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Aristotle endorses a very striking doctrine connecting necessity with what seems to be a non-modal notion -- that of 'being or happening always'. He also forges a connection between the idea of 'happening by chance' and 'happening neither always nor for the most part'. These two connections form the subject of this essay. My guiding aim is to provide an account of what the 'always/necessary' doctrine involves and of why Aristotle might have held it. Reflection on the nature of the connection between 'by chance' and 'neither always nor for the most part' throws light on what Aristotle means by 'happening always', and, in consequence, on the nature of the link between 'always' and 'necessary'; it also suggests that the basis of this link is to be found in Aristotle's general conception of the natural world as the object of explanation and knowledge. The primary texts upon which discussion of these connections must focus are De Caelo I. 12 and the analysis of chance in Physics II. 4—6. I discuss these two texts in turn, after a opening chapter which surveys the evidence for Aristotle's acceptance of the 'always/necessary‘ doctrine and considers the nature of the restrictions which he places on it. Chapter 2 comprises a translation of and commentary on Cael. I. 12, together with a translation and discussion of its companion chapter, I. 10. In Chapter 3, I examine the nature of Aristotle's argument in I. 12, and criticise various interpretations which see it as evidence that Aristotle's 'always/necessary' doctrine rests on a distinctive conception of possibility. The translation of and commentary on Phys. II. 4-6 (Chapter 4) are followed in Chapter 5 by a discussion of issues relating to the association of chance with 'neither always nor for the most part'. The final chapter returns to the question of the connection between 'always' and 'of necessity'.

From the peculiar catalogue of aporiai in the opening to the extracts from books Β, Γ, and E of the Physics at the end, book K has always been a puzzling text inside the Metaphysics. The present research aims at clarifying our understanding of the whole book and its implications on Aristotle's Metaphysics and doctrine by confirming whether K is a dependable Aristotelian source. It comprises three main parts: an introduction to the main problems, a translation with notes, and a commentary that follows the order of the chapters. In doing so, particular focus is given to a comparison with other Aristotelian works and Aristotle's legacy in the ancient Peripatos, linking K's oddities to equivalent situations in other Aristotle's treatises (particularly the Ethics). The interpretation of the book across the centuries to date will be examined in the course of the study to outline the debate over the authenticity and the athetesis of the book. New evidence is found on certain unique expressions that date to a later Greek than the one of Aristotle and are attributed to a late editor who intervened on parts of the book. Plausible connections are drawn with Theophrastus' Metaphysics and the work of Eudemus of Rhodes. Despite being a hotchpotch, K carries a meaning and it is not just a perfunctory repetition of something else better explained elsewhere in the corpus. Therefore, this research sheds light on the potential for new understanding derived from K, if not about Aristotle himself, at least on the school of thought he built and the first philosophy he was trying to define by conversing with his pupils and colleagues.

Demonstrating that Aristotle is a careful reader of Plato whose interest does not merely lie in rejecting the ideas of his teacher is not a task that has been ignored by scholars. However, surprisingly, there has been no extensive attempt to approach Aristotle's reception of Part II of the Parmenides in this way. One of my overall aims in this thesis is to correct this by demonstrating that Aristotle's engagement with the first and second deductions of the Parmenides in Metaphysics, Iota 3 is sophisticated and complex. My second aim is also one that has been unattempted: to show that in both texts, we uncover important lessons for contemporary metaphysicians. My final goal is to show that my exploration of both texts has significance for our understanding of the Parmenides and Metaphysics, Iota and the study of Plato and Aristotle more generally. In achieving this, I focus on the treatment of numerical identity and non-identity in the first and second deductions of the Parmenides and Metaphysics, Iota 3. The thesis falls into five chapters. In the first, I settle some important preliminary questions. In the second, I uncover definitions of identity, non-identity, similarity and dissimilarity in both texts and argue that we might think they could aid contemporary proponents and opponents of a 'strict' Leibniz's Law. In my third chapter, I explore whether this is in fact possible. My fourth chapter concerns two laws of identity and non-identity that seem uncontroversial but which we might worry Plato and Aristotle violate in Part II and Iota. My final chapter deals with identity and non-identity in the context of wider discussions of relativity in Plato and Aristotle. I conclude by showing that I have met all three of the overall aims of this thesis.

This thesis analyses the method, purpose, and results of Aristotle's treatment of a select number of Presocratic and Platonic theses about the soul within the context of De Anima 1. Contrary to a prevalent interpretation of De Anima 1 which sees Aristotle's treatment of his predecessors' psychological views as dialectical, I argue that Aristotle treats his predecessors as having offered potentially viable hypotheses about the nature of the soul, and that these hypotheses are treated as attempts to explain the soul's basic powers. I further show that, in order to test the explanatory limits of these theories, Aristotle uses a version of the scientific method of inquiry advertised in the Prior and Posterior Analytics, which consists in setting out the basic psychological phenomena which psychology should explain, and then testing the extent to which his predecessors' definitions of the soul are able to accomplish this task. This thesis argues that, by demonstrating where his predecessors' first principles fall short, Aristotle is able to make theoretical progress towards establishing his own 'hylomorphic' first principle of soul, that soul is the 'first fulfilment of a natural instrumental body', and towards the idea that soul operates in the body of living beings as a formal, final, and efficient cause.

In this doctoral thesis, I address questions concerning teleology, chance, and necessity in Aristotle's philosophy. These three concepts are closely related. Aristotle considers chance in relation to teleology, and contrasts his conception of teleology with his own and his predecessors' views of necessity. He explains accidental causation on the basis of the absurdity of necessitarianism. In Chapter I, I clarify Aristotle's definitions of chance events and chance in Physics B 4-6 on the basis of a detailed examination of 'coming to be accidentally' (196b23), 'for the sake of something' (196b21), 'might be done by thought or by nature' (196b22). I analyze accidental and non-accidental relations involved in the marketplace example. In Chapter II, I argue that Aristotle accepts that the regularly beneficial winter rainfall is for the sake of the crops in Physics B 8. I scrutinize Empedocles’ view as described by Aristotle and show that it is not a theory of natural selection. I seek to show that the rival view against which Aristotle argues is an amalgam of reductionism and eliminativism. In Chapter III, I analyze what Aristotle means by 'simple necessity' and 'necessity on a hypothesis' (199b34-35), and argue that, in Physics B 9, he only acknowledges hypothetical necessity. Scrutinizing the wall example and Aristotle’s reply to it, I clarify his view of the relation between teleological causation and material necessity. In Chapter IV, I clarify Aristotle's conception of accidental causes, while taking his presentation of the necessitarian argument in Metaphysics E 3 as a reductio ad absurdum. I criticize the view that Aristotle himself accepts necessitation in this chapter. In doing so, I argue that, although this point is not explicitly stated in Physics B, Aristotle thinks that what is accidental is not necessary prior to its occurrence.