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We study the effect of women’s education on fertility and children’s health during a period of gender equalization and women’s greater access to economic opportunities. In 1980, Spain raised the minimum working age from 14 to 16, while the compulsory education age remained at 14. This reform changed the within-cohort incentives to remain in the educational system. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the reform delayed fertility but did not impact the completed fertility of affected women. We also show that the reform was detrimental to the health of the children of affected mothers at delivery. We document two channels for this adverse effect: the postponement in the entrance of motherhood and the deterioration of mothers’ health habits (such as smoking and drinking). However, in the medium run, these more educated mothers reverse the adverse health shocks at birth through maternal vigilance and investment in their children’s health habits. Jiménez-Martín gratefully acknowledges the support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities (MICINN) through PID2020- 114231RB-I0 and from Spanish National Research Agency (AEI) through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics CEX2019-000915-S), Cabrales acknowledges support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities (MICINN) through PID2021- 126892NB-I00, from MICIN/AEI/10.13039/501100011033, Spain through the María de Maeztu Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D CEX2021-001181-M and from Comunidad de Madrid, Spain through EPUC3M11 (V PRICIT), and Bellés-Obrero acknowledges support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) through CRC TR 224 (Project A02).

Data de publicació electrònica: 13 de febrer de 2023 We exploit a country-wide child labor regulation that eliminated the difference in school/work alternatives for children born at the beginning and the end of the year to identify the causal effect of education on migration at low levels of schooling. By not relying on changes to the school system, we are more confident that our results are not driven by unobserved changes in school quality evolving differentially across regions. The results of a difference-in-differences methodology combined with an exploration of maternal characteristics and a regression discontinuity design suggest that internal migration hardly changed after the reform. A consideration of the external validity of this finding is also provided. Jorge González Chapela acknowledges financial support from the Government of Aragón, grant S32-20R. Sergi Jiménez-Martín acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, proyecto PID2020-114231RB-100. Judit Vall Castello acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, proyecto PID2021-126652NB-I00.

Uno de los retos de la política económica para los próximos años será el aumento de la participación laboral de los trabajadores de edad avanzada. Por ello es muy importante entender bien las posibles conexiones entre los incentivos que proporcionan las distintas políticas de seguro ofrecidas tanto a los jubilados como a los trabajadores empleados y desempleados de edad avanzada. Encontramos que una versión simplificada de la reforma de pensiones de 2011 (sin jubilación anticipada a los 61 ni jubilación parcial) es capaz de contener el gasto en pensiones (entre el 20 y el 30 por ciento) y posponer sustancialmente la salida del mercado laboral (aumento del volumen de empleo a lo largo de ciclo vital en torno al 1-2 por ciento). Finalmente, analizamos una reforma que, además de los elementos de la reforma simplificada de 2011, permite compatibilizar empleo y pensión y aumenta el premio a pedir la pensión después de los 67. Esta reforma permite aumentar (como producto de la acción voluntaria de los agentes) la fuerza laboral entre 1-2 por ciento sin afectar a las finanzas del sistema de pensiones, que podrían mejorar hasta un 2% adicional. One of the challenges of economic policy for the coming years will be to increase the labor force participation of older workers. It is therefore very important to understand the possible connections between the incentives provided by different insurance policies offered both retirees and workers employed and unemployed elderly. We find that a simplified version of the Spanish pension reform of 2011 (no early retirement at 61 or partial retirement) is capable of containing pension expenditure (between 20 and 30 percent) and substantially delay the exit from the labor market (increased volume of employment along the life cycle around the 1-2 percent). Finally, we discuss a reform that, in addition to simplified elements of the reform of 2011, allows claiming while keeping work and increases the premium to posponed retirement beyond 67. This reform can increase (as a result of the voluntary action of the agents) workforce between 1-2 percent without affecting the finances of the pension system, which could improve by up to 2%.