasurer of the American Federation of Labor, says that seventy percent of the drink bill of the United States is contributed by the American laboring man ... [...]

How much should judges be paid? We first survey the considerable history of the debate and identify the implicit causal claims made about the effect of judicial pay. We find that claims about the effect of pay on the composition and quality of the judiciary have remained remarkably similar over the past two hundred years. In contrast, claims about the effect of pay on judicial independence have changed as the meaning of judicial independence itself has shifted We take advantage of the large variation in real salaries and opportunity costs for state appellate court judges across states from 1977 to 2007 to empirically test these claims. We find that judicial salaries have a small but significant effect on the likelihood of exit and thus the length of judicial tenure, and a small effect on the background of judges that join the appellate bench. A more limited analysis of California trial court judges finds far more sensitivity to pay, however, suggesting that trial and appellate court judges may behave differently., INTRODUCTION I. BACKGROUND ON THE DEBATE ON JUDICIAL PAY A. Judicial Pay Affects the Composition of the Bench B. Other Common Law Countries C. Judicial Pay Affects Judicial Independence D. [...]

Free lunches are hard to turn down for a city staring into the fiscal abyss. As it faces dwindling revenues and the increased demand for public services that usually accompanies [...]

The judicial models that use toxic release inventory (TRI) are tested to verify whether the judicial policies toward companies that pollute the environment are severe or not. The results suggest that factories that border other states have high emissions thus a staying consistent with the hypothesis that jurisdictional considerations are an important determinant of pollution incidence.

This paper examines the consequences of the delegation of regulatory authority to local officials. The study evaluates three hypotheses of the role delegation plays in the implementation of regulatory policy: (1) the federal case, which predicts that delegation has no effect, (2) the state/local model predicts that delegation is, in fact, abdication, and (3) the full impact model predicts that both interests determine how environmental policy is implemented. The results provide evidence that while delegation does not completely remove national policy maker's ability to alter regulatory policy, it does allow local interests to alter national standards., I. INTRODUCTION Federal regulatory programs, from occupational safety to protection of the environment, are implemented jointly by national and state agencies. More broadly, almost all regulatory programs involve some delegation [...]

We explain a surprising effect of tort liability in the market for prescription drugs. Greater punitive damage risk seems to increase prescription drug utilization in states without non-economic damage caps but decrease utilization in states with such caps. We offer an explanation for this puzzle. The vertical production process for drugs involves national upstream producers (drug companies) and local downstream producers (doctors). When a single state reallocates liability from downstream to upstream producers, national drug companies see little reason to alter their nationwide output decisions, but local physicians have incentives to increase their prescriptions in that state. The net result is higher local output. We show how this dynamic can explain our puzzle by demonstrating that punitive damages shift liability upstream from doctors to drug companies, but not when non-economic damages caps limit physician malpractice liability. We provide evidence explaining when, how, and why this type of liability shifting occurs (JEL K13, I11, I18). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]