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This paper presents universal accessibility from a human rights perspective. This approach provides a comprehensive view of universal accessibility, which can be considered as a specific right or as part of the essential content of any right. Despite its self-evident justification, this right is not legally recognized.

ABSTRACT: This work gives an account of the meaning of the procedural adjustments mentioned in Article 13 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This is one of the contents of due process and it is included in the right of accessibility

In this paper I will reflect on sexual assistance, and I will discuss the possibility of shaping sexual assistance as a right. The question of whether sexual assistance is a right can have different answers depending on the framework we are in. We could fall within a purely legal framework, an ethical framework, or a combined framework such as the human rights context. From this point onwards, the question of whether sexual assistance is a right shall depend on the answer to the question regarding the nature of sexual assistance. Sexual assistance for persons that cannot perform sexual activities on their own body can be ethically justified by the theory of needs or by the notion of Instrumental Activities of Daily Living. It can also fall within sexual rights or within the right to choose a way of life.

Although there are different theories of human rights, it is possible to point out a series of features present in each and every one of them and that serve to speak of a standard theory of rights. In this paper I describe two different types of challenges that arise to this standard theory of rights. One of them moves into the interior of the theory and questions some of its features. At this point I will refer to the issues of the guarantor, of the freedom-security tension and of universality. The other great challenge questions the validity of human rights as a guide for the treatment of certain problems. At this point I will refer to the movements of people and new technologies. Both challenges, which are a sign of the historical character of human rights, force the discourse of rights to react and try to resolve them, even modifying some of the references that have characterized it.

The philosophy that stands behind a significant number of the regulatory changes underwent by disabilities in the last years is the one duly depicted by the social model of disability. Despite the relevance and appropriateness of the social model approach, when it comes to dealing with disabilities it is not a widely accepted model and it is not without its criticism. The criticism can be divided into two large groups. The first group unfolds from an approach foreign to rights; the second group comes from the inside of the rights discourse. On the other hand, the referents of the social, diversity and identity models, thoroughly discussed in specialized forums and duly embedded in different rules and regulations, have not found yet their application to society. The medical-care approach is mainstream in society. In this paper expose some of the criticisms of the social model and some of the reasons for this limited success

A historically marginalized and overlooked segment of the general population worldwide, persons with disabilities have long struggled with discrimination, inequality and even maltreatment. They have often been treated as societal outcasts and their disabilities treated as medical conditions that need to be “fixed” in order for the individual to join the rest of society. Throughout the last three decades, this approach has been steadily changing towards an inclusive model whereas persons with disabilities are recognized as a protected group of citizens who are due the same complete human rights as the general population. This change has become particularly evident with the United Nation’s approval of the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2006. However, the strides made by the approval of the CRPD are merely philosophical unless the rights recognized by the Convention can be defended by a court of law. This is where the importance of the ratification of the CRPD by member and observer states comes into focus. By ratifying the treaty in 2008, Qatar committed itself to a number of social and legal obligations. However, implementation of the CRPD in Qatar is dependent on a number of factors including political willingness, the abilities of the CRPD’s United Nations Follow-Up Committee, and the capacity to raise awareness among the public in Qatar. This paper looks into the traditional approaches taken towards persons with disabilities, the impact of the CRPD and the challenges faced by Qatar as it looks to implement the CRPD.

Based on the description of the situation of some social rights of persons with disability in Qatar, this article is aimed to highlight the need to address the protection of human rights from interdependence and indivisibility. The analysis of Qatar Law reveals that social protection alone is not sufficient guarantee of dignity, as would not be a system based exclusively on freedom as not interference. Although providing noteworthy resources for persons with disabilities along with a good level of social protection and health care, Qatar does not base its system on autonomy and inclusion and this is a shortcoming to move towards a human rights-based approach.

Equal rights for persons with disabilities is the ultimate goal mandated by the CRPD, and it can probably be gradually achieved in Qatar as steps are taken towards reconsidering the approach to disability at large. This paper examines what impact the CRPD has on the country’s legislation. To that end, we explore how the sensitive domains –health, education, employment, and justice– need to be re-evaluated in light of the CRPD, where recent improvements in the rights of persons with disabilities in Qatar can enable compliance and where the greater challenges lie. We maintain that although legal reforms are needed for Qatar to comply with CRPD, within existing legislation there is notable potential to accommodate particular amendments that could significantly assist the move towards CRPD compliance. We suggest some structural steps aimed at improving compliance, consisting of the establishment of specific institutions, the promotion of associations that represent persons with disabilities and, above all, advancement of a fundamental shift in the way disability is perceived by society, moving away from the old medical notion of disability with its focus on special features and rehabilitation and instead adopting the social model that mandates inclusion and equality.

From the continental law, this paper analyses the situation regarding the rights and fundamental freedoms of women with disabilities in Qatar. The analysis uses as the main reference, Article 6 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the General Comment that the CRPD Committee has made to this article. In this aspect, it tries to outline the difficulties that Qatar, as a State party, has in order to be able and take the very first steps towards a real inclusion for women with disabilities

En este trabajo voy a reflexionar sobre la cuestión de la asistencia sexual y su posible configuración como derecho. La contestación a la pregunta sobre si la asistencia sexual es un derecho puede variar dependiendo del marco en el que nos desenvolvamos. Así, podemos estar hablando desde un marco estrictamente jurídico, desde un marco ético, o desde un marco a caballo entre ambos como es el de los derechos humanos. A partir de aquí, la pregunta sobre si la asistencia sexual es un derecho dependerá de la pregunta sobre qué es la asistencia sexual. La justificación de la asistencia sexual en relación con personas que no pueden realizar actividad sexual sobre su propio cuerpo puede encontrar una justificación ética de la mano de la teoría de las necesidades o de la mano de las Actividades Básicas de la Vida Diaria, e igualmente puede formar parte de los derechos sexuales o del derecho a elegir una forma de vida.

The entry into force of the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities means that State Parties shall adapt their legislation and regulation to the social model designed in the international text. The present work aims to identify the general challenges faced by Qatar in that task. After presenting the keys to understanding the requirements of the Convention, the paper underlines the necessity of a cultural change in addition to a legal one. In this way, Qatar shares with other State Parties theoretical, legal, social and economic problems. Specifically, the current medical model in Qatar policies should be replaced with the conventional social model. This implies the elimination of discrimination based on disability, the universal accessibility, the legal capacity for persons with disabilities and their right to live independently. A priority is to generate an associative movement around disability.

Reasonable accommodation is one of the pillars upon which the recognition of the rights of people with disabilities rests. It acquires its full meaning when understood in connection with the concept of universal design, since both concepts fall within the framework of universal accessibility. An accurate understanding of reasonable accommodation requires, on the one hand, clarifying its connection with universal design and accessibility, and on the other, unraveling what “reasonable” means. The reasonableness in accommodation takes to three kinds of reflections. On the one hand the one concerning non-discrimination, which requires to assess, when examining whether the adjustment is justified or not, if it entails a violation of the principle of equality (since it differentiates or it does not, in an unjustified manner, thus harming a human right such as accessibility). In this justifying test there is an essential methodological tool at hand, which shall be regarded as the second great reflection on reasonableness in accommodation: the principle of proportionality. In virtue of this principle, the reasonableness test requires facing the adjustment’s adequacy and necessity and, in addition to that, the advantages or sacrifices that produces on rights. And since both of these reflections do not ensure a single answer, reasonableness requires a last reflection on the basis of acceptability. The adjustment’s justification, or the lack of it, shall be subject to the community’s acceptance or rejection.

Clearly, technical and scientific progress and moral progress do not necessarily go hand in hand. Therefore, this article encourages reflection on the new ethical challenges posed by such developments and, in particular, by robotics, a field that has developed greatly in recent decades and that has led to possibilities unimaginable until recently. Thus, the author examines here the so-called roboethics, its content, the specific fields it addresses –such as social relations and moral agency of robots–, as well as the different approaches and views on these issues.

In this brief work I will propose ten guidelines or criteria to assist in interpreting human and fundamental rights norms in a way that is correct (as much as is reasonable) and that is in line with the perspective of the constitutional court. To do so, I will work from a series of premises to help locate these guidelines within the context of a theory of interpretation. As might be expected, this theory is itself based on a theory of law. In what follows, I will provide an account of some of the characteristic dimensions of the interpretation of rights norms. Finally I will present the ten guidelines that in fact constitute what I have elsewhere termed as main criteria of interpretation.