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This paper explores the potential of elections to change our emotions and modify the relevance that voters assign to self-interest and group-identity issues. We examine this question by analyzing the 1998–2016 period of the Catalan and Basque regional elections. The analysis exploits that Basques pushed to leave Spain in the early 2000s, and Catalans pursued independence about fifteen years later. When the separatist goal emerges, two issues gain relevance. First, there is a significant rise of identity politics, associated with the territory's culture and language, to the detriment of other issues that traditionally explain vote choice, such as the left-right ideology, the degree of regional autonomy, or the economic discontent. Second, the territory becomes more divisive, big cities align against dominant separatist parties, and rural areas align with independentists. We conclude that material self-interests dilute and group-identity factors emerge to determine vote decisions in times of national dissolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2006.11.002 Byline: M. Socorro Puy Keywords: Tiebout economy; Redistribution; Sophisticated voting; Majority rule; Skill distribution Abstract: We study the extent to which, in a Tiebout economy, the exogenous distribution of skill across agents affects the compatibility between the redistributive policy and the residential decision. We propose a two-region economy where (i) each region's redistributive policy is elected by majority rule (where both cases, myopic and sophisticated voters, are considered), and (ii) each region's wage is endogenously determined by separated labor markets. We find that mobility and redistribution are compatible when either there is a low-skilled region where the median skilled agent is below the mean skill of the region, and/or when there is a high-skilled region where the median skilled agent is above the mean skill of the region. We provide examples of commonly used distribution functions that satisfy, or that fail to satisfy, the above properties. Author Affiliation: Universidad de Malaga, Spain Article History: Received 20 June 2006; Accepted 6 November 2006

This study analyzes the electoral incentives for redistributive income taxation when the incumbent strategically decides the degree of tax progressivity. Progressivity makes the median voter prefer more government spending, which induces left-wing incumbents to foster progressivity and right-wing incumbents to propose flat taxation. However, if (i) more progressivity reduces middle-income voters' fear of left-wing policies with respect to right-wing policies, (ii) parties' office holding incentives are high, and (iii) there is low uncertainty about the median voter, then left-wing incumbents opt for less-progressive taxation and right-wing incumbents opt for more progressive taxation. In addition, we show that voters' risk aversion over private consumption implies that right-wing incumbents propose more progressivity in comparison with left-wing incumbents proposing less progressivity. Our theoretical prediction can explain why, for example, Democrat Kennedy contributed to decreasing progressive taxation and Republican Bush contributed to increasing progressive taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study a model of competition between two political parties with policy compromise. There is a special interest group with well-defined preferences on political issues. Voters are of two kinds: impressionable and knowledgeable. The impressionable voters are influenced by the election campaigns. The objective of the parties is to obtain the maximum votes. Parties compete for financial support from a given interest group. Each party proposes a platform in exchange for an amount of campaign funds, and the interest group decides whether to accept or reject each of these proposals. We show that parties' competition resembles, to a certain extent, Bertrand competition. Furthermore, in equilibrium only one party gets funds from the interest group. This result differs from the one obtained in a similar model by Grossman and Helpman in which, in equilibrium, both parties are financed by the interest group. This difference arises because Grossman and Helpman assume that it is the interest group who makes the proposals to the political parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political economy occupies a unique place at the intersection of economics and political science, being an essential part of both disciplines, as well as an area that offers special insight into issues of continuing importance in public finance and policy. This article uses journal publications to rank institutions by research productivity in political economy. An incidental byproduct is a ranking of individual scholars. Ranking methodology is developed based on the established literature. Implications for the future evolution of political economy as an interdisciplinary field are suggested and discussed.. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers a report on the journal "American Economic Journal: Microeconomics" ("AEJ Micro") as of 2016. Topics include a list of peer reviewers for the journal, the editorial board of the journal, and the process of submission and review for manuscripts submitted to the journal. Statistics on articles published by the journal are presented.

The I Nations and Nationalism i Editorial Team warmly thank our reviewers for all their hard work during 2021. [Extracted from the article]

Presents an index of articles on public economic theory.