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Based on nationally representative panel data (N person-years = 40,020; N persons = 18,704; Panel Labour Market and Social Security; PASS) from 2018 to 2022, we investigate how mental health changed during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. We employ time-distributed fixed effects regressions to show that mental health (Mental Health Component Summary Score of the SF-12) decreased from the first COVID-19 wave in 2020 onward, leading to the most pronounced mental health decreases during the Delta wave, which began in August 2021. In the summer of 2022, mental health had not returned to baseline levels. An analysis of the subdomains of the mental health measure indicates that long-term negative mental health changes are mainly driven by declines in psychological well-being and calmness. Furthermore, our results indicate no clear patterns of heterogeneity between age groups, sex, income, education, migrant status, childcare responsibilities or pre-COVID-19 health status. Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic appears to have had a uniform effect on mental health in the German adult population and did not lead to a widening of health inequalities in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How much did young people suffer from the COVID-19 pandemic? A growing number of studies address this question, but they often lack a comparison group that was unaffected by the pandemic, and the observation window is usually short. Here, we compared the 2-year development of life satisfaction of German high school students during COVID-19 (N  = 2,698) with the development in prepandemic cohorts (N  = 4,834) with a difference-in-differences design. We found a decline in life satisfaction in winter 2020/2021 (Cohen's d  = -0.40) that was approximately three times stronger than that in the general population and persisted until winter 2021/2022. Young people found some restrictions particularly burdensome, especially travel restrictions, bans on cultural events, and the closure of bars/clubs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Labour market, health, and wellbeing research provide evidence of increasing educational inequality as individuals age, representing a pattern consistent with the mechanism of cumulative (dis)advantage. However, individual life courses are embedded in cohort contexts that might alter life course differentiation processes. Thus, this study analyses cohort variations in education-specific life course patterns of subjective wellbeing (i.e. life, health and income satisfaction). Drawing upon prior work and theoretical considerations from life course theories, this study expects to find increasing educational life course inequality in younger cohorts. The empirical analysis relies on German Socio-Economic Panel data (1984–2016, v33). The results obtained from cohort-averaged random effects growth curve models confirm the cumulative (dis)advantage mechanism for educational life course inequality in subjective wellbeing. Furthermore, the results reveal substantial cohort variation in life course inequality patterns: regarding life and income satisfaction, the results indicate that the cumulative (dis) advantage mechanism does not apply to the youngest cohorts (individuals born between 1970 and 1985) under study. In contrast, the health satisfaction results suggest that educational life course inequality follows the predictions of the cumulative (dis)advantage mechanism only for individuals born after 1959. While the life course trajectories of highly educated individuals change only slightly across cohorts, the subjective wellbeing trajectories of low-educated individuals start to decline at earlier life course stages in younger cohorts, leading to increasing life course inequality over time. Thus, the overall findings of this study contribute to our understanding of whether predictions derived from sociological middle range theories are universal across societal contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The school‐to‐work transition is a demanding period during an individual's life course in all societies particularly because the educational decisions made during this period have long‐lasting consequences in multiple life domains. Moreover, adverse starting points after secondary school are likely to lead to adverse outcomes that might cumulate over the life course. This study analyses subjective well‐being during this sensitive period and examines the following two questions. First, how do different school‐to‐work transitions relate to subjective well‐being changes? Second, how does subjective well‐being develop during and after secondary schooling? As the school‐to‐work transition period is structured by gender, each analytical step aims to identify gender differences. Furthermore, based on life course theories, this study investigates whether adverse starting points after secondary school lead to cumulative effects in the development of subjective well‐being. Based on data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey and fixed effects regressions, our results reveal that transitions to employment increase subjective well‐being, while transitions to unemployment decrease subjective well‐being. Furthermore, transitions to study increase subjective well‐being only among men, while such transitions appear to decrease subjective well‐being among women. The results related to the development of subjective well‐being indicate that subjective well‐being decreases during secondary schooling and continues to decrease after individuals leave school. This decrease is stronger among men. Finally, our results reveal the negative cumulative effects of adverse starting points on the development of subjective well‐being. Overall, the results reveal great intra‐individual variation in subjective well‐being during the school‐to‐work transition period in Australia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This drop might be taken as a first indication that the subjective well-being of BIS recipients may have been negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. Keywords: COVID-19; welfare benefits; basic income support; subjective well-being; life satisfaction; inequality EN COVID-19 welfare benefits basic income support subjective well-being life satisfaction inequality 85 117 33 05/20/22 20220101 NES 220101 1 Introduction The COVID-19 pandemic dramatically affected social and economic life around the world. Methods In this study, we are interested in a relatively simple question: Does the COVID-19 pandemic affect BIS recipients' subjective well-being in a different way compared to that of non-recipients? 5 Discussion In this article, we investigated whether the COVID-19 pandemic increased social inequality between a group in Germany with great social disadvantages, BIS recipients, and the working-age population. [Extracted from the article]

School closings have been a key policy measure worldwide for reducing the spread of corona-virus disease (COVID-19). In Germany, federal states closed schools in mid-March and started to reopen them in late April. This policy potentially increased parental obligations for supervision and support during homeschooling and, thus, might reinforce social inequality in educational opportunities. Therefore, this research note investigates social inequality in students' homeschooling efforts. Moreover, it asks whether social disparities in home learning environments, social support, teacher support, and cost–benefit-related considerations account for the social differences in homeschooling efforts during the school closing period in Germany. To that end, we use data from an ongoing research project on high school students in their final years that were collected during the school closing period. Our results show pronounced differences in home schooling efforts by social background. Thus far, the mechanisms under study can explain only a moderate part of the social origin effect. In summary, the results show that school closings have the potential to exacerbate social inequality in educational opportunities. Therefore, future research should scrutinise the extent to which school closings reinforce inequality in educational opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Dropping out of post-secondary education has negative consequences for career progression. However, as human capital theory predicts and as previous studies have shown, having some training still pays off. For a large part of the European workforce who has attended vocational training, however, the theoretical predictions are less clear and empirical studies are scarce. In occupational labour markets, signalling and credentialism theories predict negative effects of dropping out. Furthermore, apprenticeship dropouts learn at different training firms, which differ in their influence on human capital development and the provision of job opportunities. Relying on a unique panel data set from Germany and estimating normalized fixed effects growth curve estimators, our study reveals the following results. First, the timing of dropping out structures career progression, as late dropouts have the highest employment rates and highest wages within the dropout population. However, in an occupational labour market setting, credentials and signals are still highly important for career progression, as the wage advantage of late dropouts within the dropout population is rather small, and late dropouts suffer a wage penalty when we compare their wage profiles to those of graduates. Second, our study emphasizes the importance of training firms, which influence the human capital development of individuals during the course of training and provide dropouts with connections to their first jobs. Thus, in occupational labour markets, the consequences of dropping out depend mainly on different mechanisms, as in other settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to theories of cumulative (dis-)advantage, inequality increases over the life course. Labour market research has seized this argument to explain the increasing economic inequality as people age. However, evidence for cumulative (dis-)advantage in subjective well-being remains ambiguous, and a prominent study from the United States has reported contradictory results. Here, we reconcile research on inequality in subjective well-being with theories of cumulative (dis-)advantage. We argue that the age-specific endogenous selection of the (survey) population results in decreasing inequalities in subjective well-being means whereas individual-level changes show a pattern of cumulative (dis-)advantage. Using repeated cross-sectional data from the European Social Survey (N  = 15,252) and employing hierarchical age-period-cohort models, we replicate the finding of decreasing inequality from the United States with the same research design for Germany. Using panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (persons = 47,683, person-years = 360,306) and employing growth curve models, we show that this pattern of decreasing inequality in subjective well-being means is accompanied by increasing inequality in intra-individual subjective well-being changes. This pattern arises because disadvantaged groups, such as the low educated and individuals with low subjective well-being show lower probabilities of continuing to participate in a survey and because both determinants reinforce each other. In addition to allowing individual changes and attrition processes to be examined, the employed multi-cohort panel data have further key advantages for examining inequality in subjective well-being over the life course: They require weaker assumptions to control for period and cohort effects and make it possible to control for interviewer effects that may influence the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although research provides causal evidence on the effects of COVID-19 lockdown measures on trust, causal effects of infection risks are missing. To contribute to increasing research on the societal consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, we estimate whether high incidence rates net of lockdown measures induce causal changes in social trust. We use representative household panel data from Germany and employ a difference-in-difference design. Although social trust increased during the first phase of the pandemic, the difference-in-difference analysis reveals that high incidences have a negative effect on social trust. We show that females drive this effect. The negative effect is especially large among highly educated women and women with poor pre-COVID-19 health. Overall, our results suggest that increasing incidences signal noncompliance of unknown others. Consequently, the overall positive trend might reverse in the medium and long run, leading to declines in social cohesion over the course of the pandemic., (© The Author(s) 2022.)

Background: Vaccines against COVID-19 play a prominent role in the policies enacted to combat the pandemic. However, vaccination rates are lowest among adolescents and young adults. Therefore, research on younger individuals is needed to provide a deeper understanding of social disparities and the motives behind vaccination intentions., Methods: This study draws on a sample (N = 4079) of German high school students and graduates. Based on cross-sectional data from March to July 2021 and linear regression models, which are conditioned on personality, risk preferences, and trust, the study analyses social disparities (i.e., gender, parental education and migration background) in vaccination intentions., Results: We do not find heterogeneity by gender. Individuals with low-educated parents and a migration background indicate below-average levels of vaccination intention. Differences in solidarity beliefs entirely explain the heterogeneity between individuals with low-educated parents and those with high-educated parents. While differences in beliefs explain a substantial part of the heterogeneity in vaccination intentions, cultural and monetary resources also constitute an important source of difference in vaccination intentions between individuals with and without a migration background. These results are important because our data indicate higher infection risks among individuals with a migration and low education background. Additionally, individuals from lower social origins and with migration backgrounds report higher levels of perceived burdens associated with COVID-19-related policies. The migration results differ between first- and second-generation migrants and by region of origin., Conclusion: Polarization in solidarity explains social gradients in vaccination intention. A solidarity narrative may not motivate a significant share of young individuals to be vaccinated., Competing Interests: The Authors declare that there is no conflict of interest., (© 2022 The Authors.)