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Large mammals often impose significant costs such as livestock depredation or crop foraging on rural communities, and this can lead to the retaliatory killing of threatened wildlife populations. One conservation approach—payments to encourage coexistence (PEC)—aims to reduce these costs through financial mechanisms, such as compensation, insurance, revenue sharing, and conservation performance payments. Little is known about the equitability of PEC, however, despite its moral and instrumental importance, prevalence as a conservation approach, and the fact that other financial tools for conservation are often inequitable. We used examples from the literature to examine the capability of PEC—as currently perceived and implemented—to be inequitable. We recommend improving the equitability of current and future schemes through the cooperative design of schemes that promote compensatory equity and greater consideration of conservation performance payments and by changing the international model for funding PEC to reduce global coexistence inequalities. New and existing programs must address issues of equitability across scales to ensure that conservation efforts are not undermined by diminished social legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents a first empirical assessment of carnivore conservation under a performance payment scheme. In Sweden, reindeer herder villages are paid based on the number of lynx ( lynx lynx) and wolverine ( gulo gulo) offspring certified on their pastures. The villages decide on the internal payment distribution. It is generally assumed that benefit distribution rules are exogenous. We investigate them as an endogenous decision. The data reveals that villages' group size has a direct negative effect on conservation outcomes and an indirect positive effect which impacts conservation outcomes through the benefit distribution rule. This result revises the collective action hypothesis on purely negative effects of group size. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New policy approaches to facilitate the co-existence of wildlife and livestock are needed for situations where predation incidents greatly impact households' income and retaliatory killing threatens endangered carnivore species' survival. In this paper, models are developed to assess how two alternative policy approaches impact a herder's decisions on carnivore hunting and livestock protection. We find that while the well-established ex-post compensation policy induces suboptimal livestock protection it can generate sufficient incentives for the herder to refrain from hunting so that the carnivore population reaches its socially optimal level. Performance payments are proposed as alternative policy. They are found not to distort livestock protection incentives and can also help achieve a socially optimal carnivore population level. Which of the two scheme types gives rise to less cost is ambiguous. An empirical analysis of the model with data from tiger-livestock conflicts in India is presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A case-control, quasi-experimental study was designed (post-test only) to investigate the effect of a performance- based incentive payment scheme on behaviours of public-sector service providers in delivering a basic package of maternal and child-health services in Egyptian primary healthcare units. The results showed significant improvements in the quality of family-planning, antenatal care, and child-care services as reported by women seen in clinics where the incentive payment scheme was in operation as measured by various indicators, including both technical and inter-personal communication content. An analysis of characteristics of the service providers and clients found no significant or meaningful differences between the study groups, and the facilities of both the study groups were essentially the same. Some findings are suggestive of other influences on behaviours of the service providers not captured by the data-collection instruments of the study. Subsequent to this study, the payment scheme has been rolled out to other districts in Egypt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]