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We explore the optimal and actual responses of fiscal policy to changes in the interest rate on newlyissued public debt (the “marginal interest rate”). We set up a simple theoretical framework with a government aiming to smooth public consumption over time. The distinctive feature is that the government issues debt of different maturities. This introduces a “valuation effect” that has received little attention so far: a rise in the marginal interest rate increases the rate of discounting and, thus, lowers the value of non-maturing debt, which relaxes the budget constraint, thereby inducing a fall in the primary balance. Still, the framework predicts that the total effect of a rise in the marginal interest rate is an increase in the primary balance. Estimates for developed countries suggest that a 1 percentagepoint higher marginal interest rate leads, on average, to roughly a 1 percentage-point higher primary balance. These findings are consistent with governments smoothing the impact of changes in the marginal interest rate and exploiting the valuation effect. Finally, estimates suggest a role for the average (or “effective”) interest rate on outstanding debt. info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

In this paper, we revisit the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) within the New Keynesian (NK) model. We show in which cases the average maturity of government debt matters for the transmission of policy shocks. The central task of this paper is to shed light on the theoretical predictions of the maturity structure on macro dynamics with an emphasis on model-implied expectations. In particular, we address the transmission channels of monetary and fiscal policy shocks on the interest rate and inflation dynamics. Our results illustrate the role of the maturity of existing debt in the wake of skyrocketing debt-to-GDP ratios and increasing government expenditures. We highlight our results by quantifying the effects of the large-scale US fiscal packages (CARES) and predict a surge in inflation if the deficits are not sufficiently backed by future surpluses.

Trabajo presentado en el 8th Shanghai Macroeconomics Workshop, celebrado en Shanghai (China), del 17 al 19 de junio de 2017.--Trabajo presentado en el Government Debt: Constraints and Choices, organizado por la Universidad de Chicago durante los días 21 y 22 de abril de 2017.--This version: October 2018 (November 2014), Standard optimal Debt Management (DM) models prescribe a dominant role for long bonds and advocate against issuing short bonds. They require very large positions in order to complete markets and assume each period that governments repurchase all outstanding bonds and reissue ( r/r ) new ones. These features of DM are inconsistent with US data. We introduce incomplete markets via small transaction costs which serves to make optimal DM more closely resemble the data : r/r are negligible, short bond issuance substantial and persistent and short and long bonds positively co-vary. Intuitively long bonds help smooth taxes over states and short bonds over time. Solving incomplete market models with multiple assets is challenging so a further contribution of this paper is introducing a novel computational method to find global solutions., Faraglia gratefully acknowledges support from the Cambridge Endowment of Research in Finance (CERF), Marcet from Plan Nacional (Spanish Ministry of Science), Monfispol, AGAUR (Generalitat de Catalunya), the Axa Foundation, the Excellence Program of Banco de Espa˜na, European Research Council under the EU 7th Framework Programme (FP/2007-2013) Advanced ERC Grant Agreement n. 324048 - APMPAL and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (SEV-2015-0563) and Scott from the ESRCs World Economy and Finance program.

Do governments strategically choose debt maturity to fill supply gaps across maturities? Building on a new panel data set of more than 9,000 individual Eurozone government debt issues between 1999 and 2015, I find that governments increase long-term debt issues following periods of low aggregate Eurozone long-term debt issuance, and vice versa. This gap-filling behavior is more pronounced for (1) less financially constrained and (2) higher rated governments. Using the ECB's three-year LTRO in 2011-2012 as an event study, I find that core governments filled the supply gap of longer maturity debt, which resulted from peripheral governments accommodating banks' short-term debt demand for "carry trades". This gap-filling implies that governments act as macro-liquidity providers across maturities, thereby adding significant risk absorption capacity to government bond markets.

This paper characterizes the optimal bailout maturity structure for a sovereign on the verge of a default. I find that buying back long-term debt is strictly optimal when it can prevent a default today and in the future. Otherwise, buying back short-term debt is optimal and can prevent a default only today. The paper also investigates the choice of debt maturity structure of the sovereign in the presence of bailouts. I find that potential bailouts extend the sovereign’s borrowing capacity and make it rely more on debt with shorter maturities on average. As short-term debt is vulnerable to rollover crises, it generates more default risk. Eventually, the paper analyses how potential bailouts affect ex post welfare and studies ex ante welfare-improving policies. The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.

Using a data set covering about 277,000 firms across 79 countries over the period 2004-11, this paper examines the evolution of firms capital structure during the global financial crisis and its aftermath in 2010-11. The study finds that firm leverage and debt maturity declined in advanced economies and developing countries, even in countries that did not experience a crisis. The deleveraging and maturity reduction were particularly significant for privately held firms, including small and medium enterprises. For small and medium-size enterprises, these effects were larger in countries with less efficient legal systems, weaker information-sharing mechanisms, shallower banking systems, and more restrictions on bank entry. In contrast, there is weaker evidence of a significant decline of leverage and debt maturity among firms listed on a stock exchange, which are typically much larger than other firms and likely benefit from the spare tire of easier access to capital market financing.

The Lebanon Economic Monitor provides an update on key economic developments and policies over the past six months. It also presents findings from recent World Bank work on Lebanon. It places them in a longer-term and global context, and assesses the implications of these developments and other changes in policy on the outlook for Lebanon. Its coverage ranges from the macro-economy to financial markets to indicators of human welfare and development. It is intended for a wide audience, including policy makers, business leaders, financial market participants, and the community of analysts and professionals engaged in Lebanon.

This paper empirically examines the determinants of credit at different maturities across European Union countries during the last decade. The paper documents the lengthening of maturities since the early 2000s, and whether these patterns were driven by similar factors in advanced countries and in emerging market countries. Before the 2008 crisis, long-term credit expanded faster than short-term credit in most countries in the sample, and contracted less than short-term credit after 2008. The paper finds that domestic deposits and foreign liabilities were more important sources of funding in emerging market countries than in advanced countries. Moreover, trade openness and initial banking sector depth matter more for emerging market countries than for advanced countries.

How many and which firms issue equity and bonds in domestic and international markets, how do these firms grow relative to non-issuing firms, and how does firm performance vary along the firm size distribution? To evaluate these questions, a new data set is constructed by matching data on firm-level capital raising activity with balance sheet data for 45,527 listed firms in 51 countries. Three main patterns emerge from the analysis. (1) Only a few large firms issue equity or bonds, and among them a small subset has raised a large proportion of the funds raised during the 1990s and 2000s. (2) Issuers grow faster than non-issuers in assets, sales, and employment, that is, firms do not simply use securities markets to adjust their financial accounts. (3) The firm size distribution of issuers evolves differently from that of non-issuers, tightening among issuers and widening among non-issuers.

This paper proposes a theory of the fiscal foundations of inflation based on imperfect knowledge and learning. The theory is similar in spirit to, but distinct from, unpleasant monetarist arithmetic and the fiscal theory of the price level. Because the assumption of imperfect knowledge breaks Ricardian equivalence, details of fiscal policy, such as the average scale and composition of the public debt, matter for inflation. As a result, fiscal policy constrains the efficacy of monetary policy. Heavily indebted economies with debt maturity structures observed in many countries require aggressive monetary policy to anchor inflation expectations. The model predicts that the Great Moderation period would not have been so moderate had fiscal policy been characterized by a scale and composition of public debt now witnessed in some advanced economies in the aftermath of the 2007-09 global recession.

Swiss Confederation Ukraine has extensive public infrastructure inherited from the Soviet times but much of it has fallen into disrepair over the past decades and needs major rehabilitation or replacement so that growth may continue. Creating fiscal space for investing more is one of the critical tasks that facing the country, but a constrained fiscal space together with the use of investments as a stimulus for growth call for more efficiency in public investment management practices. There are a number of fundamental issues that need to be addressed if Ukraine is to make progress in its reform ambitions for public investment management (PIM). The most significant are: (1) most projects avoid scrutiny due to loopholes in classification (lack of definition of a public investment project); (2) there is no effective economic appraisal and appraisal review procedures in place due to limited human resource (HR) capacity, and no common technical standards; (3) the PIM system does not seem to block new projects from entering the budget but allows ministries to delay ongoing ones and squeeze in new ones; and (4) lack of strategic guidance with which to prioritize complicates project selection. One of the fundamental building blocks of a sound PIM system is a clear, legal definition of what counts as a public investment project and what does not. It should be pointed out that this already high discrepancy is only a comparative measure of input values. Developing projects that are output and performance driven should yield even greater efficiencies. Between 2000 and 2008, Ukraine was an average growth performer in a fast growing region, with gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging 7 percent. As the global financial crisis hit the Ukrainian economy it contracted by 15 percent in 2009, exposing its underlying macroeconomic and structural vulnerabilities. As a result of the insufficient structural transformation and impact of the economic crisis, Ukraine now faces substantial fiscal pressures that threaten economic stability and growth. The Government of Ukraine recognized the need for a modern public financial management (PFM) system and put considerable emphasis on several aspects of PFM reforms. Training for the development of capacity in the PIM system is tricky in Ukraine. It is becoming clear that due to the dynamic nature of the Ukrainian civil service, officials are rapidly moving from one area of the Administration to another.

Russia's economic growth slowed in the second quarter of 2011 as the inventory restocking cycle waned. High oil prices have kept the external current account in surplus but capital outflows continue. Gradually improving labor market conditions and access to credit and external borrowing are supporting domestic consumption but consumer confidence and external risks are constraining a more robust growth in domestic demand. Inflation is on a downward trend because of seasonal factors. The short-term fiscal situation is favorable mainly because of high oil prices with an almost balanced budget this year. But a large non-oil deficit requires concerted medium-term fiscal adjustment to replenish fiscal buffers and to move toward long-term sustainable levels of the non-oil deficit.

Russia has seen even higher oil windfall in the past few months, which translates into likely fiscal surpluses this year and next. The government should not miss the opportunity provided by a large oil windfall to substantially improve its long-term fiscal position, further reduce inflation, and, therefore, ensure a strong basis for durable stability and healthy growth in the future. Rising domestic demand and credit activity are increasingly supporting solid growth. Overall, labor market conditions improved recently while poverty was broadly flat during and after the crisis, but unemployment and poverty in many regions remain difficult. Further reductions in poverty will require greater policy focus and persistence in implementing more effective and targeted programs, especially in the poorest regions. Two new special-topic analyses focus on export diversification in Russia, and food and energy inflation in Europe and Central Asia region. In the first, results show that productivity is the key to exports and that lack of competition and entrepreneurial innovation are relevant obstacles to the emergence of new, potentially exportable products. In the second, it is shown that food and energy prices in Russia and other countries in Europe and Central Asia are contributing significantly to consumer price inflation, complicating anti-inflation policy and poverty reduction.

This paper examines how the scale and composition of public debt can affect economies that implement a combination of passive monetary policy and active fiscal policy. This policy configuration is argued to be of both historical and contemporary interest in the cases of the U.S. and Japanese economies. It is shown that higher average levels and moderate average maturities of debt can induce macroeconomic instability under a range of policies specified as simple rules. However, interest rate pegs in combination with active fiscal policies almost always ensure macroeconomic stability. This finding suggests that in periods where the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is a relevant constraint on policy design, a switch in fiscal regime is desirable.

In the post-global economic crisis environment, Vietnam's economy continues to grow at a reasonably rapid and stable rate. While the speed of global economic recovery has been uneven across the world, Asia as a region has done particularly well. And within Asia, Vietnam's growth performance continues to be impressive. As shown in left panel of, Vietnam was one of the fastest growing economies in the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region prior to the global economic crisis and has remained so in the post-crisis period as well1. After registering a real gross domestic product (GDP) growth of 5.3 percent in 2009, Vietnam's economy is expected to grow between 6.5-6.7 percent in 2010. Vietnam, like China, stands out not only for achieving a higher average growth rate but also a more stable growth path. This however has meant that the speed with which the Vietnam's economy is bouncing back from the lows of 2009 appears to be less impressive than countries that experienced negative growth last year. This edition of 'Taking Stock' a semi-annual publication from the World Bank attempts to understand the recent macroeconomic changes in Vietnam. It documents changes to the macroeconomic outcomes and policies with a view to inform policy discussions in the country. The analysis is mostly retrospective in nature, though discussions on prospective challenges and outlook are also briefly mentioned. Developments in the global economy in general and in the EAP region in particular are juxtaposed against Vietnam's own economic outcomes and policies to provide a more complete and nuanced picture of the issues.

India's economic performance in FY2009/10 shows that the recovery from the slowdown during the global financial crisis is well underway. India's Gross domestic Product (GDP) growth in FY2009/10 has beaten expectations by reaching 7.4 percent compared with 6.7 percent in the previous year. In particular, agricultural sector growth was better than feared with a slightly positive growth rate despite the worst monsoon shortfall in three decades. Strong growth in the fourth quarter pushed annual GDP growth to 7.4 percent in 2009-10. Fourth quarter growth reached 8.6 percent (y-o-y), the highest quarterly growth rate since the end of FY2007/08. The industrial sector's robust recovery beat expectations. Growth in the last quarter of fiscal year FY2009/10 was an unexpectedly high 13.3 percent resulting in over 12 percent growth in the second half of year, nearly double the 6 percent growth witnessed in the first half. Higher inflation mars the bright picture, but there are clear indications of moderation. Inflation as measured by the wholesale price index (WPI) averaged 10 percent during February-May 2010. India's recovery after the slowdown seems well underway. Growth is projected to climb to 8-9 percent in the next two years. These growth rates are achievable without a renewed build-up of inflationary pressure as long as agricultural growth returns to trend, infrastructure constraints are alleviated, and international prices remain stable. Over the next year, sources of growth will shift from fiscal stimulus to manufacturing and, possibly a recovering agriculture.

I analyze how lack of commitment affects the maturity structure of sovereign debt. Governments balance benefits of default induced redistribution and costs due to income losses in the wake of a default. Their choice of short- versus long- term debt affects default and rollover decisions by subsequent policy makers. The equilibrium maturity structure is shaped by revenue losses on inframarginal units of debt that reflect the price impact of these decisions. The model predicts an interior maturity structure with positive gross positions and a shortening of the maturity structure when debt issuance is high, output low, or a cross default more likely. These predictions are consistent with empirical evidence.

Public debt profiles have improved in Bolivia recently; in particular by extending the maturity structure and increasing the proportion of debt issued in domestic currency. This paper analyzes trends in public domestic debt in Bolivia since 2000, and the role of macroeconomic fundamentals and the debt management strategy adopted by the authorities. We analyze their role using transfer function models that suggest that both were critical in improving debt profiles, in particular the strengthening of the fiscal and international reserves positions, the recent appreciation of the Boliviano, and new prudential regulation that promotes the use of the latter. We also compare debt profiles with other countries in Latin America, and found that there is still room for improvement, both in terms of maturity structure and currency composition.

Using data from Germany this paper examines the direct effect of non-financial firms' use of short-term versus long-term liabilities. We develop a structural model of a firm's value maximization problem that predicts that profitability of the firm will change if firms alter their use of short-term versus long-term liabilities. We find that firms that rely more heavily on short-term liabilities are likely to be more profitable.

Capital account liberalization, it is fair to say, remains one of the most controversial and least understood policies of our day. One reason is that different theoretical perspectives have very different implications for the desirability of liberalizing capital flows. Another is that empirical analysis has failed to yield conclusive results. The answer, another influential strand of thought contends, is that this efficient-markets paradigm is fundamentally misleading when applied to capital flows. Limits on capital movements are a distortion. It is an implication of the theory of the second best that removing one distortion need not be welfare enhancing when other distortions are present.

This article analyzes how external crises spread across countries. The authors analyze the behavior of four alternative crisis indicators in a sample of 20 countries during three well-known crises: the 1982 debt crisis, the 1994 Mexican crisis, and the 1997 Asian crisis. The objective is twofold: to revisit the transmission channels of crises, and to analyze whether capital controls, exchange rate flexibility, and debt maturity structure affect the extent of contagion. The results indicate that there is a strong neighborhood effect. Trade links and similarity in pre-crisis growth also explain (to a lesser extent) which countries suffer more contagion. Both debt composition and exchange rate flexibility to some extent limit contagion, whereas capital controls do not appear to curb it.

Is there a role for debt beyond curing overaccumulation of capital? Does dynamic efficiency and the infeasibility of debt Ponzi schemes eliminate any Pareto-improving role for a government in a competitive economy with complete markets? Is there an optimal maturity structure of public debt? Using a stochastic Diamond OLG model, we tackle these questions. We show that government debt can Pareto-improve upon market allocations through a mechanism that resembles a Ponzi scheme. But instead of rolling over safe debt, we can interpret our scheme as one that rolls over an insurance contract generation for generation. This kind of dynamic risk-sharing can provide insurance against macroeconomic risk. Using the widespread welfare concept of interim Pareto optimality, we ensure that all generations voluntarily participate in our insurance scheme. Yet, the scheme cannot be replicated on capital markets. Exploiting information from the term structure of interest rates, we derive testable conditions both for dynamic efficiency and for interim Pareto optimality in terms of interest rates. We provide evidence that real world economies, while being dynamically efficient, are likely not to be interim Pareto optimal. We conclude that there may be a welfareimproving role for a well-designed maturity structure of debt.