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The temporomandibular joint (TMJ) represents a biomechanically and morphologically complex structure, tightly connected with the development and growth of mandible and craniofacial complex. The aim of this article is to comprehensively present contemporary diagnostic modalities and clinical implications for imaging of the TMJ. Contemporary imaging modalities, if used properly and according to adequate clinical implications and criteria, are able to depict different pathological processes and play a crucial role in establishing the right diagnosis and monitoring therapeutic effect. The key to right diagnosis, however, still lies in good knowledge of the TMJ developmental and functional anatomy, as well as the TMJ dysfunction related to the jaws, surrounding muscles, teeth, and cranial base.

This paper rejects an argument defending the view that the boundary between deception and manipulation is such that some manipulations intended to cause false beliefs count as non-deceptive. On the strongest version of this argument, if a specific behaviour involves compromising the victim's reasoning, then the behaviour is manipulative but not deceptive, and if it involves exposing the victim to misleading evidence that justifies her false belief, then it is deceptive but not manipulative. This argument has been consistently used as a reason to reject the traditional analysis of human deception, according to which intentionally causing someone to acquire a false belief is sufficient for deception. And because the traditional analysis is also consistent with our most basic intuitions about deception, it does matter whether this argument succeeds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the blind decision feedback equalizer (DFE) which transforms its soft feedback filter (SFBF) from the linear décor relator of received signal to the nonlinear soft feedback equalizer, and vice reversa, in order to eliminate the error propagation effects. Aiming to increase SFBF robustness in relation to the complexity of 64-QAM signal, the entropic stochastic gradient algorithm is enhanced by coefficient leaky term which restricts the overgrowth of the decorrelator coefficients in the ambient of severe inter symbol interference channels. By introducing coefficient leaky, the undesirable effects of the all-pole linear decorrelation are compensated. The achievements of the received signal decorrelation with the entropic-leaky algorithm are verified by the Monte Carlo simulations.

This paper examines the connection between lies, deception, and self-deception. Understanding this connection is important because the consensus is that you cannot deceive yourself by lying since you cannot make yourself believe as true a proposition you already believe is false – and, as a liar, you must assert a proposition you believe is false. My solution involves refining our analysis of lying: people can lie by asserting what they confidently believe is true. Thus, self-deceivers need not replace one belief with another; rather, they may just increase existing credence in a proposition they already believe is true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper refines the received analysis of deceptive lies. This is done by assessing some cases of lies that are supposedly not intended to deceive and by arguing that they actually involve sophisticated strategies of intentional deception. These lies, that is, merely seem not to be intended to deceive and this is because our received analysis of deceptive lies is insufficiently sophisticated. We need to add these strategies to our analysis of deceptive lying. The argument ends by presenting this refined analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his article, Grossmann argues that, in the context of human cooperative caregiving, heightened fearfulness in children and human sensitivity to fear in others are adaptive traits. I offer and briefly defend a rival hypothesis: Heightened fearfulness among infants and young children is a maladaptive trait that did not get deselected in the process of evolution because human sensitivity to fear in others mitigates its disadvantageous effects to a sufficient extent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to one influential argument put forward by, e.g. Chisholm and Feehan, Pfister, Meibauer, Dynel, Keiser, and Harris, asserting requires intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say (first premise) and, because liars must assert what they believe is false (second premise), liars necessarily intend to cause their hearer to believe as true what the liars believe is false (conclusion). According to this argument, that is, all genuine lies are intended to deceive. ‘Lies’ not intended to deceive are not genuine lies because they do not involve assertions and you need to assert in order to lie. In this paper, I reject this argument by arguing that the first premise is false: intending to give your hearer a reason to believe what you say is not necessary for asserting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In their paper published in 2017 in Philosophical Psychology, Ronja Rutschmann and Alex Wiegmann introduce a novel kind of lies, the indifferent lies. According to them, these lies are not intended to deceive simply because the liars do not care whether their audience is going to believe them or not. It seems as if indifferent lies avoid the objections raised against other kinds of lies supposedly not intended to deceive. I argue that this is not correct. Indifferent lies, too, are either intended to deceive or are not lies at all, since they do not involve genuine assertions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his 2018 AJP paper, Shlomo Cohen hints that deception could be a distinct subset of manipulation. We pursue this thought further, but by arguing that Cohen's accounts of deception and manipulation are incorrect. Deception under uncertainty need not involve adding false premises to the victim's reasoning but it must involve manipulating her response, and cases of manipulation that do not interfere with the victim's reasoning, but rather utilize it, also exist. Therefore, deception under uncertainty must be constituted by covert manipulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying without the intention to deceive is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Sorensen says that my assertion that p is a knowledge‐lie if it is meant to undermine your justification for believing truly that ∼p, not to make you believe that p and that, therefore, knowledge‐lies are not intended to deceive. It has been objected that they are meant to deceive because they are intended to make you more confident in a falsehood. In this paper, I propose a novel account according to which an assertion that p is a knowledge‐lie if it is intended not to provide evidence that p but to make you stop trusting all testimonies concerning whether p (in a room full of obvious liars, you will trust no one), which is how they undermine your testimonial knowledge. Because they are not intended to provide evidence that bears on the truth of p, they are not intended to make you more confident in a falsehood; therefore, knowledge‐lies are not intended to deceive. This makes them a problem for the traditional account, which takes the intention to deceive as necessary for lying, and an interesting example of Kant's idea that allowing lies whenever one feels like it would bring it about that statements in general are not believed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This letter proposes an entropy-gradient adaptive feedback filter specially derived for the blind decision feedback equalizer with a self-optimized configuration. Using software simulations, the parametric nonlinearity of the feedback filter is aligned through two operation modes--blind acquisition and soft transition--to respond with a maximum entropy signal. As a result, a simple stochastic gradient algorithm is obtained, and it can be easily optimized for an applied signal constellation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Summary: Cell polarity can be influenced by an electric field, but the mechanisms behind this response are poorly understood. A new paper shows that fission yeast cells change their direction of growth in an external electric field and suggests mechanisms based on the cortical pH gradient and on electrophoresis of membrane proteins. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In fission yeast, microtubules push against the cell edge, thereby positioning the nucleus in the cell center. Kinesin-8 motors regulate microtubule catastrophe; however, their role in nuclear positioning is not known. Here we develop a physical model that describes how kinesin-8 motors affect nuclear centering by promoting a microtubule catastrophe. Our model predicts the improved centering of the nucleus in the presence of motors, which we confirmed experimentally in living cells. The model also predicts a characteristic time for the recentering of a displaced we displaced the nucleus using optical tweezers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce a three-dimensional stochastic reaction-diffusion model to describe MinD/MinE dynamical structures in Escherichia coli. This model spontaneously generates pole-to-pole oscillations of the membrane-associated MinD proteins, MinE ring, as well as filaments of the membrane-associated MinD proteins. Experimental data suggest MinD filaments are two-stranded. In order to model them we assume that each membrane-associated MinD protein can form up to three bonds with adjacent membrane-associated MinD molecules and that MinE induced hydrolysis strongly depends on the number of bonds MinD has established.