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The literature on collective action has poorly addressed processes of incremental institutional changes within organizations. This paper helps fill this gap by shedding light on how the community-based management of an organic label has changed following its formal recognition as a ‘participatory guarantee system’ (PGS). Ostrom and Basurto's (2011) analytical tool is useful to describe the changes in collective rules to address collective action problems that take place in standard-setting and labeling activities. Using original data collected from the Ecovida Agroecology Network – the oldest and largest PGS in Brazil –, we study the multi-scale changes in governance rules from the 1970s until today. We pay particular attention to the links between the institutional consolidation of PGS, its recognition by public authorities, and its adaptation to legal rules. We detail analytical operators indicating whether the introduction of the PGS rules at the national level was bottom-up or top-down. Our findings emphasize how local communities have been able to both adapt their governance system in response to the official arrangements concerning organic regulations, and influence national public arenas where these arrangements are defined. This form of co-management has been accompanied by a significant increase in the number of PGS-certified farmers.

International audience; The concept of commons is part of the long history of the Moroccan peasantry. Traditionally, many natural resources, such as water for irrigation, collective lands and common pastures or the forests were governed by community principles derived from customary rules, like in the 'agdal' system for example. However, these collective systems have been greatly weakened over the years. Firstly, these organisations, inherited from the traditional hierarchical system of local politics, had produced sometimes unjust and inefficient systems of resource distribution to the advantage of the most powerful. Secondly, rural communities were From rural to urban areas: new trends and challenges for the commons in Morocco Recto running head : THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES Verso running head : B. ROMAGNY ET AL.

International audience; What are the main drivers and bottlenecks that shape the development of the organic sector in Africa? Which factors can support an organic transition in Africa? In this paper, we hypothesize that in order to scale up organic agriculture, food system actors must engage not only in technological innovations in production and processing, but also in institutional innovations. A change in scale means here an increased geographical presence and organizational capacity, distributed and autonomous activities, and a strong movement to share experiences across Africa. By institutional innovations, we mean new rules of exchange for fair and inclusive markets, new technologies and practices to guarantee organic quality, and innovative public policies. Based on three national cases (Uganda, Tanzania, Morocco), we propose a methodology to explore the potential synergies among these three types of institutional innovations.

International audience; AbstractFair trade (FT) schemes claim to improve food security by generating economic gains for certified households. Previous research has shown that FT-certified households may benefit from higher prices and incomes. However, little attention has been paid to the implications of FT for food security. In this paper, we use qualitative data, cross-sectional household surveys conducted among coffee-growing households in Peru and matching econometric methods to investigate whether economic gains resulting from FT are enough to ensure food security for farming households. Results show that although FT increased the return from certified coffee (prices, production, yields and net return), the extent of the food insecurity facing FT participants remained unchanged. Our qualitative results suggest that farming households use the additional income they receive from FT to pay for their children’s higher education as a long-term non-farm investment. This leakage effect raises the question of the effect of FT in the medium and long term from a rural development perspective.

Institutional change and diversity have been two major topics of debate in contemporary social sciences. At the core of this debate are actors’ skills to manage the institutional frame that defines limits and possibilities for their strategies. This article analyses how social movements produce institutional change and diversity in the organic food market. It contrasts the experiences of Participatory Guarantee Systems created by Nature & Progres (France) and Ecovida Agroecology Network (Brazil) to reframe the institutional order of the organic market. Results demonstrate that, while the conventional third-party certification remains the dominant institutional frame, there is space for competing schemes. However, the relevance of the alternatives depends both on the characteristics of the institutional order historically shaped in each context, and on the skills social movements possess to face the interests of the dominant actors. In this way, the article demonstrates that, in comparison to Nature & Progres, Ecovida has been a more skillful movement because of its closer connection with other social movements and state actors, compelling Brazil to produce an institutional frame more open to diversity than that found in France.

PurposeThis paper investigates the incentives to coffee farmers to participate in certification schemes that require improved agricultural practices.Design/methodology/approachThe authors ran a choice experiment among 250 Brazilian coffee farmers in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil.FindingsThe authors’ findings show that both cash and non-cash payments are likely to incentive farmers' participation in a certification scheme. Besides price premium, incentives as long-term contracts and provision of technical would encourage producers to adopt eco-certification schemes. Our results also suggest that non-cash payments may be appropriate substitutes to a price premium to some extent.Research limitations/implicationsThe large coffee producers are over-represented in our sample compared to the population of Brazilian coffee farms. However, it seems reasonable to focus on these producers, as they are usually the ones who individually adopt strategies, since small farmers are induced by collective strategies (e.g. cooperatives).Social implicationsThe result regarding technical assistance makes sense given that Brazilian farmers generally have poor access to rural extension services.Originality/valueWe contributed in the literature about adoption of sustainable agriculture practices analyzing the requirements and motivations for farmer participation in certification schemes. We also contribute private and public strategies to encourage the adoption of sustainable practices.

Digital innovations are central to the transformation of food systems, from production and processing through to distribution. While they have the potential to enhance environmental and social sustainability across the value chain, they could also have disruptive effects on organisations and come with huge uncertainties in terms of access to these technologies, working conditions ('Uberisation') and governance. This chapter aims to briefly address the challenges associated with the diffusion of these technologies in developing countries. We focus on the examples of digital agriculture and blockchains.

Since the 1980s, liberalization policies have profoundly altered the economic and institutional contexts in which agricultural producers operate. As a consequence, some of the older forms of collective action, dating from a period when their autonomy and room for manoeuvre were restricted because of State interventions and political ideologies, have been called into question. And yet, liberalization has brought with it a period in which collective action is all the more necessary in order to meet the challenges of a more unpredictable and competitive economic environment. To the traditional issues of economies of scale, bargaining power within value chains, and reduction of transaction costs can now be added those of ensuring sustainable development at the various levels of the agri-chain. Collective action is thus marked by a variety of empirical forms and initiatives of actors that fall more or less in line with the policies that support them. Economic and social inclusion remains a strategic focus to be achieved through participatory inclusion mechanisms, innovation platforms, and mechanisms for cooperation and joint decision making between actors on the basis of information sharing. New mechanisms in which collective action plays a key role are now required in order to respond to environmental and health issues and to meet the new attributes of quality that the consumer now demands. The relative ineffectiveness of collective action in the agrifood sectors in countries of the South is due to the inadequate institutional framework and the weak rule of law, which limit the capacity of organized producers to enforce rules internal to their organization and also those regulating their relationships with other actors of the value chains.

Certification and ecolabelling are forms of private governance meant to reflect sustainable development issues. These instruments encourage ‘good’ environmental and social practices, many of which are akin to climate change mitigation and adaptation approaches. To make it clear how effective they can be in that role, we present them here, recalling that they are at once standards for best practices, by definition supposed to inform and guide stakeholders’ choices, and market incentives (bonuses, minimum prices, etc.) to change production practices. Despite their advantages, voluntary sustainability standards are proving to be ambiguous tools for meeting the challenges of climate change.

International audience; In Turkey, the Wholesale Markets Law was enacted in 1995 to facilitate small-scale growers’ access to the fresh produce market. Cooperatives and commission agents have thus become the main marketing structures available to small-scale fresh produce growers, to supply supermarkets and comply with their new requirements. In this paper, we question the advantages and disadvantages that confront small farmers with respect to those marketing structures to allow for market matching or quality upgrading. Drawing on ownership and transaction cost arguments, we use an analytical framework to identify and compare the costs of these marketing organizations. Based on data collected through a large number of interviews with stakeholders, we show that commission agents and credit cooperatives tend to be more efficient than traditional cooperatives as regards sales performance and decision costs. However, the lack of apparent competition between commission agents does not allow for sufficient provision of incentives for producers to invest in high-quality production. Consequently, credit cooperatives are the only structure progressively turning to strategies of quality upgrading and supermarket supply. The flipside of such strategies is that they may lead to the marginalization of small-scale farmers.

Publication Inra prise en compte dans l'analyse bibliométrique des publications scientifiques mondiales sur les Fruits, les Légumes et la Pomme de terre. Période 2000-2012. http://prodinra.inra.fr/record/256699; International audience; A wide range of empirical studies show the extent to which the rise of supermarkets in developing countries transforms domestic marketing channels. In many countries, the exclusion of small producers from so-called dynamic marketing channels (that is, remunerative ones) has become a concern. Based on data collected in Turkey in 2007 at the producer and the wholesale market levels, we show that intermediaries are important to understanding the impact of downstream restructuring (supermarkets) on upstream decisions (producers). Results show first that producers are not aware of the final buyer of their produce, because intermediaries hinder the visibility of the marketing channel, thereby restricting a producer’s choice to that of the first intermediary. Econometric results show that producers who are indirectly linked to the supermarkets are more sensitive to their requirements in terms of quality and packaging than to the price premia compensating the effort made to meet standards. Therefore, the results lead us to question the role of the wholesale market agents who act as a buffer in the chain and protect small producers from negative shocks, but who stop positive shocks as well, and thereby reduce incentives.

Urban development is one of the main features of socioeconomic change familiar to developing countries: it presents the problem of increasing the food supply to respond to the food requirements of the urban consumers (Dury et al. 1999). Although peri-urban agriculture provides favourable conditions for the intensification of production systems, there is little work on the subject which applies particularly to banana. We propose to do this for the peri-urban agriculture of Yaoundé (1.4 million inhabitants), the capital of Cameroon, situated in the Central province.